THE TAITTIRIYA UPANISHAD
With Commentaries

By MAHADEVA SHASTRI 1903
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The Taittiriya-Upaniṣad is so called because of the recension (sakha) of the Krishna Yajurveda to which it is appended. It is the most popular and the best-known of all the Upaniṣads in this part of the country, where the majority of the Brahmmins study the Taittiriya recension of the Yajurveda, and it is also one of the very few Upaniṣads which are still recited with the regulated accent and intonation which the solemnity of the subject therein treated naturally engenders. The Upaniṣad itself has been translated by several scholars including Prof. Max Muller; and the latest translation by Messrs. Mead and J.C. Chattopadhyaya, of the Blavatsky Lodge of the Theosophical Society, London, is the most 'soulful' of all, and at the same time the cheapest. A few words, therefore, are needed to explain the object of the present undertaking.

Sankaracharya and Suresvaracharya are writers of highest authority belonging to what has been now-a-days marked off as the Advaita school of the Vedānta. Every student of the Vedānta knows that the former has written commentaries on the classical Upaniṣads, on the Bhagavad-Gita, and on the Brahma sutras, besides a number of manuals and tracts treating of the Vedānta Philosophy, while among the works of the latter, which have but recently seen the light, may be mentioned:—

1. the Brihadaranyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya Vārtika,
2. the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya-Vārtika,
3. the Manasollāsa,
4. the Praṇava-Vārtika,¹
5. the Naishkarmya-siddhi.

The first four of these are professedly commentaries on Sankaracharya’s works, while the last is an independent manual dealing with some fundamental questions of the Vedānta.

As the subject is treated of in the Brihadaranyaka Upaṇiṣad from different standpoints of view and in great detail, it is the one Upaṇiṣad, in commenting on which Sankaracharya evidently seeks to present an exhaustive rational exposition of the Vedic Religion by fully explaining every position as it turns up and examining it from several points of view, whereas in his commentaries on other Upaniṣads Tie contents himself with merely explaining the meaning of the texts and showing, only where necessary, how they support his advaita doctrine as against the other doctrines which seek the support of the Upaniṣads. It is certainly for this reason that Suresvaracharya, who undertook to explain, improve, amplify and supplement the teachings of Sankaracharya, thought fit to further expound the latter’s commentary on the Brihadaranyaka Upaṇiṣad. This exposition forms the colossal work known as the Brihadaranyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya Vārtika, which is held to be of no less authority than the bhāṣya itself and is more frequently cited by later writers on all knotty points of Advaita, as expounding its philosophy with greater precision. Much need not be said here as to Suresvaracharya’s marvelous power of exposition, since the readers of this series have been made familiar with it through the Manasollasā, which is only a condensed statement of the first principles of the system as developed in the commentary on the Upaniṣad and of the main lines of argument on which he proceeds to establish them.

Not quite so exhaustive, however, is either Sankaracharya’s or Suresvaracharya’s commentary on the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad. The only reason for the latter’s writing a vārtika on the bhāṣya of the

¹ The Manasollasā and the Praṇava-Vārtika, the two smallest works of Suresvara-cārya, havu been made accessible to the English-reading public in the “Minor Upauishads ” Vol. II. issued in this (The Vedic Religion) Series.
Upaṇiṣad seems to me to have been the high importance of this classical Upaṇiṣad as exclusively treating, among other things, of the five Kośas (sheaths of the Self).

As the doctrine of the Kośas is the pivotal doctrine of the Vedānta on its theoretical as well as its practical side, students of the Vedānta should be thoroughly familiar with it before proceeding further in their studies. Accordingly, in an attempt to present to the English-reading public the Vedānta Doctrine as expounded by the two great teachers, it is but proper first to take up the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad.

As though to make up for the want of that thoroughness in Sankaracharya's and Suresvaracharya's commentaries on the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad which is so characteristic of their commentaries on the Brihadranyaka, Sayana (or Vidyāranya, as some would have it), that prolific scholiast on the Vedic literature, has written a commentary on the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad which is at once thorough and lucid. Though in interpreting the original text of the Upaniṣad Sayana differs slightly here and there from Sankaracharya, he follows the great teacher very closely on all points of doctrine, and quotes profusely from the writings of the two great leaders of the school. In fact, Sayana's Introduction to the study of the Upaniṣads is, as its readers are aware, made up of long extracts from the Vārtikasara, a lucid digest of Suresvaracharya's Vārtika on the Brihadranyaka-Upaniṣad. Into his exposition of the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad, Sayana introduces, in appropriate places and in a concise form, the various discussions embodied in the Vedānta-sutras, so that by studying this exposition the reader is sure to obtain a comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedāntasutras and a fair insight into the true relation between the Sutras and the Upaniṣads.

The work now presented to the public contains a literal translation of the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad, and of Sankaracharya's and Sayana's commentaries thereon. Of Sayana’s commentary, only such portions and they are very rare are omitted as are mere repetitions of Sankaracharya’s commentary. Suresvaracharya’s vārtika is in many places especially in the Sikṣa-valli a mere repetition of the bhāṣya; and therefore it is only where the vārtika explains the bhāṣya or adds to it something new, that the vārtika has been translated. A few notes have been extracted from Anandagiri’s (or, more properly, Anandajiṇana’s) glosses on the bhāṣya and on the vārtika. I have also added some notes of my own where they seem most necessary.

The Sanskrit Text of the Upaniṣad is given in Devanagari, followed by the English rendering of the Upaniṣad printed in large type (pica). Then follows the English rendering of Sankaracharya’s commentary printed in a smaller type (small pica). The English translation of Sayana’s Commentary as well as the notes from Suresvaracharya’s Vārtika and Anandagiri’s Tika are given in a still smaller type (long primer), these notes being marked (S.) or (A.) or (S. & A.) as the case may be. Some of the foot-notes which have been taken from the Vanamala (Achyuta Krishnananda swamin’s gloss on the bhāṣya) are marked off as (V).

A. MAHADEVA SASTRI.
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SANKARACHARYA'S INTRODUCTION.

From whom is born the whole universe, in whom alone it is dissolved, and by whom alone is this upheld, — to that Self who is Consciousness be this bow!

I bow ever to those Gurus by whom all these Upaniṣads have been explained heretofore, who have explained all words and sentences as well as all kinds of proof.

For the benefit of those who wish to have a clear view of the essence of the Taittiriyaka, has the following commentary been got up by me by the grace of the Teacher.

Brahma-vidyā the specific theme of the Upaniṣad.

In the former section² were made known the obligatory acts, nityāni karmāṇi, intended for the eradication of sins already incurred, as well as kāmyāni karmāṇi, those acts by which to secure some specific objects, and which are intended for the benefit of those who seek those objects.

Now the Śruti commences Brahma-vidyā with a view to remove the cause which leads one to have recourse to works (karma.) Desire (kāma) must be the cause of works, because it is desire that urges one to work. In fact, activity is there where desire is. Indeed, no activity arises in those who have attained all desires, inasmuch as they rest in their own Self when there is no desire. When one seeks for Atman, the Self, then one has attained all desires. And the Self is Brahman. The Śruti, indeed, speaks of the knower of Brahman attaining the Supreme End. Wherefore, one is said to attain the supreme end when one abides in one's own Self, on the removal of avidyā or ignorance of the nature of Brahman, as the Śruti declares in such passages as the following:

"He attains the Fearless, the firm abode" (Tait Up. 2:7:1)

"He unites with this blissful Self." (Tait. Up. 2:8:1)

The Upaniṣad imparts knowledge concerning the Thing in Itself; for, that knowledge alone can put an end to the desires which lead one to have recourse to works.

Bondage is caused by desire, and liberation by absence of desire, as taught by the Śruti with particular care in the following passages:

“As his desire, so is his resolve; as his resolve, so his work; as his work, so his reward. But he who does not desire, who has no desires, who is beyond desire, whose desires have been attained, whose object of desire is ātman, his sense-organs do not depart. Being the very Brahman, he attains to Brahman.” (B.A.Up 4-4-5-6)

False conception regarding the Thing in Itself, — which is in fact devoid of all duality, which is ever none other than ātman, our own Self, — is due to ignorance of Its real nature. False conception gives rise to desires, and these lead to action. How can action, which thus arises from ignorance of

² i.e, in the section [of the Vedas] termed Brāhmaṇas, and which enjoins works. The works here enjoined are not intended to secure mokṣa; for, the Śrutī: “ By Dharma one wards off sin,” declares that they are intended to destroy sins already incurred. Even Jaimini, who commences his Karma-mīmāṃsa with the aphorism:— “ Now then commences an enquiry into Dharma”, excludes all inquiry into the Thing in Itself; so that this specific theme of the Upanishad has not been dealt with in the section which treats of works, i.e., of things that are to be brought into existence by effort. The ritualistic section of the Veda treats not only of the works above referred to, which one is bound to do so long as one lives, but also of those which are intended to secure objects of desire pertaining to this world or the next. Neither among these acts are there any intended to secure mokṣa, inasmuch as the (Śrutī does not enjoin any of them as a means thereto; whereas it expressly enjoins them as a means of securing worldly ends. The works enjoined in the ritualistic section of the Veda thus serve to secure such things as fall within the limits of samsāra or mundane existence.
ātman, ever co-exist with the knowledge of ātman. Therefore, knowledge of ātman is quite an effective antidote to all activities.

**Doctrine of Salvation by works alone.**

(Mimāmsaka’s objection):— Interested (kāmya) and forbidden (pratiśiddha) acts being avoided, the fruits of ārābha — the karma whose fruits are being reaped in the present birth — being exhausted by enjoyment, all sins of omission being warded off by the performance of obligatory duties, without any effort all one can attain mokṣa, which consists in dwelling in one's own Self.4

Or, it may be that, karma (Vedic ritual) being the means to the unsurpassed pleasure spoken of as svarga4 mokṣa is secured by means of karma alone.

Thus, the soi-disant Mimāmsakas hold that he who seeks mokṣa should resort to karma, and that for him no such thing as knowledge of ātman is necessary.

**No Salvation by works alone.**

(Brahmavādin’s answer):— Not so. It is indeed quite possible that innumerable karmas generated in the innumerable past births and productive of opposite effects exist, those which have already begun their effects as well as those which have not. Wherefore, since such of the karmas as have not yet begun their effects cannot be exhausted in this one birth by way of enjoying their fruits, there cannot but be another birth brought about by the residual karma. The existence of such residual karma is declared in hundreds of passages in the śruti and the smṛti, such as the following: —

"Among them, those of good conduct here soon attain to a good womb." (Ch.Up 5:10:7)

“Then, on returning to this world, he obtains, by virtue of the remainder of merit, birth in a distinguished family ..........” (Ap. Dh.S. 2:2:3)

Moreover, the fruits of brahmanicide and of the Asvamedha or horse-sacrifice are so opposed to each other that the fruits of both cannot be reaped in one and the same birth. On the other hand, they have to be reaped in two different bodies, one quite Tasmic and other quite Sattvic. Further, in the Dharma-śāstras, in the treatises on civil and religious law, it is said that the effect of even one karma done here runs through at least seven births. It needs no saying that innumerable karmas must give rise to innumerable births.

(Mimāmsaka):— Nitya or obligatory rites are intended to destroy good and evil karmas which have not yet begun their effects.6

(Brahmavādin):— No, because sin (pratyavāya) is said to accrue from their omission. Sin (pratyavāya) indeed means something evil,7 and it being admitted that the obligatory rites are

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3 There existing no cause which can give rise to another birth.

4 This theory assumes that all past karma combines together and gives rise to one birth, and that the fruits of the whole of that past karma can be exhausted in that one birth alone without any residual karma being left which may give rise to more births in the future.

5 According to the Mimamsaka, ‘svarga’ means unsurpassed pleasure; and this unsurpassed pleasure can accrue in no other state than that of mokṣa or disembodied state. Therefore, according to the Mimamsaka, the Śruti teaches that the vedic ritual such as jyotiśoma, which is said to be the means of attaining svarga, is the only means to mokṣa, the state of disembodied spirit.

6 Now the Mimamsaka argues, admitting the existence of sanchita-karma, that portion of the past karma which has not yet begun its fruits.
intended to avoid the coming evil, i.e., the sin of omitting the obligatory duties, they are not intended for the destruction of the anārabdha-karma, that portion of the past karma which has not yet begun its effect. Even granting that the nitya or obligatory rites are intended for the destruction of anārabdha-karma, even then they can destroy the impure deed alone, but not the pure one, which is unopposed to it. Indeed, since the karma which is productive of good is a pure one, it cannot be opposed to the nitya or obligatory acts. Properly speaking, it is a pure act and an impure one which are opposed to each other.

Moreover, in the absence of knowledge, karma in its entirety can never be exhausted, since then, in the absence of knowledge, those desires which give rise to karma cannot cease. In fact desires spring up in him who knows not ātman, the Self, inasmuch as they aim at results which are external to the Self. Desire can never arise with reference to one’s own Self, as He is ever present; and it has been said that ātman Himself is the Supreme Brahman.

Further, omission of nitya-karma is purely negative; and no sin, which is a positive effect, can ever arise from a mere negative circumstance. Wherefore, omission of obligatory duties is a mere sign indicative of the existence of an evil tendency resulting from sins accumulated in the past. Thus we are not at a loss to explain the force of the present participle in the following passage:

“Omitting the prescribed act, or performing the forbidden act, or being addicted to sensual enjoyments, man will fall.”

Otherwise we would be led to conclude that a positive effect springs out of a mere negative fact, a conclusion which is opposed to all evidence. Wherefore it does not stand to reason that, without any special effort, one will abide in one’s own Self.

As to the contention that, the unsurpassed pleasure termed svarga being caused by karma, mokṣa is produced by karma, (we reply) it cannot be; for, mokṣa is eternal. Indeed, what is eternal cannot be produced. In our ordinary experience we find that what is produced is impermanent. Therefore mokṣa is not a thing produced by karma.

**No Salvation by works associated with Contemplation.**

(Objection):— *Karma* associated with *Vidyā* (contemplation) has the power of producing what is eternal.

(Answer):— No, because of a contradiction. It is a contradiction in terms to say that what is eternal is produced.

By induction we infer the general law that what is produced is impermanent. It having been thus ascertained that impermanency is in the nature of all born things, Vidyā can never alter it.

(Objection):— What has been destroyed is not itself again born. Thus, like the pradhvamsābhava non-existence of a thing, known as destruction, mokṣa is eternal and is yet produced.

(Answer):— No because mokṣa is positive.

To explain: we mean that no positive result of an act, such as a pot, unlike the mere negative result, such as the destruction of a thing, is ever found eternal in our experience. If mokṣa be a positive result of an act, it must also be impermanent.

We have so far assumed that the result of an act can be purely negative, such as the destruction of a thing. Properly speaking, the result of an act cannot be merely negative.

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7 i.e. the effect of sinful acts — (sur); the coming evil — (A)
8 Manu XI. 44. The last line has been rendered according to Ānandagiri’s reading. According to some of the published editions it must be rendered as follows: “Man must perform a penance.”
When a pot is said to have been destroyed, we have potsherds produced, — which is a positive result; and these potsherds are no doubt as impermanent as the pot itself. No mere ābhāva or absence of a thing being ever the result of an act, it is a mere play upon words to say that it is produced by an act. All effects, such as the pot, ever inhere in clay etc., either manifested or latent, as attributes of the substances, but never in the mere non-existence (ābhāva). Mere non-existence (ābhāva) cannot be related to an act or a quality. Imaginary in itself, it can never be related to any other thing.

It is therefore a mere verbal quibble to speak of ābhāva as if it were a thing in itself, just as it is a verbal quibble to speak of the body of a stone-image. So the Bāṣyakāra says:

To say that pradhvamsābhāva, non-existence of a thing known as destruction, is produced is only a verbal quibble, inasmuch as nothing specific can be predicated of non-existence. Non-existence is indeed only the negative of existence. Just as existence, though one and the same throughout, is yet distinguished by cloth, pot, and so on, e.g., we speak of the existence of a cloth, the existence of a pot, and so on, so also, though ābhāva or non-existence is in itself devoid of all distinctions, yet it is spoken of as different and in association with different acts or qualities as though it were a substance etc. Non-existence cannot indeed, co-exist with attributes as the blue lotus co-exists with its attributes. If it were possessed of attributes, then it would come under the category of bhāva or being.

(Objection):— The agent concerned in Vidyā and Karma, wisdom and works, being eternal, mokṣa which is the result of a continuous current of Vidyā and Karma is also eternal like the Gangetic current.

(Answer):— No; for, agency is painful. On the cessation of agency, mokṣa ceases.

Wherefore mokṣa consists in dwelling in one’s own Self on the cessation of avidyā and kāma, on account of which one resorts to karma. Ātman, the Self, is Brahman; and since a knowledge of Him leads to the cessation of avidyā, the Upaṇiṣad which treats of Brahma-vidyā forms a subject of special study.

No cessation of avidyā can ever be brought about except by Brahma-vidyā, knowledge of Brahman. Accordingly we should understand that, for the attainment of this knowledge, the Upaṇiṣad should be studied. This vidyā alone serves to destroy avidyā or ignorance, and it concerns none other than ātman, our own Self.

**Etymology of Upaṇiṣad.**

Vidyā (knowledge of Brahman) is called Upaṇiṣad because, in the case of those who devote themselves to it, the (bonds of) conception, birth, decay, etc., become unloosed, or because it destroys (those bonds) altogether, or because it leads (the devotee) very near to Brahman, or

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9 Abhāva is nothing distinct from the particular thing which is said to be absent. It being opposed to bhāva or being, nothing positive can be predicated of it. (A)

10 As to the contention that there are many kinds of ābhāva all of which except prāgābhāva, non-existence of a thing prior to its birth are said to be eternal, we reply that, though of one sort in itself, it is yet spoken of as many owing to the multiplicity of acts or qualities attributed to it. In point of fact, there are not many distinct abhāvas. (A)

11 It cannot be disputed that attributes co-exist with substances. So, if ghaṭa-pradhvamsābhāva non-existence of a pot known as destruction be eternal in its specific character as such, the concept of pot which enters into that specific concept must also be eternal. If the concept of pot be thus eternal, how is a conception of its non-existence possible? Existence and non-existence of a pot cannot indeed co-exist.

12 So long as agency which is painful does not cease, there can be no mokṣa. Neither can there be mokṣa when agency ceases or then no action is possible which is said to produce mokṣa.

13 i.e. because the highest good cannot be attained except by knowledge of Brahman.
because therein the Highest Good is seated. As intended to produce this knowledge, the treatise is also called Upaniṣad.

**INTRODUCTION.**

The three divisions of the Taittiriya Upaniṣad.

The Taittiriya Upaniṣad is threefold — Saṃhitī, Vāruṇī, and Yājñikī. The Upaniṣad as made up of the first *prapāṭhaka* or lecture is called Samhitī because the study of Saṃhitī forms a part of it. Varuṇa being the propagator of the traditional lore of Brahma-vidyā embodied in the second and third lectures, the Upaniṣad which is made up of the two lectures is called after him. In the fourth lecture Mantras which are used in Yajñas or sacrificial rites are also mentioned, and therefore the Upaniṣad as made up of this lecture is called Yājñikī. Of these three, the chief is the Vāruṇī, inasmuch as therein is expounded the Brahma-vidyā which is the direct means to man’s *summum bonum*, viz., the attaining of Brahman.

Why Samhitī-Upaniṣad should come first.

It should not be objected that, as the chief of the three, the Vāruṇī-Upaniṣad should be first read. For, to acquire the necessary qualification to study the chief one, the Samhitī Upaniṣad should be read first. By karma or Vedic ritual, no doubt, the seeker of knowledge has attained the necessary qualification for wisdom as well as a craving for wisdom; still, concentration or one-pointedness of mind cannot be brought about by works. On the other hand, owing to the multiplicity of activities, there will be a greater tendency to wander away from the one point of study. The Kathas declare that concentration or one-pointedness of mind is essential for an intuitive realisation, in the following words: —

“By subtle seers alone, with a sharp and subtle mind, is He beheld.” (K.Up 3:12)

This one-pointedness of mind is produced by a practice of *dhyāna*, meditation. Hence the aphorisms of Patañjali describing the nature of Yoga and the means thereto:—

“Yoga is the suppression of the transformations of the thinking principle.” (1:2)

“Their suppression is secured by abhyāsa (practice) and vairagya (non-attachment).” (1:12)

Wherefore it is but right that, for a practice of dhyāna or meditation, the Saṃhitī-Upaniṣad should come first.
LESSON I.
(First Anuvāka)

INVOCATION TO GOD.

Devas place obstacles in men's way to Brahma-vidyā.

There is a popular saying that many are the obstacles which beset the way to a good end. On our way to Brahma-vidyā, especially, there are possibly many obstacles placed by Devas. It is therefore necessary to endeavor to remove those obstacles. We learn from the following passage of the Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad that Devas throw obstacles in the way to Brahma-vidyā:

“Now whoever worships the Devatā as separate, regarding ‘He is separate, I am separate,’ he knoweth not. As a cow (is to us), so is he to Devas. Just as many cows feed one man, so every one man feeds all Devas. When one cow alone is taken away, it is unpleasant; how much more so if many are taken away! Therefore Devas do not like that men should know.” (B.A.Up 1:4:10)

The passage may be explained as follows:— Men are of two classes, those who know Brahman, and those who resort to works. That he who knows Brahman becomes all has been declared in the preceding passage in the words “He who knows thus etc.” Not even Devas can throw obstacles in the way of a man becoming all when he knows the real nature of Brahman. For the man that knows Brahman becomes the ātman the very Self of those Devas, as declared in the same Upaniṣad in the following word: “And Devas cannot, verily, make him powerless; he becomes their very self indeed.” Having thus spoken of the knower of Brahman attaining the summum bonum, the Upaniṣad proceeds to show the contrary result in the case of him who has no such knowledge, in the words “now whoever worships Devatā as separate” etc. Now, I.e., after describing the glory of Brahma-vidyā, the power of avidyā or ignorance is going to be described.

He who worships the Divine Being as distinct from himself, thinking that the Divine Being, the object of worship, is distinct from himself and that the worshipper himself is distinct from the Divine Being, the worshipper, thus seeing a difference, knows not his own glory of being himself Brahman.

Just as an animal, an elephant or a horse, not aware of its own superior strength, comes under the control of men who are inferior in strength, so does the ignorant worshipper come under the control of Devas. As many cattle cows, sheep, horses, bulls, buffaloes etc. subserve the happiness of a single man, each by an appropriate service such as yielding milk, carrying loads etc., so every individual who is ignorant subserves the happiness of Agni, Sūrya, Indra and other Devas by way of offering to them sacrificial oblations, and so on. Accordingly, with reference to Devas, every individual man stands in the place of all animals. A person, for instance, who owns many cattle will be put to much pain when even a single animal is carried away by a thief or a tiger: how much more so when many are carried away! Therefore Devas are put to much pain when men realize the identity of the Self and Brahman. Since the Veda itself thus declares that it is quite contrary to the wishes of the Devas that men should acquire Brahma-vidyā, it is quite possible that Devas may place obstacles in the way of men who wish to acquire Brahma-vidyā. This has been clearly stated in the Vārtikasāra as follows:

"Without knowing the true nature of his own Self, a man works to nourish external Devas by sacrifices, gifts and other rites, as a bull works for a merchant. A man, though owning many cattle, yet suffers much pain when a single animal is stolen away. When the human animal, constituting almost the whole property of Devas, is carried away by the thief of Brahma-vidyā, all Devas are put to much pain. Thus it will be painful to Devas if men should know the identity of the Self and Brahman, and therefore they obstruct the growth of wisdom. Accordingly we find
even sannyasins taking to a vicious course of life, being thrown off their guard, with the mind turned towards external objects, bent upon quarrelling, all this because their hearts are poisoned by Devas."

Like Devas, even rśhis and others are obstructors. This also has been declared in a passage in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad, which is briefly explained in the Vārtikasāra as follows: —

"Identifying himself with a caste and a religious order, he who knows not the Truth, with his mind turned outward, forms the support of all creatures from Devas down to ants. The householder nourishes all, nourishes Devas by worshipping and offering oblations to them, nourishes rśhis by studying Vedas, Pitṛs by Srāddha rites, men by gifts of food and clothing and houses, cattle by grass and water, dogs and birds by the leavings and seeds of grain. Since no one does an act of good who has not been won by karma, the householder must have been acquired by Devas, etc., by their own karma. Devas and others always wish safety as much to the householder, who does good to them, as to their own bodies, acquired as they both alike are by their own karma. Neglect of works is the result of acquiring a knowledge of truth; and it is a great peril to which the householder is subject. This peril, indeed, cannot be averted by Devas and all. Neglect of works from sickness or languor is not a permanent loss, since man may do them afterwards. Accordingly, Devas and others thwart man's attempts to attain wisdom lest his knowledge of the real nature of Brahman may deprive them of their whole property."

The same truth is expressed by the Kaṭhas in the following words:—

"Of whom the many have no chance to even hear, whom many cannot know though they have heard." (K.Up 2:7)

And our Lord has stated the same truth in the following verse: —

"Among thousands of men one perchance strives for perfection. Even among those who strive and are perfect, only one perchance knows Me in truth." (B.G. 7:3)

**Mantra for the removal of those obstacles.**

Since many obstacles lie in the way of man's highest aspiration, a mantra to be recited for their overthrow is given in the opening section of the Śamhit-ūpaniṣad. But this mantra is not given at the commencement of the karma-kamya or ritualistic section, because performance of rites is desired even by the Devas and others and therefore no obstacles will lie in the way. It may perhaps be urged that all obstacles to wisdom have been removed by the performance of sacrificial works and gifts enjoined in the former section. We admit that it is true. But there may still exist some other obstacles which are removable by a recitation of this mantra. Want of relish for knowledge is the first obstacle, and this is the result of the great sins accumulated in the past as has been declared in the Purāṇa in the following words: —

"Wisdom-worship is not relishing to men of great sins; on the other hand, wisdom-worship even looks very repulsive in itself."

And those great sins are removed by sacrificial rites and gifts calculated to create a taste for knowledge of Brahman. It is this relish which is spoken of as vividīśa, desire to know. That it is produced by sacrificial rites, etc., is declared in the following words: —

"Him do the Brahmins seek to know by sacrifice, by gifts, by the austerity of restricted food." (B.A. Up 4:4:2)

Though the sacrificial rites, etc., when performed with a view to their immediate specific results lead to enjoyments, to samsāra or mundane life, still it stands to reason that when dedicated to the Lord they remove the great sins which obstruct the growth of wisdom. Hence the words of the Lord:
"He who does actions, placing them in Brahman, abandoning attachment, is not tainted by sin as a lotus-leaf by water." (B.G. 5:10)

And a sign of this extinction of sin is freedom from all attachment. Accordingly it has been said in the Naish-karmya-Siddhi:—

"The mind getting purer by works dedicated to the īśvara manifests non-attachment for the region of Brahma and the like, and then it is perfect in purity." (1:47)

In the Sreyomārga, too, it is said: —

"Man's conviction of the worthlessness of all this mundane existence from Brahma down to plant marks the ripening of his acts dedicated to the Divine Being, the Antaryāmin, the Indwelling Regulator."

Though the obstacle which has caused a dislike for knowledge has been removed on attaining vairāgya (nonattachment), still many obstacles may lie in the way of upāsana (contemplation) otherwise spoken of as yoga by which the mind becomes one-pointed. They are enumerated by Patañjali as follows: —

"Disease, dullness, doubt, carelessness, sloth, worldly-mindedness, misconception, missing the point, and unsteadiness are the causes of the mind's distraction and they are the obstacles." (Y.S. 1:30)

What diseases are is well-known. Dullness consists in the mind being unfit for work. Owing to a preponderance of tamas the mind does sometimes become unfit for work. Doubt is the absence of a determinate knowledge as to the object of contemplation. Carelessness is the occasional neglect of contemplation. Sloth is indifference, a tendency to procrastinate. Worldly-mindedness is the absence of vairāgya or non-attachment. Misconception is the false notion as to the nature of the object of contemplation. Missing the point is marked by the absence of a continuous progress through higher and higher stages in the concentration of mind. Unsteadiness consists in engaging in contemplation at one time, in sacrificial rites and gifts at another, in trade or agriculture yet again, and so on.

Here follows the mantra which has to be recited for the removal of obstacles on the path of yoga:

1. Om. May Mitra be propitious to us, and Varuna propitious be; may Aryaman propitious be to us; propitious be Indra and Brihaspati to us; to us propitious may Vishnu of vast extent be.

Mitra is the Devatātman, the Shining One, the Intelligence, the Self identifying Himself with, and manifesting Himself as, day and prāṇa, or upward current of life-breath. Varuṇa is the Intelligence concerned with night and apāna or downward current of life-breath, Aryaman with the eye and the sun, Indra with strength, Brihaspati with speech and buddhi or intellect, Viṣṇu with the feet. These and others are the Devatas working in the individual organism.

May all these Devatas be propitious to us. It is only when these are propitious to us that wisdom can be studied, retained in memory and imparted to others without any obstacle. Hence the prayer to them to be propitious.

Vishnu is said to be of vast extent because in His incarnation as Trivikrama His feet were very extensive. Or it may be explained thus: Mitra and other Devatās or Intelligences who identify themselves with, and function through, prāṇa and other detached members of the bodily organism have been mentioned. The Virāj-Puruṣa who identifies Himself with, and functions in, the whole organism has yet to be mentioned. He is said to be of vast extent because He pervades all, having

14 Here it is Brahman, the Sūrātman, that is invoked as Mitra, etc (Su. & A)
15 Through prāṇa or life and sense-organs. (A).
16 This study consists in determining the import of the Vedantic texts by sitting at the feet of a teacher. (A.)
the whole Brahmāṇḍa. for his body. Thus the Devas working severally in the whole body and its members have been invoked to bless the student by way of removing all obstacles.

2. Salutations to Brahman! Salutations to Thee, Vāyu! Thou art indeed Brahman perceptible. Thee indeed will I declare Brahman perceptible. The right will I declare; and I will declare the true. May That protect me; may That protect the teacher. Me may That protect; may It protect the teacher.

The seeker of Divine Wisdom bows to Vāyu and declares Him as Brahman for the mitigation of all troubles in the way of acquiring Brahma-vidyā, since on Him depend the fruits of all actions. To Brahman, i.e., to Vāyu, I make this bow. Here Vāyu himself is addressed as Brahman. Moreover, since Thou art Brahman immediate, when compared with the external organs of sensation such as the eye, I shall declare Thee Brahman perceptible.

As Sūtra, or Cosmic Life, Energy and Intelligence, Prāṇa is no doubt remote. But the individualized Prāṇa, or Vitality in the heart is present to everybody's consciousness and is therefore immediate when compared with the eye etc., whose existence can only be inferred from the fact of color etc., being perceived and which are therefore remote. Prāṇa is spoken of as Brahman perceptible, since in breathing the body expands (the root 'brih' means to expand). Though not the very Brahman, Prāṇa, is addressed as such just in the same way that the gate-keeper of a king's palace is addressed as king to get a ready admission. Prāṇa is the gate-keeper as it were of Brahman in the heart. The seeker of liberation who wishes to see Brahman addresses Prāṇa as Brahman with a view to praise the Intelligence functioning in the vitality. (A)

Since the right i.e., that which, by buddhi or intellect, is determined as right, as having been taught in the scriptures, and so constituting our duty depends upon Thee, I will declare Thee to be the right. The right thing when executed in speech and by the body constitutes the true. Since this execution, too, depends upon Thee, I shall declare Thyself to be the true. May That, that Brahman who is called Vāyu, by me thus praised, protect me, the seeker of wisdom; and may the same Brahman protect the teacher by way of granting him power to teach. The repetition of "May That protect," etc., shows earnestness.

Now, he bows to the Supreme Brahman who impels all these Devas, as their Antaryāmin, as the Ruler indwelling them all, in the words "Salutations to Brahman." Brahman as the Sūtra, endued with jñāna-sakti and kriya-sakti, with the powers of intelligence and force, holds in their places all beings of life that put on the body of Vāyu, as declared in the following passage:—

"Vāyu verily, O Gautama, is that Sūtra; by the Sūtra, verily, O Gautama, by Vāyu is this world and all beings are woven." (B.A.Up 3:7:2)

Accordingly the student bows to Vāyu also. Now, the Antaryāmin is not addressed in the second person, in as much as He is out of sight, being known only through the scriptures and inference. As the Sūtrātman, however, i.e. as Vāyu, Brahman is known through the sense of touch. This very idea is clearly set forth in the words: "Thou art indeed Brahman perceptible." Because Brahman, manifested through the upādhi or medium of Vāyu, is perceptible to the senses, the student says: I shall in the sequel, in the passages treating of upāsana or contemplative worship declare Thee, indeed, as Brahman fit for Saksātkara or direct perception. It is, indeed, the Conditioned Brahman who after a long practice of contemplation can be directly perceived in the form in which He has been contemplated. Accordingly the Chhandogas read in the Sāndilya-Vidyā as follows:—

"(He attains to the īśvara's state) who feels certain that 'departing hence, I shall attain to Him,' and to whom there is no doubt." (Ch.Up 3:4:4)

The Vājasaneyins also declare:—
"Becoming the Deva, he is absorbed in the Devas." (B.A.4:1:2)

'Becoming the Deva' means, the Sakṣātkarā or immediate realization of the Deva in this very birth. 'To be absorbed in the Devas' means to become the Deva himself after death. Wherefore, there is nothing untrue in what I am going to declare in the sequel. On the other hand, I am declaring a real fact when I say that 'Thou art Brahman perceptible.' To declare the right' is to contemplate in the mind of a real fact indeed to be expressed. To 'declare the true' is to give expression to it in speech. May the perceptible Brahman who will be spoken of in the sequel protect both myself, the student and the teacher, by granting to us respectively the power to grasp wisdom and the power to impart wisdom. The same idea is again repeated in the text.

Om Peace Peace Peace

The uttering of the word 'peace' three times is intended to ward off the troubles that occur on the path to wisdom owing to causes operating in the individual organism, in the external beings, and in the region of Devas or Cosmic Intelligences. Having thus prayed to the perceptible Brahman as Vāyu, the student contemplates by means of Pranava which designates Him the imperceptible Antaryāmin, the Ruler within, and prays for the removal of obstacles: There are three kinds of troubles:

1. The ādhīytāmika, those which arise from causes operating in the student's own body, namely, fever, pain in the head, and so on;
2. The ādhidaivika the troubles from the Devas etc.;
3. The ādhībhautika, troubles arising from Yakṣas, Rakṣasas, etc. For the cessation of these three, the word 'peace' is uttered thrice. That the contemplation of Īśvara by Pranava is meant for the removal of obstacles is formulated by Patañjali in four Sūtras as follows:—

"Īśvara is a particular soul untouched by affliction, works, fruition and impressions. His designation is Pranava. A constant repetition of it and an intense meditation on its meaning should be practiced. Thence arises a cognition of the Inner Consciousness and absence of obstacles." (Y.S. 1:24 -29)

LESSON 2.
(Second Anuvāka)

STUDY OF PHONETICS.

The Upaniṣad being mainly intended for a knowledge of it’s meaning, there should be no want of care in the study of the text.17 Therefore here follows a lesson on Śikṣā, the doctrine of pronunciation.

1. Om! We shall treat of the phonetics: sound, rhythm, quantity, strength, modulation, union. Thus has been declared the lesson on phonetics.

Phonetics (Śikṣā) is the science which treats of sounds and their pronunciation. Or, the word 'śikṣā' may here signify the sounds etc., which are treated of in that science.18 Sound: such as 'a'. Rhythm: such as udāṭta or high-pitched tone. Length: short, long, etc. Strength: intensity of stress.

17 Otherwise, the intended meaning cannot be conveyed.
18 The science of phonetics being expounded elsewhere, the second interpretation is preferable. (A)
Modulation: pronunciation of sounds in the middle tone. Union: conjunction of several sounds. These are the things to be learnt. Thus far is the lesson on phonetics. In these words the Upaniṣad concludes the present subject with a view to proceed to the next.

For him who, by the recitation of the mantra given in the first anuvāka, has removed obstacles, it is proper to proceed with the text treating of the ways of contemplation and of the nature of Brahman. As the text of the Upaniṣad is mainly intended for a knowledge of the things therein treated of, one should spare no pains in learning the text; and accordingly the Upaniṣad proceeds with a lesson on phonetics.

Here one may ask, what if one be careless? We reply: carelessness will lead to evil. It has been said, "The Mantra, when wanting in rhythm or sound, or when wrongly used, conveys not the intended idea. That thunderbolt of speech will ruin the worshipper as the word 'indra-satru ' did owing to a fault in rhythm."19

(Objection):— If so, this lesson should have been given in the karma-kāṇḍa or ritualistic section.

(Answer):— True. For that very reason, as the lesson subserves both the sections, it is given between the two sections.

(Objection):— Then, as subservient to both, let it be given at the beginning of the Veda.

(Answer):— Though subservient to both, it has to be given in the theosophical section in order to show its greater use as regards knowledge. As to the ritualistic section, despite the chance of misunderstanding the scriptures owing to error in the rhythm and sound, it is possible to do away with any imperfection in the performance by prayaśchitta or an expiatory act. Accordingly, in such cases, the Veda gives the following mantra for an expiatory offering of clarified butter:

"Whatever in the sacrifice is wrongly done, unknown or known, do, O Agni, rectify that (part) of this (sacrifice); thou indeed knowest what is right." (Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa 3-7-11.)

On the contrary, when the scriptures in the theosophical section are wrongly understood, the imperfection cannot be made up for. Indeed, it is not possible to do away with wrong knowledge by an expiatory act. We have never seen an illusory perception of serpent in a rope removed by the reciting of the Gayatri hymn. Wherefore no expiatory act whatever is enjoined in connection with knowledge, in the same way that it is enjoined in connection with the rituals.

On the contrary, in the case of him who, strivin in the path of wisdom commits any sin, the scriptures deny all expiation other than theosophy, in the following words: "If the yogin should unguardedly commit a sin, he should resort to yoga alone, never to any other thing such as mantra."

Wherefore the lesson on the phonetics is given here especially to enjoin great care in the study of the Upaniṣads, so that there may be no defect in the knowledge acquired and that the scripture may be understood aright.

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19 Pāṇini-Sīkṣā 52. The story concerning "indra-śatru" is told in the Taittiriya-Samhitā 2-4-12 as follows: Tvaṣṭa, "the Vulcan of the Hindus," whose son had been slain by Indra, prepared to get up the Soma sacrifice without Indra. The latter wished for an invitation for it, but, Tvaṣṭa would not invite him, who had slain his son. Then Indra interrupted the sacrifice and forcibly drank away the Soma juice. Thereupon Tvaṣṭa poured into the fire an oblation of the Soma juice that then remained, praying " Agui, grow up into an Indra-satru." Thence rose a person, named Vritra, 'who began to extend his form rapidly over the three regions of the earth, the interspace and heaven. Tvaṣṭa was afraid of his growing power and gave Indra a consecrated weapon to kill him with. With this weapon and with the whole strength of Vishnu at his back, Indra was able to draw away the whole strength of Vritra into himself and Vishnu, when Vritra became absorbed in Indra's body. Tvaṣṭ of course prayed that the person should prove Indra's destroyer; but, as he had mispronounced "Indra-satru," with udāṭta (acute accentor high tone) on the first instead of on the last syllable, the result was quite the contrary.
Modulation (sama) consists in reciting the text neither too fast nor too slow, in pronouncing every sound according to its proper time. As to the six things mentioned here the Veda should be recited according to the directions given in the several sciences; and these are the only six things in the science of phonetics to be attended to. Since in the Upanishad “sikṣa” and other words are recited in one neutral accentless tone, this lesson cannot indeed insist on the accentuation of radical words and terminations as taught in the science of grammar; still the accentuation as current in the traditional mode of reciting the texts' should be learnt. Though it does not enable us to acquire any special knowledge in particular, still, being enjoined in this lesson on phonetics, it may be of some: to us unknown service. That unknown service may consist-in the removing of obstacles placed in the way of him who engages in contemplation and seeks to acquire wisdom.

LESSON 3
(Third Anuvāka,)
CONTEMPLATION OF SAMHITA.

In the second lesson has been shown in what particular way the text should be recited, to secure some visible and invisible good. In the third lesson is taught a certain contemplation which is calculated to secure fruits of this and the future world.

Invocation for fame and luster.

There occurs first the following mantra which serves the purpose of an auspicious act. In the peace-chant given above, removal of obstacles was prayed for, while in this mantra the student prays for perfection in the contemplation and its fruits. The mantra reads as follows:

1. **Fame to us both: Brahma-varchasa to us both.**

Now the śruti proceeds with the Upaniṣad or sacred teaching concerning conjunction (saṃhitā). Whatever fame accrues from a knowledge of the sacred teaching regarding Saṃhita, may it accrue to both of us, master and pupil. Whatever luster accrues from that cause, may it accrue to us both. This invocation is uttered by the pupil. Such prayer, indeed, becomes him alone, as he has not yet achieved his aspirations. It does not become the master who has already achieved his aspirations. A master is one who has already achieved his aspirations. The pupil's fame consists in his being known to have rightly practiced the contemplation, and the master's fame in being known to have taught it aright. This implies that the contemplation has attained perfection, not wanting in any of its parts. Brahma-varchasa is the luster which a brahmaṇa ought to possess, and which accrues from a study of the Veda. It stands for all the fruits spoken of in the sequel of this lesson. No doubt the blessing prayed for accrues only to the pupil, the worshipper; still, by courtesy, it is spoken of as a good accruing also to the master, inasmuch as the master will feel happy when the pupil attains the fruits prayed for.

Contemplation of Saṃhita in the five objects.

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20 The contemplation of gross physical objects through Saṃhita or conjunction of physical sounds is first taught so that persons whose minds are habitually bent towards external objects may find an entrance into the subtle truths conveyed by the Upanishads (S.)

21 On account of the observance of all duties enjoined in the scriptures and by the study of the Veda under proscribed conditions (S)
The śruti now enunciates the Vidyā or contemplation for which the auspicious act of invocation has been performed.

2. Now, then, the Upaniṣad of Saṃhitā sacred teaching about conjunction) shall we declare in the five objects: in the worlds, in the lights, in knowledge, in progeny, in the self. These are great conjunctions, they say.

Now: after what has been taught in the preceding lesson as to how the Upaniṣads should be recited.

Then: because the buddhi or intellect, always accustomed as it has been to think of the text, cannot suddenly be directed to a knowledge of the truths taught in it. The śruti says:— We shall now teach the contemplation of Saṃhitā — how Saṃhitā should be regarded and meditated upon, a thing which is quite near to the mere text with reference to the five objects of knowledge: namely, the contemplation of the worlds, of the lights, of knowledge, of progeny, of the self. As concerned with conjunction and with great things, these sacred teachings regarding the five objects of thought are spoken of as Maha-samhitās, as great conjunctions, by those who know the Veda.

The student having practiced recitation of the sounds, rhythm, etc., of the text in the manner laid down in the preceding anuvāka, we shall first explain the contemplation of Saṃhitā, which concerns itself with the recitation of the Vedic text; for, the student who is going to engage in contemplation, fully imbued as he is with the idea of Vedic recitation by long practice, will find it very hard to direct his mind at once to contemplations not connected with the recitation of the Vedic text. 'Saṃhitā' means an extremely close approximation of sounds to one another, 'Upaniṣad' here means contemplation, because by contemplation one finds, lying very close by, all the good such as progeny, cattle, and the brahma-varchasa. The conjunction which has to be contemplated upon will be described in relation to five groups of things. To show that there are not as many distinct contemplations as there are groups of things to be contemplated, the śruti proposes here to treat of one single act of contemplation comprehending all the five groups of objects ............... The conjunctions are said to be great because in the contemplation they are to be regarded as great things such as the worlds.

Contemplation of Saṃhitā in the Worlds.

Now the śruti proceeds to deal with the first of the five groups of things to be thought of in the contemplation of Saṃhitā.

3. Now as to the worlds: earth is the first form, heaven the next form, the interspaces the junction, air the medium; thus far as to the worlds.

Of the conjunctions mentioned above, contemplation of conjunction in the worlds will now be described. The word 'now' in all these passages denotes the order in which the objects are to be regarded in the course of contemplation. Earth is the first form, the first sound; that is to say, the first of the two sounds joined together should be regarded as the earth.22 Similarly heaven is the next sound. The interspace (antarikṣa) is the junction, the mid-space between the first and the second sounds, the place where the two sounds are joined together. Air is the medium23 that by which they are joined together. Thus has been taught the contemplation of Saṃhitā in the worlds.

In the scriptural text 'iṣe-(t)-tvā,' 'e' and 't' the final and the initial sounds, respectively, of the words 'ishe' and 'tvā' which are to be joined together are the two sounds joined together. The middle space

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22 The earth, heaven, etc., here stand for the Devatās, the Intelligences functioning in the earth, heaven etc. The material forms are not worthy of worship. (A.)
23 The special effort. (A.)
between them should be regarded as the antarikṣa. The 't' within the brackets is the sound which comes in by doubling the 't,' one of the two sounds joined together, and it is this additional sound 't' which has to be regarded as the air.

**Contemplation of Saṃhitā in the Lights.**

Then follows the second group:

4. Now as to the lights: fire is the first form, sun the second form, water the junction, lightning the medium. Thus far as to the lights.

This and the following groups should be interpreted like the preceding one.

**Contemplation of Saṃhitā in Knowledge.**

5. Now as to knowledge: master is the first form, pupil the second form, knowledge the junction, instruction the medium. Thus far as to knowledge.

Knowledge stands for the text which has to be taught by the master and learnt by the pupil.

**Contemplation of Saṃhitā in Progeny.**

Then follows the fourth group:

6. Now as to progeny: mother is the first form, father the second form, progeny the junction, procreation the medium. Thus far as to progeny.

Progeny: sons, grandsons etc.

**Contemplation of Saṃhitā in the Self.**

7. Now as to the self: lower jaw is the first form, upper jaw the second form, speech the junction, tongue the medium. Thus far as to the self.

'Self' here denotes the whole aggregate made up of the physical body, sense-organs, etc., as well as the Consciousness witnessing them all, inasmuch as the notion of self refers to this aggregate. It is this self with which the fifth group is concerned. Speech: the organ of speech located in the throat, palate, etc. The Śruti concludes the members of conjunction described above in the following words:

8. Thus these are the great conjunctions.

**Contemplation of Saṃhitā enjoined for a specific end.**

This contemplation is prescribed as a means to a specific end in the following words:

9. Whoso should contemplate these great conjunctions thus declared is endued with progeny and cattle, with brahma-varchasa, with food to eat, with the region of svarga.

The Sanskrit verb 'vid,' to know, should be here understood in, the sense of upāsana or contemplation because this section treats of upāsana. Upāsana consists in a continuous flow of one and the same idea as recommended by the scripture, unmixed with other ideas, and made to hang on some perceptible object recommended by the scripture. He who renders constant service to the
Guru or to the King is said to render *upāsana* to him, and he attains the fruit thereof. Here, too, he who contemplates in the manner described above attains progeny and other fruits.

The Sanskrit root *'vid*', no doubt, denotes knowledge produced by the operation of sense-organs, not *upāsana* or the act of contemplation, a mental act depending on the will and effort of the individual. Still, the verb *'vid'* which means to know should here be understood in its secondary sense of *upāsana* or contemplation which is allied to knowledge, both knowledge and contemplation being alike functions of the mind. The word cannot be understood here in its primary sense inasmuch as mere knowledge which is not dependent on the individual's will and effort cannot form the subject of an injunction. If mere knowledge were meant here, then, as it has been already imparted in the words “earth is the first form” and so on, there would be no need for an injunction. It cannot be urged that the form *'veda'* occurring in the Upaniṣad is in the indicative mood and does not therefore mean an injunction. For, we regard the form *'veda'* imperative, as often used in the Vedic texts. It may perhaps be also urged that this form *'veda'* is indicative, not imperative, and that therefore the sentence merely repeats the truth already presented to the mind. In reply, we say that mere knowledge of the truth does not enable one to attain progeny, cattle, and other fruits mentioned. Wherefore, we are to understand that the word *'veda'* is used in its secondary sense of contemplation, and is in the imperative mood, signifying an injunction. This interpretation is, moreover, in accordance with the context, the present section being concerned with *upāsana* as may be seen from the last words of the sixth lesson, "thus do thou, O Prachīna-Yogya, contemplate (*upasasva)*."

Here, *svarga* is indeed the fruit to be reaped in the future. As to the cattle and other fruits, they may be attained either here or hereafter, as in the case of the Chitra sacrifice whose fruits namely, cattle are said to be attainable here in the absence of all obstacles, or hereafter if there should be any obstacles in the way of its attainment in the present birth. It is for the attainment of fruits like these that the act of contemplation which depends on the individual's will and effort is enjoined here by the word *'veda'.*

**The Philosophy of Contemplation.**

[In the Vedānta-sūtras, various points concerning *upāsana* have been discussed and settled. The Vedānta-sutras, better known as the Śaṅkara-Mimamsa, an enquiry into the embodied Self, comprise four books (adhyayas) divided each into four parts (padas), each of these four parts containing several sections (adhikaraṇas.) An adhikarana is made up of one or more aphorisms (sūtras) and forms a complete discussion of a single question. The commentator on this Upaniṣad gives here and there at the close of a lesson a digest of such discussions as bear upon the subject-matter of the lesson.

Every such discussion will be presented here in its three following parts:

1. **Question:** A statement of the two or more different, antagonistic, alternative points of view presenting themselves on a subject.

2. **Pūrva-pakṣa** or the Prima Facie View: The one or more points of view which will be ultimately set aside, with all the arguments in its or their support.

3. **Siddhānta** or Conclusion: That point of view which has the strongest support of evidence and which should therefore be accepted as the final demonstrated truth, as well as all the arguments which can be adduced in its behalf.]
The Upāsaka should be seated when engaged in Contemplation.

The question of the upāsaka's posture is discussed as follows in the Vedānta-Sūtras IV. i. 7-10:
(Question):— Is it necessary or not necessary for one to be seated while engaged in contemplation?
(The Prima Facie View):— It is unnecessary, inasmuch as no particular posture of the body has any bearing on the activity of manas.
(Conclusion):— It is necessary that he should be seated when engaged in contemplation. Otherwise, contemplation is impossible. In the first place it is impossible for one to contemplate while lying down, since all on a sudden one may be overpowered by sleep. Neither is it possible for one to contemplate when standing or walking; for, the mind would then wander away from the point by having to attend to the balancing of the body and to ascertain the right road.

No specific time and place necessary for Upāsana.  
(Vedānta-Sūtras, IV. i. ii.)

(Question):— Is there any specific time or place wherein alone one should practice contemplation?
(The prima facie view):— The Veda has prescribed the east as the proper direction for Brahmayañī, the place inclined towards the east for Vaisvadeva, the afternoon for pitriyajña, and so on. Thus, time and place of a specific character are prescribed in the case of Vedic rites. In the case of contemplation, too, which is alike an act enjoined by the Veda, there should be a specific time and place prescribed.
(Conclusion):— Concentration is the primary condition of meditation (dhyāna), and this concentration is not improved by resorting to any particular place or time. There can therefore be no specific time or place prescribed. Hence it is that the śruti, prescribing a proper place for the practice of yoga, recommends that the place selected should be agreeable to the mind. One should practice yoga only at a place which is pleasing to the mind. No specific place is prescribed in the scriptures. It is true that the śruti declares that the place selected for the practice of yoga should be "even, clean, free from gravel, fire and sand." But, as the śruti concludes by saying that the place should be pleasing to the mind, we understand that there the śruti only refers to some of the general conditions which facilitate contemplation, the end in view. These general conditions being satisfied, there is no restriction that any particular place or time should be resorted to for yoga. The śruti only means that contemplation should be practiced where concentration is possible. (Svetasvatara-Upaniṣad, 2-10)

The Scope of Saṃhita-Upāsana.

We have now to discuss as to how much of the attributes of the Being described in the scriptures should be brought within the sphere of contemplation. In the Aitareya-Upaniṣad also, contemplation of Saṃhita is given as follows:—
"Now, then, the sacred teaching regarding Conjunction" (3-1-1-1.) and so on. Now we have to enquire:

i. Are the Upāsanas given in the Aitareya recension and that given in the Taittiriya recension one and the same or different?

ii. Even if they are one and the same, is it necessary or not necessary that all that is taught in one place should be taken as taught in the other?

As to the first question;— on the principle established in the case of Pañchāgni-Vidyā and Prāṇa-Vidyā, it may at first thought appear that the Upāsanas of Saṃhita taught in the Aitareya and the Taittiriya recensions are one and the same.
Identity of Upāsanas taught in different Upaniṣads.

The identity of Upāsana in the case of Panchagni-Vidyā and Prāṇa-Vidyā has been established in the Vedānta-Sūtras III. iii. i. as follows:—

(Question):— The Chhāndogya and Brhadaranyaka Upaniṣads treat of the Upāsana of "the five fires." Are the Upāsanas different or identical?

(Prima Facie View):— The two Upaniṣads teach two different sorts of contemplation, these last being known by different names, Kauthuma and Vājasaneyaka respectively; so, too, in the case of other Upāsanas. There is yet another mark pointing to a distinction between the Upāsanas taught in different recensions. The ceremony called Śiro-vrata is spoken of in the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad 3:2:10 in the words: “This Brahma-Vidyā should be taught to those only by whom the vow of śiro-vrata has been duly observed." Śiro-vrata is a kind of vow enjoined only on the students of the Atharva-Veda, but not on others. It would, therefore, seem that difference in recension makes the Upāsanas quite distinct.

(Conclusion):— Despite the difference of recension the Upāsana remains one and the same, because of the identity of the teaching. The contemplation of Prāṇa for instance, is taught in the Chhāndogya-Upaniṣad 5:1:1 in the words, "Whoso, verily, contemplates (Prāṇa) the Best and the Highest." And the Brhadaranyaka treats of the contemplation of Prāṇa in the same words. Similarly, the five fires of Heaven, Earth, Moon, and Woman, recommended for contemplation in what is called the Panchagni-Vidyā are spoken of in exactly the same terms in the two recensions. And the fruits also of the Upāsana of Prāṇa, namely, that the Upāsaka "verily becomes the best and the highest", are described in the two recensions in exactly the same terms. As to the Upāsana being known by different names such as Kauthuma, Vājasaneyaka, and so on, they are not so named by the śruti itself. It is, on the other hand, only the students who name the different recensions of the Veda after the sages who have taught them. As to the contention that the śiro-vrata goes to indicate a difference in the Upāsana, we answer that this ceremony is necessary for the learning of the Vedic text, not for a practice of the contemplation therein taught. The words 'he that has not observed the vow should not learn it' show that it is a vow connected with the learning of the text. Wherefore, there being so many marks of identity while there is none pointing to a distinction, it is but proper to maintain that the mere fact of an upāsana being taught in two different recensions makes no difference in the upāsana itself.

Following the same principle in the present case, one may argue that even the upāsanas of conjunction as taught in the two recensions are identical, because, in the first place, the object to be contemplated upon is one and the same as indicated by the words "whoso thus contemplates this conjunction," and the words "Earth is the first form," and so on; and also because the fruits of the upāsana as described in the two places are of the same kind, namely "He is endued with progeny and cattle." (Muṇḍaka Up. 3-2-11.)

When different attributes should be gathered together in Upāsana.

Now, as to the second question raised above, the principle of combining together all the attributes spoken of in different places in connection with one and the same upāsana has also been established in the Vedānta-Sūtras III. iii. 5. as follows:

(Question):— Are the various attributes, spoken of in connection with an upāsana taught in different places, to be combined together or not?

(Prima Facie View):— The Vājasaneyaka-Upaniṣad, when teaching of the contemplation of Prāṇa, assigns to it an additional attribute that it is the 'semen,' in the words:— “The semen, verily, soared up." (Bri. Up. 6-1-12.) As this attribute is not mentioned in the Chhāndogya, one may think that that attribute should not be thought of when contemplating Prāṇa according to the teaching of the latter,
the purpose of contemplation being served by regarding the attributes of Prāṇa, as the vital breath, as speech, and so on.

(Conclusion):— Though not taught in the Chāṇḍogya recension, the attribute should be added to the object of contemplation, because it is taught in the other recension. We do find Agnihotra and other sacrificial rites being performed in all their parts as taught in the different recensions. Against this it may be urged that, the purposes of contemplation being served by those attributes only which are given in one's own recension, it is unnecessary to add to them those attributes also which are given elsewhere. This contention has no force; for, on the principle that more work produces more result, the attributes spoken of in other recensions are as serviceable as those given in one's own. Wherefore it is necessary to collect together all the attributes mentioned in different recensions. In pursuance of the principle thus established, one may think that to the details of the Saṃhitā-Upāsana given in the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad should be added those given in the Aitareya-Upaniṣad, such as;— "Speech is the first form, manas the second form," (Op. cit. 3-1-1-6.) and so on; and that to those given in the Aitareya-Upaniṣad should be added the details given in the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad, such as "Fire is the first form," and so on.

Thus at first sight it would appear that the Upāsanas of Saṃhitā taught in the two recensions are one and the same, and that the several attributes mentioned in the two places should be combined together in thought by one who wishes to contemplate Saṃhitā or conjunction. Two distinct Upāsanas of Saṃhitā. This prima facie view should be set aside in pursuance of the principle established in the Vedānta-Sūtras III. iii. 6, in the case of the Udgīthā-Vidyā. This principle is discussed as follows:

(Question):— Are the Udgīthā-Vidyās taught in the Chāṇḍogya and the Brāhadāraṇyaka identical or different?

(The prima facie view):— As they are both alike designated as the Udgīthā-Vidyā, they are properly one and the same. No doubt the designation is not authorised by the Veda; but such incidents as a war among the vital activities are related in both texts alike. Having represented the sattvic and tamasic activities of the senses as Devas and Asuras respectively, the Chāṇḍogya describes a war among them; and then, after showing that speech and other Devas are assailed by Asuras, it declares that the Prāṇa-Deva alone is unassailed by them. All this is related in the same way in the Brāhadāraṇyaka. The teachings of the two Upaniṣads refer apparently to one and the same vidyā (upāsana).

(Conclusion):— They are really two different vidyās, the thing to be contemplated upon being different in each. In the Chhāndogya, the syllable 'Om,' occurring in the Udgīthā, a particular song, has to be regarded as Prāṇa, Life; whereas in the Brāhadāraṇyaka Prāṇa, represented as the chanter of the whole Udgīthā song, as the stimulator of the organ of speech, has to be regarded as Udgīthā, that one of the four principal priests at a sacrifice whose function it is to chant the hymns of the Sāma-Veda. Thus owing to a difference in the thing to be contemplated, the two vidyās are quite different. As to the war among sense-organs being related alike in both, this point of similarity, found as it is only in minor details, cannot by itself point to an identity in the main vidyā. In both alike, no doubt, Prāṇa is represented to be the highest, as unassailable by the Asuras, and this ought to enter into the contemplation; but as the difference already pointed out in the thing to be contemplated has not been gainsaid, the Udgīthā-Vidyās taught in the two Vedas are quite different.

In accordance with the principle thus established, in the present case we should look upon the contemplation of conjunction taught in the Taittiriya and Aitareya Upaniṣads as different on account of a radical difference in the things to be contemplated upon. In the former, the things to be contemplated upon in the contemplation of conjunction have been declared in the five groups of objects; and in the latter, the things to be contemplated upon are divided into adhidaiva and adhyātmaka, cosmic and personal. It is there declared as follows:—
"Vāyu and Akāśa, these are the adhidaivata. Then as to the adhyatma: Speech is the first form, and manas the second form." (Op. cit. 3-1-1-5, 6.) and so on.

The extent of similarity in the thing to be contemplated in so far as the Earth is mentioned as the first form in both alike is not sufficient to make the two vidyās identical. The points of difference preponderate, and it is but reasonable that the preponderant should prevail. The two vidyās being thus different, it is not right that the several things mentioned in the Aitareya-Upaniṣad as worth contemplating should be added to those declared here in the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad. No part of the New Moon and Full Moon sacrifices, for instance, is added to the Agnihotra, because the last is quite different from the two. It has been thus proved that the two vidyās taught in reference to Samhita are different, and that therefore no part of the details given in the Aitareya should be added to what is given in the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad.

Self-Contemplation and Symbolic Contemplation.

There is yet another point for discussion. Upāsanas are of two kinds, those which involve the contemplation of the Self, and those which are concerned with external symbols (Pratīkā). In the former, the Paramātman, the Highest Self, is contemplated in His saguṇa or conditioned form, as taught in the sixth anuvāka. There it is taught that the Pūruṣa, known as Paramātman, the Highest Self, abiding in the heart-space, has to be contemplated upon as made up of manas, as immortal, as golden, and so on, in the thought; "I am that Paramātman." This contemplation of the Self is well discussed in the Vedānta-Sūtras IV. i. 3. When the devotee contemplates a visible thing outside the Highest Self, and exalts that thing by way of regarding it as a great Devatā or as Brahman Himself, the contemplation is said to be symbolic, concerned with a symbol. In the present case it is taught that;—"Earth is first form." Here the first sound in a conjunction has to be contemplated, being regarded as the Bhū-Devatā, the Intelligence functioning in the Earth. Where it is taught that "Manas should be contemplated as Brahman " and so on, it is manas, &c., exalted by being regarded as Brahman, which should be contemplated. No Symbol should be contemplated as the Self. And this symbol should not be regarded by the devotee as his own Self. A symbol is an effect of or an emanation from Brahman, and as such it forms a fit object on which the contemplation of the Supreme may be made to hang. That such symbols should not be regarded as the Self has been established in the Vedānta-Sūtras, IV. i. 4. as follows:—

(Question):— When it is taught that manas should be regarded as Brahman, that the Sun should be regarded as Brahman, and so on, it means that the symbols, manas, the sun, etc., exalted by being regarded as Brahman, form the objects of contemplation. Are those symbols to be regarded in contemplation as one's own Self?

(Prima facie view):— These symbols should also be contemplated as one's own Self, for the symbols are effects of or emanations from Brahman, and as such are one with Brahman; and jīva, too, is one with Brahman. Thus all distinction being absent by both of them being alike one with Brahman, the symbol which is the object of contemplation and jīva who is the contemplator are one and the same.

(Conclusion):— When the symbol which is an effect of or emanation from Brahman is regarded as one with Brahman, then what has made it a symbol has quite vanished away.

When the pot becomes one with clay, the pot as such has vanished away. When, again, the jīva, the separate individual Ego, is regarded as one with Brahman, then he ceases to be a separate individual Ego, and in consequence he ceases to be a contemplator. If, with a view to preserve intact the distinction between the object of contemplation and the contemplator, the oneness of cause and effect and the unity of jīva and Brahman be disregarded, then the symbol and the contemplator cannot be one, and they will be quite different from each other like the cow and the buffalo. Wherefore it is not right to contemplate the symbol as the Self.
One mode alone of Self-Contemplation should be practiced.

Now, all upāsanas in which Brahmaṇ, the object of contemplation, is regarded as one with the Self, culminate in the sākṣātkāra or actual perception of Brahmaṇ; so that when Brahmaṇ is intuited by one Upāsana, other contemplations are of no use. By engaging in another contemplation, the mind may even wander away from the sākṣātkāra already attained. Accordingly, when several upāsanas are taught for the benefit of one who seeks to attain Brahmaṇ-sākṣātkāra, to intuitively realize Brahmaṇ, it has been decided that only one of them it may be any one should be resorted to.

Symbolic Contemplations may be practiced in any number.

But, in the present case, the contemplation of conjunction may be practiced in one, two, or more forms at will. This point has been settled in the Vedānta Śūtras III. iii. 60. as follows:

(Question):— Is there any restriction as to the number of symbolic contemplations to be practiced? Or can they be practiced in any number at will?

(Prima facie view):— The principle established in the case of those upāsanas in which the Self is contemplated as one with the object of contemplation may be applied to the contemplation of symbols, the object in view here alike being the sākṣātkāra.

(Conclusion):— There is a vast difference between the two. As to the former, the Śruti gives us to understand in the words, "Becoming the Deva, he is absorbed in the Devas" that as the culminating point of contemplation, the contemplator realizes while still alive his unity with the Deva, and that after death he becomes the Deva Himself. There is no evidence whatever to show that contemplation of symbols produces sākṣātkāra. And as sākṣātkāra is not the aim of the contemplation of symbols, we should understand that the several objects of enjoyment, declared in the respective contexts to be attainable, constitute the fruits of the contemplation of symbols. Accordingly, as producing fruits of a distinct kind, one upāsana does not become useless when another has been practiced. And the objection that the mind would wander away from the point does not at all apply to the present case; for, by contemplating one symbol at certain moments and again at another moment contemplating another symbol, the apūrva or invisible effect of the first contemplation does not become extinct. Therefore the symbolic contemplations may be practiced at will, either one alone or more than one; and in the latter case the many contemplations may be practiced either severally or conjointly.

The Symbol should be contemplated as Brahmaṇ, not vice versa.

From the expression "Earth is the first form" it may at first sight appear that, being the first mentioned, earth is the subject of the proposition and is therefore the thing to be contemplated, i.e., the symbol, and that the first sound in the conjunction, which is subsequently mentioned, is the predicate, showing how that symbol is to be regarded. On the other hand, earth being the superior of the two, the first sound in the conjunction should be looked upon as a symbol and contemplated as earth. For instance, the small salagrāma stone is regarded as the Supreme as Vishnu, as Siva, and so on; but not vice versa. The principle that an inferior thing which is a symbol should be viewed in contemplation as a superior one is established in the Vedānta-śūtras IV. i. 5. as follows:—

(Question):— The śruti teaches us to contemplate that "Manas is Brahmaṇ." and so on. There arises the question, are we to regard manas etc. as Brahmaṇ, or are we to regard Brahmaṇ as manas etc.?

(Prima facie view):— Brahmaṇ being the Dispenser of the fruits of all actions, it is Brahmaṇ whom we should contemplate as manas, as something not Brahmaṇ.

(Conclusion):— Brahmaṇ is the superior of the two, and it is therefore proper that manas, the inferior one, should be contemplated as Brahmaṇ, the superior. To take an example from our worldly concerns: when a king's servant is addressed as king himself, he feels honored, but not vice
versa. The word 'as' (Sanskrit 'iti') going with Brahman in the passages — "let him contemplate manas as Brahman" shows that manas should be regarded as Brahman. It may be asked, how can Brahman award fruits of action, when something other than Brahman, such as manas, is worshipped? We answer thus: as the presiding Lord witnessing all actions, He can award fruits of our contemplation in the same way that He awards fruits when we worship a guest who is entitled to our hospitality. Wherefore, we should contemplate the symbol, which in itself is a thing different from Brahman, viewing it as Brahman.

No doubt the words in the text, "the sacred teaching about conjunction shall we declare in the five worlds," seem to imply that earth etc., denoted as they are by words in the locative case, are the objects to which contemplation should be directed that is to say, that they are the symbols; still, it is but proper to understand that the first sound, etc., are the symbols which have to be viewed as earth etc. When, for instance, it is taught; "Let him contemplate the fivefold Sāman in the worlds," it has been made out that the Sāman forming an integral part of a sacrificial rite is the symbol which should be viewed as worlds, these last being denoted by a word in the locative case. Indeed, this point has been established in the Vedānta-Sūtra IV. i. 6, on the ground that Sāman used as the object of the act of contemplation is the main thing to be contemplated, and is therefore the symbol which should be viewed as worlds. Similarly, here in the passage "whoso should contemplate these conjunctions," conjunctions form the object of the act of contemplation, and we are therefore to understand that they are symbols to be viewed as earth etc. Though earth, etc., are symbols, yet as constituting the forms in which the first sound, etc., are to be viewed, they may be properly referred to in the words " in the worlds" etc.

To discuss yet another point:

(Question):— What is upāsana? Is it a single act of thought or a frequent repetition of one and the same thought?

(Prima facie view):— Just as the scriptural injunction "He shall initiate a Brahmaṇa of eight years into the study of Vedas" is duly observed when the act is once done, so too, by a single act of thought, the scriptural injunction is duly fulfilled, and no repetition of the thought is necessary.

(Conclusion):— Not so, we say; for, as in the learning of the Vedic texts, the thought should be repeated. Just as, in pursuance of the scriptural command that every one should learn his own scriptures, one recites the Vedic text frequently till he can fix it in memory, so, the thought should be often repeated. If the very word 'adhyayana' means repeated utterance, the word 'upāsana' also means a frequent repetition of thought. Accordingly the blessed bhāṣyakara, in his commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras IV.i.i. says as follows: "Moreover, the words 'upāsana' (devotion or contemplation) and 'nidīhyasana' (meditation) denote acts involving frequent repetition. Accordingly, indeed, when we say 'he is devoted to (upāste) the prince', or 'he is devoted to guru', we refer to a person who attends on the prince or guru intently, never swerving from the act. So, when we say 'parted from her husband she meditates on him,' we refer to a woman who thinks constantly of the husband and is quite anxious to meet him.

It is true that no definite measure of the frequency of thought is anywhere prescribed in the śruti, as is done in the case of mantras meant for repetition; but the thought should be revolved until the idea that the symbol is the Deity contemplated upon has struck its roots deep down in the mind of the contemplator. Therefore the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad-Vāttitika says:—

"To approach a thing, viewing it as something else as taught in the scriptures, and there to dwell long till they come to be regarded as one, constitutes what is called upāsana."
It is like wise ministers having installed a boy prince on the throne and constantly waiting on him till all people come to recognize his sovereignty and obey him as their king. When once the symbol has come to be regarded as the Deity, the idea does not again depart from it. To illustrate: the idea of God comes up to the mind on seeing the icon in a ruined temple though no longer worshipped. The results spoken of in the scriptures will accrue to him who has contemplated the symbol till the idea that it is the Deity Himself has taken a firm root in the mind.

LESSON 4.
(Fourth Anuvāka.)

PRAYERS FOR HEALTH AND WEALTH.

In the third lesson contemplation of conjunction has been taught for the attainment of progeny and other fruits. From that indirectly accrues also the power of concentrating thought, a necessary condition for the attainment of a knowledge of Brahman. Now, no man who is wanting in retentive power of intellect, who forgets the teaching of scriptures once learned, can acquire a knowledge of Brahman. And no man who, owing to sickness and such other causes, lacks physical vigor, etc., or who suffers from want of food and clothing and the like, can apply himself to the study of the scriptures and such other means of acquiring a knowledge of Brahman. Therefore mantras conducive to the attainment of retentive power of intellect and the like are taught in the fourth lesson.

**Prayer for intellectual vigor.**

First, the śruti teaches the mantra to be recited by him who wishes to acquire retentive power:—

1. **Who, of all forms, the bull of chants, sprung up from chants immortal, May He, the Lord, me with intelligence cheer. Of the immortal, O God, the possessor may I be!**

Here are taught japa and homa the recitation of mantras and the offering of oblations as means of obtaining medha and sri, intelligence and fortune. (That such is the purpose of this lesson is) shown by the expressions, “May He, the Lord, me with intelligence cheer;” and “then to me fortune bring.”

**Praṇava, the essence of the Vedas.**

The syllable 'Om' is said to be the bull of Vedas because of the ascendancy thereof as of the bull in a herd of cattle. It is 'of all forms,' because it pervades all speech, as declared elsewhere in the śruti:—

“As all leaves are fast bound in the stalk, so is all speech fast bound in the 'Om.' The syllable 'OM' is all this.” (Chh. Up. 2-23-4)

It is for this reason that it is spoken of as the “bull of chants.” The syllable 'Om' is indeed the of object contemplation here, and it is therefore but proper to extol it as the bull of chants and so on. The Vedas are verily immortal, and it is from such immortal Vedas that the syllable 'Om' was born: that is to as the say, most essential element of the Vedas did it shine forth to Prajāpati, the Lord of creatures, when he began to meditate with the object of knowing what was the most essential element in all Vedic and vulgar speech. The syllable 'Om' is eternal and cannot therefore be literally said to have a birth. May that syllable Om, the Supreme Lord, the Dispenser of all aspirations, cheer me with wisdom! Or (to interpret the śruti better still): May He strengthen me with intelligence. —
It is the strengthening of intelligence that is here prayed for. Of the immortal, i.e., (by the context), of that knowledge of Brahman which is the means to immortality, the possessor may I be.

Praṇava is the highest among the Vedas which are chanted in Gayatrī and other metres, as declared in the Katha-Upaniṣad:

“That place which all the Vedas declare, for which they declare all penances, which seeking they live the life of celibacy, that place I tell thee briefly: it is Om.” (Katha-Up. 2-15.)

The whole universe is only Its embodiment, inasmuch as all things are comprehended in speech composed of words, and the whole speech is comprehended in that syllable 'O' the first member of Praṇava. That all things are comprehended in speech is declared in the Aitareyaka as follows:

“Speech is his (the breath's) rope, the names its knots. Thus by his speech as by a rope, and by his names as by knots, all this is bound. For, all these are names indeed."(Aitareya-Aranyaka 2-1-6-1.)

Just as a dealer in cattle ties together many animals by bands attached to one long extended rope, so, in the hands of Parameśvara, the Supreme Lord, speech is the long rope, and names such as 'Devadatta' are bands, and by these all things in the universe are tied up. Everything therefore rests in speech. That is to say, every man, on hearing his own name pronounced by another, comes up to him as though he were bound and dragged by bands of rope. That the whole of speech, with all the things in the universe comprehended within it, is itself comprehended in Praṇava is declared by the Chhandogas in the following words:

"As all leaves are fast bound in the stalk, so, is all speech fast bound in the syllable 'Om.' The syllable 'Om ' is all this." (Chha. Up. 2-23-4)

Just as the vāta, asvattha and other fig leaves are pervaded by fibers running through them, so is the whole speech pervaded by the syllable 'Om.' We should bear in mind that it is through the syllable 'A' that the whole speech is comprehended in the Praṇava, as declared in the Aitareyaka:

“'A' is the whole of speech; and manifested through different kinds of contact (mutes) and of winds (sibilants), it becomes many and different." (Aita. Aranyaka 2-3-6-14.)

Those sounds which are termed sparṣas and those which are termed ushmans are uttered in the Matrika-mantra with 'A' attached to them. The sound 'A' is therefore said to be embodied in the whole speech. Thus has been shown how Praṇava is 'of all forms,' embodied in the whole universe. Praṇava manifested itself to Prajāpati as the highest or most essential element of the Vedas. Accordingly the Chhandogas read as follows:

"Prajāpati brooded on the world. From them thus brooded on threefold knowledge issued forth. He brooded on it, and from it thus brooded on issued the three utterances (vyahrtis), Bhuḥ, Bhuvah, Svāḥ. He brooded on them, and from them thus brooded on issued the syllable OM" (Chha. Up. 2-23-3, 4.)

To brood upon the worlds is to meditate deeply upon them with a view to find out their essence. To issue forth is to clearly shine forth as the essence. Immortality or freedom from death constitutes what is known as liberation, and that is the end for which the syllable OM manifested itself. Hence it is that the Chhandogas, in the opening section treating of the syllable OM, read at the commencement, “He that is well established in Brahman attains immortality." Praṇava being the designation of Brahman, he alone who devoutly contemplates Praṇava can be said to be well established in Brahman.
May He, the Supreme Lord, who is designated by Praṇava, cheer me, the seeker of wisdom, (by endowing me) with the power of retaining in memory the scriptural texts and their teaching. May I, O God, by Thy Grace grasp the immortal, i.e., the scriptural texts and their teachings whereby to attain immortality.

**Prayer for physical and moral health.**

Having given the mantra for acquiring retentiveness, the śruti now proceeds to teach a mantra for securing immunity from sickness:

2. Able may my body be, sweetest be my tongue uttering only what is most agreeable! With ears much may I hear! The sheath of Brahman art thou, veiled by intelligence. What I have learned do Thou keep.

Moreover, may my body be able! May my tongue be sweetest, With ears much may I hear! May my kārya-kāraṇa-sanghāta the aggregate of the causes and the effects, i.e., the gross physical body and the subtle senses making up my whole bodily organism be competent for ātma-jñāna, competent to acquire a knowledge of the Self. And it is for the same end that I pray for medha, intellectual retentiveness. Of Brahman, of the Paramātman or Highest Self, Thou art the sheath, as of a sword, being the seat of His manifestation.

I speak of Thee as the sheath of Brahman because those who have cast aside all worldly desires perceive the Supreme in Thee, and because, as both the designation and the symbol of Brahman, Thou art alone the means of perceiving Him. — (S)

Thou art indeed the Pratīka, the symbol of Brahman: in Thee Brahman is perceived. By worldly intelligence Thou art concealed; that is to say, the truth concerning Thee is unknown to men of common intelligence.

Concealed as Thou art24 by their worldly intelligence, they whose thoughts are engrossed in the external objects do not contemplate Thee, the Divine Being, who givest immortality. (S.)

Do Thou guard what I have heard, do thou guard my wisdom, the knowledge of the Self and the like which I have acquired by hearing the scriptural texts; that is to say, do Thou enable me to acquire wisdom and retain it.

Do Thou guard my wisdom from the attacks of attachment, aversion and other such evils: do Thou so watch that when I am engaged in the study of scriptures and in other means of acquiring knowledge, I may not meet with any obstacles to wisdom, such as worldly attachment and the like. (S.)

These mantras are to be repeated by him who wishes to improve the retentive power of memory.

As I seek wisdom, may my body be healthy and thus efficient for a practice of contemplation! May my tongue be endued with extreme sweetness; may it be an apt organ wherewith to recite the scriptural texts! May I hear many a scriptural text conducive to the growth of wisdom: may I not be afflicted with the evil of deafness. O Praṇava, Thou art the place where I may meditate upon the Supreme Being, the Cause of the universe. Just as a leather-sheath is the place for preserving a sword, so is Praṇava the place for a safe meditation of Brahman. Accordingly, concerning the syllable 'Om,' the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad says:

“This is the best means, this the highest means.” (Op. cit, 2-17.)

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24 As a salagrama stone is concealed by the idea of God. (A.)
Thus Praṇava is associated with the retentive power of intellect. Do Thou, O Supreme Lord, designated as Thou art by that grand Praṇava, protect my learning — all the secret truths of the Veda that I have learned with my ears— by way of removing the obstacles of forgetfulness and the like.

**Prayer for fortune.**

Here follow the mantras with which the seeker of fortune should offer oblations:

3. **Bringing to me and increasing ever and anon clothes and kine, food and drink, doing this long, do Thou then bring to me fortune woolly, along with cattle. Svāhā!**

Then, after endowing me with medhā or intelligence, do Thou endow me with fortune which in an instant — rather, ever — will bring to me and increase clothes and kine, food and drink. For to one who is devoid of wisdom fortune is indeed only a source of evil.

Works conducing to man's good in this or the future world can be accomplished only by means of wealth, human and divine — i.e. material wealth such as money, and spiritual wealth such as contemplation of the Divine Being and wisdom. Hence the prayer for the two. — (S.)

Fortune is, said to be woolly because the fortune sought for includes goats and sheep as well as other kinds of cattle. From the context we are to understand that here the syllable 'Om ' is addressed. The word 'svāhā' shows that the mantra is intended for an oblation.

The word also marks the end of a mantra here as well as in the succeeding cases. (S.)

Do Thou, Supreme Lord, designated by Praṇava, secure to me fortune from all sources, providing me with clothes, etc., for my enjoyment, increasing them when acquired, preserving them, when thus increased, long and safe for me who is the seeker of wisdom .... To that God, who will endow me with fortune, may this thing — clarified butter or the like — be an oblation.

**Prayer for obtaining disciples.**

Now the śruti gives five, mantras wherewith the person who has been endowed with fortune abounding in clothes, food, drink, etc., offers oblations with a view to obtain disciples for the propagation of the traditional wisdom.

4. **May devotees of Brahman come to me from every side! Svāhā!**

5. **Variously may devotees of Brahman come to me! Svāhā!**

6. **Well-equipped may devotees of Brahman come, to me! Svāhā!**

7. **Self-controlled may devotees of Brahman come to me! Svahā!**

8. **Peaceful may devotees of Brahman come to me! Svahā!**

May disciples, intent on the acquisition of knowledge, come to me, a teacher of the traditional wisdom! Whatever be their respective ends — be it cattle, or the region of svarga, or the region of Brahma, or liberation, to me may they come, endued with intellectual aptitude tar wisdom, abstaining from all puerile, sportive outgoing activities of the sense-organs, free from anger and other evil tendencies of the mind!

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25 On my acquiring a knowledge of the Vedic teaching. (S)
The mantras from the 5 to 8 are not read in this context in some countries, in the belief that they belong to some other recension.26

Prayer for fame.

Here follow the mantras productive of fame as a teacher of traditional wisdom:

9. Famous among people may I become! Svāhā!
10. Superior to the wealthiest may I become! Svāhā!
   … Superior to the wealthiest among the same class of people as myself, may I become;
   that is to say, may I be superior in virtues to the class of men who possess wealth!
By Thy Grace, O Supreme Lord, may I be famous among all people as a teacher. .......

Prayer for union with the Divine.

How the worshipper may become famous and superior is described in the following mantras:

11. That Self of Thine, O God, may I enter! Svāhā!
12. Do Thou, O God, enter me. Svāhā!
13. In that Self of Thine, of a thousand branches, O God, do I wash myself. Svāhā!

Prayer for many disciples.

The śruti then proceeds to give a mantra intended to secure many disciples, illustrating the thing by analogies.

14. As waters run to a low level, as months into the year, so unto me may devotees of Brahman, O Disposer of all, come from every side! Svāhā!

Prayer for light and peace.

The year (aharjara, consumer by days, or consumer of days) is so called because, revolving round and round in the form of days, it wastes away the worlds, or because days are consumed in the year in which they are comprehended.

As water flows quickly down an inclined level, as months run into the year, not one of them transgressing it, so may the devotees of Brahman come unto me from all parts of the country with extreme quickness, and may they never transgress me!

26 Nor does Sri Sankarāchārya recognise them as forming apart of this Upanishad.
27 i.e., do Thou destroy all cause of distinction. (S.)
15. Refuge

Thou art, to me do Thou shine forth; forth unto me must Thou come!

Thou art like a refuge, like a rest-house close by, wherein to shake off all weariness. Thou art the abode wherein resting, thy devotees can shake off all sin and pain. Do Thou, therefore, shine forth to me. Do Thou come unto me: do thou make me one with Thyself, as the metallic head of an arrow (becomes one with the body it pierces into).

The seeker of fortune, as spoken of in this section — I.e. in the chapter on wisdom, — must be one who seeks wealth wherewith to perform the sacrificial rites which serve to destroy all accumulated sins of the past. It is only on the extinction of these sins that wisdom shines forth, as the smṛti says:

“Wisdom arises in men on the extinction of sinful karma. As in a clear mirror, they see the Self in the self.”

Do Thou make me illustrious as the teacher of Brahma-vidyā. Do thou come to me, i.e., be gracious to me.

LESSON V.
(Fifth Anuvāka.)

CONTEMPLATION OF THE VYAHRITIS.

Contemplation of Samhitā (conjunction) was first taught. Then followed the mantras intended for him who seeks wisdom and those intended for him who seeks fortune. These mantras subserve wisdom indirectly. Here follows the contemplation of Brahma within, in the form of Vyahritis, the utterances whereby to secure the fruits, of self-lordship (svarājya).

Accordingly this section proceeds to extol His glory. (S.)

The three Vyahritis being held in high regard, Brahma declared independently of them may not be readily accepted by the intellect; wherefore the śruti teaches the disciple to contemplate, within the heart, Brahma, otherwise termed the Hiranyakarītha, as embodied in the Vyāhritis. — (A.)

The fifth and the sixth anuvākas treat of the contemplation of Brahma; the fifth treating of the contemplation of the subordinate Devatas, while the sixth treats of Brahma, the Supreme Devatā. First, the Śruti speaks of the three as the symbols of the three subordinate Devatās.

The three Utterances.

1. Bhūḥ, Bhuvāḥ, Suvaḥ; there are thus, verily, these three utterances.

The utterances mentioned here are known as the most celebrated ones. Vyahritis are so called because they are uttered in various rituals, such as agnihotra, as is well known to all.

The Fourth Utterance.

Having thus spoken of the three Vyahritis well known in connection with the ritualistic section, the śruti proceeds to declare another Vyāhrīti as a symbol:

2. Of them, verily, that one, the fourth, 'Mahaḥ', did the son of Mahāchamasa discover.

28 Or the haunt of all living creatures — (S.)
This Vyāhṛti, namely 'Mahah', is the fourth of them. It was the son of Mahachamasa that discovered this fourth Vyāhṛti. As a past event is described here, the present tense should be understood in the sense of past time. Mention of Mahachamasya is intended to show that the Vyāhṛti was discovered by a Rishi. Since the name of the Rishi is mentioned here, we understand that contemplation of the Rishi forms an integral part of the upāsana taught here.

Mahachamasa is so named after the great vessel (chamasa) of Soma. The vessel of Soma is spoken of as 'great', because it is used in most of the Soma sacrifices. His son is the र्षि here referred to as Mahāchamasya. That र्षि teaches the Vyāhṛti 'Mahah', — the fourth of the Vyāhṛti of which three have been mentioned as Bhuḥ etc., — as the main object of contemplation.

Contemplation of the Utterances.

Now the śruti proceeds to enjoin how the four Vyāhṛti should be regarded in contemplation.

3. That is Brahman; that is ātman; its limbs the other Gods.

The Vyāhṛti uttered as Mahah, and discovered by the son of Mahāchamasa, that is Brahman.29 Indeed, Brahman is Mahat (the Great); and the fourth Vyāhṛti, too, is Mahah? — What else is that Vyāhṛti? It is that ātman,30 because it is all-reaching. The other Vyāhṛtis, — i.e., the worlds, the Gods, the Vedas, the praṇas, — are all, indeed, reached by the Vyāhṛti, 'Mahah,' i.e., by the sun, the moon, Brahman (Prāṇava) and food respectively. The other Gods are therefore its limbs. Here 'Gods' stand for others also, namely, worlds, Vedas and praṇas.

"Mahah, the fourth Vyāhṛti, should be regarded as Brahman, the Reality. Because it is Brahman, this fourth Vyāhṛti is Atman abiding in the middle of the body. The other Gods of the Vyāhṛtis should be regarded as its limbs, namely, hands, feet, and the like. Or, this may be a mere raise of the fourth Vyāhṛti, no contemplation of them as such being enjoined here. The word 'Mahah' being derived from a root meaning 'to worship,' it is but proper to praise the Vyāhṛti as Brahman, the Adorable One. Just as the conscious Self is superior to the limbs of the body, so 'Mahah' the fourth Vyāhṛti is superior to the other Vyāhṛtis.

Contemplation of the Utterances as the Worlds.

The Upaniṣad proceeds to enjoin the contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis as the worlds:—

4. As Bhuḥ, verily, is this world; as Bhuvaḥ, the mid-region; as Suvaḥ, the other world; as Mahah, the sun; by the sun, indeed, do all worlds excel.

Because Gods, the worlds, etc., are all the limbs of the Vyāhṛti 'Mahah' which is the trunk as it were, therefore it is said that by the sun the worlds attain growth and so forth. It is indeed by the trunk of the body that the limbs attain growth. — Thus the first Vyāhṛti 'Bhūḥ' should be regarded as the world, as Agni, as the Rig-Veda, as praṇa; and so should the other Vyāhṛtis be regarded each in four forms.

The Vyāhṛti 'Mahah' is the trunk as it were of Brahman or the Hiraṇyagarbha who ensouls the worlds etc. As the trunk of the body contributes to the growth of the limbs, so in the form of the sun etc., the Vyāhṛti 'Mahah' contributes to the growth of the worlds' and so on. This is another reason why Mahah is spoken of as ātman, the first reason being that Mahah reaches all. (A. & S.)

29 That is to say, let this fourth Vyāhṛti be contemplated upon as Brahman. It should be regarded as -Brahman, because of its greatness, and as ātman because it pervades all. (S.)
30 ātman is derived from a root which means 'to reach,' 'to pervade'.
Because all worlds fall within the ken of our regard (mAḥ — to regard with reverence) only when illumined by the sun, it is very proper that Mahaḥ should be regarded as the sun.

Contemplation of the Utterances as Gods.

Now the Upaniṣad enjoins the contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis as Gods:

5. As Bhūḥ, verily, is Agni, Fire; as Bhuvaḥ is Vāyu, the Air; as Suvaḥ is Āditya, the Sun; as Mahaḥ is Chandramas, the Moon; by Chandramas, indeed, do all luminaries excel.

It is only when the moon shines that all the stars around shine in excellent forms.

Contemplation of the Utterances as Vedas.

Then the Upaniṣad enjoins the contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis as the Vedas;

6. As Bhūḥ, verily, as the Riks; as Bhuvaḥ, the Sāmans; as Suvaḥ, the Yajuses; as Mahaḥ, Brahman; by Brahman, indeed, do all the Vedas excel.

"Brahman" here means the syllable 'Om'; none else can be meant here where we are concerned with words, namely, the Vedas.

The Riks, the Sāmans, and the Yajuses refer to the mantras occurring in the three Vedas respectively. 'Brahman' here denotes the syllable 'Om.' By 'Om' indeed are all the Vedas made excellent, inasmuch as the recitation of the Vedas is preceded by that of the Praṇava.

Contemplation of the Utterances as life-breaths.

Now the Upaniṣad enjoins the contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis as life-breath:

7. As Bhūḥ, verily, is the upward life; as Bhuvaḥ, the downward life; as Suvaḥ, the pervading life; as Mahaḥ, the food; by food, indeed, do all lives excel.

It is only when food is eaten that the cravings of vitality are satisfied. Vyāhṛtis represent Puruṣa in His sixteen phases.

Now the Upaniṣad concludes its teaching concerning the Vyāhṛtis regarded as the worlds and so on: They, verily,' these four (Vyāhṛtis) become fourfold; four, four are the Vyāhṛtis.

They, namely, these four (Vyāhṛtis), Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Suvaḥ and Mahaḥ are each fourfold, each being in four forms. Four in all, they become each four. Reiteration of them as presented above is meant to impress that they should necessarily be contemplated in the aforesaid manner.

It is not merely to magnify the Vyāhṛtis that this is repeated. It is intended to impress that each Vyāhṛti should be contemplated in its four aspects, so that the contemplation may comprehend the Supreme Spirit (Puruṣa) in His sixteen phases (A.)

Each Vyāhṛti becoming four, the Vyāhṛtis in all become sixteen. To show that all of them should enter into the contemplation, 'four' is twice repeated in the last sentence.

Contemplation of the Utterances enjoined.

Now the Upaniṣad enjoins the contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis:

8. Whoso contemplates them, he knows Brahman; to him do all Devas offer tribute. He who contemplates the Vyāhṛtis mentioned above knows Brahman.
(Objection):— Brahman being already known, been declared above "That is Brahman; That the ātmā, there is no necessity to declare here that he knows Brahman, as if Brahman were unknown before.

(Answer):— No. There is no room here for such objection, because the śrūti intends to teach something in special about Brahman. — True; that the fourth Vyāhṛti is Brahman has been known; but neither the distinctive feature of His being knowable within the heart nor the whole description (to be given in the next lesson) of Himself and of His attributes, that He is formed of thought, that He is full of peace, and so on, is yet known. It is indeed with a view to teach all this that the śāstra looks upon Brahman as if unknown and says "he knows Brahman." Hence no room for the objection. The meaning is this: he knows Brahman, who contemplates Him as possessed of all the attributes to be described in the sequel. So that this lesson relates to the same thing that is treated of in the next: both the lessons treat, indeed, of one and the same upāsana. And there is also something in the sequel which points to this conclusion. The words "He is established in Fire as Bhūḥ" constitute a mark pointing to the unity of upāsana. Nothing here goes to signify that two distinct contemplations are here enjoined. There are no words, indeed, such as ' Veda;' 'upāsīta,' i.e. 'let him regard,' 'let him contemplate,' — marking off one injunction from the other. The words "he who knows (veda) them," occurring in the fifth lesson refer to what is to come next and does not therefore point to any distinction in the contemplation (upāsana). It has been shown how these words refer to what is to be said in the next lesson which teaches the distinctive features of Brahman (to be contemplated here).

9. To him who contemplates thus, all Devas, becoming his subordinates, bring tribute on his attaining to self-lordship (svarajya). All the worlds as well as all Devas contribute to his enjoyment according to their respective powers. This is the fruit accruing to the contemplator.

To 'him who contemplates the Vyāhṛtis regarded as the Earth, and, so on, Indra and all other Gods pay reverential homage.

(Objection):— He who contemplates symbols such as the Vyāhṛtis here spoken of cannot attain to the Brahma-loka, inasmuch as in the Vedānta-sūtras, IV. iii. 15, it has been determined that those alone attain to that region who contemplate Brahman independent of a symbol. Thus as they do, not attain to Brahman, it is not right to say that he is worshipped by all Gods.

(Answer):— No such objection can be urged here. For, when a person contemplates the Vyāhṛtis, he contemplates Brahman also as taught in the next lesson. The contemplation of Brahman is, indeed, the primary factor, while the contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis is supplemental to it. The contemplator, therefore, does attain to Brahman, and it is but right to say that he will be worshipped by all Gods.

LESSON 6.
(Sixth Anuvāka.)

CONTEMPLATION OF BRAHMAN.

It has been said that the other Gods represented by Bhūḥ, Bhuvah, and Suvah, are the limbs of Brahman, the Hiranyagarbha represented by Mahāḥ, the fourth Vyāhṛti. Now the śrūti declares that the hrdaya-ākāśa, the bright space in the heart, is the proper place for the contemplation and immediate perception of that Brahman whose limbs the other Gods are, just as the salagrama stone is the proper place for the contemplation of Vishnu. Indeed, when contemplated there, that Brahman is immediately perceived in all His attributes, as formed of thought and so on, as the amalaka fruit
is seen in full when held in the palm. It is necessary also to declare the path by which to attain to the state of the universal Self. With this end in view the śruti proceeds with the sixth anuvāka.

**Brahman in the Heart.**

1. **Here, in this bright space within the heart, is He, that Self who is formed of thought, un-dying, full of light.**

The heart is the lotus-like fleshy organ, the seat of life, with the apertures of many a nādi opening into it, with its head downward; and it is seen and well recognized by all when a sacrificial animal is dissected. There is ākāśa or bright space within it as there is in a vessel. Therein is the Puruṣa, the Self, so called because He lies in the body, or because by Him the Earth and all other worlds are filled. He is mano-maya, formed of manas, thought or consciousness, — so described because He is known through thought or consciousness. Or, 'manas' may mean antah-karaṇa, the organ of thinking, and the Mano-maya is He who identifies Himself with thought, or whose characteristic mark it is. He is immortal. He is effulgent, full of light.

Brahman, who has been declared as if He were remote, is now said to be the immediate one. Do thou see the Self by thyself in the space within the heart. This space within the heart is the abode of buddhi, the intellect. There dwells the Self (Puruṣa) to be cognized immediately as one formed of thought (Mano-maya). The Self is spoken of as Mano-maya because, just as Rahu, the eclipsing shadow, is seen along with the moon, so is the Self directly seen only along with the manas. Or, because the manas is the organ by which the Soul (Puruṣa) can think of objects, He is 'spoken of as Mano-maya. Or, the Soul is spoken of as Mano-maya because He identifies Himself with manas; or because the Soul is manifested through manas, which therefore forms the mark pointing to His existence. (Ś).

In the fifth lesson the contemplation of the subordinate Gods has been taught. The sixth treats of the contemplation of the paramount God.

In the middle of the heart-lotus there is ākāśa, the bright space, of the same capacity as the thumb of the individual to whom the heart belongs, and so often talked of in the Śrutis and in the Yoga-Śāstras. In this bright space is Puruṣa, the Paramatman, the Highest Self, the All-pervading. He is no doubt everywhere; but here the śruti teaches that the heart is the place where we may contemplate and realize Him. Indeed, manas can intuitively realize Him only when, having been restrained by samādhi in the middle of the heart, it becomes one-pointed, as the śruti else where says "He is seen by the sharp intellect." The word 'this' (Sanskrit 'ayam' = this here) preceding the word 'soul,' signifies immediateness and therefore shows that the Soul is capable of being immediately realized in intuition. That Soul shines forth in all His grace and beauty when contemplated in the middle of the heart. Accordingly the heart is spoken of in connection with the Dahara-vidyā and Śāndilya-Vidyā.31 Manas is the main feature of the Soul who is thus to be contemplated in the heart: those who seek knowledge realize Him by manas, and those who resort to contemplation have to meditate with manas. He transcends death and shines by His own light.

**The Path of Light leading to Brahman.**

Now the Śruti proceeds to show the path by which the sage attains to Brahman described above, as realized in the bright space of the heart, forming the very Self of the sage, and here referred to as Indra, the Lord:

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31 Vide Chhāṇḍogya-Upanishad VIII. 1-6; III. 14.
2. In the mid-region of the throat's two pillars, that which hangs down like a nipple, that is the birth-place of Indra, where the hair-end splits up dividing the two regions of the skull.

There is a nādi (tube) called suṣumna, passing upward from the heart, and often referred to in the yoga-śāstras. It passes through the mid-region of the throat's two pillars, as also of that bit of flesh which hangs down like a nipple between the throat's two pillars, and through the region of the skull where the roots of hair lie apart. When it reaches this last place, the nādi passes up breaking open the two regions of the head. That is the birth-place of Indra, that the path by which to attain to one's own true nature.

The suṣumna-nādi which starts up from the heart forms the path by which to reach Indra, the Lower Brahman presented here for contemplation. This path will be found described at length in the works on Yoga. The sage has to force his way up through the nipple-like piece of flesh hanging down in the throat with its face turned downward, and to pass by the path of suṣumna filled with udāna-Vāyu, the up-going current of the vital air. This, it should be known, is the path of Indra, and the sage can effect his passage through it by means of the Rechaka-Prāṇāyāma, that process of restraining breath which consists in driving the life-current upwards and outwards. Passing by that path, he breaks open the two regions of the skull and reaches the surface of the head where we find the hair-roots parted from one another (S.&A.)

The right and left sides of the mouth's interior situated just above the root of the tongue are called the tālukas, "the throat's two pillars." Between them lies a small piece of flesh hanging down like the nipple of a heifer, and often referred to in the Yoga-śāstras, 32 quite visible to others, and even touched by an expert in the Lambikā-yoga (Ibid p.128) with the tip of his own tongue. That is the seat of Indra, of Paramesvara, the Supreme Lord. This piece of flesh stands for the Sushumna nādi; and the śruti here speaks of it as if it were Sushumna itself which lies quite close to it, in the same way that, when pointing out the moon, we point to the end of a tree's branch as the place where the moon is. And penetrating into this nādi, the mind becomes one-pointed, and is then able to immediately realize the Paramatman, the Supreme Self. To this end the Kshurika-Upaniṣad reads as follows:

"There are one-hundred and one nādis. Of them sushumna is regarded the best, which rests in the Supreme, untainted, of the same form 'as Brahman. Ida lies to the left and Pingala to the right. Between them is the Supreme Abode, and he that knows It knows the Veda."

Thus, the Suṣumna-nādi is the abode of the Supreme Lord. And it is His abode because it is also the path by which to attain immortality. That it is the path to immortality is declared by the Chhandogas and the Kaṭhas as follows:

"Of the heart there are a hundred nādis and one more; of them that one pierces right through the head. Rising up by this, one reaches deathlessness; the others, leading in divers ways, are used for going out." (Kaṭha-Upa. 6-16. Chāṇḍogya-Upa. 8-6-6.)

The Sushumnā-nādi forces its way up between the right and left portions of the head especially there where the roots of the hair lie. Just as the tip of the hair beyond which there is no hair is spoken of as the hair-end, so here the root of the hair below which there is no hair is spoken of as the hair-end.

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32 Vide Minor Upanishads Vol. II. pp. 62-66
State of Brahman attained.

Having thus taught the path of the upāsaka's exit for attaining the fruit of the contemplation, the śruti proceeds to declare what that fruit is:

3. In Agni as Bhūḥ he rests, in Vāyu as Bhuvaḥ, in Adītya as Suvaḥ, in Brahman as Mahaḥ. He attains self-lordship; he attains to the lord of manas, the lord of speech, the lord of sight, the lord of hearing, the lord of intelligence. Then he becomes this, the Brahman whose body is the bright space, whose nature is true, whose delight is life, whose manas is bliss, who is replete with peace, who is immortal.

By that path, he who thus contemplates and realizes that Self who is formed of thought makes his exit from the head and becomes established in Agni (Fire),

Represented by the vyāḥṛti 'bhūḥ' — who is the lord of this world, a limb as it were of the Great Brahman; i.e., in the form of Agni he pervades this world. Similarly in Vāyu, Air, represented by the second Vyāḥṛti, 'Bhuvaḥ,' he is established. So, too, he is established in Ādītya, the Sun, represented by the third vyāḥṛti, ' Suvaḥ.' He is also established in Brahman, the main body represented by the fourth vyāḥṛti ' Mahaḥ.' Resting in them all as their very Self, becoming Brahman Himself, he attains to svārājya, self-lordship; i.e. he becomes himself the lord of the body represented by subordinate Gods, in the same way that Brahman is their lord.

In this world, he who has none else for his king, who is himself the king, is said to be a svarāj, an independent lord. The contemplator becomes such a king here and attains to such kingship over manas, speech, sight, ear, intellect; there is no doubt of it. Such excellent results accrue from the contemplation of the Divine Being described above- (S.)

And to him all Gods will offer tribute in subordination to him, just as they offer tribute to Brahman. He attains to the lord of manas; he attains indeed to the Lord of all minds, to Brahman who is the Soul of all things. It is indeed Brahman who thinks with all minds. To Brahman he attains who contemplates Him in the aforesaid manner. Moreover, he becomes the lord of all organs of speech, the lord of all organs of sight, of all organs of hearing, and of all organs of understanding. As the Soul of all things he becomes the owner of the sense-organs of all beings of life.

Moreover, he becomes something even greater than that; he becomes, to wit, the very Brahman of whom we are speaking, whose body is ākāśa, the bright space, rather, whose body is as subtle as ākāśa; whose nature is true whether expressed through matter with form or through formless matter; who sports in the prānas or life-functions, who is the pleasure-ground of all life-functions; to whom the mind causes nothing but happiness; who is peace and perfection, who is found full of peace and endowed with the attribute of immortality. It should be here understood that these additional attributes pertain to the same Being who has been already described as Mano-maya and so on.

The Śruti here describes the form of Brahman represented by the Vyāḥṛti, with a view to enjoin the contemplation thereof. As the life-giving Soul of the three worlds, this Brahman expresses Himself in as 'sat-tva,' as 'sat' and 'tyād,' as 'mūrta' and 'amūrta,' as matter with form and as matter with no form. He has His pleasure-ground in the senses (prānas); or, in Him the senses have their pleasure-ground. (S.)

By the contemplation of the three Vyāḥṛtis the contemplator becomes established in Agni and so on: he attains the powers which Agni, Vāyu and Ādītya possess. By the contemplation of the fourth Vyāḥṛti he becomes established in Brahman abiding in the Satyaloka he attains the power of that Brahman. It is this power which is described at length in the words "he attains self-lordship" etc. He

33 See Brḥ. Up. 2-3. The air and ether (ākāśa) are formless, while light, water and earth present themselves in forms.
becomes himself the Lord of Agni and other subordinate Gods. Because he is their king, it is said that all the Devas offer tribute to him. Not only does he become himself the lord of all, he attains to lordship over the minds of all beings of life. As the very Soul of all living beings, he is the lord of all sense-organs. The anthaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense which is one in itself, is spoken of as manas and vijnāna, in virtue of its two distinct functions: when acting as an organ, it is called manas, the mind, while acting as an agent it is spoken of as vijnāna, the intellect. Formerly, he was the lord of the mind, speech and other organs pertaining to an individual organism, whereas, now that he has by contemplation attained to the upādhi of the Virāj, to the state of the Universal Soul, he becomes the lord of the mind, speech, etc., pertaining to all organisms.

After attaining to the state of the Virāj, the Macrocosmic Soul, he will be endowed with a knowledge of the real nature of Brahman; and when nescience (avidyā) is thus destroyed, he attains to a state which the śruti proceeds to describe as follows: Like ākāśa. Brahman is, in His nature, devoid of form. Or, to interpret the śruti in another way, as the basic Reality on which the imagination of the whole universe rests, Brahman is the essence of all; and, as such, may be said to be one with ākāśa in nature. In ākāśa there are two elements found, one being the Real Basic Substance that may be described as Sat, Chit, Ānanda, or Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, and the other being an imaginary element made up of nāma and rūpa, name and form. The latter of the two elements, composed of name and form, is false and cannot therefore constitute the nature of Brahman; but the Basic Substance is real and constitutes the nature of Brahman. The same thing is meant when Brahman is described as one "whose nature is true." As the Reality whereon rests the whole imaginary universe, Brahman's being is real, can never be reduced to a non-entity. So also, all life's play, all its activity such as birth and the like, takes place in Brahman. That prāṇa or life is born of Brahman is declared as follows: "From Him is prāṇa born, manas and all senses." (Munḍaka-Up 2-1-3.) The same thing is taught in the form of question and answer:

Question:— "Blessed Lord, whence is this prāṇa born?" (Prasna-Up 3-1)

Answer:— "From ātman is this prāṇa born." (Ibid. 3-3)

The śruti thus speaking of prāṇa's birth also serves to account for the popular notions as to the Atman being present in the body or departing from it. This, too, has been declared by the śruti as follows:

"On what staying shall I say? Thus thinking, He evolved prāṇa.' (Ibid. 6-3, 4)

Brahman is the seat of all this play of life. And Brahman is the Being in whom lies the bliss of manas. When manas ceases to face sense-objects and turns towards Brahman, then it is that great happiness accrues to manas. And this is declared in the Maitreya-Upaniṣad as follows:

"That happiness which belongs to a mind which by deep meditation has been washed clean from all impurity and has entered within the Self cannot be described here by words; it can felt by the inner power only."

In this Upaniṣad, too, it is declared as follows:

"Nectar, in good sooth, this (soul) possessing a thing of bliss becomes." (Tait. Up. 2-7)

And Brahman is replete with peace, the mind having ceased altogether to wander away. Indeed, Brahman being known, the mind, immersed as it is in the pure nectar of bliss, will never wander away. This kind of peace is described by the Svetasvataras in the words:— "knowing Siva he attains unlimited peace." (Op. cit. 4-14)

The Lord also has taught as follows:

"Thus always keeping the mind steadfast, the yogin, with the mind controlled, attains to the peace to be found in Me, culminating in Nirvana." (B.G. 6:15)
Wherefore, Brahman is full of peace obtaining in the mind. Or, the peace now spoken of may be said to inhere in Brahman Himself. Unlike Maya, which is subject to change, transforming itself into the universe, Brahman never changes; He is quite immutable (kūṭastha), as the śruti says,

"Unborn is ātman, great and firm." (Brh. Up. 4:4:20)

Accordingly, Brahman is replete with peace inherent in Himself. And Brahman is devoid of death. Death means departure of the vital breath from the body, and this is possible only in the case of the Jīva who is associated with the vital air, not in the case of the Paramātman, unassociated with the vital air. The absence of the vital air in Brahman is declared elsewhere in the śruti as follows: "He is without life.; without manas, pure." (Munḍ. Up. 2:1:2)

**Contemplation of Brahman enjoined.**

Having thus described the Entity to be contemplated, the path by which to reach to Him, as also the fruits of the contemplation, the Śruti proceeds to enjoin the contemplation as follows:—

4. Thus, do thou, O Prachīṇa-yogya, contemplate.

Thus do thou, O Prachīṇa-yogya, contemplate Brahman described above, endued with the attribute of thought and so on. This exhortation of the teacher implies the high regard he has for the truth here taught.

Thus does the Teacher named Mahāchamasya instruct the disciple who is prācīṇa-yogya, i.e., who has prepared himself for the course of contemplation, having washed away all his sins by the observance of all obligatory rites prescribed in the former (or ritualistic) section, both nitya and naimittika, those which have to be practiced every day of one's life as well as those which have to be performed on particular occasions. The word "thus" shows that the disciple has to contemplate the Entity described as dwelling within the heart and so on, with the attributes described in the words "whose body is ākasa," and so on. No doubt, in the words "This then he becomes," the śruti seems to imply that the state of Brahman is the result to which the contemplator will attain after having attained to the condition of the Virāj; and we should accordingly understand that the sequel the portion commencing with "whose body is ākasa," and so on. No doubt, in the words "This then he becomes," the śruti declares that the object of contemplation and the resultant state should be identical, the attributes described in the words "whose body is ākāśa" should also enter into the contemplation of Brahman here taught. Hence it is that the Teacher (Sankaracharya) has construed the passage as describing the attributes of Brahman here presented for contemplation.

**The Fifth and Sixth Lessons treat of one and the same Upāsana.**

Now we have to discuss the following question: Do the Fifth and Sixth Lessons treat of one upāsana or two different upāsanas?

(Prima facie view):— They treat of two different uplands, inasmuch as the things to be contemplated as well as the fruits of contemplation spoken of in the two lessons are different. In the fifth, the thing to be contemplated is a symbol, the Vyāhṛtis, regarded as the worlds etc., whereas, in the sixth, the object of contemplation is Brahman formed of thought and endued with other attributes. In the former the fruit of the contemplation is described in the words "To him all Devas offer tribute; whereas the latter speaks of quite a different result, namely, the attainment of independent sovereignty. Therefore the upāsanas treated of in the two lessons are quite different.

(Conclusion): — Both being addressed to one and the same person, one upāsana alone is taught in the two places. In the words;— "whoso contemplates them, he knows Brahman " (V. 9) the śruti declares that the contemplation of Brahman is intended for the same person for whom the contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis is intended. Further, the sixth lesson declares the fruits of the
contemplation of the Vyāhṛtis as well, in the words "In Agni as Bhūḥ he becomes established." (VI. 3). Wherefore, one upāsana alone is taught in both the lessons. As to the difference in the things to be contemplated, it may be easily explained by considering their mutual relation to be one of āngaṅga-bhāva, that of chief and subordinate factors. Then, the offering of tribute by all the Devas may be regarded as the fruit accruing from the āṅga or subordinate factor. In the case of the fruit of a subordinate factor spoken of in the passage "He who pours oblation with the leaf-ladle (parṇamayī juhuh), he never hears of evil repute," (Taittiriya-saṁhitā III.5.7) it is but proper to maintain that the passage is intended merely to recommend the main act of sacrifice, but not to reveal any particular fruit accruing from the subordinate factor referred to, inasmuch as nobody ever seeks to know the fruit of the act of pouring oblations with a leaf-ladle, that act forming but an integral part of the main sacrifice and being therefore incapable of producing any fruit of its own, distinct from the fruits of the main act. But, here, contemplation of Brahman, independent of the Vyāhṛtis, is possible, and it may therefore be concluded that the latter is taught with a view to a particular fruit of its own; and its fruits are spoken of not merely with a view to recommend the main factor in the contemplation. The two, therefore, together constitute one upāsana, of which they are respectively the chief and subordinate factors.

Many are the Self-Comprehending Upāsanas.

We cannot, however, by extending the principle thus established to the contemplation of Brahman as earth &c. to be taught in the Seventh Lesson, hold that it constitutes one upāsana with what is taught in the Sixth Lesson; for, on the principle discussed in connection with the Sandilya-Śṛṇvāṇa. The Dahara-Vidyā, the Dahara-Vidyā, and the like, it must be quite distinct from the other. This latter principle is determined in the Vedānta-Sūtras III. iii. 58. as follows:

(Question):— The Dahara-Vidyā (Chhan. Up. 8:1-6), the Sānḍilya-Vidyā, (Ibid 3:14) the Madhu-Vidyā (Ibid 3:1-11) and the like, are described in the Chāṇḍogya and other Upaniṣads. Now a question arises as to whether all these vidyās (contemplations) together constitute one upāsana or each constitutes a distinct upāsana by itself.

(Prima facie view):— On the principle determined in the preceding section, all of them constitute together but one upāsana, inasmuch as a contemplation of all of them put together is the best course and there is but one Brahman.

(Conclusion):— Because it is impossible to practice all contemplations combined into one whole, the Vidyās must be different. And Brahman, the object of contemplation in these Vidyās, cannot be regarded as one and the same; for, He differs with the different attributes assigned to Him. Nor is it impossible to determine the scope of each Vidyā, inasmuch as in each case the upakrama and the upasamhāra, the opening and the concluding sentences, serve to clearly define the limits of the Vidyā. Therefore the several Vidyās are distinct from one another.

One alone of the Self-Comprehending Upāsanas should be practiced.

The two Vidyās described in the Sixth and Seventh Lessons being thus distinct from each other, one alone of them should be practiced, but not both. This point has been determined in the same work III. iii. 59.

(Question):— Now, Upāsanas are either Self-comprehending or symbolic. The former comprise all the contemplations of the Conditioned Ātman, in each of which the Being contemplated upon is, as pointed out in the Vedānta-sūtras IV. 1.3, regarded as one's own Self; and the latter are concerned with the contemplation of the symbols (pratīkās), of things external to the Self and elevated in thought by being studiedly regarded as some Devata or God. Is there, or is there not, a restriction as to the number of the Self-comprehending Upāsanas which one should practice?
(Prima facie view):— Of the Self-comprehending Vidyās such as Sandilya-Vidyā, either one alone may be practiced, or two, or three, as a person chooses, since no authority constrains us to practice any one or more particular upāsanas; and there is indeed no reason whatever why a person should practice the Sandilya-Vidyā alone or the Dahara-Vidyā alone, or any other Vidyā exclusively. The matter is therefore left to one's own choice.

(Conclusion):— There is in the first place one determining factor, namely, the fact that no purpose is served by others.

To explain; The object of the Upāsana is an immediate intuitive realization of īśvara. If it can be accomplished by a single upāsana, other upāsanas serve no purpose. Moreover, the realization obtained by an upāsana is not one brought about by an organ of right knowledge; it is, on the other hand, generated by incessant meditation and consists in thinking of oneself as one with the Entity contemplated upon. How can this idea of identity remain firm, when, after practicing one kind of upāsana, the person abandons it and resorts to another, and thus his mind passes from one idea to another? Thus, by reason of the practice of more than one upāsana having no purpose to serve and even causing unsteadiness of mind, it is necessary that one alone of the Self-comprehending upāsanas should be practiced, and no more.

Contemplation of Brahman as the Self.

As in the case of the right knowledge of Brahman, so, even when contemplating Brahman, He should be regarded as one with the Self. That the right knowledge of Brahman consists in knowing that He is one with one's own Self has been shown in the Vedānta-Sūtras IV. i. 3:

(Question):— Should the knower apprehend Brahman as distinct from himself or as one with his own Self?

(Prima facie view):— Brahman treated of in the scriptures should be known by jīva, the knower, to be quite distinct from himself, inasmuch as jīva and Brahman cannot be identical, the one being subject to misery, and the other being above all misery.

(Conclusion):— The difference lies only in the upādhi. It has been clearly shown in the Vedānta-sūtras II. iii. 40 that jīva, though Brahman in reality, is subject to the miseries of worldly existence as caused by his connection with the upādhi of antaḥ-kāraṇa. As there is no real distinction between them, it should be known that Brahman is identical with one's own Self. Hence it is that those who know the real truth understand Brahman to be identical with the Self, as declared in the grand propositions "I am Brahman;" "This Self is Brahman;" and they even teach the same thing to their disciples in the words “That, Thou art." Therefore it should be known that Brahman is identical with the Self.

Accordingly, in the present case, the contemplation should be practiced thus: "I am the Paramatman, the Supreme Self, formed of thought, immortal, full of light."

How Paramatman is Mano-maya, formed of thought.

In the Vedānta-sūtras I. ii. i. it has been discussed, with reference to the Sandilya-Vidyā, how the Paramātman can be spoken of as Mano-maya, formed of thought.

(Question):— In the Chāṇḍogya-Upaniṣad, the Entity to be contemplated is described as “formed of thought, luminous in form, embodied in prāṇa." (Op. cit. 3:14:2) Is it jīva or īśvara who is thus spoken of?

(Prima facie view):— It is jīva; for, in the case of jīva it is easy to explain his connection with manas and the like. The word "mano-maya" meaning “formed of manas” refers to a connection with manas or thought, and the word "prāṇa-śārīra" meaning “having prāṇa for his body " refers to a
connection with prāṇa or life. Neither of these can be explained in the case of Iśvara, owing to the denial of manas and prāṇa (in the description of Iśvara) in the words “Having no prāṇa, having no manas, who is pure.” (Mūṇḍ. Up. 2:1:2) Moreover, it can in no way be explained how He who has no place to rest in can have His abode in the heart, or how He who pervades all can be very small in size as declared by the śrutī in the Sandilya-Vidyā: “This Ātman who is within the heart, and who is very small.” (Chhan. Up. 3:14:3) Hence it is Jīva that is spoken of in the passage referred to.

(Conclusion):— The very Brahman who is spoken of in the preceding passage where peace (sama) is enjoined in the words "All this is Brahman, born from Him, dissolving into and breathing in Him; so let every one contemplate Him in peace", (Ibid. 3:14:1) is the Thing to which the epithets 'mano-maya' and 'prana-śaṅkāra' refer. The meaning of the passage which enjoins peace may be explained as follows: — All that we see is Brahman, because from Him it is born, unto Him it dissolves, and in Him it breathes. Therefore, since Brahman who is Himself the All can have no likes or dislikes, one should be peaceful at the time of contemplation. Brahman being thus construed to be the subject of discussion in this passage, the next passage in which the epithet 'mano-maya' occurs must also refer to Brahman. And there is no inconsistency in speaking of Brahman associated with manas and prāṇa; for, though not applicable to the Unconditioned, the epithets can be explained as showing how Brahman should be contemplated in His conditioned form. Therefore, here as in all other Upaniṣads, Brahman is declared to be the object of worship. Nowhere, indeed, in the Upaniṣads, is Jīva declared to be the object of worship. The conclusion, therefore, is that it is Brahman who should be contemplated.

Just as, in the Chāṇḍogya-Upanishad, it is to Brahman spoken of in the passage enjoining peace during contemplation that the epithet 'mano-maya' refers, so also, here in this lesson, it is the Paramātman, designated by the word ‘puruṣa’ which means 'all-pervading', who is spoken of as 'formed of thought'. That the word 'puruṣa' means 'all-pervading' is taught in the Sreya-mārga as follows:—

"Puruṣa is so called because of His lying in the body, or because He is full in Himself, or because all we see is pervaded by Him."

(Objection):— The first etymology "lying in the body " applies to jīva also.

(Answer):— No, because Brahman is here the subject of treatment, as shown by the opening words “whoso knoweth these, he knoweth Brahman," as also by the concluding words “Brahman whose body is the bright space."

How Brahman is full of light.

That the words “full of light” may be applied to Brahman has been determined in the Vedānta-Sūtras I. i. 20 as follows:—

(Question):— In the first adhyāya of the Chāṇḍogya-Upanishad, the śrutī first taught all the subsidiary objects of contemplation connected with the Udgītha-Upāsana and then proceeds to speak of the main object of contemplation in the following words:

"Now that golden (i. e., full of light) Soul (Puruṣa) who is seen within the sun," and so on.

Now, in the solar orb there dwells a certain jīva or individual soul who, in virtue of his works (karma) and knowledge (vidyā) of a superior kind, has attained to the position of a God (Deva) and is engaged in the government of the world. And, as present everywhere, Iśvara dwells in the solar orb also. Hence the question, which of the two is spoken of in the passage quoted above?
(Prima facie view):— It may be that the Devatā or the Individual Intelligence functioning in the solar orb is referred to here; for the soul (puruṣa) here spoken of is said to have a limited sovereignty, a seat and a color. His limited sovereignty is referred to in the following words:

“And He is the lord of these worlds which are beyond it (the sun), as also of the desires of the Devas.” (Ibid.1-6-8.)

And His seat is referred to in the words "who is seen (lying) within the sun". The epithet "golden ‘ refers to His color. Now, Paramesvara who is the Lord of all, who is the abode of all, who has no color or form, cannot, indeed, be said to have a limited sovereignty, or to dwell in another as His abode, or to possess a color or form. Wherefore it must be some Devata or Individual Intelligence who is here spoken of.

(Conclusion):— -The 'golden Puruṣa' here spoken of must be the Iśvara, for He is said to be the Sarvātman, Himself the all, to be one with all, to be immanent in all things as their very essence. In the passage, “That is the Rik, that the Sāman, that the Uktha, that the Yajus, that the Brahman (Vedas),” (Ibid.1-7-5.) the śruti refers by the word 'that' to the golden Puruṣa, the subject of discussion, and teaches that He is one with the whole universe including the Rik, Sāman etc. And this can literally apply to the One Second-less Paramesvara, not to a Devatā or Individual Intelligence of the dual universe. And the attribute of being free from all sins, as described in the words “He has risen above all sins,” is a characteristic mark of Brahman. No doubt, the Devata of the solar orb has risen above works (karma) and therefore generates no acts of virtue and sin in the present or in the future; but, as He is still subject to pain caused by the asuras (demons) and the like, we may presume that the accumulated sins of past births still cling to Him, giving rise to the pain. The limited sovereignty, seat, and color pertaining to an upādhi can also apply to the Paramātman, the object of worship, when associated with the upādhi. Wherefore it is iśvara who is spoken of as the golden Soul (Puruṣa).

Attributes of Brahman mentioned elsewhere should be borrowed.

Just as, in the passages of the Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad under reference, oneness with all and the like attributes are regarded as characteristic features of Brahman, so, here in the Sixth Lesson, immortality and true-naturedness and the like may be regarded as characteristic features of Brahman. Therefore, it is the Paramatman who should be contemplated upon as ended with intelligence and other qualities. In the Śāṇḍilya-Vidyā the Chhandogas read as follows:—

"Full of intelligence, embodied in life, luminous in form, of unfailing will." (Chha. Up. 3-14-2.)

The Vajasneyins, again, read in the Bṛhadaranyaka as follows:

"That person, full of intelligence, unfailing light indeed, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or barley. He is the Ruler of all, the Lord of all; He rules all this, whatsoever exists."34

So that, on the principle of the Panchāgni-Vidyā contemplation of the five fires, we should understand that, though the three Upanishads belong to different recensions, one and the same Vidyā (contemplation) is taught in all of them, inasmuch as the Being who is presented in them for contemplation is of the same nature viz., He who is full of intelligence, and so on. The principle of the Panchāgni-Vidyā has been discussed in the Third Lesson35 Vidyā being identical, each of the three recensions should borrow whatever new features are spoken of in the two others arid

34 Bri. Up. 5-6-1.
35 Vide ante pp. 44-46.
contemplate the Being in all His features thus brought together. And this principle, too, of borrowing new features from other recension or recensions has been discussed in the same Lesson.

**Upāsana should be practiced till death.**

The contemplation should be practiced till the attainment of saksātkara or immediate perception, i.e., till the devotee comes to regard himself as one with Brahmān endued with all the attributes gathered together as shown above. The word 'upāsana' means "repetition of an idea," as has been shown in the Third Lesson.36 And the śruti also viz.,

"Becoming the Deva, he is absorbed in the Devas,"37 speaks of the saksātkāra, or intuitive realization of Divinity in this very birth. Even after attaining the sāksātkāra, the upāsana of Brahman should be continued till death. This point is discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras IV.i. 12, as follows:

(Question):— Are upāsanas to be practiced as long as one chooses or till death?

(Prima facie view):— The word 'upāsana' means a continued current of one and the same idea uninterrupted by any foreign idea. This can be accomplished in a limited period of time. Wherefore, it may be practiced as long as one chooses, and it is not necessary to practice it till death.

(Conclusion):— The idea prevailing at the last moment of life is the one which determines the future birth; and that idea cannot arise easily except by practicing upāsana till death. Hence the śruti:—

"Whatever object a man thinks of at death when he leaves the body, that, O son of Kunti reaches he by whom that object has been constantly meditated upon "38

(Objection):— How, then, can the idea of svarga possibly arise at the last moment of life in him who has to go to svarga in virtue of the Jyotishtoma and other acts of sacrifice. We say that the apūrva, the unseen effect generated by the sacrificial act, will produce the idea.

(Objection):— Even in the case of an upāsana there may exist some apūrva or unseen effect.

(Answer):— Yes, it exists; but then we should not, on this score, dispense with the constant repetition of the idea, which is a known and tangible means of obtaining the result. Otherwise, every kind of pleasure or pain or the like being the result of an apūrva or invisible cause, there is no use making an effort to obtain food etc., which is the known means of securing the pleasure. Wherefore, practice of contemplation till death is necessary, as it is the known means of obtaining the intended result.

**Where the upāsaka's path of departure diverges.**

A special feature in the departure of the upāsaka, who has been thus repeating the contemplation till death, is discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras IV.i. 17 as follows:—

(Question):— Is there any or no special feature in the departure of one who has been practicing contemplation, as compared with other men's departure?

(Prima facial view):— It has been said that an upāsaka's departure is the same as _that of others till they come to the starting-point on their paths. Now, it is but proper to hold that, even after they start on their paths, their departure is the same, inasmuch as, in the case of both alike, the śruti speaks of the flashing of the heart etc. Accordingly the Śruti says:—

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36 Ante pp. 56-57,
37 Bri-Up-4-1-2
38 Bha. Gita VIII, 6,
“The tip of his heart flashes; with that flash this soul (Atman) makes his exit through the head or through other parts of the body.” (Behead. Up. 4:1:2)

This passage may be explained as follows:

The present birth closes when 'the sense of speech attains unity with manas' and so on, i.e., when the whole liṅga-śārīra combined with Jīva becomes absorbed in Paramāṁma, remaining in Him as a mere potentiality. Then; for the next birth, the liṅga-śārīra again manifests itself in the heart. At that moment, in the liṅga-śārīra which then rests in the tip of the heart, there occurs an illumination in the form of an idea of the future birth which is to come next, commonly spoken of as 'antya-pratyaya,' the idea of the last moment. With this idea in mind, the soul departs through the nāḍīs. And this is the same for all. Wherefore the upāsaka's departure differs in no way from that of others.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as nāḍī in the head, others making their exit by other nāḍīs only, because of the upāsaka having constantly thought of the nāḍī in the head, and in virtue of the peculiar power of the contemplation of the Conditioned (Saguṇa) Brahman. This point is clearly set forth elsewhere in the śruti in the following words:

"Of the heart there are" etc.

That is to say, the other nāḍīs serve only for exit, but not for the attainment of immortality. Wherefore there is some specialty in the departure of an upāsaka.

**How far the process of death is the same for all.**

As to that part of the process of departure which precedes the point of divergence where the upāsaka makes his exit through the nāḍī of the head, five points are discussed in the Vedānta-Sūtras referring to a passage in another Upanishad. The passage referred to occurs in the Chhāṇḍogya-Upaniṣad and reads as follows:

"The speech, my dear, of that departing person is absorbed in manas, manas in life, life in fire, and fire in the Supreme God." (Op. cit. 6-8-6)

With reference to this passage, the five following points have been discussed and established:

1. The Upanishad does not mean that the ten senses of the dying man, — 'speech' standing here for all the ten senses, are not totally and substantially absorbed in manas. It only means that the action of speech, etc., ceases while manas is still active, their activity being thus absorbed as it were in the activity of manas. (Vedānta-sūtras IV. ii. 1-2).

2. Similarly, when manas is said to be absorbed in life, the Upanishad only means that the activity of manas ceases when prāṇa or life-breath is still active. (IV. ii. 3).

3. Life becomes absorbed, not in fire (the element of matter called tejas), but in Jīva, the man's own conscious Ego, as declared in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka- Upaniṣad:— "To this Self, at the last moment, do all prāṇas go." (Vedānta-Stras. IV. ii. 4-6.)

4. The process of departure consisting in the cessation of one activity after another up to the starting-point on the path of exit through a nāḍī is the same for all the three, for him who is led by Dharma and Adharma, for an upāsaka, and for him who has attained to an intuitive knowledge of the truth. (IV. ii. 7). (5). The activity of the external organs of sensation, manas, and prāṇa, having been absorbed in that of Jīvātmā, the conscious individual Ego, the activity of this Jīvātmā is in its turn absorbed in that of the five subtle elements of matter, tejas or fire (in the passage quoted from the Chāṇḍogya-Upaniṣad) standing here for all the five subtle elements, among which the

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39 For the whole process read the sequel.
40 Kaṭh. Up. 6:16. Quoted in full on p. 84.
element of fire predominates. These subtle elements of matter are then absorbed in the Paramātman. In the case of him who has not yet realized the true nature of Brahman, the elements of matter do not in their substance become absorbed in the Paramātman; it is only their activity that ceases, while in their substance they exist potentially in the Paramātman who alone is awake at the time (IV. ii. 8-19).

Thus in five sections has been discussed that part of the process of departure which is common to all.

**The Path of Light.**

The present birth closes with the absorption, in the Paramātman, of all activity of the liṅga-śarīra made up of the five subtle elements. Subsequently (IV. ii. 17) is discussed a special feature in the departure of an upāsaka who, wending his way to Brahma-loka, makes his exit through the nāḍī of the head. And the path of exit has been described here (in part) in the second passage of this lesson. We should understand that this portion of the path stands for the whole Path of Light which leads to the region of Brahman.

Concerning the path to the region of Brahman, six points are discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras with reference to a passage in the Chāṇḍogya-Upanishad which reads as follows:

"Now, when he so starts up from this body, then, by these rays alone does he start upward."\(^{41}\)

**The departing: soul of the upāsaka joins the sun's rays even at night.**

(i) In this passage the Chhandogas declare that, on making his exit through the nāḍī of the head, the soul joins the rays of the sun. One may perhaps think that, though it is possible for the upāsaka, dying during the day-time, to join the sun's rays, it is not possible for him to do so if he should die at night. As against this it has been argued that, though at night the sun's rays are not manifested, yet the soul does join them, since there exists a connection between the nāḍīs and the sun's rays as long as the body exists (IV. ii. 18-19).

**Even the upāsaka dying in Dakṣinayana has access to the Northern Path.**

(ii) In the Uttara-mārga or Northern Path which begins with the sun's rays, the Uttarāyaṇa (i.e., the progress of the sun north of the equator) is mentioned as a stage. This may at first lead one to think that the upāsaka dying in the Dakṣināyana does not attain the fruits of the upāsana. Against this it has been argued that the fruit does accrue to the upāsaka in as much as the term 'uttaryana' means here the Devatā or Intelligence who identifies himself with the period of time so called. (IV. ii. 20-21).

**The Path of Light is but one.**

(iii) In the Chāṇḍogya and Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads, the Path is spoken of in connection with the Panchagni-Vidyā, as commencing with light (archis), in the words:— "they arrive at light" (Chhan. Up. 4:15:5):" In connection with another Vidyā, the Vājasaneyins speak of the Path as commencing with the Vāyu-loka, the region of Vāyu (Air). In the words:— "He comes to Vāyu" (Ibid 5:10:1) In the Paryanka-Vidyā, the Kaushitakins speak of it as commencing with the Agni-loka, the region of fire, in the words:— "Betaking himself to this path gone by the Devas, he comes to the Agni-loka." (Kau. Up. 1:3). These passages may lead to the view that the Northern Path is of several kinds. Against this it has been argued that it is possible to construe the passages cited above by regarding the regions of Vāyu and Agni, etc., as definite stages on one path. (IV. iii. i.)

\(^{41}\) Op. cit. 8-6-5.
The stages on the Path of Light leading to Brahman are mentioned differently in different Upaniṣads as follows:

1. THE CHÂNDOGYA-UPANISHAD: — The Light (Archis), the Day (Ahan), the Bright Half of the Moon (Apûryamâṇa-pakṣa), the Six Months during which the Sun goes to the North, the Year (Samvatsara), the Sun (Āditya), the Moon (Chandramas), the Lightning (Vidyut), Brahman.

2. THE BRIHADARANYAKA-UPANISHAD: — Day, the Bright Half of the Moon, the Six Months during which the Sun goes to the North, the Region of Devas (Devaloka), the Sun, the Lightning, Brahman.

3. THE KAUSHITAKI-UPANISHAD: The Region of Fire (Agni), the Region of the Air (Vāyu), the Region of Varuṇa, the Region of Prajāpati, the Region of Brahman. The ascending order of the stages as determined by the Vedânta-Sûtras is as follows: —

(i) The Light or the Region of Agni, (2) the Day, (3) the Bright Half of the Moon, (4) the Six Months during which the Sun goes to the North, (5) the Year, (6) the Region of Devas, (7) the Region of the Air, (8) the Sun, (9) the Moon, (10) the Lightning, (11) the Region of Varuṇa, (12) the Region of Indra, (13) the Region of Prajāpati, (14) the Region of Brahman.

The Vāyu-loka precedes the Aditya-loka.

(iv). The question arising as to the situation, on the path, of the Vāyu-loka spoken of by the Kaushitakins, it has been shown that it is situated just below the Aditya-loka, the region of the Sun, because it is said in the Brhadaranyaka that the soul reaches Āditya by the path afforded by Vāyu. 42 (IV. iii. 2.)

The region of Lightning precedes that of Varuna.

(v). The Kaushitakins place on the Path of Light the regions of Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati. There arising a question as to their relative situation on the path, it has been argued that inasmuch as the Lightning and Varuṇa (the Lord of water) are related to each other through rain, the region of Varuṇa should be placed next above that of the Lightning, and that the regions of Indra and Prajāpati should be placed above the region of Varuṇa, on the principle that new-comers should be placed last. (IV. iii. 3.)

The Light, etc., are the guiding Intelligences.

(vi). The Light, etc., placed by the śruti on the path, constitute neither sign-posts on the way (mārga-chihna), nor regions of enjoyment (bhoga-bhūmi); but they are Devatas or intelligences who lead the soul from one region to another on the way. (IV. iii. 4-6.)

The Path of Light is common to all upāsakas of Saguṇa Brahman.

The path whose course has been thus determined is meant only for those who contemplate Saguṇa Brahman. He who has realized the true nature of Brahman by the right sources of knowledge has nothing to do with the path. This departure by the Path of Light applies to all upāsanas of Saguṇa Brahman, not to those upāsanas only in connection with which the path is mentioned in the śruti. By this Path, the upāsaka attains to Brahman; for, it has been declared that "a non-human Spirit dwelling in the region of the Lightning conducts the souls to Brahman. It has also been determined that the upāsaka's (immediate) goal is not Parabrahman Himself, Who cannot be said to be reached by a path, but that particular region of Brahman which falls within the sphere of evolution. (IV. iii. 7-14.)

42 Op-cit 6:10:1
The worshippers of symbols cannot attain to Brahma-loka.

This region of Brahman in the evolved universe cannot be reached by those who contemplate symbols (prātīkas). It can be reached only by those who contemplate Brahman, not by others, (IV. iii. 15-16.)

The glory of the Brahma loka.

It is this region of Brahman (constituting the Goal reached by the Path of Light) which is described by the śruti in para 3 of this lesson. On reaching the Brahma-loka, the upāsaka identifies himself with both the Individual Intelligences and the Universal Intelligence. As identifying himself with the Individual Intelligences, he becomes one with Agni, Vāyu, Āditya and other Intelligences and partakes of their powers. As identifying himself with the Universal Intelligence, he becomes Brahman, the Lord of the Earth (Bhūh) and all other worlds, and attains to Svarājya; i.e., he becomes an independent lord.

In saying that the Yogin attains to the state of Brahman now described the Kaushitakins speak of him in the Paryanka-vidyā as follows:—

"Then five hundred Apsarases (celestial damsels) go towards him, one hundred with chowries in their hands, one hundred with garlands in their hands, one hundred with ointments in their hands, one hundred with garments in their hands, one hundred with fruits in their hands. They adorn him with an adornment worthy of Brahman, and when thus adorned with the adornment of Brahman the knower of Brahman moves towards Brahman." (Kaush. Up, 1-4.)

Concerning this very attainment of Brahman, this independent dominion (svarajya), the following four points have been discussed and settled in the Vedānta-sūtras:

In Brahma-loka, the Yogin secures objects of enjoyment by mere thoughts.

(i). The Yogin who dwells in the Brahma-loka attains objects of enjoyment by merely thinking of them. He does not stand in need of any external means to bring them about, (IV. iv. 8-9)

In Brahma-loka, the Yogin can enjoy with or without a body.

(ii). Concerning the Yogin who has him self thus created objects of enjoyment by thought, one śruti declares that he assumes a body\(^{43}\) wherewith to enjoy the objects, while another declares that the Yogin does not assume a body for the purpose. To explain this difference, it is not necessary to suppose that there are two different classes of Yogins, to whom respectively they apply. The fact, on the other hand, is that one and the same person may, as he chooses, assume a body or not for the purpose. (IV. iv. 10-14).

The bodies of a Yogin's creation have each a soul.

(iii). When the Yogin above referred to chooses to create simultaneously more bodies than one, it may be supposed that Jīva, the individual soul, is present only in one of them while the others are soulless. But, as a matter of fact, all bodies have their respective souls (Jīvātmans), all of these latter acting according to the will of one individual. (IV. iv. 15-16)

No Yogin can create the universe as a whole.

(iv). Though the Yogin can thus create, by mere thought, the objects of his enjoyment, his bodies, and his souls (Jīvātmans), he cannot, in the same way, create the great elements of matter such as

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\(^{43}\) The physical body and the organs of external sensation.
ākāśa. (ether) or the Brahmāṇḍa (the Mundane. Egg) or the worlds made of matter. It is the beginningless, eternal Paramesvara, the Supreme Lord alone, but not a Yogin, who is the creator of the universe (IV, iv, 17-22).

Thence the YOGIN attains to Videha-kaivalya in due course.

The YOGIN who has become an independent Lord as shown above attains, while still in the Brahmaloka, to the Sākṣātkara, immediate intuitive realization of the true nature of the unconditioned Brahman; and then, on the Brahmaloka coming to an end, he attains Videha-kaivalya, the disembodied state of mokṣa. This state has been described in this lesson in the words “Then he becomes this," etc. The same has been expressed by the Blessed Vyasa in the following aphorism:—

"At the close of creation, along with its Lord, (they go) then to the Supreme, as said (in the śruti)." (IV. iii. 10).

That is to say, on the dissolution of the Brahmaloka, they attain to the Supreme Brahman, along with Brahman, the Four-faced, the Lord of the world, as declared in the śruti and the smṛti:—

“Those aspirants who by Vedāntic wisdom have well ascertained the Thing, and whose minds have been purified by the yoga of renunciation, they all, at the last moment of the Great Cycle, become released from the Great, the Immortal,” (Kaivalya Up, 2—3)

"When the dissolution comes at the end of the Great Cycle, they all, perfected in soul, enter the Supreme Abode."

Thus, he who contemplates Brahman first attains to Brahmaloka and then attains absolute Liberation.

LESSON 7.  
(Seventh Anuvāka)  
CONTEMPLATION OF BRAHMAN IN THE VISIBLE.

This lesson treats of the contemplation of the Hiranyagarbha.

The śruti has thus taught us to contemplate Brahman in the form of the Vyāhṛti; and now it proceeds to teach that the self-same Brahman should be contemplated in the paṇktas or five-membered groups of objects composed of the earth and so on.44 As related to the number five, the universe made up of these groups may be regarded in the light of the pankti metre45 and the whole is therefore a pankta, made up of the pankti. And a yajña or sacrificial rite is also a pankti46 as declared in the śruti “Five-footed is the pankti (metre) and yajña is a pankta." Therefore to regard this whole universe as the pankta, as made up of (the five-fold groups of objects such as the earth and other) worlds and so on, is tantamount to regarding it as a yajña or sacrificial rite itself. By the yajña thus effected, one becomes the Prajāpati manifested as the pankta, as the universe made up of the five-membered groups of objects.

44 With a view to attain great results. (S),
45 Pankti is a vedic metre consisting of five feet (pādas) of eight syllables each.
46 That is to say, the universe may he regarded not only in the light of the pankti metre as has been shown above, but also in the light of a yajña or sacrificial rite. (A.)
The Hiranyagarbha or Prajāpati, i.e., Brahma manifested as the universe, is a paṅkta, because the universe has been built out of the five elements of matter. To regard the Hiranyagarbha as a paṅkta, it is to regard Him as a yajña, which is also a paṅkta, as brought about by the interaction of five factors, namely, (i) the sacrificer, (2) his wife, (3) his son, (4) divine wealth such as Vidyā or contemplation, and (5) human wealth such as man's action and the materials used in performing the sacrificial rite. By the yajña thus effected in contemplation, the upāsaka attains to the state of the Prajāpati, the governing Soul of the universe, manifesting Himself in the form of the three worlds. (S. & A.).

In the Sixth Lesson has been taught the contemplation of Brahma regarded as mano-maya (formed of thought) and so on. Inasmuch as this Brahma, who has none of the attributes perceivable by the eye, can be grasped only by the aspirants of the highest class, the śruti proceeds to teach in the Seventh Lesson the contemplation of Brahma endowed with attributes perceptible to the eye, a contemplation which is suited to the aspirants of a lower class.

**External groups of the visible.**

Now the śruti first gives three groups of five members each, external to the human organism, as the attributes (forms or embodiments) of the Brahma who has to be contemplated.

1. Earth, the mid-region, heaven, (the main) quarters and the intermediate quarters; Agni (Fire), Vāyu (Air), Aditya (Sun), chandramas (Moon) and Nakṣatras (the Stars); plants, trees, the bright space (ākāśa.), and ātman (the Self): thus far among the external beings.

Now the śruti proceeds to show how the whole universe is a paṅkta. Earth, etc., constitute the paṅkta of worlds (lokas); Agni, etc., of Devatas; waters, etc., of bhūtas or external beings. Mentioned as one among 'ātman' here means the Virāj (the Universal Soul manifesting Himself in the form of the visible or physical worlds). Before the words 'among the external' we should understand the words "the among beings worlds, among the Devatas," inasmuch as the paṅktas of the worlds and Devatas also have been mentioned.

...Waters, etc., are the five substances (dravya) These three groups of five objects pertain to external being, because they are made up of the earth and other objects of creation which are regarded as external, comprehended in the notion of 'this,' as distinguished from prāṇa (upward vital breath) and others to be mentioned below, which are comprehended in the notion of I. So far has been taught how to contemplate Brahma in the external world.

**Internal groups of the visible.**

To prevent the confounding of the preceding groups with those which follow, the śruti marks off the latter from the former and proposes to describe three more groups of things each;

2. Now, as to the self. Prāṇa, vyāna, apāna, udāna, samāna; the eye, the ear, manas, speech, touch; skin, flesh, muscle (snavrt), bone, marrow.

Now will be mentioned three internal groups of five things each. Prāṇa, etc., form the group of the five airs; the eye, etc., form the group of the five senses; skin, etc., form the group of the five ingredients of the physical body.

After the enumeration of the three groups of external objects, three groups of five things each comprising the self are enumerated. The self here spoken of refers to the self familiarly so called, namely, the aggregate of the physical body and the senses, which those people who have no philosophic culture look upon as I. Now the śruti proceeds to treat of the contemplation of Brahma in this self. Prāṇa, etc., are none other than the five different functions of that one vital air
which abides in the middle of the body. Hence the aphorism of the Holy Sage Vyasa concerning Prāṇa, “of fivefold functions like manas is it said to be” (Vedānta-sūtras II. iv. 12). And the several seats of these functions are enumerated by the ancients as follows:—

"In the heart is the prāṇa; in the anus, the apāṇa; samāṇa is in the navel situated; udāna lies in the region of the throat; traverses the whole body,"

The upāsana enjoined.

The three fivefold groups of external things as well as the three fivefold groups of internal things thus far enumerated represent together the whole universe constituting Brahman's upādhi or seat of function. It is Brahman of this nature, associated with the upādhi, that has to be contemplated. The contemplation is enjoined in the following passage by way of speaking about it in appreciative terms:—

3. This having ordained, the Rishi spoke thus: Paṅkta verily, is this all; by paṅkta, indeed, does one the paṅkta strengthen.

Having ordained that this whole universe, external as well as internal, is fivefold (paṅkta), the Rishi, i.e., the Veda, or a certain sage who attained to a realization of the same, said as follows: all this is paṅkta, built on the principle of five. The number (five) being present in both alike, by the internal paṅkta does (the upāsaka) strengthen the external; i.e., the former fills the latter; i.e., again the former is perceived as one with the latter. That is to say, he who contemplates thus, regarding all this as paṅkta, as built on the principle of five, becomes one with the Prajāpati, indeed.

Having realized that the whole universe is paṅkta, is built on the principle of five, the Rishi said that all this universe from Brahma down to plant is paṅkta and no other. Because of this identity in number, by the internal (adhyatmika) paṅkta does one strengthen the whole external group, the former becoming one with the latter. (S.)

That is to say, on the principle that the lower object should be regarded as the higher, one should regard the internal group as one with the external. (A).

A certain Rishi, a seer of super-sensuous truths revealed in the scriptures, perfected in contemplation, i.e., having intensely meditated upon the earth, mid-region and other objects of holy regard to the point of realization, i.e., having attained in his own consciousness to the state of the Virāj, the Universal Soul, — the Rishi taught to his disciples the truth which he has realized in his own consciousness, in the following words:

All the world we perceive, the body of the Virāj, is paṅkta, is related to the pankti metre, as is well known to all.

To explain: According to the śruti "five- syllabled is paṅkti," the number five enters into the metre of pankti. So also is the universe associated with the number five, because of the declaration of the adepts, namely, that the great quintupled elements of matter and all their evolutions constitute what is called the Virāj. Accordingly, in virtue of the relation of similarity which the universe bears to this pankti metre, the universe is said to be paṅkta. So too even the contemplation of the earth, etc., as concerned with groups of five things, may be regarded as paṅkta. Therefore, the upāsaka attains to the State of the Virāj, who, as has been shown, is paṅkta., by the contemplation of the earth, etc., which is also paṅkta. By this appreciative reference to the upāsana, the śruti implies the injunction that he who wishes to attain to the state of the Virāj should contemplate in the manner described above.

On the principle already enunciated, it is to be understood that, on attaining to the Virāj, mokṣa will be attained in due course, through knowledge of the truth.
CONTEMPLATION OF PRAṆAVA.

The śruti has taught the contemplation of Brahman, first in the form of the Vyahriti (Utterance), and subsequently in the form of panktas or fivefold groups.

Now will be taught the contemplation of the syllable 'Om', which is an accessory to all kinds of worship. When contemplated as the Higher or Lower Brahman, the syllable 'Om', though a mere sound, forms indeed a means of attaining the Higher or Lower Brahman. It is, verily, the abode of the Higher as well as the Lower Brahman, just as an idol is the abode of Vishnu. So the śruti says, "By this means alone, he goes to one of Them." (Prasna-Up. 52)

Praṇava being held by all in high regard, any teaching regarding the contemplation of Brahman will not be so readily accepted by the intellect if the teaching were altogether dissociated from Praṇava. The contemplation of Brahman is therefore taught here through Praṇava. The Praṇava which is a mere sound is, no doubt, insentient in itself and cannot therefore be conscious of the worship offered to it; still, as in the case of worship offered to an idol, it is the Īśvara who in all cases takes note of the act and dispenses the fruits thereof. (A.)

In the Seventh Lesson has been taught the contemplation of Brahman as manifested in the form of earth and other visible gross forms, for the benefit of the aspirants of low mental culture. In the Sixth Lesson was taught the contemplation of Brahman manifested in the subtler forms of manas and the like, for the benefit of the aspirants of a middling class who can grasp subtle truths to a certain extent.

In the Eighth Lesson will be taught, for the benefit of the highest class of aspirants, the contemplation of pure Brahman as declared in the Vedānta and designated by Praṇava.

The Praṇava -Brahman.

The śruti first speaks of Praṇava, the object of contemplation;

1. 'Om' is Brahman. 'Om' is this all.

One should hold in mind — i.e., contemplate that — the sound 'Om' is Brahman. For, every form of sound is pervaded by syllable the 'Om', as declared elsewhere in the śruti:— "As all leaves are fast bound in stalk" etc. Inasmuch as the thing designated is dependent on its designation, all that we see is said to be the syllable 'Om'.

One of the points of similarity, on account of which the syllable 'Om' may be regarded as one with Brahman, is that, like Brahman, it is the basis of all. (A.)

The syllable 'Om,' and nothing else, is the designation of the Paramatman, as Patañjali says in his Yoga-sūtra already quoted:— "His designation is Praṇava." The being that has to be contemplated here is none other than that Brahman who is denoted only by the syllable 'Om'. No such upādhi as the earth or manas should be thought of. That is to say, one should merely pronounce the syllable 'Om', the designation, and (while doing so) contemplate Brahman denoted by it, proceeds to explain how the syllable 'Om' can be the designation of Brahman, by stating that in this very syllable 'Om' all this universe, made up of names and forms, is comprehended. That all words are therein comprehended is declared by the śruti in the words:— "As all leaves are fast bound in the stalk," etc., and "speech is his (breath's) rope," etc. The śruti shows that all things are included in the

47 The passage is fully quoted on page 61.
syllable 'Om' through the words denoting them. All this has already been shown in the Fourth Lesson when commenting upon the phrase "of all forms." Thus the Praṇava being present in every thing, it can be the designation of Brahman who is also present in every thing.

**The Praṇava extolled.**

In the sequel, the syllable 'Om' is extolled, since it is the thing to be contemplated:

1. **Om!** — this verily is compliance; and on uttering 'O recite,' they begin to recite. With Om they sing sāmans. 'Om! Som!' — thus do they tell the prayers. 'Om!' — thus does the Adhvaryu convey acceptance. 'Om!' thus assents the Brahma (priest). 'Om!'— thus one permits the offering of an oblation to Fire. “Om!” — thus says the brāhmaṇa who is about to recite. “May I obtain Brahman;” thus wishing, Brahman verily does he obtain.

'Om' is the word of compliance. When one's duty is declared by another, the former complies with it, by uttering Om,' thereby conveying the idea 'I shall do so,' or 'I shall go there,' and so on. Indeed, every one knows that 'Om' is the word of compliance. Moreover, when the direction "O recite" is given, they recite accordingly. Similarly, with 'Om' the Sāman-chanters sing the Sāmans. 'Om Som' — this being uttered, those who pray tell their prayers. So, with 'Om,' the Adhvaryu conveys acceptance. By 'Om' the Brahma (one of the priests) expresses his assent. When a sacrificer says that he is going to offer an oblation by 'Om' verily does another give permission. 'Om' indeed does a Brahmin utter when about to recite the sacred texts: that is to say, with 'Om' does he start the recitation. Wishing to learn Brahman, the Veda, he does master the Veda. Or, to interpret it in another way, — wishing to attain Brahman, the Paramatman, i.e., wishing to lead his self to the Paramatman, a brāhmaṇa utters 'Om' and 'Om' alone, and by that syllable 'Om' he does attain Brahman.

The meaning of the whole passage is this: because all undertakings which start with the syllable 'Om' become fruitful, therefore one should contemplate the 'Om' as Brahman.

The śruti proceeds to show that the syllable 'Om' is related to all things, by citing a few instances connected with Vedic ritual. In the Darsa (New Moon), and the Pūrṇamāsa (Full Moon) and other sacrificial rites, when the Adhvaryus, i.e., the priests who perform the acts enjoined in the Yajur-Veda, have to address a direction to the utter the mantra 'śrāvaya.' Ṵāpastamba says that this direction may begin with 'a,' or with 'o,' or with 'Om.' The second alternative has been adopted by the śruti here. The 'o' in the mantra is intended to address the Agnīdhra. So the mantra means, “O Agnīdhra, give the Devas to know that an oblation is about to be offered.” The syllable 'o' in the mantra is similar to 'Om.'

The word of direction “O śrāvaya!” resembles 'Om' in so far as 'o' occurs in both, and everybody knows also that 'O' resembles a part of the Praṇava. Thus the Adhvaryus issue their direction by means of 'O' which is only a part of 'Om.' So the Sāman-chanters, the Udgātṛis, chant their Sāmans after uttering the Praṇava. Similarly, even the Hotṛis, the Rig-Vedic priests, recite the hymns with Praṇava, by uttering “Om Som.” The Hotṛ seeking the permission of the Adhvaryu for reciting the hymns, address the Adhvaryu and say “Somsavom, shall we pray?” Here 'som' is the first syllable and 'om' the last. Putting together the first and last syllables, the śruti says that the Hotṛis pray with "Om Som." When the Hotri has recited the hymns, the Adhvaryu addresses them a word of encouragement, known as 'pratigara.' When uttering the word of encouragement, the Adhvaryu utters 'Om.' In the middle of a hymn, on the completion of the first half of a verse, the Adhvaryu utters the words of encouragement:

"O Hotri, your chanting the first half of the verse has delighted us." On the completion of the verse, the pratigara, or the word of encouragement, should be uttered with the Praṇava at its beginning;
and the Praṇava so uttered denotes assent to the chanting of the hymn. When the whole hymn is completed, the Praṇava alone should be uttered to convey assent. Thus even in the pratiṇgāra the Praṇava is present. The Brahma (priest) is one who knows the conduct of the rituals as taught in the three Vedas.

When he urges other priests to acts, such as the sprinkling of consecrated waters, then he begins his direction with the Praṇava. In the Agnihotra-homa, when the Adhvaryu is about to take out milk by a ladle from the milk-vessel and to pour it into the vessel named Agni-hotra-havanī, then he asks the sacrificer's permission in the words "Om! shall I take out the oblation for the Devas?"

The sacrificer grants permission by uttering the syllable 'Om.' In the same way, when about to engage in the Brahma-yājña or sacred study of the Vedas, a brāhmaṇa commences the study by uttering the Praṇava. Thus by citing instances from the Vedic ritual, it has been shown that the syllable 'Om' pervades all.

**The Contemplation of Praṇava enjoined.**

Then the śruti proceeds to enjoin the upāsana of Praṇava by way of declaring the fruits of the upāsana. He who wishes to attain Brahma should contemplate Brahma as designated by the syllable 'Om.' By this contemplation, he will certainly attain Brahma.

**The relation between Om and Brahma.**

Now we have to enquire, what does the passage "Om is Brahma" mean? Does it mean that the syllable Om is a symbol and should be deliberately looked upon as Brahma? Or does it mean that we should contemplate Brahma with the adjunct of Om, Brahma as designated by Om?

It may at first appear to mean that one should contemplate the word 'Om' itself as Brahma, thus regarding it as a symbol on which the idea of Brahma should be superimposed. So interpreted, the words 'Om' and 'Brahma' are in their proper order as the subject and the predicate of the proposition.

As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: on the principle discussed in connection with the Udgīthā-Vidyā, the syllable Om should be regarded as a mere adjunct of Brahma, not as the main object or contemplation. The principle referred to is discussed as follows in the Vedānta- Śūtras III. iii.9;

**The meaning of "Om, the Udgīthā."**

(Question):— It is said in Chandogya Up. 1:1:1 — “Let him contemplate the syllable Om the Udgīthā." Here the words ' syllable' and 'Udgīthā' are put in apposition to each other; and this appositional use may be explained in four different ways: (i) It may mean mere adhyāsa or superimposition of the idea of Udgīthā upon 'Om,' like the passage "let him contemplate name as Brahma." (2) Or it may be intended to remove a mistaken idea we say, for example, "the thief is a pillar" when we wish to undeceive a man who has mistaken a pillar for a thief. (3) Or, it may imply unity as in the sentence “Jīva is Brahma." (4) Or, it may imply a relation of substance and attribute as in the sentence "The blue thing is a lotus." In which one of these four ways should the passage under discussion be explained?

(The prima facie view):— In the absence of a determining' cause we cannot construe the passage in any one particular way exclusively.

(Conclusion):— It is possible to make out that 'Udgīthā' should be construed as a specifying adjunct of the syllable 'Om.' The syllable 'Om' occurs in the three Vedas, the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, and the Śāma-veda. The question may therefore arise, which one of them is to be contemplated? This question is answered by the passage thus: that particular 'Om,' and not any other one should be
contemplated, which forms part of the Udgātha Sāman. Thus the 'Om' which is to be contemplated here is specified as the one occurring in the Sāma-veda. If we construe the passage otherwise, as implying a removal of illusion, or as implying unity, we will have to make a conjecture as to the fruit of the contemplation of 'Om' so conceived, for it is a contemplation which is quite independent of that which has been treated of in the remaining part of the section, and as such it must produce quite a distinct result. On the other hand, if we construe the passage to mean the relation of substance and attribute, the contemplation enjoined here will be that of the symbol 'Om' viewed as 'rasatama,' the most essential element as taught in the sequel; so that, no injunction of a contemplation distinct from the one which is to follow is intended in this connection, and therefore no conjecture need be made as to the fruit produced separately by that contemplation.

(Objection):— The word 'Udgātha' denotes the whole song, of which the syllable Om is a only a part; the term Udgātha cannot therefore be literally applied to 'Om.' Thus, if you interpret the passage so as to make 'udgātha' a specifying adjunct of 'Om,' the word 'Udgātha' will have to be understood in a secondary sense.

(Answer): —True. But to construe 'Udgātha' as a specifying adjunct of 'Om' is preferable to construing it in any other way. To interpret the appositional use as implying superimposition, i.e., to make the śruti speak of 'Om' as 'Udgātha' which 'Om' is really not, is to ignore the literal meaning of 'Udgātha altogether, just as to speak of an idol as Vishnu is to ignore the literal meaning of the word 'Vishnu' altogether as applied to something which is not Vishnu. To do so is to violate the literal construction altogether. If, on the other hand, we construe the śruti so as to mean that the syllable 'Om' is a part of the Udgātha, i.e., if we interpret the word 'Udgātha' to mean a part of the Udgātha,' we do not ignore the literal meaning of 'Udgātha altogether. This interpretation is at least in partial accordance with the literal sense and is therefore nearer to it than the rest. In applying in this sense the epithet 'Udgātha' to 'Om,' we surrender only a portion of the denotation of the word — namely, all the syllables in the Udgātha other than 'Om.' Therefore, in the passage Let him contemplate the syllable 'Om' the Udgātha," the word 'Udgātha' is an epithet applied to 'Om' in order to distinguish it from the same syllable occurring in the other Vedas,

The meaning of 'Om is Brahman.'

To return to the present subject. In the passage "Om is Brahman," the word 'Brahman' may denote any one of the three kinds of Brahman: Brahman as manifested in the form of thought (Manomaya), or Brahman as manifested in the form of earth &c., or the pure Unconditioned Brahman. In accordance with the principle of interpretation discussed in connection with the Udgātha, the epithet 'Om' to Brahman shows that the Unconditioned Brahman is here spoken of as opposed to the Conditioned Brahman. The passage means that the Supreme Brahman denoted only by the designation Om should be contemplated. If Om be a mere symbol, then it is the word which has to be deliberately viewed as Brahman; and then it will be a contemplation of the word 'Om,' not of Brahman. In that case, the upāsaka of the symbol cannot hope to attain even the Brahma-loka, much less the Real Brahman. If Brahman cannot be attained, then the words of the śruti "Brahman verily does he obtain," speaking of the fruits of the contemplation, are falsified. When Brahman Himself designated by the syllable 'Om' is contemplated, the upāsaka attains to the Brahma-loka; and there realizing Brahman in His essential nature, he goes to Brahman Himself and thus attains Videhamukti, Liberation from embodied existence altogether. Therefore the passage "Om is Brahman" speaks of Brahman in His essential nature as designated by the syllable 'Om.'

Contemplation of the Unconditioned Brahman.

(Objection):— Brahman in His essential nature can be reached only by knowledge (vedana) coming
from a right source (pramāṇa), not by upāsana or contemplation.\(^{48}\) Hence it is that, in the Sandilya-Vidyā, Dahara-Vidyā and the like, the contemplation enjoined is that of the Sagun or Conditioned Brahman. In none of them is enjoined the contemplation of Brahman in His essential nature. Moreover, on ascertaining from the Vedantic texts the Unconditioned Brahman in His essential nature, one has achieved all one’s aspirations, and can have nothing more to achieve by means of the upāsana. Further, those who know Brahman are rid of all sense of agency; how can they engage in an upāsana?

(Answer):— These considerations do not detract from the soundness of our conclusion. For, the Vedantic propositions are of two sorts, avāntara-vākyas and mahā-vākyas, subordinate propositions and main propositions. A subordinate proposition is that which treats of the essential nature of Brahman as the cause of the universe, while the main proposition teaches that the Ego is essentially one with Brahman. Now, for him who has realized the unity as taught in the main proposition, there is, we admit, no purpose to be served by the contemplation, as the opponent has shown; nor can he regard himself as an agent concerned in the act of contemplation. On the other hand, he who has learned from the subordinate propositions the essential nature of Brahman as the mere cause of the universe does not lose the sense of his own agency; and he can be an upāsaka. We can even imagine the contemplation serving a purpose: the upāsaka goes first to the Brahma-loka, and realizing there the true nature of Brahman, he attains Videha-mukti. Such a man should, therefore, contemplate the essential nature of Brahman.

Accordingly the Nṛsimha-Uttara-Tapanīya-Upaniṣad teaches many ways of contemplating the Unconditioned Brahman. The śruti also enjoins the contemplation of Brahman in His essential nature:

"When a man has entered the assembly of those who have committed minor sins or of those who have committed major sins, he should contemplate Brahman during a quarter of the night."

And the contemplation of Brahman in His essential nature has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras I.iii.13. as follows:—

(Question):— The Prasnopanishad reads,

"He, again, who contemplates that Supreme Spirit (Puruṣa) by this triple syllable 'Om'\(^{49}\) and so on.

What Brahman should be contemplated? Is it the Lower Brahman known as the Hiranyagarbha, or is it the Supreme Brahman?

(The prima, facie view):— It is the Lower Brahman that should be contemplated. For, the śruti declares the fruit of the contemplation in the words "he by the sāmans is carried up to Brahma-loka."\(^{50}\) The upāsaka is said to go to the region of Brahman, the "Lotus-seated," whereas the fruit of the contemplation of the Supreme Brahman, by which man should be able to realize his highest end, cannot be said to end there. The phrase "Supreme Spirit (Puruṣa)," an epithet of the Supreme Brahman, can be applied to the Lower Brahman also, inasmuch as the latter is supreme with reference to others below.

(Conclusion):— It is the Supreme Brahman that should be contemplated here. For, the Upaniṣad speaks, in the sequel, of the Brahman contemplated here as identical with the Supreme Being that has to be finally realized. The passage of the Śruti referred to reads as follows:

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\(^{48}\) Which partakes of the peculiar colour of the mind of the individual concerned and does not therefore necessarily represent the Thing as it is.

\(^{49}\) Op. cit. 5-5.

\(^{50}\) Ibid
"He sees the Puruṣa lying in the body, the Higher than that highest, than that Jīva-ghana, the aggregate Soul."

That is to say, he who, by upāsana, has attained to the Brahma-loka sees the Paramatman lying in the heart of all living beings, who is higher even than the Hirayagarbha, than that Highest Being who is all Jivas in the aggregate, The Paramātman who, in this passage, is spoken of as being realized at the end, is the very Being who at the commencement of the section is referred to as the Being who has to be contemplated. The words 'Supreme 'and 'Puruṣa' in both theshow that one occurring places and the same Brahman is spoken of in the two places. Neither is the Brahma-loka the only fruit attainable; for, from there liberation will be attained in due course. Therefore the passage means that the Supreme Brahman Himself should be contemplated. Thus the contemplation of Brahman even in His pure essential nature being possible, he who wishes to attain to Brahman should utter the Praṇava and contemplate Him, in His pure essential nature as designated by the Praṇava.

LESSON 9.
(Ninth Anuvāka)

UPĀSAKA'S DUTIES.

As it has been taught that one becomes an independent Lord by mere knowledge (vijñāna), one may think that works enjoined in the śrutī and in the smṛti are of no use. As a safeguard against this possible error, the Upaniṣad here proceeds to treat of works with a view to show that they\textsuperscript{51} are means of attaining the end of man.

In the Eighth Lesson it has been taught that Brahman should be contemplated by means of Praṇava, which designates the Unconditioned Brahman. This may lead one to think that, because by mere upāsana the end of man, namely, liberation attainable in due course, can be accomplished, no purpose of an upāsaka is served by the obligatory duties enjoined in the śrutī and the smṛti. To prevent this supposition, the Upaniṣad teaches in the Ninth Lesson that performance of the obligatory duties should be conjoined with the upāsana.

The works incumbent on an Upāsaka.

1. The right, as well as study and teaching; the true, as well as study and teaching; penance, as well as study and teaching; restraint, as well as study and teaching; peace, as well as study and teaching; the fires, as well as study and teaching; offering to fires, as well as study and teaching; guests, as well as study and teaching; the human, as well as study and teaching; the offspring, as well as study and teaching; begetting, as well as study and teaching; propagation of the race, as well as study and teaching.

What 'the right' is has been already explained. The right and the other duties to be mentioned below should be practiced, as well as Svadhyāya, the learning of one's own Veda, and Pravachana, which means either Adhyāpana, the teaching of it, or Brahma- Yajña, a daily solemn recitation of it. The meaning of 'the true' has been already explained along with 'the right'. Or the 'true' may mean truth-speaking. Penance (tapas): bodily mortification. Restraint (dama): calmness of the organs of external sensation. Tranquility (Sama): calmness of manas, the internal organ.

\textsuperscript{51} They co-operate with the apara-vidyā or lower wisdom, and their purpose is therefore the same as that of the apara-vidyā-(A),
While practicing these, fires should be consecrated, and oblations offered to them; guests should be honored; the human — that is to say, social duties — should be discharged as occasions arise; offspring should be begotten by having intercourse with wife in season, at periods favorable for conception; the race should be propagated through children's children, by getting the sons married. While engaged in all these acts, one should pay special attention to the studying and the teaching of the Veda. It is to impress this truth that study and teaching are repeated along with every one of the other duties. Indeed, a knowledge of the Vedic teaching can only be acquired by learning the Vedic text, and on that knowledge the highest good depends; while the teaching or recitation of the Veda is intended for retention of the text in memory as well as for increase of merit (Dharma). Special regard should therefore be paid to the study and teaching of the Veda.

The right (rita): when a man wishes to say something, he first ponders over the thing as it is and then thinks of the word denoting it. Rita, is this mānasīc act of thinking as to the right word which will accurately describe the thing. Svādhyāya: the necessary study. ... It will not do for the seeker of mokṣa to practice contemplation only; he should practice right speech, as also the study and teaching of the Veda. Penance (tapas): Fasting and other kinds of bodily mortification. The Śruti says “there is no higher penance than fasting.”

In the Śruti elsewhere — "by yajña, by gift, by tapas, by fasting" — fasting is mentioned separately from tapas, and this shows that gifts of money and the like are penances intended for those who cannot practice fasting. The Śruti says 'It is verily a penance, they say, when one gives away his property.'

Restraint:— the withdrawing of sight and other organs of external sensation away from forbidden objects.

Transcendence:— the restraining of the mind from all forbidden thoughts.

Fires (Agnis):— consecrated fires known as the Ahavaniya., etc.

Agnihotra:— the offering of oblation in the consecrated fires in the morning and in the evening.

Guests:— such as those who go to other's houses to beg food on odd occasions, not on the new-moon day or any other specially sacred days.

The human: — the honoring of women and other such acts as are incumbent on people at marriage and on other like occasions. As sanctioned by the custom prevailing among the leaders of society, even these acts should be observed like those which are enjoined in the Śruti and the Śmṛti.

Offspring, etc:— He should also observe the necessary sacramental rites antecedent to the child-bearing. He should have intercourse with wife in proper season with a view to produce children.

Even the upāsaka should perform all acts and ceremonies enjoined in the Śruti and the Śmṛti according to the caste and the religious order to which he belongs; otherwise, obstructed by the sin accruing from the neglect of enjoined works, the upāsana cannot produce the desired effect. We cannot, however, extend this principle and say that even a knowledge of the real nature of Brahman requires the aid of works to produce its intended effect: for, he who knows truth has nothing to do with works, inasmuch as all illusion regarding his own Self i.e., the false idea that he is an agent, that he belongs to a particular caste or to a particular religious order has ceased. But since, in the case of an upāsaka, the illusion still exists, he has yet some concern with works and it is therefore but proper that his upāsana should be conjoined with works. It may perhaps be urged that, for him who contemplates incessantly, it is not possible to engage in Agnihotra and similar rites which tend

52 Such as marriage (A)
53 Yajñiki Up. 73.
54 Brh Up. 4.4-22.
to mental distraction and involve a vast amount of labor. Then let him engage in that course of action which will help upāsana: let him practice self-control, controlling the body, the senses and the mind.

This is the end the Yoga-Śāstra has in view when treating of yama and niyama, the several forms of self-control, both of a positive and a negative character. Though performance of Agnihotra and practice of self-control are meant as alternative courses of action according as the person has a wavering or unwavering mind, yet the study and the teaching (or recitation) of scriptures are quite necessary. The Śruti repeats these two duties along with every other duty, with a view to impress the truth that they should be constantly practiced in whatever other duties he may be engaged. The study of scriptures should under no circumstances be neglected, since in case of neglect, one becomes a Śūdra as the Smṛti says:

“That twice-born man who, without studying the Vedas, turns his attention to other things, soon becomes a śūdra while still alive, as well as his whole family.”

As to the prohibition of the abandoning of the daily recitation, the Śruti declares in the section of Brahma- yajña as follows:

“Untouched by evil is the study of the Veda. It is, verily, the purifier even of the Devas. He that casteth it aside, is not lucky (even) in speech: no share hath he in heaven. So it is said: ‘He who hath abandoned (the Veda, which is) the friend, aye which knoweth the friend, for him there is no lot even in speech. Much may he hear, but he heareth false. Not indeed doth he know the path of good deeds.’”

As to the sannyāsin who renounces all former works, even he should not abandon the study of the Veda. To the same effect the Smṛti says:—

"Let a man renounce all works, let him not renounce that one thing, the Veda."

(Objection):— The Aruṇi-Upaniṣad enjoins the abandonment even of the Vedic study (svadhyāya). There the things to be abandoned are enumerated as follows: "sons, brothers, relations, etc., hair-tuft, the sacred cord, the sacrificial rite, the canon, the Vedic study (svadhyaya)" and so on.

(Answer):— This objection does not apply here. For the Śruti enjoins that the ritualistic section of the Veda, which is of no use to the parivṛtakas or sannyāsins, should alone be abandoned. A repeated study, however, of the useful portion is necessary, as the same Upaniṣad mentions it as one of the sannyāsin's duties, in the following words:—

"He shall first take a bath at the three sandhis (connecting periods), he shall hold communion with ātman in samādhi; he shall often repeat the Aranyakas of all the Vedas; he shall repeat the Upaniṣad, aye shall he repeat the Upaniṣad."

That none should give up the study of one's own scriptures or the teaching and reciting of them, that is, that special regard, should be paid to these duties, is indicated by the repetition, in the śruti, of the words "study and teaching."

**The most important of the upāsaka's duties.**

Now the śruti refers to the different views as to which one of the duties mentioned above is the most important:—

2. The true, as Satya-vachas, the son of Rathītara holds; penance, as Tapo-nitya, the son of Purusihṣṭha holds; study and teaching alone, as Naka, the son of Mudgala, holds; that, verily, is penance, aye that is penance.

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56 Taitt. Aranyakā 2-15
The teacher named Satyavachas, of the family of Rathitara, so called because he speaks nothing but truth,— maintains that truth-speaking alone should be practiced. The teacher named Tapo-nitya, so called because of his constant penance, the son of Purusishte, holds that penance alone should be practiced. The teacher named Naka, the son of Mudgala, thinks that the study and teaching of the Vedas should alone be practiced. Because the study and teaching of the Vedas constitute in themselves a penance, they alone should be practiced. Though already mentioned, truth-speaking, the study of the Vedas, and their recitation are again mentioned here with a view to inspire special regard for them.

Nāka is so called because, always contented with the study and recitation of the Vedas, he never felt any sort of anguish. No doubt in the words, "By penance Devas were first to go to God; by penance did the Rishis attain svarga," (Yājñiki-Up.79)

The śruti declares that penance is the most important. This does not, however, detract from the validity of Maudgalya's contention that the study and the recitation of the Vedas are the most important. They alone constitute the highest penance, as the repetition of the words shows, and are therefore the most important. It is because they constitute the highest penance, that the Vedic recitation termed Brahma-Yajña should be practiced even on those days on which the first learners should not study the Vedas,

Accordingly the śruti says:—

“He who, thus knowing, studies the Vedas even when it rains and lightens, when it roars and thunders, when the wind is blowing, even on the new moon day, he only practices penance; study, indeed, is penance." (Tait. Aranyaka 2-14)

Another passage points to the same idea:—

“Standing or walking, sitting or lying down, he shall not fail to recite the Veda; then he is a man of penance, he is pure, who, thus knowing, recites the Veda." (Ibid 2-12)

Wherefore, as productive of great fruits, it is a penance higher even than the penance of fasting and giving away wealth, as declared by the śruti in the following words:—

“What measure of svarga he wins who gives away this earth full of wealth, that measure of the world he (who studies the Veda) wins, (a world) which is even greater and inexhaustible. He, moreover, conquers death, he attains unity with Brahman.” (Ibid 2-14)

LESSON 10.
(Tenth Anuvāka)

THE ILLUMINATION.

A Mantra to be repeated

The Mover of the Tree I am; my fame like the mountain's peak. The High One making (me) pure, I am the very Immortal One as He is in the sun; I am the Lustrous Wealth. Of high wisdom (I am), immortal, undecaying. So runs Trisanku's teaching of wisdom.

The purpose of the mantra.

The mantra that comes next is meant for recitation; and its recitation leads to wisdom, as the context
gives us to understand. Indeed, the present section is devoted to wisdom, and we are not given to understand that it is meant for any other purpose. And it stands to reason that wisdom arises in him whose mind has been purified by svodhyaya or recitation of the sacred text.

The mantra is an expression of Self-realisation.

As the Antaryāmin, I am the Mover, the Impeller of the perishable tree of samsāra or mundane existence. My fame is on high, like the mountain's peak. The High One is the Primal Source, acting as the purifier. Shining forth through wisdom, the Supreme Brahma restores me to purity, — me who am the Sarvātman, the Self of all.

Brahman, the Primal Source, is the Supreme Purifier, because by shining forth through buddhi in consciousness, He frees me from samsāra or region of births.—(S)

When thus purified, I become Brahma, the Pure One, the Primal Source. — (A)

I am the Immortal, the Pure Principle of ātman (the Self), the selfsame Pure Immortal Principle of Ātman who, in hundreds of passages in the śruti and the smṛti, is said to abide in the Sun, the source of all our nourishment. Verily, I am the Lustrous Wealth, the self-luminous Principle of Ātman. Or, (to interpret the śruti in another way):— I have obtained the Lustrous Wealth, the Brahma-jñāna or knowledge of Brahma, the wealth which conduces to the happiness of mokṣa, that which illumines the Principle of Ātman. I am highly wise, as endued with wisdom, with omniscience. I am omniscient because I am endued with the power of sustaining, producing and destroying the saṁsāra, or mundane existence. As such I am immortal, endued with the attribute of immortality; and I am undecaying. Or, (to interpret the śruti in another way):— I am soaked with amṛta, with the waters of immortality,

Thus the Rishi, named Trisanku, who became Brahma and realized Brahma, said after attaining to a knowledge of Atman's oneness, with a view to proclaim, like the sage Vamadeva, the fact that he had achieved all aspirations. This mantra which the Rishi had seen in his divine vision (arsha darsāna) is an expression of Ātmavidyā, showing what constitutes Self-realization.

The recitation (japa) of the mantra given above conduces to purity and progress. He who seeks liberation should devoutly repeat the mantra, well-balanced in mind, with a view to attain Brahma-jñāna, the realization of Brahma. (S)

Conditions of saintly vision.

From the fact of this sacred text, which sets forth wisdom, being read next in order to the section (ninth lesson) which treats of right-thinking and other acts of virtue (Dharma), we may conclude that divine visions (arshani darsanani), relating to the Self (ātman) and other things, occur to him who, free from desire (kāma) and aspiring to know Brahma, is devoutly engaged in the obligatory works enjoined in the śruti and the smṛti.

Not the recitation of the sacred text alone leads to Brahma-jñāna. On the other hand, all works conduce to the same end.—(A)

The seeker of mokṣa, who devoutly performs the works enjoined in the śruti and the smṛti, attains saintly (arsha) vision, an intuitive knowledge of truth to which leads to mokṣa. —(S) When the devotee performs the works enjoined in the śruti and the smṛti, in the service of the Lord (Īśvara), doing them devoutly for the sake of the Lord, not for the sake of their immediate fruits, and when he has thereby been purified in buddhi and aspires for liberation alone, then he attains the intuitive knowledge which leads to liberation, that knowledge which arises in him untaught, revealing nothing but truth.—(A)

57 The Generator.— (S.)
Repetition of this mantra serves as a substitute for Brahma-yajña.

In the Ninth Lesson it has been taught that the works enjoined in the Śruti and the Smṛti should be performed in addition to the contemplation of Brahman. It has also been incidentally taught that Brahmayajña is the best tapas (or austerity). But there may be persons who, though earnest, are yet not competent for Brahma-yajña, as having not learned the Vedas owing to dullness of intellect or other causes. Now, in the Tenth Lesson the śruti gives a mantra, by repeating which even those persons can reap the fruits of Brahma-yajña.

Saṁsāra cut asunder by non-attachment.

The tree here spoken of is the tree of saṁsāra, because (like a tree) saṁsāra can be cut asunder by a knowledge of the Reality. This tree of saṁsāra is graphically described in the Taittiriya-aranya in these words:

"Now, He that knoweth the tree whose root is on high, whose branches are down below,... "

The Root, the Source of the tree of saṁsāra, is the Supreme Brahman, who rises high above all universe. Its branches are the bodies of Devas, men, and beasts, and they are down below. The Katha-Upaniṣad reads:

"This old, old tree that sees no morrow's dawn (stands) with its roots up and branches down."59

The tree of saṁsāra is impermanent and does not stay the same to-morrow. It has no beginning. The Lord, too, has described it in the following words:

"They speak of an eternal Asvattha rooted above and branching below, whose leaves are the Vedas; he who knows it is a Veda- knower." 60

May I, the seeker of liberation, be able to cut asunder the tree of saṁsāra by the sword of indifference (vairāgya) to sense-objects! That it is cut asunder by indifference has been taught by the Lord in the following verse:

"Having cut asunder this firm-rooted- Asvattha by the strong sword of non-attachment, then that Goal should be sought, whither having gone none return again."61

No obstacle lies on the path of the unattached Soul.

The tree of saṁsāra being cut asunder, my fame becomes like unto a mountain's peak; it rises high as the mountain's peak is high. The fame concerning my liberation rises very high and spreads in the regions of Devas: so that even Devas cannot thwart my wishes. Accordingly the śruti says:—

"Indeed, not even Devas have power to prevent his becoming (Brahman)." 62

Purity of the unattached Soul.

My purity transcends all, I am as pure as the Immortal abiding in the fast-coursing Sun. The Sun indeed courses always with extreme swiftness. So He is addressed:

"I bow to Thee, who in one-half eye-wink travels two thousand and two hundred and

58 Sayana’s interpretation of this lesson differs a little from Sankaracharya’s.
59 Op. cit. 6—1
60 Bhag. Gita. 10:1.
61 Ibid. 15:3,4.
62 Brh. Up. 1:3:10
two yojanas.\textsuperscript{63}

In the sun there abides the Shining One, the Immortal Being. Accordingly, in the Madhuvidyā,\textsuperscript{64} the Chhandogas declare that the solar sphere is sweet honey, and that in its several compartments eastern, western, etc. there are stored up immortal essences of red, white, and other colors, constituting the fruits of works enjoined in the Rig-Veda and other scriptures. And it has also been declared that the Vasus and other gods live upon these immortal essences.

**Purity leads to wisdom and immortality.**

Extremely pure as I am, may I come by the lustrous wealth! Wealth is of two kinds, human and divine. Human wealth consists of gold, silver etc., which are perceived by the eye. That which is heard by the ear, i.e., the Brahma- jñāna and the like which are known only through the Veda, constitutes divine wealth. Accordingly, when treating of a certain course of contemplation, the Vajasaneyins enjoin the contemplation of the eye and the ear regarded respectively as symbols of human and divine wealth. "The eye is human wealth; by the eye indeed does one perceive it, The ear is divine wealth; by the ear indeed does one hear it." The epithet 'lustrous' shows that the divine wealth is here prayed for. Here luster is vigour; and Brahma-jñāna, the divine wealth, is vigorous because of its power to remove all samsāra.

Endowed with these riches, with this divine wealth of Brahma-jñāna, may I be possessed of vigorous intelligence, of the intellectual power of clearly grasping the teachings of the scriptures which expound Brahma-jñāna; and may I then be soaked with the ambrosia of Brahmic bliss!

According to the sage Trisanku, the recitation of this mantra constitutes the austerity of Vedic recitation known as Brahma-yajña, which one should practice after learning the Veda from a teacher.

**Lesson 11**

(Eleventh Anuvāka)

**THE EXHORTATION.**

In the Tenth Lesson a mantra has been taught which may be recited in lieu of Brahma-yajña; so that, even to a man of dull intellect, Brahma-yajña is easy of performance. Thus it is possible for one to combine performance of the works taught in the Śruti and the Smṛti with practice of the contemplation taught before, thereby to attain liberation through an intermediate stage. In the Eleventh Lesson the Śruti leaches that performance of works is by itself a step towards mokṣa, inasmuch as it creates a taste for wisdom.

**Works are necessary for wisdom.**

In proceeding in this lesson to enjoin the observance of certain necessary duties, the Śruti evidently means that, prior to the attaining of the knowledge that the Self (Ātmān) is one with Brahma, it is absolutely necessary to perform the works enjoined in the śruti and the smṛti. The aim of this exhortation is evidently the regeneration of the aspirant. Indeed, Self-knowledge does readily spring up in him who has been regenerated, i.e., whose manas (sattva) has been purified, Hence the smṛti,

"By tapas (austerity) man killeth sin; by Vidyā (wisdom) he reacheth the Immortal."

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\textsuperscript{63} Yojana = about 8 or 9 miles

\textsuperscript{64} Chha. III. et. seq.
In the sequel here the śruti says:—

"By tapas do thou seek to know Brahman." (3:2)

So, to bring about the dawn of wisdom, works must be performed, because of the śruti's exhortation; and transgression of the exhortation cannot but lead to evil. First, too, in order comes the exposition of works. (In this Upaniṣad), prior to the exposition of pure Brahma-vidyā, works are treated of; and once the Brahma-vidyā has arisen, works serve no purpose, as this Upaniṣad teaches in the sequel:

"He finds the Fearless as the mainstay."65

"Him verily in truth burns not the thought 'why have I not done righteousness?'"66

"He has no fear of anything whatever."67

From this it may be concluded that works conduce to the rise of knowledge by way of extinguishing the past accumulated sins. And there is a mantra to the same effect:

"By avidyā (works) crossing over death, by vidyā does one reach the Immortal."68

The mention of right speech and other duties in the Ninth Lesson is meant to remove the impression that they are of no use whatever, while here the śruti means to teach that their observance is necessary as conducing to the dawn of knowledge. Two sides of the injunction should be distinguished here:

(i) that prior to the attainment of knowledge it is necessary to perform works, and (2) that it is only prior to knowledge that their performance is necessary. — (A) He who aspires to mokṣa should observe the duties mentioned here with a view to obtain wisdom. They should be observed till the Self-knowledge is attained. Once the Self-knowledge has been attained, all human aspiration has been achieved; and as the Self is ever free in Himself, there is no more purpose to be served by works. It is, therefore, only prior to Brahma-jñāna that performance of works, as tending to the purification of manas, is absolutely necessary. — (S)

Know as well as learn the Veda

1. Having taught the Veda, the teacher then exhorts the pupil.

After teaching the Veda69 to the pupil (ante-vāsin, lit., he that dwells near), then the teacher begins to exhort him: that is to say, when the pupil has learnt the texts, the teacher then instructs him in the meaning of the texts. This gives us to understand that after learning the Veda the pupil should not turn back from the abode of the teacher without making an enquiry into Dharma, into the nature of the works enjoined in the Veda, And the smṛti says:—

"And one should know and then engage in works."70

Who the teacher is, Manu says as follows:—

"The twice-born who draws the pupil near and teaches him the Veda with the (ritualistic) formulas as well as the secrets, him they call a teacher." (2:140)

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65 T.U. II. 7, 66 Ibid.II.9. 67 Ibid 68 Isa-up. 11. 69 The whole Veda — (S) 70 Vide Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra 2:2:5
The pupil is he who always dwells in close proximity with a teacher, such as the one described above. The smṛti says:—

"Never leaving him, his shadow as it were, (the pupil) should reside with the teacher."

To such a pupil, the master teaches the Veda after drawing him near i.e. after due initiation, (Skt. Up-ni = to lead near). Then, when the pupil has learned the text, the teacher instructs him in the duties to be performed. From this we understand that after learning the Veda the pupil should not return home from the teacher's family without enquiring into Dharma.

**Duties briefly stated.**

2. Speak the true. Follow Dharma.

Speak the true: give utterance to what they comest to know by proper evidence and what is worthy of utterance. And thou shalt follow Dharma, too. 'Dharma' here stands for duty in general, inasmuch as the several duties, such as truth-speaking, are particularized below. The wise who know all Dharma lay down that truth - speaking consists in giving utterance to a thing as it is perceived, without hypocrisy or a motive to do injury. The wise say that Dharma consists in the observance of Agnihotra and other works. — (S).

Truth-speaking stands also for other virtues mentioned along with it, such as "harmlessness, truth, the abstaining from theft," etc. 71 'Dharma' means Agnihotra and other sacrificial rites enjoined in the extant srutis. Jaimini has defined it thus; "Dharma is the thing taught in (the word of) command (Veda)" 72 Thus the two comprehensive sentences teach that all duties enjoined in the sruti and the smṛti should be observed.

**Duties never to be neglected.**

On the principle that "Once done, the command of the scriptures has been observed," one may suppose that after a single performance of the works enjoined in the sruti and the smṛti they may be abandoned. To prevent this supposition the sruti commands as follows:—

3. From study swerve thou not. Having offered dear wealth to the teacher, cut thou not the progeny's line. From the true it will not do to swerve, nor from Dharma, nor from welfare. Neither will it do to swerve from well-being, nor from study and teaching, nor from duties to Devas and Pitris.

Be thou never negligent of study. Never forget the scriptures thou hast learnt from the Guru. The smṛti says:—

"Know that to forget what has been learnt is equal to brahmanicide."

As a return for the knowledge, do thou obtain for the teacher a most acceptable wealth 73 and give it to him. Then, with the permission of the teacher, secure a suitable wife and prevent break in the line of descent. It will not do to bring about a break in the line of descent. That is to say, if a son is not born, attempts should be made to get a son by means of sacrificial rites such as the Putrakamyapāśi, a rite performed with a view to get sons. This appears to be the meaning of the sruti because of the mention of three duties: "offspring, begetting, and propagation." Otherwise, the sruti would have mentioned only one, that of begetting. To swerve from the true is to have an occasion to utter a falsehood. In virtue of the word 'swerve' we understand that it will not do to utter falsehood even in forgetfulness: otherwise the sruti would have simply forbidden the uttering of falsehood.

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71 Yajñavalkya-smṛti 1.122.
72 Pūrva-mimāṃsa 1:1:2.
73 Cows, gold, cloth &c. (Sāyana) such as the teacher desires in accordance with the Law — (S).
The śruti again speaks of the duty of truth-speaking with a view to teach that one should never tell a lie, however small, even in forgetfulness. —(S).

It will not do to swerve from Dharma. Dharma refers to some particular works to be done; to swerve from Dharma, therefore, means to neglect those works. Dharma should never be neglected; it should be observed. It will never do to swerve from welfare i.e., from acts tending to self-preservation nor from well-being, i.e., from those auspicious acts which promote one's prosperity.

The means of self-preservation are either physical or super-physical. The Vedas recommend certain rites whereby to secure longevity and health (vide. Taittiriya-Samhitā II. iii.11), and these are the super-physical means; medicine and the like constitute the physical means. Similarly, there are both physical and super-physical means of acquiring wealth. The Taittiriya Samhitā 2:1:1 prescribes a super-physical means to it.

The accepting of gifts from others is the physical means. Since, without welfare and wealth, it is not possible to perform the works which are conducive to mokṣa, it is necessary to warn against the neglect of welfare and wealth.

To study the Vedas and to teach them are indeed absolutely necessary.

First the Śruti warned against the forgetting of what has been learned. Here is a warning against the neglect of teaching to others what has been learnt, as well as against the omission of Brāhma-yajña. It is also necessary to observe all the rites (enjoined for the propitiation) of Devas and Pitris.

The rites propitiative of Devas — such as Vināyaka-Vrata, Ananta-Vrata — are enjoined in the Purāṇa; the annual ceremonies and the like are propitiative of the Pitris.

**Persons worthy of worship.**

Now the śruti enjoins that one should worship one's mother etc., as Devatās, without regarding them as mere humans;

4. Treat thy mother as a God; as a God treat thou thy father as a God shalt thou treat thy teacher; thy guests as Gods shalt thou treat.

These should be worshipped as Devatās.

Worship thy mother as if she were a Deva – Rudra, Vishnu, Vināyaka, or the like.

**How far to observe Vedic prescriptions and orthodox custom.**

5. What works are free from fault, they should be resorted to, not others,

6. What are good works of ours, they should be done, not others.

Thou shalt do such other works as are free from blame and sanctioned by siṣṭācāra or practice of wise men, but not those works which, though practiced by the wise, are open to blame.

As to the works intended to produce unseen results, thou shalt necessarily engage in the good works which we, the teachers, practice and which are not contrary to the teaching of the Vedas, but not in the contrary ones, though practiced by the teachers.

As to acts other than those mentioned above, thou shalt strive to perform those which are practiced by the wise, and which do not seem to involve any evil. It will never do to resort to evil acts or to those which are open to the least suspicion of evil, though practiced by the wise. Thou shalt follow our example only with regard to those acts which are not contrary to the śruti and smṛti and which are in accordance with the practice of the wise.— (S).

As to the works tending to promote welfare and prosperity, the śruti lays down some restrictions.
These works are of two classes:— those which are open to blame and those which are not. Those which have been already referred to, namely, the sacrificial rites conducive to longevity, acceptance of gifts, the conducting of a sacrificial rite for another, are works not open to blame and are therefore worthy of performance; the others, such as the magical rites performed for malevolent purposes, though conducive to welfare by way of destroying the enemy, should not be resorted to, since they are open to blame as leading to hell.

Wise men's practice being authoritative like -the śruti and the smṛti, one may suppose that the teacher's example should be followed in all acts. But here too, the śruti makes a certain reservation. Sri Krishna has described two kinds of sampad or nature Daivi and Asuri; divine and demoniac in the following words:

"Fearlessness, purity of heart, steadfastness in knowledge and Yoga, alms-giving, self-restraint and sacrifice, sacred reading, austerity, uprightness;"

Harmlessness, truth, absence of anger, renunciation, tranquility, absence of calumny, compassion to creatures, uncovetousness, gentleness, modesty, absence of fickleness;

“Boldness, forgiveness, fortitude, purity, absence of hatred, absence of pride; these belong to one born for a divine lot, O Bhārata.

"Ostentation, arrogance and self-conceit, anger as also insolence, and ignorance belong to one who is born, O Pārtha, for an Āsuric lot."74

Now thou shalt follow us in cultivating the good qualities such as fearlessness, but not ostentation etc. This principle should be extended to the whole range of siṣṭhācāra or orthodox custom. To illustrate: — Parasurāma, the son of Jamadagni, killed his mother by the father's command. Here we should follow the example of Parasurāma in the good act of obeying the father's command, but not in the sinful act of killing the mother. And so in other cases.

Conduct towards great men.

7. Whatever brahmaṇas are better than ourselves, in their sitting it will not do for thee to breathe.

Whoso among the brahmaṇas not kṣatriyas and others are eminent as teachers75 versed in the śāstras or scriptures etc., and are superior to ourselves, thou shalt entertain them by offering them seats and so on, i.e., remove their fatigue. Or (to interpret in another way): when such brāhmaṇas are seated in an assembly for discussion, thou shalt not even so much as breathe; thou shalt merely grasp the essence of what they say.

In their discourses, thou shalt not hasten to say anything. Thou shalt grasp the essence of their discourse and never thwart them, if ever you have power to do so. — (S)

If ever you meet righteous persons, superior by age, knowledge and qualities to us who are thy teachers, thou shalt remove their fatigue by offering them seats, by washing their feet and by such other kinds of service. Or to interpret in another way, thou shalt not breathe in their assembly. Much less shalt thou engage in a discussion with them in a tone of familiarity, thinking that thou art very learned. All thy concern should be to learn what they teach.

How to make gifts.

8. With reverence should gifts be made, never with irreverence should a gift be

74 Bhag. Gita XVI. 1-4;
75 It is a common thing that for fear of the king etc., people make gifts during marriage and other occasions — (S).
made. With liberality should gifts be made, with modesty should gifts be made. With fear should a gift be given, in friendliness should a gift be given.

Whatever thou hast to give, do thou give it only with reverence. Never with irreverence should a thing be given. When thou givest wealth to a brahmaṇa, thou shalt give it reverently. Nothing should be given with irreverence. What is irreverently given is of no use in either world. Accordingly the Lord says:—

“Whatever is sacrificed, given, or done, and whatever austerity is practiced without faith, it is called Asat, O Pārtha; it is naught here or hereafter.” (B.G.17:28)

To interpret the śruti in another way: Just as a reverential man makes a gift, so, even in the absence of reverence, a man should make a gift. The verse quoted above teaches only that thereby he does not reap the fruit of a gift made Sāttvically. But he does reap the fruits of a rājasic or a tamasic gift. Accordingly the Lord distinguishes three kinds of gifts:—

"That alms which is given knowing it to be a duty to give to one who does no service, in place and in time, and to a worthy person, that alms is held Sāttvic." And what is given with a view to receiving in return, or looking for the fruit, or reluctantly, that alms is held to be Rājasic.

"The gift that is given at a wrong place or time to unworthy persons, without respect or with disdain, that is declared to be Tāmāsic." (B.G. 17:20 – 22)

With ostentation, with modesty, or from fear of śāstras, with the discrimination of the nature of the time, place, and the donee should gifts be made. These sentences treat of the three kinds of giving mentioned above. "I am rich in wealth; as my wealth goes to slaves, men and women, so let it go to the brahmaṇas." When a gift is made thus insultingly by a man because of his vast wealth, that gift is tamasic. When a man makes gifts in the same spirit because of the shame felt by him when abstaining from making gifts while his equals do so, his giving is rajasic. Those gifts are sattvic which, for fear of sin, a man makes to the sacrificial priests and the like as laid down by law. A man with sattvic nature should give with discrimination. For example, he should know that full fees are due to the four important priests such as the Adhvarya, half fees to the next four such as Pratiprasthaṭ, one-third to the next four such as Neṣṭṛī, one-fourth to the next four such as Unnetṛī.

Or, the whole passage speaks of sattvic gift only. “There should be no guile in the matter of wealth”; thus the law lays down that gifts should be made according to one's means. A wealthy man should make large gifts lest making small gifts may bring great shame on him.

**How to decide matters of doubt.**

Having thus taught of the duties which cannot otherwise be known, the śruti now proceeds to show how to decide in matters of doubt:

9. Now if to thee a doubt as to a deed, of a doubt as to conduct, should occur, as the brahmānas there who are thoughtful, zealous, well-versed, not hard (at heart), desirous of Dharma would act in such matters, so there shalt thou act.

If, to thee, thus acting, there should ever occur a doubt as to a deed enjoined in the śruti or in the smṛti, or a doubt as to a custom (acāra), then, in those matters, thou shalt act just in the way in which the brahmānas of the country and the age who are competent to judge, well versed in the matter, not urged on by others to the deed or custom, seeking Dharma, seeking what is beyond the senses, unassailed by kāma (worldly desire) would act in such matters.

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76 Owing to confusion of mind (S)

77 Who are able to discern the subtle points — (S)
Deeds are of two classes, those which are enjoined in the śruti, such as the Agnihotra, and those which are enjoined in the smrī such as the sandhya-vandana or worship of the Divine Being at the main points of time in the day. To take an example from the works enjoined in the śruti; In one place the śruti says:— "The offering of oblation should be made when the sun has risen " and elsewhere it says “The offering of oblation should be made when the sun has not yet risen."

This may give room to a doubt. Again, to take an example of the works enjoined in the smrī: A doubt may arise as to whether the Sandhya Devatā the form in which the Divine Being should be worshipped at the main points of time in the day is of the male or female sex, the scriptures speaking of the Devata in either way. To take an example of a custom in worldly affairs handed down in the family:— A doubt arises as to the propriety of marrying a maternal uncle's daughter or of eating animal food, inasmuch as contradictory views obtain in these matters. In such matters of doubt as these thou shalt act in the way in which those brahmaṇas would act who live in the same country, age, and tribe in which thou livest at the time; who, as free from attachment, aversion, anxiety and other evil tendencies of mind, are competent to decide as to the real meaning of the scriptures; who are themselves engaged in the observance of the constant and incidental duties, intent on their due performance; who are free from anger, free from bigotry; and who work only for virtue (Dharma), not for gain and honor.

On intercourse with the accused.

Having thus taught how to act in matters of doubt, the śruti now goes on to teach the procedure whereby to decide as to whether one should abstain or not from social intercourse with persons accused of a sinful act:

10. Now as to the accused: as the brahmaṇas there who are thoughtful, zealous, well-versed, not hard (at heart), desirous of Dharma would act in such matters, so there shalt thou act.

Now as to those who are suspected to be guilty of a blameworthy act, do thou proceed as recommended above.

The Peroration.

The exhortation is concluded as follows:

11. This is the direction; this the advice; this the secret of Vedas; this the command; thus shall devotion be, and thus verily (all) this shalt thou observe.

This is the direction, this is the advice that fathers or others should give to their sons, etc. This is the secret — the meaning — of the Vedas. This is the word of God; this is the exhortation as to all things that are authoritative. Therefore all that has been taught shall be duly done. The repetition shows high regard for the instruction here set forth, implying that all this should be observed, that none should fail to observe it.

The righteous should strive to obey every command that has been thus laid down. The instruction thus given from para 2 to 10 is ṛdeśa, the Vedic injunction. Just as a king commands his servants so does the Vedic injunction command the devotee. Upadeśa is the command laid down in the smṛī, so called because the smṛīs are very near to the śruti, upon which they are based. Even in the smṛīs that cannot be traced to the original śrutis, directions such as "speak the true" are given in the same form. What has been taught in the words "speak the true" etc., constitutes the essence of the Vedas. Of the three parts of the Vedas, the mantras (prayers to Gods etc.), the arthavādas or subsidiary passages, and the vidhis or injunctions, the last, namely, the injunctions, constitute the very essence of the Vedas. These commands are the commands of God, as the Lord says “Śruti and

78 Īśvara, the Paramatman, the Highest Self. — (S)
smṛti are my own command"

Because these duties, such as "speak the true" taught in the śruti and the smṛti are enjoined by God Himself and constitute the essence of the Vedas, therefore it is a bounden duty to observe them.

Seeing that here the śruti lays so much stress on works, some hold that works alone can lead to mokṣa: while some others hold that mokṣa results from works and knowledge combined. Both these theories were refuted by us (in the introduction to the study of the Upaniṣads) when discussing the relation between the ritualistic section and the wisdom section of the Vedas. Though works are not the direct cause of mokṣa, they conduce to it by way of creating a desire for knowledge. Hence the injunction of works in the wisdom section of the Veda.

**Does the highest good accrue from works or from knowledge?**

In the opening section (the introductory part of the bhāṣya) it was shown that Vidyā or knowledge of Atman by itself leads to the Highest Bliss. To establish the proposition still more firmly, the commentator again enters into a discussion of the point on this occasion when the śruti is found to enjoin works, his main object being to show that works and knowledge serve each a distinct purpose — (A)

Now, to discriminate between Vidyā and Karma, knowledge and works, we shall discuss the following question: Does the highest good accrue from works pure and simple, or from works aided by knowledge, or from knowledge and works operating together conjointly as co-ordinate factors, or from knowledge aided by works, or from knowledge pure and simple?

**The theory that the highest good accrues from works.**

One may say that the highest good accrues from works (karma) pure and simple, because he alone is qualified for works who possesses a knowledge of the whole Vedic teaching. And this knowledge includes a knowledge of Ātman as taught in the Upaniṣads, as the smṛti says "The whole Veda with the secret (rahasya) should be learnt by the twice-born". In the words "knowing thus, one sacrifices," "knowing thus, one officiates at a sacrifice," the śruti shows that only a man of knowledge is qualified for works of any kind. It is also said:— "knowledge first, then action." There are indeed some exegetes who maintain that the whole of Veda is intended to teach works; so that if the highest good cannot be attained by works, the Veda is of no use.

It is a principle recognized by all exegetes that the Veda speaks of things as they are only with a view to teach something else which has to be done, which has to be newly brought into existence. On this principle, we should understand that, where the Veda treats of Atman as He is, subserves an injunction of an act by way of creating an exalted notion of the nature of the agent concerned in the act; so that, the śruti speaking of the fruits accruing from the knowledge of Ātman points in the main to the injunction of an act. The highest good, therefore, accrues from works alone. — (A)

**Works cannot produce liberation.**

Not so, because of the eternality of mokṣa. It is indeed admitted that mokṣa is eternal, and it is also known to all that the effect of an act is temporary. If the highest good accrue from works, then it would be temporary, a conclusion which nobody is prepared to accept.

(Objection):— The interested and prohibited acts being avoided, the armada-karma being exhausted by its fruits being enjoyed, no sin of omission being incurred when all obligatory duties are performed, mokṣa is attained even without knowledge.

(Answer):— This cannot be, because, as was already shown, there possibly exists some residual karma which gives rise to another body; and the performance of obligatory works cannot neutralize that part of the residual karma which is not opposed to them. As to the contention that he alone is qualified for works who possesses a knowledge of the whole Vedic teaching, we answer: This too
cannot be, because, apart from the knowledge acquired by a mere study of what is heard (i.e. of Vedic texts), there is *upāsana*. Possessing the knowledge acquired by a mere study of Vedic texts, a man is indeed qualified for works; no such knowledge as has to be acquired by means of *upāsana* is necessary for works. And *upāsana* is laid down as another means to mokṣa, as a means which is quite distinct from the knowledge acquired by a study of Vedic texts. And so it must be, because the śruti declares that it is a distinct thing. That reflection (manana) and meditation (nidanhdhāsanā or *upāsana*) are distinct from the knowledge acquired by a mere study of Vedic texts is clear from the fact of separate efforts being enjoined in the śruti, which, after directing "thou shalt hear of the Self," teaches again that "thou shalt reflect and meditate upon the Self."

**Neither does liberation accrue from works and Upāsana combined.**

(Objection):— So, then, let mokṣa accrue from works aided by Vidyā or Upāsana. It is possible that, when aided by Vidyā, works acquire a power to produce a new effect. Just as a poison, dadhi or thick sour milk, etc., though in themselves liable to produce death, fever and such other effects, acquire, when co-operating with a mantra, sugar, etc., power to produce quite new effects. So, mokṣa may be produced by works aided by Vidyā.

(Answer):— No. The objection already stated, that what is produced cannot be eternal, applies to this view also.

(Objection):— On the authority of the Vachana:⁷⁹ (saying, i.e. śruti) mokṣa, though produced, is eternal.

(Answer): — No, because the śruti is a revelation. Śruti, as we all understand, reveals a thing as it is; it does not make what has not been in existence. Indeed, not even on the authority of a hundred śrutis, can it be that the eternal is produced, or that what is produced is imperishable. This argument will do also to refute the view that Vidyā and Karma, conjoined as co-ordinate factors, produce mokṣa.

(Objection):— Vidyā and works serve to remove the obstacles on the way to mokṣa.

Avidyā and adharma are the obstacles. They are destroyed by Vidyā and works respectively. Thus, these do not produce mokṣa itself. Mokṣa, which consists in remaining as the Self, is eternal. And all philosophers admit that non-existence known as destruction (pradhvamsābhāva), though an effect produced, is eternal. — (A)

(Answer):— No: we find that works produce quite a different effect. Works are found to bring about one of the following effects: *utpatti* or production of a new thing, *vikāra* or change of state, *samskāra* or consecration, āpti or acquisition; but mokṣa is different from production or any other of these effects.

The cessation of avidyā can be brought about only by Vidyā (Brahma-jñāna) as taught in the śruti:—

"The heart's knot is dissolved; all doubts are cut apart; deeds perish when higher and lower that have once been seen."⁸⁰

To effect it, Vidyā does not require help; and the effect of work, it is well known, is something different. To illustrate these effects with reference to Vedic sacrificial acts: a sacrificial cake (*purodāsa*) is a thing produced by an act; grain is consecrated by the act of sprinkling water thereon while uttering some mantras; the soma plant changes its original state by the act of pressing out the juice of the plant; and the Veda is acquired by the act of studying. On the contrary, mokṣa, the state

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⁷⁹ This refers to such passages as "And again he returns not." (Chha-Up. 8:15:1.) (A)

of remaining as the One Self, cannot have a beginning, is not capable of improvement, is not subject to change, is not a thing to be acquired; and it cannot therefore be an effect of Karma. — (A)

(Objection):— Because of a path being spoken of in the śruti, mokṣa is attainable. The śruti speaks of a passage in the following words: "They, free from stain, go forth by the sun's gate." These words, "Rising by this, one reaches deathlessness" Mokṣa is therefore a thing to be reached.

As the śruti speaks of the Path of Light leading to mokṣa, we understand that mokṣa consists in reaching Brahman who dwells beyond the Brahmāṇḍa, the Mundane Egg. Therefore it cannot be contended that mokṣa is ever present, is inherent in the nature of the Self. — (A)

(Answer):— No, because (the goal) is everywhere and is not a thing different from the pilgrim.

As the cause of akāśa and all else, Brahman is omnipresent; and all conscious souls (Vijñānātmans) are identical with Brahman. So that, mokṣa is not a thing to be attained. What is to be gone to must be distinct from the goer, must be a thing removed in space from the goer. What is not distinct from another cannot be gone to by that other. That the goer here is not distinct from the Goal is taught in hundreds of passages in the śruti and the smṛti, such as the following:—

"Having created it, He penetrated into it." (Taitt. Up 2:6)

"And do thou also know Me as kṣetrajña in all kṣetras (bodies)." (B.G. 13:2)

(Objection):— This contention is opposed to the śruti which speaks of the Path and the Divine glory (of the liberated Soul). To explain: There is yet another objection. To hold that mokṣa is not a state to be attained is to contradict the passages speaking of the Path, and those passages which declare as follows:—

"He becomes three ….. " (Chh. Up. 7:16:2)

"When he desires the world of the fathers (pitris), by his mere will the fathers come to receive him …….. (Ibid 8:2:1)

"He moves about there eating, playing, and rejoicing, be it with women, carnages, or relatives, never minding the body into which he was born." (Ibid 8:12:3)

(Answer):— No; because these passages refer to Karya-Brahman, to Brahman manifested in the evolved universe. It is only in the evolved Brahman that women, etc., can be found, but not in Brahman who is the cause, as witness the following passages:

"Existence alone, my dear, this at first was, one alone without a second." (Chhand. Up. 6:2:1)

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite." (Ibid 7:24:1)

"When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?" (Brh. Up. 4:5:15)

Combination of Vidyā and works is impossible.

In arguing that works can have no effect on mokṣa, it has been hitherto assumed that a conjunction of works and knowledge is possible. Now the bhāṣyakāra proceeds to argue that the conjunction is impossible. — (A).

And because of their mutual opposition, combination of Bright) knowledge and works is an impossibility. Of course, Vidyā or Right Knowledge which is concerned with the Reality wherein

82 Katha. Up. 6-16
agency and other factors of action are altogether absent, must be opposed to karma or works which can only be brought about by various factors operating together. It is, indeed, impossible to regard one and the same thing both as being really marked by agency and so on and as devoid of all such distinctions. One of the two states must, of necessity, be an illusion. If one of them is an illusion, it is the duality that should be regarded as an illusion, set up as it is by the innate ājnāna or ignorance of truth as said in hundreds of passages such as the following:

“For, when there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other.” (Ibid)

"He who sees any difference here goes from death to death." (Kath.Up. 2:10)

“Where one sees something else, that is the finite." (Ch. Up 7:24:1)

“Now, if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know.” (Brh. Up. 1:4:10)

“If he makes but the smallest distinction in It, there is fear for him." (Tait. Up. 2:7:1)

That oneness is the truth is declared in the following passages:

“This Eternal Being that can never be proved is to be perceived as one only." (Bri.Up 4-4-20)

“One alone without a second." (Cha. Up. 6:2:1)

“Brahman alone is all this. " (Nr. Ta. Up. 7)

“The Self alone is all this. " (Cha. Up. 7:25:2)

And no work is possible in the absence of a consciousness of all such factors of action as sampradāna, i.e. a being to whom something may be given. Moreover, there are thousands of passages in the śruti, teaching that, in right knowledge, there is no consciousness of distinction.

Hence the mutual opposition between Vidyā and Karma, between right knowledge and works; and hence the impossibility of their combination. Wherefore, the contention that mokṣa accrues from Vidyā and Karma combined does not stand to reason.

(Objection):— This contention is opposed to the śruti inasmuch as works are enjoined (in the śruti).

(To explain): If it be argued that the śruti imparts a knowledge of the oneness of the Self by denying the agent and the other several factors of action, like unto that knowledge of the rope which removes the illusion that it is a serpent, this argument is opposed to all Vedic texts which treat of works, as there would be nothing left for them to teach. But the works are enjoined; and such an opposition will not do, since the Vedic texts are all authoritative.

(Answer):— No, because the śruti aims to teach the best interests of man. (To explain): The passages of the śruti which are devoted to knowledge (Vidyā) aim at delivering man from saṁsāra and therefore proceed to impart wisdom with a view to bring about, by means of wisdom, the cessation of avidyā or nescience which is the cause of saṁsāra.

(Objection):— Even this contention is opposed to the śāstra which aims to teach the reality of the agent and other factors of action.

(Answer):— No. The śāstra which, assuming the existence of the several factors of action as popularly understood, enjoins works with a view to the extinction of sins already incurred is conducive to the interests of those who seek liberation as well as of those who seek the (immediate) fruits of action, and as such it cannot operate so far as to teach further that the several factors of action are real.

That is to say, the various texts of Śruti which have been learned in pursuance of the Vedic command should be held as authoritative (i.e. imparting true wisdom) not because the distinctions,
mentioned therein are real, but because they teach what is to the best interests of man. — (A).

No rise of wisdom is possible so long as the obstacle of accumulated sin lies in the way to it. And on the extinction of this sin wisdom arises; then comes the cessation of avidyā, and then the final cessation of samsāra,

Till now, the impossibility of a conjunction of Vidyā and Karma, of knowledge and works, has been argued on the ground that they are respectively based on truth and illusion,

Now the bhashyakāra proceeds to argue the point on the ground that Vidyā and Karma are intended respectively for akāmins and kāmins, for those who are free from kāma or desire and those who are not yet free from it. — (A)

Moreover, desire for the not-self (external objects) arises in him who sees the not-self; and thus desiring, he does works; and, to reap the fruits of those works, he will have to take a body etc., to undergo sānscāra, to pass through birth and death. To one who, on the contrary, sees the oneness of the Self (Ātman), there can be no desire. Ātman (the Self) being not different from one's own self, Ātman cannot be an object of desire; so that to be established in one's own true Self is mokṣa. Hence, too, the opposition between knowledge and works. And because of their mutual opposition, knowledge does not stand in need of works to bring about mokṣa.

And we have shown that as to the (right) knowledge itself coming into existence, the obligatory works are the cause of knowledge as removing the accumulated sins of the past which lie as obstacles in the way, and that therefore the works are treated of in this section. Hence no contradiction of the śrutis enjoining works.

We therefore conclude that the Highest Good accrues from Vidyā alone, from knowledge pure and simple.

**Knowledge leads to salvation without the aid of works.**

That in leading to mokṣa, knowledge does not require the help of works, has been determined in the Vedaṇṭa Sūtras III, iv. 25, as follows:

(Question):— Does or does not the Self-knowledge require the help of works in producing its fruits?

(Prima facie view):— It does require the help of works, because these latter form its anga, its limb as it were. The Darsa-Purnamasa rite, for instance, does require the help of the Prāyāja, its anga. It has been no doubt shown in the opening section (III. iv. i.) that knowledge, as an independent means to the end of man, cannot form an anga or appendage of works. It has not, however, been shown that works do not form an anga or appendage of knowledge; so that, as our premise that works are an appendage of knowledge still holds good, knowledge cannot do without works.

(Conclusion):— Brahma-jñāna, does not require any external help in removing what it has to remove (namely, avidyā or ignorance of the true nature of the Self), because it is an illuminator, like a light, or like the consciousness of a pot. As to the contention that works form its anga or appendage, we ask, in what way do works form its appendage? Is it by way of helping knowledge in bringing about its fruits like the prayāja, or because they are necessary to bring knowledge itself into existence, just as the pounding of grain is necessary to bring a cake into existence? The former cannot be the case; for, then, mokṣa as produced by works would be only a temporary effect. If the latter were the case, the prayāja and the like could not be called angas, inasmuch as they do not

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83 By due performance of works enjoined. (Tr.)

84 Which is devoted to Vidyā. (Tr.)
bring the principal act into existence. Therefore, once the knowledge has arisen, it does not stand in need of works to produce its effect.

**Works are necessary for the rise of knowledge.**

That works are necessary for knowledge to arise has been determined in the Vedānta-sūtras III. iv. 26-27 as follows:—

(Question):— Are works necessary or not necessary for Brahma-Vidyā to arise?

(Prima facie view): — Just as the Brahma-Vidyā does not require the help of works to produce its fruit, so also no works are necessary for its birth. Otherwise, it will be playing fast and loose, once saying that Brahma-Vidyā requires the aid of works and again that it does not require it.

(Conclusion):— There is no playing fast and loose here. For, one and the same thing does or does not require an external aid according to the end in view and according to its capacity for the achieving of that end. A horse, for example, is not necessary for dragging a plough, but he is necessary for driving in a coach. And it cannot be urged that there is no authority to prove that works are necessary for knowledge to arise. "Him, by the recitation of the Vedas, do the Brahmins seek to know, by sacrifice, by gifts, by the austerity of fasting" (Bri. Up. 4-4-22.) in these words the śruti gives us to understand that recitation of the Veda and such other works form the remote means to the knowledge of Brahman, by way of creating a desire for knowledge. "Having become tranquil, self-controlled, quiet, patient, well-balanced, one sees the Self in the self:" (ibid 4:4:23) in these words the śruti enjoins tranquility, self-control and other forms of nivritti or quietist life as a means of bringing about knowledge; so that these form the proximate means to knowledge. Therefore, works like sacrificial rites, and virtues like tranquility and self-control, are necessary for the rise of knowledge.

**In working for knowledge, the duties of the order are fulfilled.**

In the Vedānta-sūtras III. iv. 32 - 35 it has been determined that, in doing works for the sake of knowledge, the duties of the order are also fulfilled.

(Question):— Is it necessary to perform the prescribed duties twice separately, once for the sake of knowledge, and again by way of observing the duties of the order? Or will it do to perform them only once?

(Prima facie view):— The very works such as sacrifices etc., which are enjoined in the Upaṇiṣad as a means of acquiring knowledge, are also the works which are enjoined in the ritualistic section as the duties of the several orders. As the ends in view in the two cases are different, the works should be done twice.

(Answer):— Not necessary. When a person eats food in fulfillment of a sraddha (a ceremonial rite performed in honor of the manes) the call of hunger is also answered by that very act. So, too, by doing works for the sake of knowledge, the demands of the holy order to which the individual belongs are also answered. One may perhaps urge that works for knowledge are optional as prompted by desire while the duties of the order are obligatory and therefore constant; and that, such being the case, when we do the works only once to achieve both the ends, we only confound together two such contradictory things as constant and temporary duties. But this objection cannot stand: for on the authority of scriptures, one and the same act may put on two different aspects. For example, the śruti says "the sacrificial post should be of khadira wood," and again says "for the seeker of manliness, the sacrificial post should be of khadira wood." Here on the authority of the scriptural injunction, one and the same thing serves the purposes of both the obligatory and the interested sacrificial acts. So too, here. Therefore, it will do to perform the sacrificial acts, etc., only once for the attainment of both the ends in view.
Works of all orders conduce to knowledge.

(Objection):— If so, there is no room for other asramas or orders of religious life, because of Vidyā being caused by works. And since works are enjoined exclusively with reference to the order of householders, it is the only order of life (in which man may work for knowledge); and the texts, too, which enjoin life-long observance of works will favor this view above all others.

(Answer):— No; for, works are of many kinds. Agnihotra, etc., are not the only works. There are works unmixed (with cruelty and the like), namely, chastity (brahmacharya), penance (tapas), truth-speaking, sáma or control of the mind (or inner sense), dáma or control of the external senses, ahimsa or abstention from cruelty, and others, enjoined on other orders as everybody knows, and which conduce even more effectively to knowledge; and there are also works such as Dhyana, Dharana and the like. And the śruti itself is going to declare “By tapas (meditation) do thou seek to know Brahman.” (Tait-Up-3-2) It is possible, in virtue of the works done in the former births, to attain knowledge even prior to entering on the life of a householder; and since the order of a householder is entered on only for the sake of works, it is quite useless for a man to become a householder when he possesses the knowledge for which works are intended. Moreover, sons etc., are intended for attaining to the several lokas or regions of enjoyment. How can a man actively engage in works, when from him have fled all desires for the enjoyments of this world, or of the Pitri-loka, or of the Devaloka, which are to be secured by means of sons (works and upāsana), and when, realizing the eternal Self, he finds works of no use? Even a man who has already entered the order of householders should abstain from all works when, on the rise of right knowledge, he loses all attachment as the knowledge becomes ripe, and he finds all works quite useless to him. And this is indicated by the śruti in the words:— "Verily, my dear, I am about to go forth from this place." (Bri Up-4-5-2.)

(Objection):— It is not proper to say so, because it is found that the greater part of the śruti is devoted to works. The śruti puts forth more effort to teach Agnihotra and other works; and there is much trouble involved in the works themselves, inasmuch as Agnihotra and the like can be accomplished only with the aid of many things. Such duties as austerity and chastity enjoined on other orders pertain to the order of the householders alike, and all other works can be accomplished with very limited means. It is, therefore, improper to hold that other orders of life are alternatives quite equal to the order of householders.

(Answer):— No, because of the aid rendered by the works done in former births. (To explain):— The argument that a greater part of the śruti is devoted to works does not detract from the validity of our contention. For, even the works done in former births, be they works like Agnihotra or works like the practice of brahmacharya (chastity), are helpful to the rise of wisdom; and this is why we find some persons free from all attachment from their very birth, while some others, who are engaged in works, are not altogether free from attachment and hate knowledge. Wherefore it is desirable that those who, in virtue of the purificatory acts done in former births, are free from attachment, should enter other orders of life (than that of householders).

And because of the multiplicity of works. (To explain): Because innumerable results accrue from and because people long more for those results — "May I come by this," "may I come by that," thus do people desire innumerable things, it is but right that a greater part of the śruti should be devoted to works. And because works are means. We have already said that works are the means of attaining knowledge. Greater effort should be put forth as to the means, not as to the end.

(Objection):— As knowledge is caused by works, there is no use making further effort. Knowledge arises from works on the extinction of the accumulated sins of the past which have obstructed its rise. All exertion such as the study of Upaniṣads other than the performance of karma or Vedic rituals is 'useless.
(Answer):— No, because there is no such rule. There is no law laid down to the effect that knowledge comes from the extinction of obstacles alone, but not from the Divine Grace (Īśvara-Prasada), or from the practice of austerity (tapas) and dhyāna and the like. Ahimsa (abstention from injury), brahmacharya (chastity) and the like are all conducive to wisdom, while sravāna (study of Upanishads), manāna (reflection upon their teaching), and nididhyāsana (meditation) are the immediate cause of wisdom. We, therefore, conclude that there are other asramas or orders of life. And we also conclude that all orders are qualified to work for vidyā, and that the highest good accrues from knowledge alone.

**Knowledge is possible even beyond the pale of asramas.**

That even the works of those who do not belong to any one of the four recognized orders conduce to knowledge has been determined in the Vedānta-sūtras III. iv. 36 39 as follows:—

(Question):— Does that man attain knowledge or not, who does not pertain to one of the four recognized orders?

(Prima facie view):— Knowledge of the Reality cannot be attained by a widower, by a snataka (one who has finished his studies with the teacher and has been just initiated into the order of householders, but who has not yet taken a wife), and in short, by any person who, having completed the duties of one order, has not for some reason entered on the duties of the next succeeding order; for, such a person does not belong to any recognized order of religious life, which is the means of purifying the mind (buddhi).

(Conclusion):— Knowledge is possible even for those who do not belong to any one of the four recognized orders of religious life, inasmuch as there are works, such as japa (recitation of the set formulas), which are quite independent of the four holy orders and are yet conducive to the purification of the mind. The smṛti says "By sacred recitation alone, verily, can a brahmaṇa be perfected; there is no doubt of this."(Manu 2:87) In the śrutis, we are told that Raikva, who does not belong to any particular order and is yet to marry, is qualified for samvarga-vidyā.85 Thus Gargi and other instances of persons who do not belong to any one of the recognized orders may be cited. This does not mean that the recognized orders serve no purpose; for they tend to accelerate purification. Knowledge is, therefore, possible even for him who does not belong to any one of the recognized holy orders.

**LESSON 12.**

**(Twelfth Anuvāka).**

**THANKS GIVING.**86

In the Eleventh Lesson the master's exhortation to the pupil has been given. So far it has been taught that there exist upāsanās and works which are remote aids to the right knowledge of Brahman. In the Twelfth Lesson the śrutis gives the peace-chant which should be recited on reading the texts treating of these external aids, on studying their meaning, and on observing the acts thus enjoined.

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85 Vide Chan.-Up. 4:1 et. seq

86 Sayana has construed this anuvāka as a supplement to the teaching imparted in the Sikṣāvallī. But according to Sankaracharya, it forms a prelude to what follows here in the Brahmvallī
1. Om! May Mitra be propitious to us, and Varuṇa propitious be; may Aryaman propitious be to us; propitious be Indra and Brihaspati to us; to us propitious may Vishnu of vast extent be. Salutations to Brahman, Salutation to Thee, Vāyu! Thou art indeed Brahman perceptible. Thee indeed have I declared Brahman perceptible. The right have I declared; and I have declared the true. That has protected me, That has protected the teacher; aye, That has protected me, That has protected the teacher. Om Peace! Peace! Peace!

This lesson should be construed in the same way as the First Lesson. In the First Lesson, the words 'I will declare Brahman' are used because Brahman has not been already. Similarly, since the removal of obstacles has to be sought for, the words "May That protect me" are used; whereas at the end the words "I have declared Brahman," "That has protected me," are used inasmuch as Brahman, has already been spoken of, and all obstacles have been removed. The disciple refers to the removal of obstacles which has been already effected, with a view to show that he is not ungrateful. Otherwise, if the seeker of mokṣa does not remember the good done by Indra, Varuṇa and other Gods, it would seem that he is ungrateful; but it is not proper to be ungrateful, inasmuch as the śruti says:—

"In the case of brahmanicide, an expiation is taught, but there is no expiation for ingratitude."

Prayer for mutual good-feeling between Master and disciple.

May Brahman protect us both! May He give us both to enjoy! Efficiency may we both attain! Effective may our study prove! Hate may we not (each other) at all! Om! Peace! Peace! Peace!

May Brahman protect us both together, both the teacher and the pupil! May Brahman give us both to enjoy! May we achieve efficiency for wisdom and may we, thus efficient, pursue our study effectively, i.e. may the study enable us to understand what is taught! May we not hate each other at all! On the occasion of instruction, enmity may arise from some unworthy act which the pupil or the teacher may have done unawares. It is to prevent this that the benediction is uttered:

May we never have occasion to cherish mutual hatred! The peace-chant is read here with a view to remove all ill-feeling which, in the intercourse between the master and the pupil, may have arisen from an unworthy act. The knowledge imparted by the master cannot bear fruit unless the mind (antah-karaṇa) of the master is pacified; for, the master is not different from Īśvara. —(S)

The meaning of the word "peace" uttered thrice here has been already explained." This peace-chant serves also to remove obstacles in the way of the knowledge which is going to be imparted. It is indeed to be wished that knowledge of the Self may be attained without let or hindrance; there lies the source of the highest good.

This peace-chant is intended to remove all obstacles in the way of Brahma-vidyā which is going to be taught. As to what has been already taught, no peace-chant is here necessary, as the śruti says:— "That has protected me," thus showing that the knowledge already imparted has produced its effect without any obstacle. Indeed in the sequel, the Upaniṣad will teach the inherent identity of the Self and Brahman, a knowledge of which will devour all ignorance. Freedom from kāma (desire) accrues only from the knowledge of That which being unknown, kāma (desire), with all its train, comes into being.(S)

In the Saṃhitī-Upaniṣad was clearly expounded the means to Brahma-vidyā. In the Varuni-Upaniṣad the real nature of Brahman will clearly be explained.

First the śruti gives a mantra intended for recitation, and which will prevent the rise of all mutual enmity between the master and the pupil, so that there may reign perfect mutual amity between
Master and disciple.

The disciple for whom the teaching herein embodied is intended is one who has conceived a taste for knowledge as a result of the performance, in this birth or in the past births, of the nitya and naimittika (obligatory and occasional) works enjoined in the ritualistic section; whose mind has been turned inward and has attained one-pointedness by the practice of contemplation taught in various forms in the Saṃhitī-Upaniṣad; who has clearly seen the transience of all the worlds that can be earned by kamyā (desire-prompted) works, and who has, therefore, grown disgusted with them; who, having concluded that mokṣa cannot be attained by works, approaches the Guru for the sake of the knowledge of Brahman's real nature, which alone can lead to mokṣa. And the Guru is one who has studied the Vedas, who has mastered the whole of the Vedic teaching and is therefore competent to instruct; whose mind, being ever devoted to Brahman, is never engrossed in external things. Accordingly the Atharvaṇīkās say:—

"Having surveyed the worlds that deeds (done for reward) build up, he who loves God unto renunciation should betake himself. The uncreated is not by the created (to be obtained). To find out that, he verily should to a teacher go—versed in the law, who takes his final stand on God fuel in hand." (Mund. Up. 1:2:12)

And the Kathas, too, read as follows:

"Of Him the speaker is a wonder, and able is he who attains (Him); a wonder is he who knows (Him) taught by an adept." (Kath. Up. 2:7)

Here, though the Guru has achieved all aspirations and has nothing more to achieve, yet the disciple prays, in this mantra, for the welfare of both.

May Brahman whom I can know after securing the grace of the master (acharyā) protect both me and the Guru! May Brahman so guard us both at the time of instruction that the Guru may teach me with full energy and at the same time I may grasp the teaching with full comprehension and without doubts! –Thus the disciple first prays for Brahman's providential care in the matter of ultimate result, namely, that his grasp of the teaching may be such as to dispel all his avidyā and that the master may be pleased on seeing this cessation of avidyā. To attain this end, the disciple prays, “may we both so co-operate as to infuse into the knowledge a power to produce the desired effect! Then the disciple prays for the means by which this can be effected: May all the texts which we, the Guru and the disciple, have been studying together, prove effective by way of illumining the teaching therein embodied! May we not cherish mutual hatred! The disciple may be displeased that the Guru has not properly explained, and the Guru may grow displeased with the disciple for want of ardent devotion; may there be no occasion for this kind of displeasure!

CHAPTER 2.

BRAHMA-VIDYĀ IN A NUTSHELL.

Homage to the eternal Consciousness, That which is present in all divers things, never a thing of the past, the Innermost one, the Immutable, neither to be secured nor to be avoided! — (S)

Brahma-Vidyā is the specific theme of this section.

In Book I. were first taught those contemplations the contemplations of Saṃhita and the like which are not incompatible with works; then was taught the contemplation of the Conditioned Self through the Vyāhritis, where of fruit is independent sovereignty (svārājya). But these alone cannot
bring about a complete annihilation of the seed of saṃsāra. With a view, therefore, to the extinction of ajñāna or ignorance which is the seed of all trouble, with a view to impart a knowledge of the Self divested of all conditions, the sruti proceeds with this section (Book II) as follows:

1. The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme.

The Seeker of Brahmajanāna should renounce works.

Brahma-vidyā is intended for that person who has become pure in mind (antaḥ-karāṇa) by the observance of obligatory duties, with no more attachment for the immediate fruits of actions than for the sons, etc., seen in a dream. From sense-perception, from the Scriptures, and from inference, he learns that all fruits accruing from works are perishable; and thus knowing, he loses all attachment for them as for a hell. That (state of liberation) which is free from all faults, which is marked by the extinction of all desire, is unattained merely because of our Tamas (ajñāna or nescience); for, this non-attainment of liberation rests in popular belief, unsupported by reason. No factor of action can destroy the nescience which has placed mokṣa beyond reach; and therefore he alone who has renounced all works and is equipped with the qualifications stated above is qualified for a knowledge of the Inner One. Renunciation is verily the best of all means to mokṣa. He alone who has renounced all can know It, his own Inner Self, the Supreme Abode. "Give up dharma and adharma, and likewise the true and the false." And so the Taittiriya-śruti also says: "Renunciation is Brahman." The disciple should, therefore, see that whatever is brought about by works is perishable; and then, equipped solely with the renunciation of works, he should strive for knowledge of the Inner Self. If a thing conies of itself into existence, of what use is action there? If it be in the nature of a thing never to come into existence, what have works to do there either? But when a thing is capable of being produced and needs only a cause for its birth, then alone action is necessary to cause the birth as in the case of a pot which has to be produced from clay. On the other hand, that which, like a flower in empty space, never comes into existence, or that which, like ākāśa, always exists, can never be brought into existence by an act. And the śruti does not purpose to enjoin that anything should be done. It does not enjoin that the end in view should be achieved, because everybody knows it without an injunction. Nor does the śruti purpose to command the performance of the mere sacrificial act, because the mere act is painful. The śruti purposes to instruct merely as to the means of attaining the desirable.

"Do thou by tapas seek to know Brahman well;" in these words the śruti stimulates us to work for Brahma-jñāna, and in the words "Whence (all) these beings are born" the śruti speaks of the characteristic nature of Brahman whom we seek to know. And the means of realizing Brahman consists in abandoning the sheaths (kośas) one after another, in rejecting everything that has any concern with action, and thus entering the Innermost Being, That which is at the back of all Kośas.

— (S).

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87 For, these upāsanas have their origin in kāma and karma, in desire and works. — (S)
88 i.e., to impart a knowledge of the Thing in itself, of the Self as He is. — (S)
89 Maha-narayana-Up, 21-2.
90 And it cannot be that the smrti which has man’s happiness in view teaches what primarily is painful to him.
91 The source of all stimulus to action lies in our own rāga or passion.
92 Tait. Up. 3 2; i.e., if you want to know "Brahman, you should resort to tapas,
93 Ibid 3—1.
Cessation of Avidyā is the specific end.

And the aim of this Brahma-vidyā is the extinction of avidyā, and, through it, the final cessation of saṃsāra. The śruti will accordingly declare:— "Brahman's bliss knowing, he fears not from anything whatever." (Tait. Up. 2-9.) So long as the cause of saṃsāra exists, it cannot be said that "the Fearless he attains as the mainstay " (Ibid 2-7.) nor that " sins committed or virtues neglected burn him not." (Ibid 2-9.) We are thus given to understand that from this knowledge of Brahmā as the All-Self, comes the cessation of saṃsāra.

In the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme" the śruti itself speaks of the purpose with a view to show, at the very outset, the bearing and the purpose of the Brahma-vidyā. The bearing and the purpose of Vidyā being known, one will try and listen to the teaching, grasp it, and hold it in the mind; for Vidyā is attainable only through these processes, such as sravaṇa (listening to the teaching), as elsewhere the śruti says:—

"Ātman should be heard, should be thought of" etc. (Bri.,Up. 2-4-5)

In speaking of the end as conceived by a person who, owing to avidyā, longs for it (as though it were something external, as something he has yet to attain to), the śruti means to stimulate the effort whereby to attain the end which being one with the true Self of the seeker is really infinite. Since all the works which have been spoken of in the ritualistic section are intended to bring about some effects, i.e., to yield fruits external to the Self, the disciple will act in no other way. On learning that results of all actions are perishable, the man loses all longing for them; but, as avidyā, the root of kāma, is yet not destroyed, he still cherishes a desire to rise up from this lower region (of causes and effects) to the Supreme. Thus, in the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," the śruti speaks of an end and a means, only with a view to the attainment of what is quite the contrary, by way of leading the disciple to the Innermost One. Like a mother inducing her child to drink a medicinal mixture, by saying that thereby his hair will grow in profusion, the śruti induces one who is yet a child in knowledge to strive for that which cannot be attained except by knowledge. As to the notion that it detracts from the nature of mokṣa to thus think of it as an effect produced by a means, that notion is burnt away into nothing in the fire of the knowledge that Brahman is one. That inborn desire of every man which expresses itself in the form "May I not be put to the slightest misery, may I always be happy," is possible only when the object of that desire namely, mokṣa exists. Though he has not realised the true nature of mokṣa, still man works for liberation all the same, his mind burning with the desire described above, and filled with the fear of saṃsāra. Since everywhere activity can be induced only by (stating) the end to be attained, the śruti starts with the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," with a view to allure man (to the proper course of action). Attracted by the fruits declared in the śruti, he betakes himself to śravaṇa. and other processes of acquiring knowledge; for, these are the only processes by which knowledge can be acquired, as the śruti itself has declared. No activity, here, of whatever kind, be it the one enjoined in the Vedas or that which is concerned with a worldly pursuit, is without an end in view. It is therefore the end in view that can induce activity. (S).

Brahman will be denned in the sequel. Brahman is so called because He is the greatest. The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme, the Unsurpassed. The Supreme here spoken of must be Brahman himself, inasmuch as by knowing one thing something else cannot be attained. Elsewhere the śruti clearly says that the knower of Brahman attains Brahman: "He who doth truly know that Brahman Supreme, he Brahman Himself becomes." (Mund. Up, 3:2-9)

Here the end is stated in the words "reaches the Supreme." The attainer of the end is spoken of as "the knower of Brahman." By this sentence the śruti necessarily implies that Brahma-vidyā is the means of attaining the Supreme. Just as a sacrificer achieves svarga by means of Agnihotra, so the knower of Brahman can attain to the Supreme by means of Brahma-vidyā. (S).
To speak of Brahman as one to be reached is only a figure of speech.

(Objection):—The śruti declares in the sequel that Brahman is present in all and forms the Self of all; so that He is not one to be reached. We generally speak of one thing being reached by another, of one limited object by another limited object. Brahman being unlimited and the Self of all, it is not proper to speak of His attainment as though He were limited and distinct from one's own Self.

Attainment being always associated with duality, with the limitations of space, time &c., how can it be predicated of Brahman who is not limited by them. (S).

(Answer):—There is no incongruity here. How? Because of the attainment or non-attainment of Brahman being dependent on perception or non-perception.

(To explain):—The Jīva who, though in reality one with Brahman, yet identifies himself with the physical (Anna-maya) and other bodies which are limited and external to the Self and formed of material elements, and he becomes engrossed in them. Then, just as a man, whose mind is engrossed in the enumeration of those that are external to himself, is oblivious of his own existence, though in reality he is immediately present there to make up the required number,94 so the jīva is quite oblivious of his being in reality one with Brahman; and regarding, in virtue of this avidyā (nescience), the physical and other external bodies, the non-self as his own Self, he thinks himself to be none other than the physical and other bodies, the non-self; so that by avidyā, Brahman, though one's own Self, becomes unattained. Thus, we can quite understand how one, owing to avidyā, has not attained his true nature as Brahman, and how he attains it by vidyā, on seeing that Brahman, who is the Self of all, as taught in the śruti, is his own Self, like a man who, owing to ignorance, misses himself making up the required number, and who, when reminded by someone else, finds himself again by knowledge. The non-attainment of the One Self, who is the All, is due to avidyā, like the missing of the tenth man, the avidyā consisting in regarding the five bodies severally Anna-maya etc, as his own selves. By the knowledge that "I am the tenth", the tenth man is attained only through the destruction of ajñāna; and similarly Brahman is attained by the removal of ajñāna. So long as we admit that the knower, the knowable and the like are distinct from Brahman, we understand the word Brahman in its secondary sense. To understand the word in its primary sense, we should know that the knower, the objects of knowledge, etc., are all one with Brahman. There is then no occasion for an injunction (niyoga) of an act,95 as there is during our recognition of duality, inasmuch as here the evil is removed by the mere destruction of ignorance, as a sick man becomes himself on the eradication of his malady.

He who invests his Inner Self with agency and then wishes to attain that Self who is not an agent is like one who, suffering from an intense chill and seeking for fire, approaches a fire demon. Granted that, by a man still cherishing the notion of agency, Brahman is attained; we ask, what is the cause of His non-attainment? There is indeed no cause other than non-perception. Wherefore, here, by way of removing the evil of avidyā and all its effects, the śruti teaches that the Inner Self, whose agency is due to avidyā, is really immutable. Displacing the consciousness of the universals and other external objects which pre-supposes the agency of the knower, by means of that (immutable) Consciousness of the Inner Self which is the essence of the other consciousness, one attains the Supreme. (S).

Having given in the First Lesson, the mantra to be recited for the removal of all possible obstacles, such as mutual enmity between the master and the pupil, the śruti states at the outset of the Second

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94 A story is told of ten way-farers who, after crossing a stream, wanted to see whether all the passengers were alive. But each of them, counting all the nine others except himself, found that one was missing and all began to weep bitterly for the loss of one of them, till at last they were disillusioned by someone telling each of them that the reckoner himself was the tenth.

95 Such as the act of meditation by which Brahman may actually be reached. (A).
Lesson, concisely and in an aphoristic form, the essence of the whole Upaniṣad. The doctrine of Liberation by knowledge of Brahman is the essential teaching of the whole Upaniṣad.

The primary meaning of 'Brahman'.

The word 'Brahman' derived from the root "bṛḥ" to grow, denotes 'a great thing'. And unsurpassed or absolute greatness must be here intended, inasmuch as there is nothing in the context, nor any word or particle in the sentence, pointing to a limitation. If we have been speaking of a thing which is relatively great, or if there be a significant word or particle in the sentence (implying limitation), then limitation may be meant. In fact, neither of them is found here. Absolute greatness consists in being eternally pure and soon. This is evidently what His Holiness (Sri Sankaracharya) means when He writes in the commentary on the Śāriraka-Mimamsa (or the Vedānta-ṣūtras) as follows:

"There must exist Brahman, who, by nature, is eternally pure, conscious and free, omniscient and omnipotent. The etymology of the word 'Brahman' points indeed to what is eternally pure and so on, in accordance with the meaning of the root 'bṛḥ'."

That this is the intended meaning of the word will be clear from the definition "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman."

Brahman is knowable.

He who knows i.e. realizes intuitively by manas Brahman thus described is here spoken of as 'Brahma-vid', the knower of Brahman. The Vājñāneyins read as follows:

"By manas alone can He be realised; there is here no duality whatever." (Bri.Up, 4:4:49)

By means of manas operating through the eye and other senses, one perceives, not the pure Brahman, but the Brahman associated with name and form. Accordingly the śruti says that Brahman has to be seen 'by manas alone', by manas unassociated (with the external senses).

(Objection):— Though independent of the eye and other senses, manas depends (for its knowledge of Brahman) on Vedic Revelation, Brahman being knowable only through Śāstra (Revelation).

(Answer):— Yes; hence the word "realised." That is, Brahman as taught in the Vedas can be brought home to one's mind by means of manas acting independently of the senses. By the word 'alone,' all organs of external sensation, such as the eye, are excluded; and by the word 'realised' — Sk. anu-draṣṭavya = can be seen after Revelation is admitted.

An immediate knowledge of Brahman possible.

It should not, however, be supposed that, Brahman being revealed by the Vedas, an indirect (parokṣa) knowledge of Brahman is alone possible, as in the case of Dharma and Adharma. The analogy between the two is not so complete: for, Brahman is, by His very nature, the Immediate (aparokṣa), as the śruti has declared, "That Brahman which is the very Immediate" (Bri.Up.8:4:1.) whereas Dharma and Adharma are, in their nature, remote.

We admit that though Brahman is in Himself the Immediate, there is the illusion that He is remote. Hence it is that in the subordinate propositions such as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," the śruti speaks of Brahman in His aspect as the Cause of the universe, and then, with a view to remove the false notion of remoteness, teaches in the main propositions that Brahman is one with the Pratyagātman, the Inner Self. Accordingly, the Vājñāneyins declare, "He that knows 'I am Brahman' becomes this all." Here, too, in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Brahman's identity with the Inner Self is taught in the words "Whoso knoweth the One hid in the cave," etc. It is not possible even to imagine that anybody will ever fall into the error of supposing the Pratyagātman to be remote; for, by all men including children and cowherds, the Inner Self, the Pratyagātman, is
regarded as immediately perceived in manas. If things like a pot, which are apprehended by the Pratyagātman or Inner Self through sight and other senses, and which are even insentient in themselves, can be regarded as immediate because they are not apprehended through a medium such as linga (a mark, forming the middle term of a syllogism), how is it possible for one to suppose, even by a mistake, that the Pratyagātman is remote (parokṣa), — that Pratyagātman whose remoteness we cannot so much as imagine, the very Chit or Conscious Principle which is self-luminous and illumines all? That the Pratyagātman is self-luminous and illumines all is taught in the śruti in the following words:

"After Him alone shining, all things shine; by His light does all this clearly shine." (Katha.Up 5:15)

Such being the case, it is not possible to suppose that any one will, even by a mistake, regard as remote the Pratyagātman who is really the illuminator of all, the very Chit or Consciousness shining forth in the notion of 'I' even in our consciousness of practical life.

(Objection):— The Witness (sakṣin), as distinguished from the physical body and other sheaths (kośas), five in all, is remote (parokṣa).

(Answer):— No, because of His being absolutely immediate. Because He is regarded as immediate even when associated with the physical body and other sheaths which are insentient (jāda) and therefore capable of obscuring Him, much more therefore is He immediate when unassociated with them. Thus, because of His being one with the Inner Self who is immediate, Brahman, though knowable through Revelation, is apprehended in manas as the Immediate.

**Brahman realisable through manas.**

(Objection):— What is apprehended by manas can never be Brahman, as the Talavakaras say:

"What by manas one thinks not, by what, they say, manas is thought, That alone, do thou know, is Brahman, not that which they worship thus." (Kena Up. 1—6)

This passage may be explained as follows: That Witness-Consciousness (Sākṣi-Chaitanya) which no born creature can apprehend by manas as an object of thought, and by which, as those who know the mysteries of the Vedas declare, that manas is illumined, do thou, O disciple, understand that the Witness-Consciousness is Brahman. As to the Brahman whom the Upāsakas worship as the Cause of the Universe revealed in the scriptures, as something external to their own Self, like a pot presenting itself as an object of perception, the Being thus worshipped cannot be the Brahman properly so called, because no being that is external to one's own Self, that is an object of perception, that is conditioned by an upādhi, can be the Brahman proper.

Because of such denial, what is perceived immediately by manas as an object of thought cannot be Brahman.

(Answer):— No such objection can be raised here. We do not indeed admit that the śruti means that Brahman cannot be apprehended by manas. If, on the contrary, that be the meaning of the passage, how is it that the śruti teaches "That alone, do thou know, is Brahman"?

(Objection): As the Witness is self-luminous, it does not stand to reason to say that He is illumined, like a pot, by the consciousness proceeding from manas.

(Answer): Well, we explain thus. Certainly, Brahman is not illumined by the phala, by the resulting or generated consciousness of manas. He is, however, illumined by the vr̥tti, by the mental modification, i.e., by the manas thrown into a particular mode. When Brahman is grasped by the mano-vr̥tti, by manas in that particular state into which it is thrown by the teaching of the maha-vākya or main proposition which teaches that Brahman is identical with the Witness-Consciousness, when manas is thrown into this state, i.e., when the right knowledge of the Reality
has been attained, avidyā which is the cause of all distinction between Brahman and the Inner Self vanishes altogether. It cannot be urged that this state of manas is only a remote knowledge; for, contact with the object can alone bring about a change in the mode (vr̥tti) of manas. When a change in the mode of manas is brought about through the eye, it then assumes the form of a pot in virtue of its contact with the pot, and people call it immediate perception. Why should we not in the same way regard as immediate perception that mode also of manas in which it assumes the form of the Witness-Consciousness by coming in contact with it?

How Revelation helps the realisation of Brahman.

It should not be objected that, if only by contact with the object the manas can be made to assume the form of the Witness-Consciousness, Revelation (Vākyā) has no purpose to serve. For, Revelation alone can remove the illusion that Brahman, denned as the Cause of the Universe, is distinct from the Pratyagātman, the Inner Self. Thus, that mode of manas which apprehends the unity of the Inner Self and Brahman is brought about only by contact with the vishaya or object of knowledge in consequence of the śruti having denied all distinction; so that, this knowledge, though produced by Revelation, is immediate. But in the case of a person whose mind is turned outward and does not therefore come in contact with the Witness-Consciousness dwelling within, the knowledge he has of the unity of the Inner Self and Brahman has been brought about by Revelation alone. Such knowledge is mediate, remote (parokṣa), like the knowledge we have of Dharma, Adharma, Svarga, Naraka, and so on.

And here the absence of saksātkaṇa or immediate perception is not due to any fault in Revelation. It is due to the fault of the person himself in that his mind is turned outward. We do not, for instance, think it a fault of the eye that a person who faces the east does not see the color and form of the things in the west. When the person whose mind has been turned outward resorts to Brahma-dhyāna to nididhyāsaṇa as it is called, and thereby brings about that state of the mind (buddhi) wherein, being turned inward and becoming one-pointed, it is competent to investigate and apprehend the subtle, then, the mind (buddhi) comes in contact with the Inner Self, puts on His form, and, aided by Revelation, casts away the illusion of duality. And this state of buddhi is called Sakṣātkaṇa. In the case of a mukhyādhikarin or duly qualified disciple whose mind has been turned inward even prior to listening to the Revelation (of unity) by the contemplation of Saguṇa Brahman, or by nididhyāsaṇa after listening to the teaching of the unity, and who, by a course of logical reasoning based upon agreement and difference, has been able to distinguish the Witness-Consciousness from the physical body, etc., and to realize It, and who has determined the nature of Brahman as taught in the subsidiary passages (avāntara-vākyā), the mahā-vākyā gives rise to the very saksātkaṇa or direct perception of the Self as one with Brahman, not a mere indirect knowledge. This very idea is explained in the Vākyavṛtti as follows:

"The Inner Consciousness that shines forth is the very non-dual Bliss,96 and the non-dual Bliss is the very Inner Consciousness. When the knowledge of their mutual identity thus arises, then, indeed, the non-Brahman-ness of the 'Thou' as also the remoteness of the 'That.' If so, what then? Listen: The Inner Consciousness is established as the ceases, very Perfect Bliss."97

Absolute Identity of Brahman and the Self,

(Objection):— Though mutual unity (anyonya-tadātmya) may be predicated of Brahman and the Self, yet they cannot be One Indivisible Essence (akhada-eka-rasa); for despite the unity of 'blue' and 'lotus,' they are yet distinct as attribute and substance. Accordingly, here, too, there may still

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96 i.e. Brahman. (Tr.)
97 Op. cit. 39-41
remain the distinction as Brahma and the Self.

(Answer); No; there is a difference between the two cases, because of the failure of unity in the case of a substance and its attribute. The attribute of 'blue' is found in the clouds and the like, and thus its unity with the lotus fails. Even the substance, namely the lotus, fails to coexist with blue colour inasmuch as there are white and red lotuses. Being thus distinct from each other, an inseparable unity (akhaṇḍa-artha) between a substance and its attribute is impossible; whereas the unity of Brahma and the Self never fails, and they are therefore one and the same thing, the One indivisible Essence. And this truth has been taught by Visvarūpāchārya in the following words

"No Self-ness (Atma-ta) can be outside Brahma; nor Brahman-ness (Brahma-ta) outside the Self. Therefore the unity of these two is different from that of 'blue' and 'lotus'."

(Objection): If so, the words 'Ātman' and 'Brahman' being synonymous, there would be no use having two separate words.

(Answer) — Not so. Despite the absence of all distinction in the thing denoted, a distinction yet exists in the ideas to be removed which are creatures of delusion, namely, the non-Brahman-ness (of the Self) and the remoteness (of Brahman). This, too, has been taught by the ācārya as follows:

"Though the very Self, Brahman is, owing to delusion, tainted with remoteness. So also, though the very Brahman, the Self thinks as if there is some other being."99

The Thing is one alone. In Its aspect as revealed only in the śruti, It is called Brahma. In Its aspect as the one immediately perceived in manas, It is called ātman, the Self. Its nature, as the Cause of the universe, as the Omniscient Being, and so on, is revealed only by the śruti; and the mediateness of our knowledge thereof leads to the illusory idea that Brahma Himself is remote. And since the physical body and the like called up in the immediate cognitive perception of 'I' are non-Brahman, we fall into the error of thinking that even the Witness, the Conscious Self, is non-Brahman. Because the distinction between Brahma and ātman thus conceived accounts for the two separate words in use while the real thing spoken of is the One indivisible Essence, an immediate knowledge of Brahma as identical with the immediate Self within, arises from the mahavakya. A person who is endued with this kind of knowledge is here spoken of as Brahma-vid, the knower of Brahma.

**He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma.**

Such a one is fit to attain the Supreme; and so indeed the śruti says: 'He reaches the Supreme'. The (Sanskrit) word 'para' (here translated as 'Supreme' means also 'other'). But the word cannot mean 'other' here, inasmuch as the Thing is non-dual, the śruti having denied all duality in the words:—

"Here is no duality whatever." (Bri. Up. 4:4:19.) If the word signifies 'highest', Brahma must be the thing denoted by the word 'para', all the rest being low as made up of māyā. Thus it is tantamount to saying that he who knows Brahma reaches Brahma Himself. The Atharvanikas expressly say: "he who verily knows that Supreme Brahma becomes Brahma Himself." (Mund. Up. 3:2:9)

(Objection.):— The act of reaching spoken of in such sentences as "he reaches the village" consists in a contact with the village preceded by a passage. Therefore, just as an upāsaka of the Saguṇa Brahma rises up through the nādi of the head, and after passing on the Path of Light, reaches the Brahma-loka, by a similar process, we should explain, the knower of Brahma reaches Brahma.

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98 Alias Suresvaracharya
(Answer):— No, because of the denial of ascent and passage. Ascent is denied by the śruti in the words "His prāṇas (the vital air and the senses) do not ascend." The denial of passage is conveyed by the śruti in the following words:—

"As to the path of the person who has become the Self of all beings and who rightly sees all beings, Devas are confounded, looking out (as they do) for the path of the pathless."

To explain: The Brahma-vid, who is the Self of all beings of life, sees all those beings rightly as one with himself. What his path is, even Devas are at a loss to know. These Devas are the Guiding Intelligences (the Ativāhikas, Transporters) on the 'northern,' 'southern' and downward paths; and they get confounded when looking out for the path of the pathless, of the Brahma-vid who has no path; they are at a loss to find his path, whereas they can trace the course of those who have to pass through the three paths, namely, the upāsakas (those who have practised contemplation), the performers of sacrificial rites and acts of charity and non-performers of these acts. Wherefore, it is only a figure of speech to say that Brahman is reached. And the dissolution (of the Brahma-vid's life-principles in the universal life) is spoken of by the śruti in the following words:—

"His prāṇas ascend not " " here alone they; are dissolved."

"Being Brahman himself, he is merged in Brahman.""

Though he is the very Brahman even prior to knowledge, by ajñāna he imagines himself, to be a jīva, and on the attainment of knowledge he himself, i.e., the upādhi in whose association he has become a jīva, disappears altogether so that he becomes Brahman even in consciousness. A man, not being aware of the jewel on the neck, searches for it elsewhere; and when reminded by some one, he feels the jewel and then says, as if by a figure, that it has been attained. Similarly, to say that Brahman is attained is only a figure of speech.

CHAPTER 3.

KNOWLEDGE AND LIBERATION.

The question as to the essential nature of Brahman will be discussed later on (in Chap IV.) We shall now proceed to discuss some points in connection with the knowledge of Brahman and the attainment of the Supreme.

Knowledge is an independent means to the end of man.

That the knowledge of Brahman referred to in the expression "the knower of Brahman" is an independent means to the summum bonum has been determined in the Vedānta- Sūtras III.iv.i. as follows:—

(Question): Is the Self-knowledge an independent means to the end of man, or is it a mere accessory to sacrificial rites ?

(Prima-facie view):— In the absence of the knowledge that the Self (Atman) is distinct from the body, a person is not sure that there is a soul going to the other world, and he will not therefore engage in the Jyotishṭoma and other sacrificial rites. Thus, as impelling one to sacrificial rites, the Self-knowledge imparted by the Upaniṣads is an accessory factor (āṅga) of sacrificial rites.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Knowledge of the Self (Atman) as distinct from the body is of two kinds: one is the knowledge that the Self (Atman) is an agent and passes from this to the other world, while the other is the right knowledge that the Self is one with
Brahman. Of the two, the knowledge of the Self as the agent rouses activity; but the knowledge of the truth that the Self is the non-dual Brahman does not induce action; nay, it even brings about cessation of activity by its denial of the reality of action and its various operative factors as well as of its fruits.

(Objection):— We are told that even men of right knowledge such as Janaka were engaged in action.

(Answer):— Yes; they took to that course of life for loka-sangraha, i.e., with a view to set an example to the world.

If performance of works be necessary even for men of right knowledge to secure liberation, then how to explain the śruti which speaks (in their case) of the worthlessness of offspring etc., in the words "what have we with offspring to do, we to whom this here, this Self, is the world." (Bri. Up. 4:4:22) Thus the śruti says that when the world of the True Self has been immediately realised, the offspring etc., which are the means of securing happiness in the world of non-self, turn out to be of no use. Of the same tenor are the statements "For what end are we to study Vedas?" "For what end are we to worship?" and so on. Wherefore, knowledge of the True Self is an independent means to the summum bonum, not a mere accessory factor of sacrificial rites.

**The student attains knowledge in this or in a future birth.**

As to when that knowledge arises, the Vedānta-sūtra (III.iv.5.) discusses as follows:—

(Question):— Does the student of Brahma-vidyā attain the knowledge invariably in this birth, or does he attain it either in this birth or in a future birth?

(Prima facie view):— When the processes of **sravaṇa** (study), **manana** (reflection) and ** nididhyāsana** (meditation) have been gone through, the knowledge does, of necessity, arise in this very birth. There is certainly no necessity for the alternative in point of time that it is attained either in this very birth or in a future birth; for, the man who engages in **sravaṇa** and other processes desires to attain knowledge in this very birth. A person engages in the study with the desire "may I come by wisdom in this very birth." It should not be supposed that since sacrificial rites, etc., produce their effects in the unseen (i.e. in future births), and since the sacrificial rites, etc., are said to be the means of attaining the knowledge of Brahman, this knowledge of Brahman can, like svarga and other fruits of sacrificial rites, etc., be reaped only in a future birth. For, the sacrificial rites, etc., have served their purpose by way of creating a desire for knowledge, even before the student engages in **sravaṇa** and other processes. Wherefore, the knowledge does, of necessity, arise in this very birth.

(Conclusion):— We maintain that, in the absence of obstacles, the knowledge arises in this very birth. But when there is an obstacle in the way, it arises in a future birth, in virtue of the ** sravaṇa** and other processes gone through in this birth. That many an obstacle may exist is declared as follows:

"Of whom the many have no chance even to hear, whom many cannot know though they have heard." (Aitareya. Up.2:4:1)

Against this it should not be argued that there exists no evidence for the assertion that the knowledge arises in a future birth as a result of the **sravaṇa** and other processes of study gone through in former births; for, the śruti speaks of Vamadeva having attained knowledge while yet in the womb: "Lying still in the womb, Vamadeva thus uttered it." Therefore knowledge arises in this very birth or in a future birth.

**Nothing is real except Brahman.**

It has been said above that because there exists nothing real except Brahman, the word ‘para’ here
in the Upaniṣad cannot mean 'other'. The unreality of all else has been determined as follows in the Vedānta-sūtras III.ii.31-37.

(Question): Does anything exist or not beyond Brahman?

(Prima facie view):— It must be admitted that, beyond Brahman who is said, in the words "not thus, not thus," (Bri.-Up. 2-3-6) to be devoid of all perceptible attributes, there exists something. The reasons are:

(i) Brahman is spoken of as a bridge in the following passage: "Then, as to the Atman, He is the bridge, the support." (Chha. 8:4:1) Now, in common parlance, a bridge is bounded by the shore on either side and keeps the water in its place; and crossing over the bridge one reaches the dry land. Similarly, Brahman is a bridge maintaining the universe in its place; and there must be something else beyond, which one reaches after crossing over Brahman.

(2) The śrutī applies a measure to Brahman in the words "Four-footed is Brahman," (Ibid 3:18:2) "The Puruṣa has sixteen phases." (Ibid 6:7:1) We find such measures applied in common parlance to a quadruped or the like beyond which there is something else, but never to a thing beyond which there is none else.

(3) The śrutī speaks of Brahman's contact with another in the words "With the Existence, my dear, he then becomes united." (Ibid 6:8:1) And that contact is possible only when something exists beyond Brahman, the Existence.

(4) In the words "Atman, verily, my dear, should be seen," the śrutī refers to a distinction as the seer and the seen.

For these reasons, it cannot be held that there is nothing beyond Brahman.

(Conclusion):— In the first place Brahman cannot be a bridge in the primary sense of the word for, otherwise, it would even follow that Brahman is formed of earth and wood. If, on the other hand, Brahman is spoken of as a bridge on account of some point of agreement with it, then let the point of agreement consist merely in holding something in its place, not in regard to something else existing beyond; and the śrutī, too, reads "the bridge, the support." As to the śrutī applying a measure, it is only for the purposes of contemplation; for such measures are applied in the śrutī when treating of a contemplation, not when teaching as to what the Reality is. Such distinctions as the śrutī refers to are due to the upādhis, like the distinction between the infinite ākāśa and the ākāśa limited by a pot. Thus, because the passages which seem to imply that there is something else beyond Brahman admits of a different explanation, and because the śrutī denies all else in the words "One alone without a second," there exists nothing beyond Brahman.

A peculiar feature of the death of the Brahma-vid.

It has been said that the attainment of Brahman here spoken of is unlike that of the Brahma-loka, in that the life-principles of a Brahma-vid does not, at death, depart from his body. This point has been established in the Vedānta-sūtras (IV. ii.12-14) as follows:

(Question):— "His prāṇas do not depart;" in these words the śrutī denies the departure of prāṇas (i.e., the life-principles which make up the Liṅga-sarīra, comprising the prāṇa-maya, mano-maya, and vijñāna-maya kośas) in the case of the person who has known the Reality. Is it the departure from the physical body or the departure from the jīva that is denied here?

(Prima facie view):— It is the departure from the jīva that is denied here; for otherwise, if life does not depart from the body, then there would be no death of the body.

(Conclusion):— Water sprinkled on a heated stone goes nowhere else, nor even is it seen there; on the other hand, it disappears altogether. Similarly, the life-principles of a person who has known the Reality, though not departing from the body, do not yet remain in the body; on the other hand,
they become altogether dissolved. Thus, owing to absence of vitality, the body is said to be dead. It need not be urged here that, in the absence of life's departure, the body cannot be said to die. For, from the distension (and inertness) of the body we have to infer that the life-principles which are said to have not departed from the body do not remain in the body either.

(Objection):— In preference to all this trouble, let us admit life's departure from the body and deny its departure from the jīva.

(Answer):— We cannot say so; for, the wearing of another body being inevitable so long as the prāṇas or life-principles departing from the body cling to the jīva, there can be no mokṣa at all. Therefore it is life's departure from the body, not from jīva, that is denied here.

To reach Brahman is to be rid of separateness.

It has been said above that the reaching of the Supreme consists in the extinction of the upādhi or limitation which makes ātmāna jīva. This extinction of the upādhi has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras IV.ii. 15. as follows:

(Question):— Do the wise man's prāṇas or vital powers, i.e., speech and other senses, become dissolved in the Supreme Brahman or in their respective causes?

(Prima facie view):—When speech and other prāṇas (life-principles) of the wise man undergo dissolution at death they are dissolved in their respective causes, but not in the Paramātman, the Supreme Self; for, in the words "When, this person dying, speech goes to the Fire, life-breath to the Air, sight to the Sun" (Bri. Up. 3-2-13.) etc., the śruti teaches that life-breath etc., designated as kalas (constituents of the organism) in the passage "To their bases go the fifteen kalās," (Mund. Up. 3-2-7) are absorbed in their respective causes referred to (in this latter passage) as the basic 'principles (pratishthas).

(Conclusion):— From the stand-point of the person who has realised Truth, they are absorbed in the Paramatman Himself, as ascertained from the śruti which elsewhere says:

"Just as the rivers onward rolling unto their setting in the ocean go, quitting both name and form; just so the sage, from name and form set free, goes to the shining Man beyond Beyond." (Ibid. 3-2-8.)

This passage speaks, in the illustration, of the absorption of rivers into the ocean. It may be urged that the absorption (of prāṇas) in the Paramatman, which is the point to be established, is not quite so explicit here. If so, there is the following passage which makes it quite clear:

"Just as these rivers rolling onward, towards ocean tending, on reaching ocean sink, their name and form (distinctive) perish 'ocean' they're simply called; in just the self-same way, of that all-watchful one, these sixteen phases, Man-wards tending, on reaching Him sink in the Man, their name and form do perish the Man they're simply called." (Prasna. Up. 6-5.)

This last passage represents the stand-point of the Tattva-vid himself, i.e., of the person who has realised Truth. That passage of the śruti, on the other hand, which has been quoted in support of the prima facie view represents the stand-point of the by-standers. On the death of the Tattva-vid, the persons standing near think, from their own stand-point, that even his speech and other prāṇas are absorbed in the Fire, etc. Hence no discordance between the two passages. Therefore the prāṇas of the Tattva-vid are dissolved in the Paramatman, the Supreme Self.

Jīva is ever liberated.

The nature of liberation which is attained on the extinction of the upādhi has been determined in the Vedānta- Sūtras IV. iv. 1-3. as follows:
(Question)—The śrutis say: "Serene, rising out from this body and becoming that Supreme Light, he attains to his true Self." (Chh. Up. 8-12-2) This passage may be explained thus:

On the extinction of the upādhi, jīva attains perfect serenity. Thus serene, jīva gives up all attachment for the three bodies, reaches the Supreme Brahma and dwells in the state of liberation. Now the question is: Is this state of liberation a new acquisition? or has it been inherent in jīva all along?

(Prima facie view):—The state of liberation here referred to has not already existed in jīva; it is, on the other hand, an acquired state, since the śruti declares in the words "he attains to his true Self" that the state has been newly brought into existence. If it existed before, it must have existed even in the state of saṃsāra and cannot therefore be a result achieved. Therefore the state of liberation is like svarga a newly acquired condition.

(Conclusion):—The state of liberation has already existed in jīva since it is spoken of as 'the true Self in the passage' he attains to his true Self." The śruti "svēna rūpeṇa abhinishpadyate" cannot simply mean that he attains to a state or form belonging to him, (the word 'sva' being to mean 'his own' the statement); for, then, interpreted would be of no purpose. The state of liberation, whatever that might be, belongs to jīva as a matter of course; and the statement, therefore, would convey no specific meaning. If, on the other hand, the expression "svēna rūpeṇa abhinishpadyate " is interpreted to mean 'he attains to his true Self,' then the statement will serve to show that it is not a mere possession or belonging (i. e., something external which has been newly acquired). Nor does the word 'attain' imply that the state of liberation has been produced, inasmuch as what has already existed does not admit of production. On the other hand, the attainment here consists in the manifestation of the Brahma-ness in virtue of the knowledge of Truth. It may perhaps be urged here that in that case the expressions "becoming the Supreme Light," and "attains to his true Self" are tautological. We answer: the expression "becoming the Supreme Light" merely points to the fact of having eliminated from 'That' (i.e., from Brahma, the Cause) all that is foreign to His essential nature, while the expression "attains to his true Self" points to the fact of having realised the import of the whole proposition ('That Thou art'). And the fact that liberation has existed does not detract from its being an end to be aimed at; for, the liberation that has hitherto existed has not been free from ajñāna. Therefore the state of liberation is none other than the Ancient Thing Itself, (the One Reality that has always been in existence).

The Liberated Soul is identical with Brahma, 244

Yet another feature of the state of liberation has been discussed in the Vedānta-Sutras IV. iv. 4. is as follows: —

(Question):—Is the liberated soul distinct or not distinct from the Supreme Brahma?

(Prima-facie view):—The liberated soul must be distinct from the Supreme Brahma, inasmuch as they are respectively spoken of as the agent and the object of an action. In the words "The serene one approaches (or becomes) the Supreme Light" the serene one, i.e., jīva, is spoken of as the agent of the act of approaching, and Brahma, 'the Supreme Light,' is spoken of as the object. Wherefore, the liberated jīva is distinct from Brahma.

(Conclusion):—It has been said that to approach or become the Supreme Light is merely to know the essential nature of 'That' (i. e., Brahma the Cause) eliminating there from all that is foreign to it.100

So, at that stage there may yet be a sense of duality. Subsequently in the words "he attains to his

100 Brahman being still regarded as separate from jīva. — (Tr.)
true Self,” the śruti refers to that state of the liberated soul which corresponds to the import\(^{101}\) of the proposition "That Thou art" taken as a whole. At this stage there can be no distinction between jīva and Brahman, since later on in the words "He is the Highest Puruṣa (spirit)" (Ibid 8:12:3.) the śruti refers to the liberated Soul and declares that 'He' i.e., the jīva who has attained to his true Self — is the same as the Highest Spirit, i.e., Brahman. Therefore, the liberated Soul is not distinct from Brahman.

**How Brahman is both conditioned and unconditioned.**

Yet another point in this connection is discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras IV. iv. 5—7.

(Question) — Brahman who is identical with the liberated Soul is spoken of in the śruti in two ways, as conditioned (sa-viṣesha) in some places and as unconditioned (nir-viṣesha) in some other places, as witness the following passages:

"It is the Self, free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are unfailing, whose purposes are unfailing." (Ibid 8:1:5)

"As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has the Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge." (Bri. Up. 4:5:13)

The question is, is Brahman both conditioned and unconditioned at the same moment? or, is Brahman conditioned at one time and unconditioned at another?

(Prima facie view):— Brahman, when in the state of liberation, cannot be both conditioned and unconditioned at the same moment, the two states being quite opposed to each other. It must, therefore, be that He is in the two states alternately at different moments.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: From two different stand-points of view, Brahman may be conditioned and unconditioned at the same time. He is unconditioned from the stand-point of the liberated one, whereas from the stand-point of one who is still held in bondage, Brahman, who is one with the liberated, appears to be the Cause of the universe endued with omniscience and other attributes. Certainly, the liberated ones are never conscious that they are possessed of omniscience, unfailing will and other such attributes, inasmuch as the avidyā which lies at the root of the idea has been destroyed. But those who are held in bondage are under the sway of avidyā and therefore imagine that Brahman who is ever unconditioned is endued with omniscience and other such attributes. It being thus possible to explain that Brahman is at the same moment conditioned or unconditioned according as the stand-point is the one or the other, it is idle to suggest that Brahman exists in these two different states alternately at different periods of time. Wherefore Brahman is both conditioned and unconditioned at the same time.

**Liberation is the highest state.**

One more point has been discussed in the Vedānta- sūtras III.iv.52 as follows:

(Question):— Is there any state higher than the state of liberation here referred to?

(Prima facie -view): The Brahma-loka, the region of Brahman to which the upāsakas of Saguṇa Brahman attain as the fruit of their contemplation, is of four states:

- Śālokya (being in the same world as Brahman, the Four-faced),
- Śārūpya (being of the same form as Brahman),
- Śāmīpya (being very close to Brahman), and

\(^{101}\) Viz., the absolute identity of Brahman and jīva. — (Tr)
Or thus: By the rule "more work, better results" svarga is of various sorts. Similarly, liberation here referred to, which is alike the fruit of an act may be surpassed by some other state.

(Conclusion):—– What we call liberation is none other than one's own inherent nature as Brahman, but not an acquired state like svarga. It has been taught in the śrutis and even stands to reason that Brahman is of one nature. Therefore, liberation is of one sort, whether attained by Brahma, the Four-faced, or by man. The Sālokya and other specific kinds of liberation mentioned above are acquired results and therefore admit of degrees of excellence according to the quality of the upāsana; but the mukti or liberation (spoken of here), we may conclude, is not of that nature.

CHAPTER 4.
BRAHMAN DEFINED.
An Explanatory Verse.

In the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme" the śrutis has aphoristically set forth knowledge and mokṣa, the means and the end; and their nature has been determined in the Vedānta-Sūtras as shown in the previous chapter. Now the śrutis cites a certain verse, which forms a short commentary on the aphorism.

"The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme:"— this is to express in an aphoristic form the whole teaching of the Second Book (Ānanda-Vaḷḷī). Now the following verse (rc) is quoted (1) with a view to determine the nature of Brahman who, as has been indicated in the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," is the Thing to be known, but whose characteristic nature has not been stated definitely by way of giving a definition which will set forth His characteristic nature as distinguished from all else; (2) with a view that Brahman, of whom it has been but vaguely said that He should be known, may be more definitely known, i.e., in order that we may know that Brahman, as defined below, is the same as our own Inner Self (Pratyagātman) and no other; and (3) with a view to show that the fruit of Brahma-vidyā declared above in the words "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme" consists in attaining to the state of the Universal Being (Sarvātma-bhāva, lit., all-Self-ness), in being Brahman Himself who is beyond all attributes of samsāra.

2. On that, this has been chanted:— "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman; ...."

As referring to what is taught in the foregoing Brahmana text, the following verse (rc) is chanted "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman; ..."

For a clear understanding of what has been taught in the foregoing aphoristic statement, this sacred verse is cited. That is to say, the whole meaning of the aphorism is clearly explained in the verse. In the foregoing aphoristic expression, the śrutis speaks of the "knower of Brahman." Now, one will be inclined to ask what Brahman is. Accordingly, the śrutis describes the nature of Brahman in the four words "Real, Consciousness, Infinite (is) Brahman."

Definition of Brahman.

The sentence "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman" forms a definition of Brahman. The three words, "Real," "Consciousness," and "Infinite" are the attributive adjuncts \(^{102}\) (viṣeṣanārtha) of

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\(^{102}\) i.e., epithets stating the specific attributes of Brahman. — (A.)
Brahman, the substantive (vīseṣya). Brahman is the substantive, because, as the Thing to be known, Brahman forms the subject of discourse. Because of their relation as substantive and attributive, the words “Real” and so on are in the same case, all of them referring to one and the same thing (samānadvikāraṇa). When qualified by the three epithets, "Real," etc., Brahman is distinguished from all other substances. Indeed, a thing is known only when it is distinguished from all else, as, for instance, when we speak of “a blue big sweet-smelling lily.”

That is to say, — just as the epithets ‘blue,’ ‘big,’ and ‘sweet-smelling’ serve to define a lily, so the epithets ‘Real’ etc., serve to define Brahman, the Supreme Being. When so defined by the epithets “Real” and so on, Brahman is distinguished from all other substances, none of which possess the said attributes of Brahman, (i.e., which are all unreal, insentient and finite). A thing is said to be known when known as distinguished from all else. A blue lily, for instance, is said to be known only when known as distinguished from the red lily and the lilies of other colours. Similarly, Brahman can be said to be known only when known as distinguished from all else, (from the unreal etc.), since, otherwise, there can be no definite conception of Brahman. — (S).

Since the words ‘Real,’ are of the same etc., case, all referring to one and the same thing, they must be related as attributive and substantive (vīseṣyāna-vīseṣya), just as in the phrase “a blue big sweet-smelling lily” the words are related as attributive and substantive. In the passage of the śruti under consideration, Brahman must be regarded as the substantive, because, as having been declared to be the knowable, Brahman forms the main subject of discourse and the words ‘Real’; etc., mark off Brahman from all that are unreal etc.

**What is a definition?**

(Objection): — A substantive is specified by an attributive, only when it also admits of qualification by quite a different attributive, like, for instance, the lily, which is either red or blue or of some other colour. When there are many substances coming under one genus, each being distinguished by a distinctive attribute, then only do the attributes have a meaning, but not when there is one thing alone of the kind; for then it admits of no qualification by any other attributive. Just as there is only one sun which we see, so there is only one Brahman; there are no other Brahmans from whom He may be distinguished, unlike the blue lily (which can be distinguished from the red lily and other varieties.)

A substantive is a thing which admits of being qualified by various attributives in turn. As there is no Brahman of another kind, how can Brahman be a substantive? — (S).

That is to say: When a substantive denotes a thing which exists in various forms of manifestation, each form being distinct from others, then that substantive needs qualification by an attributive if any particular form of the thing should be denoted. The lily, for instance, being of various kinds, each distinct from others, it has to be qualified by ‘red’ or ‘blue’ or the like, in order that a particular variety may be denoted. Brahman being secondless, there are not many Brahmans, and therefore Brahman cannot be qualified by an attributive. — (A).

Besides the blue big sweet-smelling lily spoken of at present, there are other kinds of lily, namely, a red lily, a small lily, a slightly fragrant lily, which are all met with in common experience. Therefore, in this case, the words ‘blue,’ etc., serve to distinguish the lily meant here from other lilies. But there are no other kinds of Brahman; there is no Brahman who is not real, there is no Brahman who is insentient, there is no Brahman who is finite. Just as the sun we see is only one, so Brahman also is one alone. Since there are no other Brahmans from whom the one meant here has to be distinguished, the adjuncts ‘Real,’ etc., are of no use.

(Answer):— No, because of the adjuncts being intended as a definition.

To explain: The objection does not apply here. Why? For, the main purpose of the attributives here
is to define Brahman, not merely to state His specific attributes. What is the difference between a
definition and the defined on the one hand, and the attributive and the substantive on the other? We
shall tell you. The attributives serve to distinguish the substantive from others of the same genus
only, while a definition aims to distinguish the thing defined from all else, as when we say “ākāśa is
the space-giving substance.” And we have said that the sentence 'Real ......’ is intended as a
definition.

If ‘Brahman' and ‘real' etc., be respectively regarded as the substantive (viseshya) and the
attributive (viseshaṇa), then the objection may apply.

But, since we regard them as the defined (laksya) and definition (lakṣaṇa) respectively, the
foregoing objection cannot in the least apply to our interpretation. Now, that is termed attributive
(viseshaṇa) which abides in a heterogeneous thing it qualifies, and which is a co-inhering attribute
distinguishing it from others of the same class.— (S).

That is to say, an attributive is that which always coexists with the substantive in consciousness,
distinguishing it from others (of the same genus) — (A).

The substantive (viseshya) is that which exists both as a genus and as particulars, and which is
possessed of various attributes, each of these attributes being sometimes found and sometimes not
found in association with it —(S).

That is to say, the substantive (viseshya) is that which denotes a thing as distinguished only from
others of the same genus (A).

A definition or characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) is that attribute which isolates all things from the thing
defined, i.e., which enables one to distinguish in consciousness the thing defined from all others,
and which always inheres in the thing defined. — (S).

That is to say, a definition distinguishes the thing defined from all else of the same and other
genera. —(A).

A thing is said to be defined by a definition, when the definition marks it off from others of the
same genus as also of other and therefore opposed genera.— (S).

That is to say, a thing is defined when it is marked off from all else.—(A).

The words “real," etc., form defining adjuncts of Brahman, and there do exist things which have to
be excluded from the conception of Brahman. A simple attributive serves merely to distinguish the
thing described from others of the same class; whereas the defining adjunct serves to distinguish the
thing denned from all else. Accordingly the words 'real,' etc., serve to distinguish Brahman from all
things that are not Brahman, from all unreal, insentient and finite things. When we define ākāśa as
space, the definition serves to distinguish ākāśa from all corporeal substances, and yet there is
nothing else belonging to the same class, i.e., no other ākāśa from which it has to be distinguished.
Similarly, here, all unreal, insentient and finite things are excluded from the conception of
Brahman.

The words ‘real,' 'consciousness' and 'infinite' do not qualify one another, because they are all
intended to qualify something else. Here, they qualify the substantive 'Brahman.' Therefore, every
one of these adjuncts is independent of the other adjuncts and is directly related to Brahman. Thus:
Brahman is Real, Brahman is Consciousness, Brahman is the Infinite.

**Brahman is the Real.**

Whatever does not deviate from the form in which it has been once ascertained to be is real; and
whatever deviates from the form in which it has been once ascertained to be is unreal.

When a thing never puts on a form different from that form in which it has been once proved to be,
that thing is real, and as such it must be quite distinct from kārya or what is produced.— (S).

All changing form (vikāra) is, therefore, unreal, as the śrutī definitely says;

“(All) changing form (vikāra) is a name, a creation of speech; what is called clay is alone real: thus, Existence (Sat) alone is real.” (Chha. Up. 6-14.)

Thus, in the words “Brahman is real,” the śrutī distinguishes Brahman from all changing forms (vikāra).

When a thing which has been ascertained to be of a certain form never deviates from that form, then that thing is real, we say, as, for example, the rope which has been mistaken for a serpent. That thing is unreal which deviates from its (once ascertained) form, as, for example, the serpent which comes up in idea when in reality there is only a rope.

Similarly Brahman, who forms the basis of the whole universe, is real because of the absence of deviation even in muki. As proving false when right knowledge arises, the universe is subject to deviation in muki and is therefore unreal. Accordingly the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad teaches the unreality of the universe in the words “a mere myth (māyā) is this duality.”

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The Chhandogas, too, declare, by way of illustration, the unreality of pots and other changing forms (vikāra) and the reality of clay, the material cause (prakṛti), as follows:

“(All) changing form is a name, a creation of speech; what is called clay is alone real: thus, Existence (Sat) alone is real.” (Chha. Up. 6-14.)

Brahman is Consciousness.

From this,¹⁰⁴ it may follow that Brahman is the cause. And it may also follow that, being the cause, Brahman, like any other substance is a factor of an action, and is like clay insentient (acīt).

The śrutī, therefore, says that Brahman is Consciousness.

The meaning is: consciousness alone is absolutely real, while the insentient matter is real only from the stand-point of our ordinary worldly experience (vyawahāra).

The word 'jñāna' means knowledge, consciousness. Here the word 'jñāna' should be derived so as to mean 'knowledge' itself, but not “that which knows,” since the word is used as an adjunct of Brahman along with 'real' and 'infinite.'

The word 'jñāna' maybe derived in four ways: it may denote, with reference to the act of knowing, either the agent of the act, or the object of the act, or the instrument of the act, or the act itself; i.e., it may mean the knower, or the object known, or the instrument of knowledge, or the act of knowing. The question is, which one of these is here meant?

Because the word is used to distinguish Brahman from all else, and because it goes along with the adjunct 'infinite,' the word should, in all propriety, mean 'knowledge'; since, otherwise, it is open to many objections.

By 'jñāna' we should understand that knowledge which is real (i.e., unfailing,) and infinite. Thus, as standing best to reason, the word 'jñāna' should be derived so as to mean knowledge itself. — (S) Elsewhere this etymology would make 'jñāna' mean the act of knowing; but here, from its association with the adjuncts 'real' and 'infinite,' the word 'jñāna' denotes Consciousness pure and simple, the undifferentiated unconditioned Consciousness. — (A)

Brahman, indeed, cannot be real and infinite if He were the agent of the act of knowing: how can Brahman be real and infinite, while undergoing change as the agent in the act of knowing? That,

¹⁰³ Gauḍapāda-Kārikas i:17
¹⁰⁴ i.e., from the analogy of clay.
again, is infinite which is not limited by anything else. If Brahman were the knower, He would be marked off from what is known and from (the act of) knowing and cannot therefore be infinite, as the śruti elsewhere says:

"Where one sees nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. But where one understands something else, that is the finite." (Chh Up. 7:24:1)

(Objection):— Since in the passage “where one understands nothing else” it is only the knowing of non-self that is denied, the śruti may mean that one knows one’s own Self.

(Answer):— No; for, the passage is intended to convey a definition of the Infinite. The śruti quoted above, “where one sees nothing else” is intended to define the nature of the Infinite (bhūman) Taking for granted the prevalent notion that “what one sees is something else, (something other than one’s own self), the śruti here gives us to know the nature of the Infinite in the words “where there is no seeing of something else, that is the Infinite.” Since the words “something else” are used in the śruti where it seeks to deny what we prima facie understand by seeing etc., the passage cannot convey the idea that one can act upon (i.e., know) one’s own Self. Owing to the absence of duality in one’s own Self, there can be no knowing of one’s own Self. If the Self were the thing known, there would be no knower, inasmuch as the Self is concerned in the act only as the thing known. It cannot be contended that the one Self alone is concerned in both ways, both as the knower and as the known; for, as devoid of parts, the one Self cannot be both the knower and the known simultaneously. Being indivisible, the Self cannot, indeed, be the known and the knower, at the same time. Moreover, if the Self be knowable like a pot, etc., all instruction through the scriptures as to the knowledge thereof would be useless. Indeed, instruction as to the knowledge of what can be known in the ordinary way like a pot, etc., would, indeed, be of no use. Therefore, if Brahman be the knower, He cannot be infinite. If Brahman be subject to special conditions of existence as the knower and so on, He cannot be the Existence pure and simple, and the pure and simple Existence alone is real, as elsewhere the śruti says “That is real.” (Chh. Up. 6:3:7). Therefore the word ‘jñāna’ being used as an adjunct of Brahman along with the words ‘real’ and ‘infinite’ the word should be so derived as to mean knowledge or Consciousness, and the expression ‘Brahman is Consciousness’ serves to dispel the notion that Brahman is an agent or any other factor of an action, as also the notion that He is, like clay, etc., an insentient (acit) thing.

**Brahman is the Infinite. 245**

Brahman being defined as Consciousness, it will perhaps be thought that He is finite, since we find that all worldly consciousness is finite. To prevent this supposition the śruti says “Brahman is Infinite.”

Brahman is infinite or endless, i.e., having no limit or measure. — (S)

To prevent the supposition that Brahman spoken of as Consciousness is finite like the consciousness of a pot, the śruti says that ‘Brahman is infinite’.

In common parlance the word jñāna (knowledge consciousness), etymologically means ‘that through which something is known, or which or shines forth’ is applied to that particular mode (vritti) of mind (antah-karaṇa), which connects a pot or the like with Consciousness; and this state of mind is material (bhautika) inasmuch as the śruti says “formed of food (Anna-maya), verily, my dear, is manas.” The stands to reason that such jñāna (consciousness) is limited. But here (in the definition of Brahman) the word is derived so as to mean knowledge itself and denotes the very

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105 i.e., to deny the seeing, hearing, etc., of things beyond the Self. —(Tr)

consciousness (sphurāṇa). As this consciousness is immaterial, it is infinite, limitless. There are three kinds of limit, due respectively to space, to time, and to other things. Now, there is no limitation (in Brahman) due to space or time, inasmuch as in the words "like ākāśa, He is all-pervading and eternal," the śruti gives us to understand that He is present at all times and in all places. Like His presence at all times and in all places, His essential oneness with all things is declared in the śruti as follows:

"Aye, this immortal Brahman is before; Brahman is behind, on right and left, stretched out above, below. This Brahman is surely this all. He is the best." (Mund. Up. 2:2:11)

So, since there exists nothing distinct from Brahman, there is no limitation caused by other existing things either. Thus, the passage means: Brahman is that which is distinguished from all that is unreal, from all that is insentient, from all that is finite.

**Brahman is not a non-entity.**

(Objection):— Since the attributives, 'Real,' etc., serve to merely exclude unreality and the like, and since Brahman, the substantive, unlike such (substantives) as 'lily' is not known, it would that the appear that the passage “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," conveys the idea of a non-entity (sūnya) like the following:

“Bathed in the waters of the mirage, crested with sky-flowers, here goes the son of a barren woman, carrying a bow of the hare's horn.”

This objection has been started against the statement already made that the attributives 'Real' etc., are meant to exclude the unreal etc., (vide p. 238). The meaning of the objection is this: As a matter of fact, all substantives such as lily denote things which fall within the range of other sources of knowledge than śabda or word, whereas Brahman, the substantive here, is not a thing knowable from any other source of knowledge than the scriptures; and the mere word 'Brahman' cannot be a proof as to His existence and nature. And since the words 'real,' etc., are merely meant to exclude the unreal, etc., the passage 'Real, Consciousness Infinite is Brahman’ cannot give us an idea of a positive entity.

(Answer):— This passage does not refer to a non-entity for the following reasons:

1. We have nowhere experienced an illusion which does not embrace (i.e., rest on) some reality. Accordingly all illusion rests only on some reality. — (S).

That is to say, when the passage “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,” excludes the unreal etc., it means to teach that Brahman is the reality lying at the basis of the illusory manifestation of the whole universe. — (Tr).

2. A word such as 'lily' conveys to us an idea of the thing denoted by the word; it cannot convey an idea of the absence of the thing, an idea which forms the import of a vākya or assemblage of words. — (S).

That is to say, 'not unreal,' 'not insentient,' 'not unlimited,' each of these is an idea that can be imported only by an assemblage of words, and therefore the single words 'real' etc., cannot convey the negations referred to. These words, on the other hand, convey respectively the ideas of supreme reality, self-luminosity, and fullness (infinity). — (A).

3. One grasps from a word first the thing denoted by the word, and then comes to know of the absence of the opposite, because of their mutual opposition, as in the case of inimical animals, the

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107 There being no source of knowledge, other than śruti, concerning Brahman,
slayer and its victim—(S).

When we see a place infested with rats, we infer the absence there of their enemy, the cat. Similarly, from the word "real," etc., we first obtain the idea of supreme reality, and so on; and then we infer (by arthāpatti, Presumption)¹⁰⁸ the absence of the opposite, of unreality and the like, since such contraries as reality and unreality cannot abide in one and the same thing. Accordingly, as knowable primarily from a different source of knowledge (manantara), the absence of what is opposed to the thing directly denoted by a word cannot be the primary sense of that word. — (A).

(4) From a proposition (sabda) we understand, in the first instance, the relation (saṅgāti), of the substance and the attribute (dharmin and dharma), whereas the absence of the contrary is known from quite a different source of knowledge (manāntara) and is not therefore looked upon as the import of the proposition. — (S).

The 'Brahman is real' in the first proposition imports, in the first instance, the idea of the coexistence (tādāmya) of Brahman and reality as the substance and the attribute; and then on a second consideration, namely, if Brahman is real, how can He be unreal? — i.e., by arthāpatti or presumption which is a quite different source of knowledge, the absence of unreality in Brahman is known. Accordingly, not being unknowable from other sources of knowledge, the latter does not form the main import of the proposition. The meaning derived secondarily from the import of a proposition, cannot be itself the import of the proposition. — (A).

(5) The idea of blue does not arise without involving the idea of the thing that is blue; so, too, the idea of a substance does not arise without involving that of the attribute. — (S).

The ideas of substantive and attributive are always correlated, so that the śruti speaking of Brahman as Real, Consciousness and Infinite, cannot refer to a mere nothing.— (A).

(6) Every word such as 'blue' primarily conveys to us the idea of a thing as related to something else. This is why there always arises the question, what is it that is blue? —(S).

Since no non-entity can be related to anything, no word in a sentence can ever denote a non-entity.

— (A).

**Brahman is not a momentary existence.**

The passage cannot refer to a momentary existence (kṣanika) either. The Vārtikāra says: — Similarly, as may be determined by pratyakṣa or immediate perception, it is not possible to establish the momentariness of anything whatever. — (S).

It is acknowledged by all that every pramāṇa or instrument of knowledge is such only as revealing what has hitherto remained unknown. And as a thing cannot be both known and unknown at the same moment, this difference must be due to its different conditions at different moments of its existence. Accordingly, there is no evidence for the momentary existence of anything whatever. The śruti, moreover, declares that Ātman's vision is never obscured. — (A),

(2) Moreover, the idea of the destruction of a thing is inconceivable. — (A).

 Destruction of a pot cannot take place when the pot exists; nor even can (the attribute of) destruction inhere in the pot. If it should inhere in the substance (pot) as its attribute, then the pot has not been destroyed at the moment any more than before — (S).

A pot cannot be said to have undergone destruction so long as it exists. Since existence and destruction are opposed to each other, they cannot pertain to a thing at the same moment. Destruction cannot take place when the pot does not exist; for, what is there to be destroyed? Perhaps the opponent may say:— though destruction has taken place when the pot exists, the

¹⁰⁸ Vide Minor Upanishads Vol. II. p. 26,
destruction itself has been destroyed in its turn on facing its opposite, the existence of the pot. As against this, the Vārtikāra says:— (A).

Do you maintain that destruction itself has been destroyed? Then, we agree. May you live a hundred years! My contention is that the pot is not subject to destruction, and so far you do not argue against it. The act of destruction cannot do away with the thing, such as a pot, which undergoes destruction, — i.e., in which the action takes place — any more than the act of going can do away with the goer. How can anything, which depends for its existence upon something else existing, do away with that other thing.—(S).

**Brahman defined here is a positive entity.**

Admitting that here the words 'real,' etc., are meant as mere attributives pointing to the denial of what the substantive is not, we have tried to show that the passage refers neither to a non-entity nor to a momentary existence. Now in point of fact, as said before, the passage is meant to define the essential nature of Brahman in Himself and cannot, therefore, point to a non-entity or to a momentary existence. So, the Bhāshyakāra proceeds to answer the objection as follows:— (A)

The objection cannot apply here, became the passage is intended as a definition.

For Brahman to be a substantive, it is enough if we have an idea that He exists; and it is not necessary that He should fall within the range of some other *pramāṇa* or source of right knowledge.109 And we form an idea of the possibility of Brahman's existence on the following consideration:— Where a rope is mistaken for a serpent, we know that the false serpent rests on a reality, namely, the rope. Similarly, there should exist some reality at the basis of the whole manifested universe, which is false because, like the illusory serpent, it is a phenomenon (*drṣṭa*), an appearance. The śrutis, therefore, defines here not a mere non-entity, but the essential nature of Brahman who is thus presumed to exist. Moreover, we should understand that no specifying attributes of Brahman are sought here, inasmuch as Brahman's essential nature is not itself known already.— (A).

We have said above that, though they are mere attributives, 'real' and other adjuncts are intended, in the main, to define the essential nature of Brahman. If the thing defined were a non-entity (*śūnyā), the definition would serve no purpose.110 Thus, because the passage is intended as a definition, we think that it does not refer to a mere non-entity. Though serving to exclude the opposite, the adjuncts 'real' etc. do not, of course, abandon their own connotation.

The word 'real' connotes unfailing existence the word 'consciousness' connotes self-luminous knowledge of objects, and the word 'infinite' connotes all-pervading-ness. Thus, each of the adjuncts conveys a positive idea while excluding the opposite, and therefore does not signify a mere negation. — (A).

Certainly, if the adjuncts 'real,' etc., were to connote mere negation (*śūnyā), they cannot be the determinants of a substantive. If, on the other hand, the adjuncts convey positive ideas of their own such as reality, then we can understand how they serve to determine the nature of Brahman, the substantive, as distinguished from other substantives which are possessed of the opposite attributes. Moreover, even the word 'Brahman' conveys a positive idea of its own.

In conjunction words, — 'real' etc. — the word 'Brahman' connotes a positive idea of its own, namely, *greatness*.

Absolute greatness consists in being unlimited in space and time and being secondless; and nothing here warrants a limitation of the *greatness* connotated by the word. The word 'Brahman’ connotes

109 As the opponent suggests

110 A non-entity need not be defined simply because it is a nonentity. (A).
a being who is of unsurpassed or absolute greatness. This is another reason why the passage cannot refer to a non-entity.— (A).

The word 'Brahman' has a known meaning of its own as conveyed by the root 'brh' to grow. His Holiness (Sri Sankaracharya) has shown (elsewhere), in another way, how the word 'Brahman' has a definite sense of its own:—

“As Brahman is the Self of all, everybody knows of His existence. Every one feels the existence of the Self.”

Thus, as the Self of all, Brahman's existence is familiar to every one. And that Brahman is the Self is declared by the śrutis in the words:— "This here, the Self, is Brahman." Thus, since the passage does not refer to a mere we can understand how the words 'real' non-entity, real, etc., serve to specify Brahman and define Brahman's essential nature. Otherwise, what is there to be specified? or whose essential nature has to be defined?

Of these (attributive words), the word 'infinite' constitutes a qualifying adjunct by way of denying all limitation, while the words 'real' and 'consciousness' are qualifying adjuncts by themselves conveying some (positive) ideas of their own.

The exclusion of the opposite is, as was already shown, only an implication, not the primary import of the words. — (S)

**As one with the Self, Brahman is infinite.**

Since in the passage “From Him, verily, from this Self (ātman) was ākāśa born, etc.,” (Taitt. Up. 2:1) the word 'Self' (ātman), is used with reference to Brahman, Brahman is the very Self of the knower. And in the words "He unites with this blissful Self” (Ibid. 2:8) the śruti declares that Brahman is the Self. And also because of His entrance: in the words "having created it, He entered into that very thing," (Ibid. 2:6.) the śruti shows that Brahman Himself has penetrated into the body in the form of jīva. Brahman is, therefore, the knower's own Self.

Brahman will be spoken of as “one hid in the cave,” and again as the Self (ātman) in the words “From Him, verily, from this ātman here, was ākāśa born”. From these two passages we may conclude that the words 'Brahman' and 'ātman' denote one and the same thing. Do you maintain that the Supreme Brahman is spoken of as distinct from the conscious Self? Then how could the distinction, alleged to be taught by the Scripture as an absolute truth, be ever set aside? If the Self be not in Himself the Supreme Brahman, how can His nature be altered by the mere command of the śruti, how can it be altered by something else (i.e., by constant meditation of the unity?) From him who directs his mind to the Inner Self, who has rid himself of all attributes alien to the Self, and who has then attained, in accordance with the teaching of the scriptures, the knowledge that 'I am Brahman', — how can the Supreme be different from him? If all such attributes as “not gross,” be held to be the attributes of Brahman who is distinct from the Self, of what avail are they, all of them being alien to the Self? If, on the other hand, they are the attributes of the Self, they serve to

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113 Ibid. 2:1. i.e. as the witness of the buddhi, i.e., again as the Self (ātman) —(A)
114 Therefore Brahman cannot be limited by the Self. (A)
115 In such passages as “who abides in the Self (ātman)” etc., Bri. Up. 3-7 (Madhyandina-śākha) — (A)
116 That is to say, inasmuch as it could not be set aside, we should understand that the arutī merely reiterates the distinction. As set up by illusion, with a view to teach unity, — (A)
117 The alleged Vedic command being "Let, the mind dwell in the thought that 'thou art That'." —(A)
118 The passage here referred to is "Tell me Brahman who is visible, not invisible, the Self (ātman) who us within all" Bri.Up. 3:4:1 (A).
obliterate the idea of all distinction between the Self and Brahmā. The śruti opens with the word 'Brahman' and ends with the word 'ātman'. Each of the words 'Brahman' and 'ātman' will find its complete signification only when it includes the connotation of the other, and this is not possible if Brahmā and ātman were two distinct entities. —(S).

**Brahman is the eternal, infinite, independent Consciousness.**

(Objection): — If so, Brahmā being the Self, He is the knower, the agent of the act of knowing. It is a well-known fact that the Self is the knower. "He desired:" in these words the śruti gives us to understand that he who has desire is the knower. 119 Thus, as Brahmā is the knower, it would not be proper to speak of Brahmā as knowledge or consciousness. 120 It would also make Brahmā non-eternal. If Brahmā were knowledge, i.e., the dhātārtha, the root-sense, the very act of knowing, then Brahmā would be non-eternal. And then Brahmā would also be relative or dependent for the act signified by the root 'jīna' to know, depends upon the operation of karakas or accessories of action; and knowledge or consciousness being here the meaning of the root, it is non-eternal and dependent.

(Answer):— No; for, as it is not distinct from the essential nature (of the Self), knowledge or consciousness is spoken of as an effect, only by courtesy. Consciousness is the essential nature of the Self (ātman); it is not distinct from the Self, and it is therefore eternal. Now to explain: The manifestations in the form of sound, etc., of the buddhi, which is an upādhi of (the Self), and which, passing through the eye and other sense-organs, puts on the forms of sense-objects, are objects of ātman's consciousness; and whenever they arise, they become permeated by ātman's consciousness; and it is these manifestations of buddhi, illumined by the ātman's consciousness and spoken of as consciousness itself, which constitute the meaning of the root 'jīna' to know and are imagined by the undiscriminating men to be the inherent attributes (dharman) of ātman Himself, changing every now and then.

The changes which take place in the buddhi are ascribed to the Self owing to non-discrimination. The Self is not the agent in the act of knowing, because knowledge or consciousness which is the essential nature of the Self is not distinct from Him. It is the buddhi which gives rise to the cognitions, and its agency is ascribed by courtesy to the Witness thereof. For, the buddhi gives rise to vrittis or cognitions permeated by ātman's consciousness — all embraced by the consciousness — as sparks of incandescent iron (are permeated by fire). On seeing that these cognitions to which the buddhi has given rise are all set with Consciousness, the ignorant think that Consciousness itself is produced, though it is eternal, immutable (Kāṭasthā). What other witness can be cited to prove the agency of that Witness whose evidence is the only one men have as to the manifestation and obscuration of the buddhi? As Consciousness is unaffected prior to the rise of any particular state of buddhi, so, too, even on the rise of that state, Consciousness remains unaffected, as our own experience proves. —(S)

That is to say, there exists no evidence to prove that any change has taken place in Consciousness which witnesses the absence as well as the presence of a state of buddhi. The Witness Consciousness remains unaffected by the state of buddhi while merely witnessing the absence or presence of buddhi's modes. — (A)

As to Brahmā's Consciousness, however, it is, like the sun's light or like the heat of the fire, not distinct from Brahmā's essential nature (svarūpa); nay, it is the very essential nature of Brahmā, not dependent on any external cause, inasmuch as it is His own eternal nature. As all beings are undivided from Him in time and space, as He is the cause of time and ākāśa and all else, as He is

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119 And as shown in the Tarka-sūtras or the Sciences of Logic, it is but proper that the Self (ātman) is an agent — (S)
120 Bri. Up. 1-2; 1-4.
extremely subtle, to Him there is nothing unknowable, however subtle, concealed and remote it may be, whether past or present or future. Wherefore, Brahman is all-knowing. And there is also the following mantra:

“Without hands, without feet, He moveth, He graspeth; eyeless He seeth, earless He heareth. He knoweth what is to be known, yet is there no knower of Him. Him call they first, mighty, the Man.” (Sveta. Up. 3:19.)

The Śruti further says:

“Knowing is inseparable from the knower, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from Him that He could know.” (Bri. Up. 4-3-30.)

Because Brahman is not different from the Conscious one (Self) and has not to rely (for His Consciousness) on the sense-organs and other instruments of knowledge, we must understand that, though essentially of the nature of Consciousness, Brahman is yet eternal. His Consciousness is not what is connoted by the root (namely, the temporary act of knowing), inasmuch as It is immutable. And for the same reason, Brahman is not the agent of the act of knowing.

**Brahman is beyond speech.**

For the same reason, Brahman cannot be designated by the word 'jñāna'. On the other hand, the word 'jñāna' which refers only to a semblance of His (Consciousness) and denotes a state (dharma) of buddhi, Brahman is indicated, but not designated, inasmuch as Brahman is devoid of attributes such as genus (quality, act, etc.), through denoting which words can be applied to things, and inasmuch as the word refers to the same thing to which 'real' and 'infinite' refer.

As Brahman illumines agents and acts, words which designate agents and acts can but remotely indicate the Supreme Brahman; they do not directly designate Him. Brahman's Consciousness, which is inseparable from all, which is immutable and is not different from Brahman, is immanent in all as their Innermost Self. — (S)

Neither can Brahman be designated by the word 'Real.' Being in His essential nature devoid of all alien elements, Brahman, when defined as real, is only indicated by the word which denotes the genus or universal of being (satta-sāmanya) in the external world. Brahman cannot indeed be primarily denoted by the word 'satya'.

Accordingly, in their close mutual proximity, the words 'real' etc. determine the sense of one another; and while thus showing that Brahman cannot be directly designated by the words 'real' etc., they serve also to indicate the essential nature of Brahman.

These words, without giving up their own meaning, indicate the nature of the Supreme by eliminating every thing alien to His nature and removing the ignorance which is the root of all illusion. 'Real' and other words used here have different meanings only in so far as they serve to eliminate different ideas such as unreality. When the elimination has taken place, all these words point to the one essential nature of Brahman, which is not therefore a complex idea conveyed by an assemblage of words (vākyā). — (S)

Hence the ineffable nature of Brahman by a word, as the śruti declares in the following words:—

“Whence (all) words return without attaining, as also manas." (Taitt. Up.2-4)

“He finds his fearless mainstay in the Unuttered, in the Homeless." (Ibid. 2-7)

Hence, too, is He, unlike the blue lotus, not denoted by an assemblage of words. All such passages as these can have a meaning only when Brahman is of the nature described above.
Thus (the meaning of the words in the definition is as follows): The word 'real' (satya) signifies immutability (kāṭastha-ta), and the word jñāna (knowledge) consciousness. Consciousness being in itself immutable (and forming the nature of Brahman), the knower, (i.e., the Witness, Brahman) is infinite (ananta), i.e., One. — (S).

'Real,' etc., construed as specifying attributives.

Though in reality there is only one Brahman and no more, still, as associated with upādhis which are unreal, insentient, and limited, three other Brahmans — belonging to the same genus of Brahman as the Real Brahman, but who are respectively unreal, insentient, and limited, — may appear to exist, from the stand-point of an ignorant person. Accordingly, the words 'real', etc., serve to distinguish the Brahman meant here from the other Brahmans.

'Real' etc., construed as defining attributives.

But when the passage is regarded as a definition, it serves to distinguish the one Brahman from the upādhis which belong to a different genus altogether. Elsewhere, for example, the śruti has defined the Infinite (Bhūman) by distinguishing It from all ordinary consciousness which is triple (triputi), i.e., which always comprises the three elements of perceiver, perception and percept. The Chhandogas read as follows;

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, and understands nothing else, that is the Infinite." (Chhand. Up. 7-24-1)

Here the śruti teaches that the Infinite is that thing in which the threefold consciousness of one seeing another is absent and thus points to the Reality which is beyond all ordinary experience by distinguishing It from everything else. Similarly, here, too, we may understand that in the words 'Real' etc., the śruti defines Brahman to be untinged with unreality and so on by way of distinguishing Him from all that is unreal.

‘Real’ etc. define Brahman by mutual government.

Now, when construed as mere (specifying) attributives, the three words — 'real', 'consciousness,' and 'infinite' — combine together by way of governing the meaning of one another and point to the essential nature of Brahman.

To explain: The word 'real,' which means absence of bādha or liability to prove false, denotes three kinds of reality, namely: —

(1) Pratibhāṣika or pertaining to illusion,
(2) Vyāvahārika or pertaining to practical or ordinary life,
(3) Pāramārthika or absolutely true.

In the case in which the mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, the silver does not prove false so long as the illusion (pratibhāṣa) lasts, and this sort of reality is therefore spoken of as Pratibhāsika. Earth and other elements of matter, as also the body (śarīra) and other material compounds, do not prove false in our consciousness of practical life, and their reality is therefore spoken of as Vyāvahārika or pertaining to ordinary or practical life. Not proving false even after the attainment of the knowledge produced by the Vedānta (Upaniṣad), the reality of Brahman is Paramārthika or absolutely true. The word 'real' to the three kinds of alike, applied reality points here to Brahman, as it is governed — i.e., as its application is restricted — by the words 'consciousness' (jñāna) and 'infinite' (ananta).

The real of the illusory and the ordinary consciousness are neither conscious nor infinite. Even the word 'jñāna' (knowledge or consciousness),' applied alike to Consciousness (Chīt) and to the vrūtis or modes of buddhi, points here to Brahman whose essential nature is Chīt or Consciousness, since
the use of the word is restricted by the words ‘real' and 'infinite.' Certainly, unlike Brahman, the **buddhi-vṛttis** or states of mind are neither absolutely real (**abādhya**), i.e., beyond all liability to prove false, — nor devoid of the three kinds of limitation. The word ‘infinite', too, applied alike to the akiśa which is unlimited in space and to Brahman who is devoid of all kinds of limitation, applies to Brahman alone when its use is restricted by the words 'real' and 'consciousness,' for the reason that akiśa is neither consciousness nor absolutely real. Thus governing one another, the three words 'real,' 'consciousness' and 'infinite' point to Brahman who is immutable, conscious, and secondless. So the teachers of old say:

"Real' means immutable, 'jñāna (knowledge)’ means consciousness, and 'infinite' means one. Thus by the three words is Brahman denoted."

Of the three words, the word “infinite” denotes Brahman by merely excluding all else, whereas the words "real" and "consciousness" refer to Brahman by primarily signifying in themselves immutability and consciousness and incidentally excluding falsity and insentience (**jādyā**) as the **Vārtikakāra** has said. There the **Vārtikakāra** has said that the idea of exclusion is not the primary import of the sentence and that it is derived from another source of knowledge. This other source of knowledge is the inexplicability of a coexistence of the pairs of opposites reality and unreality, consciousness and unconsciousness.

It is true that the relation (here imported) of substance and attribute is not real; still, it does form a gateway to the knowledge of Brahman in His true nature in the same way as a reflection, which is false in itself, leads to a knowledge of the real object, or in the same way as the seeing of a woman in a dream indicates the good that is to come. In so far as from the three adjuncts we thus get a knowledge of the essential nature of Brahman, they constitute a definition of Brahman.

**Brahman defined as the Real.**

Or, each of these adjuncts is in itself an independent definition of Brahman. The unreal, — namely, **ajñāna** and its effects, — being excluded by the word 'real', there remains one thing alone, the indivisible (**akhaṇḍa**). Consciousness, i.e., Brahman. The attribute of reality, which has thus hinted at the essential nature of Brahman, is itself an effect of ajñāna and therefore false; and as such it is excluded by the very word 'real'.

The **kataka** dust, for example, when dropped into the muddy water, removes the muddiness, and itself disappears. Or, to take another example: a drug swallowed for the digestion of the food already eaten causes the digestion of itself and of the food. It should not be supposed that, as the attribute of reality is thus excluded, it will follow that Brahman is false. For, unreality has been already excluded.

On the disappearance of the **kataka** dust, for example, the former muddiness does not again appear; nor, when the drug has been digested, does the food again become undigested. Both reality and unreality having been thus excluded, the result is to define that Brahman is attributeless. Does any one imagine that such a thing is non-existent? He should not; for then the Thing cannot be Existence (**Sat** and the Self (**ātman**). The Chhandogas declare 'Brahman is Existence and the Self.' Having begun with the Reality under the designation “Existence (**Sat**))”— in the words “Existence alone, my dear, this at first was” — they read "That is real (**satya**), That the Self (**ātman**)." (Ch.in.6-9-4.) Thus the very thing that is here (in the **Taittiriya-Upanishad** spoken of as ‘real’ is in the **Chandogya-Upaniṣad** declared to be Existence and the Self.

Certainly, Existence cannot be non-existent, any more than light can be darkness. We have already refuted the idea of the non-existence of the Self by citing the bhāṣyakāra’s (**Sankarācārya’s**) words.

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121 The clearing-nut, a seed of the plant **Strychnos Potatorum**, which being rubbed upon the inside of the water-jars occasions a precipitation of the earthy particles diffused through the water and removes them.
Moreover, Brahman cannot be non-existent, because He is the basic reality whereon rests the illusory notions of reality, falsity, and so on. There can, indeed, be no illusion without an underlying basic reality. To this end, the Chhândogya-Upaniṣad first expounds, as the opponent's view, the theory of Non-existence in the words, "On that, verily, some say that Non-existence alone this at first was, one alone without a second: from that Non-existence the existence was born" then it condemns that theory in the words "How, indeed, my dear, can it be thus?, he said, how can existence be born of Non-existence?;" and then finally it concludes with the theory of Existence, as its own, in the words "Existence alone, verily, my dear, this at first was, one alone without a second." And this theory alone is consistent with experience. If, on the other hand, Non-existence were the upadāna or material cause of the universe, (i.e., if the universe is made up of Non-existence), then the whole universe would present itself to consciousness in association with non-existence — thus: earth does not exist, water does not exist, and so on. But the universe is not so regarded. Wherefore, Brahman, the Cause of the Universe, is Existence itself. Just as in the Chândogya are expounded the merits and faults of the theories of Existence and Non-existence in regard to Brahman, the Cause, so also here in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad will be expounded the merits and faults of the theories of Existence and Non-existence with reference to Brahman in His aspect as the Inner Self (Pratyagātman):

"Non-being, verily, doth one become if he doth Brahman as non-being know. Brahman is! — if thus one knows, they then as being Him do know." (Taitt, Up. 2-6)

The Kaṭhas (6:13) also read, "'He exists' — thus alone is He to be known." Therefore, though actually devoid of the attribute of reality or being, still, as the basic reality whereon rests that illusory notion, Brahman is Being, Existence itself.

(Objection):— If a thing cannot exist in either of the only two possible alternative modes of existence, no other mode of existence is indeed possible. On this principle, we think that it does not stand to reason that Brahman is devoid of both the attributes, reality and unreality.

(Answer):— Not so. It is possible, as in the case of a eunuch (napuṣaksaka). A eunuch is neither of the male sex nor of the female sex. So here.

(Objection):— The existence of this third class of persons is proved by immediate or sensuous perception.

(Answer):— If so, Brahman also is known from the śrutī (to be neither real nor unreal.)

(Objection): — But, in the words "Brahman is real," the śrutī says that Brahman is denoted by the word 'real' and thus admits of the attribute of reality.

(Answer):— No, because of the śrutī declaring that Brahman is beyond speech in the words, "whence all words turn back." (Sve.Up.6:19) But the word 'real' which in common parlance is applied to the real of our ordinary consciousness, and which, on the strength of the attribute of such reality falsely ascribed to Brahman, excludes the opposite attribute of unreality, points to the real Brahman, the mere Existence devoid of both the attributes, just as a person extracts by one throw another that has pierced into his sole, and then, casting aside both, leaves the sole alone. Thus, the definition that 'Brahman is real' is faultless.

**Brahman defined as Consciousness.**

(Objection):— As jñāna (knowledge, consciousness), Brahman may be concerned in an act. Jñāna may mean either that by which something is known, or the very act of knowing. In the former case, Brahman becomes an instrument in the act of knowing, and in the latter He becomes an act.

But, properly speaking, Brahman cannot be either. "Partless, actionless, tranquil;" (Tait.Up.2:4) in these words action is altogether excluded. Therefore the definition of Brahman as
jñāna is fallacious.

(Answer):— Not so. Like the word 'real' (satya), the word 'consciousness (jñāna) also is a laksana an indicator. The root, in itself, denotes only a mode of mind (buddhi-vṛtti). Accordingly in the Upadesa-sahasri it is said:—

"The ātman’s semblance (ābhāsa) is the agent, and the act of buddhi is the meaning of the root. Both these, combined together without discrimination, form the meaning of the word 'knows.' Buddhi has no consciousness, and the Ātman has no action; so that, properly speaking, neither of these can alone be said to know." (18:53-54)

The word ‘jñāna’ which denotes primarily the buddhi, or mind having consciousness reflected in it, and manifesting some sense-object as sound, touch, and so on, ascribes to Brahman the attribute of cognition, with a view first to exclude inertness and insentienty (jadatva) from Brahman and then to indicate the true nature of Brahman as devoid of even that attribute, i. e., as the Pratyagātman (Inner Self), as the Eternal Consciousness. All this has been clearly explained by the Vārtikākāra. The śruti says:—

"Sight is indeed inseparable from the seer."122 “As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus, indeed, has the Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.” (Ibid 4:5:13)

In these passages the śruti declares that the Self is one Eternal Pure Consciousness, and it is the actionless Self of this nature that is here hinted at by the word jñāna (consciousness). Therefore the definition that Brahman is Consciousness is free from all faults.

**Brahman defined as the Infinite.**

(Objection):— The definition that Brahman is the Infinite excludes the three kinds of limitation, so that, it follows that Brahman has the absence of limitation for its attribute. To say, for instance, that there is no pot here on this piece of land is to signify that the piece of land has the absence of a pot for its attribute. Accordingly, the passage cannot point to one Indivisible Essence (akhaṇḍa-ekarasa).

(Answer): — When limitation of Brahman by a second thing is excluded, even abhāva or non-existence as something distinct from Brahman has been excluded: so that the word 'infinite' first predicates of Brahman an association with abhāva or non-existence — which is itself a product of māyā, with a view to exclude limitation, and then excluding, on the principle of the kataka dust, even that abhāva, it points only to the One Essence, the One Existence. Thus alone can we explain the śruti which says elsewhere, “Existence alone, my dear, this at first was." Therefore the definition of Brahman as the Infinite is faultless. Accordingly the Vārtikākāra says:—

“As the Self is the womb of time and space, as the Self is the All, as nothing else exists, the Supreme Self is absolutely infinite. “There can be indeed no limitation of the Uncreated Reality by the fictitious. Time and other things (we experience) here are all fictitious, because of the śruti 'mere creation of speech is all changing form.'”123

**Other definitions of Brahman.**

On the same principle of construction that has been adopted in interpreting the expression 'Brahman is real' we, should construe, as forming each an independent definition, such words as 'bliss' (Ānanda), 'self-luminous (svayam-jyotis)', 'full (pūrṇa)', occurring in the passages like the

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122 Brihad.Up. 4:3:23
following:—

"Consciousness and Bliss is Brahman." (Bri. Up, 3-9-28)

"There he becomes the self-luminous Puruṣa." (Ibid. 4-3-9.)

"Full is That, Full is This." (Ibid. 5-1-1)

Accordingly, bliss and other attributes should be gathered together in this connection. Such plurality of definitions is due to the plurality of the popular illusions concerning the nature of Brahman which have to be removed; and Brahman is not, on that account, of many kinds. It is the Unconditioned (Nir-viśeṣa) alone that all the definitions ultimately refer to.

The principle of the gathering together (upasamhāra) of bliss and other defining adjuncts in this connection has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras III. iii. 11-13 as follows:—

(Question):— The Taittirīya-Upaniṣad describes the Supreme Brahman as 'Bliss,' ‘Real,’ and so on in the following passages: “Bliss is Brahman " ‘Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman." The question is: Is it necessary or not necessary to take into account these attributes of Brahman when studying the teaching of the Aitareyaka and other Upaniṣads concerning the Supreme Brahman, as contained in such passages as “Consciousness (prajñāna) is Brahman?”

(Prima facie view):— Not necessary, because such attributes are peculiar to the Vidyā (upāsana) inculcated in that particular Upanishad, as in the case of the attributes like “the Dispenser of blessings.” To explain: in the Upakośāla-Vidyā, Brahman is spoken of as “the Dispenser of blessings,” “the Dispenser of Light,” etc, and so on, while in the Dahara-Vidyā, He is spoken of as “one of unfailing desires and unfailing purposes.” But the attributes mentioned in the one Vidyā are not to be taken into account in the other. A similar assortment should be made here in the case of 'bliss' and other attributes.

(Conclusion):— The two cases are not quite analogous. Since the attributes such as “the Dispenser of blessings” are mentioned where specific courses of contemplation are enjoined (for specific purposes), each group of attributes should be held quite apart from other groups in strict accordance with the injunctions. But the attributes such as 'bliss' are calculated to give rise to a knowledge of Brahman, and, as such, they do not form subjects of injunction.

Accordingly, since there is no room at all here for injunction pointing to a particular assortment of attributes, and since all of them alike are calculated to lead to a knowledge of Brahman, they should all be taken into account in determining the essential nature of Brahman.

Brahman is unconditioned.

That Brahman is unconditioned has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 11-21 as follows:

(Question):— Is Brahman conditioned or unconditioned?

(Prima facie view):— “This Brahman is four-footed:” in such words as these the śruti declares Brahman to be conditioned. “Not gross, not subtle;” in these words the śruti declares Brahman to be unconditioned. Therefore, Brahman actually exists in both ways.

(Conclusion):— It is the Unconditioned that is taught in the scriptures, inasmuch as it is the Unconditioned that other sources of knowledge cannot tell us anything about. On the contrary, Brahman, conditioned as the author of the universe, can be known by a process of inference such as

124 Ait. Up. 5-3.
125 Chan. Up. 3-18-2.
126 Bri. Up. 3-8-8.
the following:— the earth and all other things must have a cause because they are effects. Therefore, when in the upāsana section the conditioned Brahman is presented for contemplation, the śruti only reiterates the nature of Brahman as ascertainable from other sources of knowledge. But that is not the idea concerning the nature of Brahman which the śruti aims, in the main, to inculcate. We should not, however, suppose that Brahman really exists in both ways, as made out respectively by inference and from the śruti. To say that one and the same thing is both conditioned and unconditioned is a contradiction in terms. Thus, inasmuch as the notion that Brahman is conditioned does not constitute the chief aim of this teaching, it must be a mere illusion; and therefore Brahman is in reality unconditioned. It is this Brahman, the One Indivisible Essence, that is referred to in the passage 'Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman.'

CHAPTER V.

SUMMUM BONUM.

Having thus explained the nature of Brahman in the first foot (quarter) of the verse which is calculated to unfold the meaning of the aphorism "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," the śruti proceeds to explain, in the remaining portion of the verse, the nature of the knowledge and of the attainment of the Supreme referred to in the aphorism.

2. "...Whoso knoweth the one hid in the cave in the highest heaven attains all desires together, as Brahman, as the Wise."

He that knows Brahman of the nature described above abiding in the cave in the highest heaven attains all desires without any exception: he enjoys all the pleasures that one may desire, he enjoys them all simultaneously, as one with the Omniscient Brahman.

What it is to know Brahman.

(Objection):— As one with the knower, the Supreme Brahman cannot be a thing that the knower may seek to attain, And since there is no (knower) other than Brahman, how can it be said "whoso knoweth the one hid in the cave," and so on?—(S).

If Brahman and the Self be identical, there can be no knower, nothing knowable, no knowledge. How can there be a knowing of Brahman at all?

(Answer):— All statements as to the knowing of Brahman, as to the attainment of all desires, and as to muktī, are figurative. The Vārtikākāra says: — The knower attains the one who is (ever) attained, by the mere cessation of nescience on attaining to the consciousness of the absence (in Brahman) of unreality and other such attributes as have been set up by his ignorance of (the true nature of) Brahman as real etc. Thus alone does a person come to know (Brahman) though already known; thus alone does the Self come to be liberated though already liberated; thus alone does nescience cease to exist though really it never existed. I can swear thrice to it.127 So, with the vision obscured by agency and other attributes ascribed (to the Self) by avidyā, one fails to see Brahman in His true nature as real, etc., though He is one's own Inner Self. Wherefore, when on the cessation of avidyā the vision is fully open at all times, one devours away all notions of duality such as the knower, and sees the Inner Self (Pratyagātman).— (S)

Just as a person comes to know that he is the tenth man on hearing the statement " thou art the tenth," though evidently the knower, the thing known, and knowledge are not really different from one another, so also, in pursuance of the teaching of the śruti, a person may come to know also that

127 i.e., I assert this on the authority of the scriptures which say " One alone without a second " and so on —(A).
he is himself Brahman. So long, however, as he does not know that he himself is Brahman, the illusion that he is a jīva does not cease by the mere knowledge of Brahman (the Cause). He should, therefore, know that one's own Inner Self 'hid in the cave' is identical with Brahman.

**The Avyakrita as 'the highest heaven.'**

The cave (guha, from the root 'guh' to hide) — the buddhi (the intellect), is so called because therein are hidden all things, such as the knower, knowledge, and the knowable; or because the human ends, enjoyment and liberation, are therein hidden. In the buddhi is the highest heaven, i.e., the highest ākāśa (lit., the bright one) known as the Avyakrita, the Undifferentiated. That (the Avyakrita),¹²⁸ indeed, is the highest¹²⁹ ākāśa, because of its nearness to 'Ākṣara' (the Supreme Brahman) as shown in the following passage:

"Here, O Gargi, in this Indestructible One (Ākṣara) the ākāśa (Avyakrita) is woven like warp and woof." (Bṛhad.Up. 3-8-11.)

In so speaking of Brahman being "hid in the cave in the highest heaven,"¹³⁰ the śruti refers to the state of things as they are. For, there is no evidence that any one, other than Brahman defined as real, etc., dwells within the buddhi. The devotee, having then (on hearing the teaching of the śruti) completely withdrawn his mind from all things that are not real, etc., enters into what dwells within the mind and realizes the Self (ātman), the Real —(S).

That is to say, on hearing the teaching of the śruti that Brahman, who is devoid of all conditions of cause and effect, lies hidden in the Avyakta, the cause of Buddhi, the devotee who belongs to the highest class of the students of Brahma-Vidyā, i.e., whose mind is turned away from all unreal, insentient and limited objects (which are painful in themselves) completely (i.e., without cherishing the least doubt or misconception regarding their real nature) first conceives Brahman as the Cause; and then, seeing that all effects as well as their absence (abhāva) are mere illusions having no real existence apart from Brahman, the Cause, and seeing also that Brahman, the Cause, is not distinct from Brahman who is neither the cause nor the effect, he comes to the conclusion that the Witness of the buddhi is really none other than Brahman who is the Real, Consciousness, the Infinite, and Bliss. —(A).

Thus, with a view to point out the means of realizing the unity of Brahman and the Self, the śruti has taught to us in the words "hid in the cave, in the highest heaven," — that Brahman who is beyond all causes and effects, who lies in the Avyakṛta, in the Brahman that abides in the buddhi as the cause lies in the effect.— (S. & A).

The 'cave' is the five kośas (sheaths of the Self) in their aggregate. So we have elsewhere said:—

"Behind the physical body there is prāṇa.; behind prāṇa., there is manas; behind that again is the agent (kartri); behind this again is the enjoyer (bhokṣṭ). This series is the cave." (Vedānta-Panchadasi, 3:2.)

The Avyakṛta, the cause of these five kośas, is here spoken of as the 'highest heaven.' The nature of the Avyakṛta has been described by those who are acquainted with the tradition as follows:

¹²⁸ Here follows the reason why ākāśa (Vyoman) is interpreted to mean the Avyakrita, not the element of matter known as ākāśa.— (A).

¹²⁹ The material ākāśa is low in comparison with the Avyakrita; the latter may, therefore, be spoken of as the highest ākāśa.— (A)

¹³⁰ i.e., in the Avyakrita. The Avyakrita is Brahman unknown (ajñāta). When removed by ignorance from the Self, i.e., when unrecognised as one with the Self, Brahman is called the Avyakrita and forms the Cause of the whole universe. — (A)
"The nescience concerning ātman, with a semblance of consciousness in it, is the Avyakṛta, the cause of the two bodies (the gross and subtle bodies, the sthūla and sūkṣma śarīras)."

And the śruti also shows in the words "That, verily, the Avyakṛta then this was— that, before evolution, this whole universe was the Avyakṛta. To be the Avyakṛta is to be in an unmanifested condition. On account of Its similarity to ākāśa in so far as both are alike incorporeal (amūrta), the Vajasaneyins speak of the Avyakṛta as ākāśa in the Aksara-Brahmaṇa, where Gargi puts a question and Yajavalkya answers:

(Question): — "In what is the ākāśa (Avyakṛta) woven, like warp and woof?"132

(Answer):— "Here, indeed, in the Aksara, O Gargi, is the ākāśa woven like warp and woof."133

As the cause of the five elements of matter (including ākāśa commonly so called, the air, and so on) this (Avyakṛta) ākāśa is the highest. The Supreme Brahman abides in this highest ākāśa. It is no doubt true that the universe including the Avyakṛta and the five elements abides in the imperishable Supreme Brahman called Aksara, since the universe is 'superimposed upon Him who is the basic reality underlying all. Still, the buddhi (intellect) of the seeker of knowledge (realisation) dismisses from its view all external objects of sense (sound, etc.,) and entering within through the Anna-maya and other kośas up to the Avyakṛta, it realizes the true nature of Brahman as transcending the universe. It is, therefore, from the standpoint of the one who seeks realisation, that Brahman is spoken of as though He were abiding in the Avyakṛta, here spoken of as "the highest heaven."

Or,134 the words 'cave' and 'heaven' may be construed as put in apposition to each other. Then the 'cave' is the Avyakṛta -ākāśa itself; and being the Cause and the subtler, the Avyakṛta, too, has all things contained within It in the three times (past, present, and future). Within this cave of the Avyakṛta, Brahman lies hidden.

Such is the construction put upon this part of the passage by some commentators. — (A).

They construe 'cave' and 'heaven,' as we have seen, in two ways:

1. as vyadhi-karaṇa, referring to two distinct things, to buddhi and (Avyakṛta) Brahman respectively, whereof the latter is located as it were in the former, as the cause (such as clay) is located (i. e., is constantly present) in all its effects (such as pot);

2. as samānādhi-karaṇa, as referring to one and the same thing, the Avyakṛta Brahman being the cave wherein all things are contained, as the effects are all contained in the cause. — (Tr).

The ākāśa of the heart as the 'highest heaven'.

Now Sankarācārya proceeds to give what he considers to be a better interpretation:—(A).

But it is proper to understand by "the highest heaven" the heaven or ākāśa135 of the heart, inasmuch as 'the heaven' is intended as vijnāna-āṅga, as an aid to the realisation or immediate knowledge (of Brahman). That the 'heaven' or ākāśa of the heart is the highest is clear from another passage of the śruti which says:

132 Ibid. 3-8-7
133 Bri. Up. 3-8:11.
134 i.e., instead of construing 'cave' and 'heaven' as Vyaḍhi-karaṇa, as referring to two distinct things, one being located in the other. — (A.)

135 i.e., the material (bhuta) ākāśa enclosed in the heart. (A)
"And the ākāśa which is around us is the same as the ākāśa which is within us; and the ākāśa which is within us, that is the same as the ākāśa which is within the heart." (Cha.Up. 3:12-7,8,9.)

The (material) ākāśa, in the heart is supreme when compared with the ākāśa outside the heart. It is the ākāśa wherein the buddhi rests. —(S)

The thumb-sized ākāśa which, as all know, exists within the heart-lotus is itself spoken of as 'the highest heaven.' It is but proper to speak of the ākāśa in the heart as the highest one when compared with the ākāśa outside the body and the ākāśa within the body, inasmuch as the ākāśa within the heart is the seat of the samādhi and the suṣupti states of consciousness which are free from all pain, whereas the other two are seats of the jāgrat (waking) and svapna (dream) states of consciousness. In that ākāśa lies the 'cave,' the buddhi, so called because the triple consciousness comprising the knower, knowledge and the known, as well as the Jīva's enjoyment and liberation caused respectively by illusion and discrimination, are located in the buddhi.

In the material ākāśa of the heart lies the buddhi (the understanding); and in the buddhi dwells Brahman; i.e., Brahman is manifested in the buddhi. This interpretation of the passage stands best to reason. For, then, it amounts to saying that as one with the Seer, — with the Witness, with the Self, 'Brahman is the Immediate (aparokṣa).

Otherwise, i.e., if the passage be interpreted to mean that Brahman dwells in the Universal Being (Samaśṭi), i.e., in the Avyakta or Māyā, it would follow that Brahman is remote (parokṣa). Then, owing to its remoteness, the knowledge thus imparted cannot remove the illusion of samsāra which is a fact of immediate perception. Because the śruti intends to teach that, as one with the Seer or the Immediate Consciousness within, Brahman is immediate, dwelling in every one's own heart, therefore we should understand that the ākāśa of the heart is the 'heaven' here spoken of. Then alone can the śruti impart to us an immediate knowledge of Brahman. — (A)

Brahman 'hid in the cave' is one's own Self.

In this 'heaven' of the heart there is the cave, the buddhi or understanding; and there (in the cave) is Brahman hidden; which means that Brahman is clearly perceived through the vṛitti or state of the buddhi. In no other manner,136 indeed, can Brahman be related to any particular time or place, inasmuch as He is present everywhere and devoid of all conditions.

The Self (ātman) is spoken of as lying in the buddhi because the idea that the Self is the doer and the enjoyer has arisen from His contact with matter (i.e., with the antah-karaṇa, the inner sense, the buddhi), or because Brahman is perceived through the state (vṛitti) of the buddhi free from Tamas and Rajas, as the śruti elsewhere says:— "By manas alone can Brahman be seen."137 The buddhi is spoken of as a cave because those who have turned their mind inward see Brahman quite hidden in the buddhi, beset with kāma and avidyā. — (S).

Brahman is said to be hidden in the buddhi because it is in the buddhi that Brahman is perceived. It is, indeed, there that Brahman dwells as the Inner Self. Though Brahman is one's own Self, He is not perceived by those whose minds are directed outward, veiled as He is by kāma, avidyā and so on. But He is perceived by those whose minds are turned inward, since in their case the veil of kāma and avidyā is torn away.

With a view to remove the duality involved in the idea that the Supreme Brahman is knowable by the knower, the śruti here teaches that the Knowable is "in the cave in the highest heaven," i.e., in

136 than as being clearly perceived through the buddhi. (A)
137 Bri.Up. 4:4:19
the knower.—(S).

(Objection):— If jīva and Brahman, the knower and the Knowable, were identical, then, since jīva is a saṃsārin, it would follow that Brahman also is a saṃsārin, and then nobody would seek to attain Brahman. —(A).

(Answer):— He who has been all along treading the path of ends and means, enters at last, in his own Self, the Supreme, who is altogether unrelated to ends and means. —(S).

That is to say, the jīva, the saṃsārin, who has all along been acting with the hope of attaining svarga and other objects of desire by means of sacrificial rites, realizes at last as one with his own Self the Supreme Brahman, who is neither an end nor a means. When even the saṃsārin thus ceases to be a saṃsārin, where is room for the objection that our interpretation makes Brahman a saṃsārin by speaking of His identity with jīva who is a saṃsārin. (A).

Attainment of the Supreme Bliss.

What of him who thus realizes Brahman? He enjoys all desires, i.e., all desirable pleasures, without any exception. Does he enjoy them alternately one after another as we enjoy sons, svarga, and the like? The śruti answers: No; simultaneously he enjoys them all amassed together at one and the same moment in one single consciousness, which, like the sun's light, is eternal and inseparable from the true nature of Brahman, and which we have described as Real, Consciousness and Infinite. This is the meaning of the words "together, as Brahman." The enlightened sage becomes Brahman; and, as Brahman Himself, he enjoys all pleasures simultaneously, not like the man of the world who enjoys pleasures one after another, his true Self being limited by an upādhi and so forming a mere reflection as it were like the sun's image in water, and partaking of the nature of saṃsāra, while his pleasures are dependent on dharma and other causes, on the eye and other sense-organs. How then (does he enjoy the pleasures)? In the manner mentioned above: he enjoys all pleasures simultaneously, as he is identical, in his true essential nature, with Brahman the Omniscient, the Omnipresent, the Universal Being; while his pleasures are not dependent on dharma and other causes, or upon the eye and other sense-organs. 'The wise' means 'the omniscient.' Indeed, nothing short of omniscience can be properly called wisdom. Himself being omniscient and Brahman he enjoys all pleasures. The word 'iti' (in the original = thus), added to the mantra at the end, is intended to mark the close of the mantra quoted.

So long as the consciousness of agency remains, there can be no enjoying of all pleasures at one moment. Accordingly the śruti says that he enjoys them all as Brahman.

If the śruti be interpreted to mean that he enjoys all the pleasures along with Brahman, thus implying duality, then Brahman would not be one with the Inner Self. It is not even possible to think that the Supreme Brahman, defined as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite" is external to the Self. Since the word 'saha' is a mere particle, it cannot be contended that the word means 'along with' and nothing else. So, the passage means that the sage who has known

Brahman enjoys all pleasures simultaneously. When all that is unreal, etc., has been removed by the right knowledge of Brahman, there exists nothing else except the Self (ātmā). Accordingly, as Brahman, the wise, the sage attains all pleasures at one and the same moment. Nothing else besides the Inner Self is found abiding within the cave of the heart. Wherefore, to him who has realised Brahman (defined as Real, Consciousness, Infinite), Brahman is the same as the Inner Self and none other. To show that there exists none to be known and attained other than the wise man himself, 'Brahman' and 'the wise' are grammatically put in apposition to each other, thus denoting that the

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138 i.e., again, that Brahman is the same as the Witness and no more, and that the Witness is the same as Brahman and no more. (A)

139 A particle (nipāta) can have more meanings than one. —(A)
two words refer to one and the same thing. By the one consciousness which admits of no sequence, he comprehends all pleasures occurring in a sequential order, as the śruti elsewhere says:

"But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring (and) freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only," etc. (Bri. Up. 4:4:6)

At the beginning, at the end, and in the middle, the minds working in all the innumerable bodies are indeed permeated by the one undifferentiated Consciousness experiencing none separate from the Self. Since the knower of Brahman has attained all desires, which are the stimuli of all kinds of activity, he no longer enters on any pursuit whatever, for want of a motive. Avidyā is the source of all desires, and all activities grow out of desires. Activity gives rise to Dharma and Adharma, and these give rise to the body which is the seat of evil. Therefore, in the case of the wise sage, immediately on the destruction of avidyā follows a complete cessation of all the phenomena (of mind) which are the main-springs of all activity. —(S).

In the words "he attains all pleasures," etc., the śruti explains what the attainment of the Supreme is which was spoken of in the aphorism. The knower of Brahman attains simultaneously all pleasures experienced by all beings of life. The man without the knowledge puts on, one after another, bodies of different kinds as the result of his own actions (karma); and then, in the form of jīva, a reflection of his own true Self caused by his connection with the upādhi, like the sun reflected in water, he enjoys pleasures through the eye and other sense-organs as the Vārtikākāra has explained above.

(Objection): — A mantra in the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad declares the existence of two sentient entities in the body, in the following words:—

"Two beauteous-winged companions, ever mates, perch on the self-same tree; one of the twain devours the luscious fruit; fasting, the other looks on." (Op, cit. 3:1:4)

Of the two, it is the jīva, the enjoyer, limited by the upādhi and forming as it were a reflection of the true Self, and having only one body who comes by enjoyment; whereas it is by the Witness, the non-enjoyer, the Absolute Consciousness called Brahman, who, as free from all upādhis, is present everywhere, it is by Him that the whole world of objects of enjoyment is illumined. This is common to the wise and the ignorant alike. Under such circumstances, we ask, on what special ground is it spoken of as the result attained by the wise man?

(Answer): — We answer: the wise man, realizing that Brahman who illumines all objects of enjoyment is one with himself in his true nature, feels quite happy. But the ignorant man does not feel in that way.

(Objection): — Just as the pleasures of all beings are illumined by the consciousness of Brahman, so, too, all the miseries of all beings may be illumined by that consciousness. By this consciousness of the miseries, the wise sage may also feel pain.

(Answer): — No, because of the absence of all taint of misery in Brahman, the Witness. Accordingly, the Kaṭhas (Kaṭha-Up. 511.) read:

"Just as the sun, the eye of all the world, is not besmirched with outer stains seen by the eyes; so, that one inner Self of all creation is never smeared with any pain the world can give, for it standeth apart."

(Objection): — Neither is Brahman affected by happiness any more than by misery.

(Answer): — True. Brahman is not affected by happiness. But bliss is the very nature of Brahman, as the śruti declares:

"Bliss is Brahman, he knew." (Taitt-Up. 3-6.)
Though Bliss is the very nature of Brahman, it puts on the form of a sensual pleasure (vishayānanda) when limited by a state of mind (citta-vritti). In his longing pursuit after an object of desire, a man feels miserable on failing to obtain it; but when at any time that object is obtained in virtue of a past merit (punya), his longing for it ceases, and then his mind is turned inward and thrown into a peculiar sattvic state (vritti). The mind in that state comprehends a portion of Brahman's Bliss within, and this limited Bliss is called vishayānanda, the sensual pleasure. This is the meaning of the Brihadaranyaka when it says:—

"This is His highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss." (Op. cit. 4:3:32.)

It is these sensual pleasures (vishayānanda) those small bits of Brahman's Bliss snatched by the sattvic vrittis and experienced by all living beings from Brahma (the Fourfaced) down to the plant — which are here referred to by the śruti in the words "he attains all desires". "Desire" here means that which is desired. It is pleasures, not miseries, that are desired by all beings of life. The Brahma-vid, the person who has realised Brahman, disregards, in virtue of his right knowledge, all limitations in these pleasures which are due to the vrittis or states of mind; and then he realizes as Brahman that residual essence which has been thus liberated from all limitation and whose essential nature is Bliss.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INFINITE AND EVOLUTION.

The relation of the sequel to the foregoing.

The subject-matter of the whole vallī (Book II), expressed in an aphoristic form in the Brahmana passage (Chapter II) "The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," has been briefly explained in the mantra (Chaps. III and IV). Again with a view to determine at greater length the meaning of the same passage, the śruti proceeds with the sequel which forms a sort of commentary thereon.

Mantra and Brāhmaṇa.

The Veda consists of two portions, Mantra and Brahmaṇa. The Brahavaḷḷi falls under the category of Brāhmaṇa. Brāhmaṇa again is eight-fold. And the eight varieties of Brāhmaṇa are enumerated by the Vajasaneyins as follows:

1. Itihāsa or story "Bhrigu, the son of Varuṇa, once approached his father Varuṇa," and so on.
2. Purāṇa (cosmogony): the portion treating of sarga and pratisarga, primary and secondary creations: such as "That from which all these creatures are born," etc. (Ibid)
3. Vidyā or Upāsana: the contemplations, such as are enjoined in the words " Whoso should

140 Mantra and Brāhmaṇa are thus distinguished:— Mantra is that portion of the Veda which consists of prayers or hymns or words of adjuration addressed to a deity or deities and intended for recitation. Brāhmaṇa is that portion of the Veda which contains rules for the employment of the mantras at various sacrifices, detailed explanations of these sacrifices, their origin and meaning, with illustrations in the way of stories and legends.

141 Or Ānandavalli as Śaṅkarāchārya calls it.

142 Taitt. Up. 3-1
contemplate these great conjunctions thus declared," etc. (Ibid 1-3).

4. *Upaniṣad* or instruction in the secret wisdom:— In the Lesson XI (Exhortation) in the Śikṣā-valli, it has been said "This is the secret of the Vedas." (Ibid 1-11)

5. *Slokas* or verses: such as those to be quoted in the sequel of this Book, Ānanda-valli.

6. *Sūtra* or aphorism such as "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme." (Ibid 2-1)

7. *Anuvyākhyaṇa* or a short succinct gloss, such as "Real Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," etc., (Ibid) where the words of the sūtra are succinctly explained one after another.

8. *Vyākhyaṇa* or a clear exhaustive exposition of that point in the anuvyākhyaṇa which needs further explanation. The passage forming the text of the present chapter is a Vyākhyaṇa, because of the evolution (śrṣṭī) being described there with a view to explain how Brahman is infinite as declared in the Anuvyākhyaṇa. So the Vākyavṛttikāra says:

"Do thou know That which the śruti (first) declares to be infinite, and to prove whose infinitude the śruti then says that the universe is evolved from it."

The evolution which will serve to show that Brahman is infinite, the śruti describes as follows:

3. From That, verily, — from This Self is (ether) born; from ākāśa, the air; from the air, fire; from fire, water; from water, earth from earth, plants; from plants, food: from food, man.

**Brahman is absolutely infinite.**

Now, in the beginning of the mantra it has been said "Real, Consciousness, Infinite, is Brahman". How can Brahman be real and infinite?

It has been taught in the mantra that one's own Self is Brahman who is the Real, Consciousness, and the Infinite; who is beyond the five kośas; who is the Fearless; who is described in the sāstras as invisible" and so on. Then the question arises, how can Brahman be such? — (S) That is to say, like all things which are marked by the threefold limitation, Brahman is also a thing divided from other things, and like them He must be finite, unconscious and unreal. How can Brahman be the Real, Consciousness, and the Infinite? — (A)

We answer: — Brahman is infinite in three respects:143 in respect of time, in respect of place, and in respect of things respectively. Ākāśa for example, is infinite144 in space; for, there is no limit to it in space. But Ākāśa is not infinite either in respect of time or in respect of things. Why? Because it is an effect (kārṇa).145 Unlike ākāśa, Brahman is unlimited even in respect of time, because He is not an effect. What forms an effect is alone limited by time. And Brahman is not an effect and is therefore unlimited even in respect of time. So, too, in respect of things. How is He infinite in respect of things? Because He is inseparable from all. That thing, indeed, which is separate from another forms the limit of that other; for, when the mind is engaged in the former, it withdraws from the latter.

The thing which causes the termination of the idea of another thing forms the limit of that other thing. The idea of the cow, for instance, terminates at the horse; and because the (idea of) cow thus

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143 Brahman being the cause of time, space, and all, He is infinite in all three respects, and as such He is the Real and Consciousness; so that it is now necessary to show first that He is the cause of all; and when it is shown that Brahman is infinite in all three respects, it will necessarily follow that He is the Real and Consciousness. (S).

144 Because ākāśa, is the Prakṛti or material cause of all that exists in space. An effect is, indeed, a part of the cause and does not exist elsewhere outside the cause. —(S).

145 i.e., it is born in time. And ākāśa is not infinite as a thing; for, there are other things besides ākāśa.
terminates at the horse, the cow is limited, finite. And this limit is found among things which are separate from one another. There is no such separation in the case of Brahman. He is therefore unlimited even in respect of things. Here one may ask: How is Brahman inseparable from all? Listen. Because He is the cause of all things. Brahman, indeed, is the cause of all things, ākāśa, and so on.

(Objection):— Then Brahman is limited by other things, in so far as there are other things called effects.

(Answer):— No, because the things spoken of as effects are unreal. Apart from the cause, there is indeed no such thing as an effect really existing, at which the idea of the cause may terminate; and the śruti 146 says:— "(All) changing form (vikāra) is a name, a creation of speech," etc. So, in the first place, as the cause of ākāśa, etc., Brahman is infinite in space; for, it is admitted by all that ākāśa is unlimited in space. And Brahman is the cause of ākāśa. From this it may be concluded that (ātman) is infinite in respect of space. Indeed an all-pervading thing is never found to arise from that which is not all-pervading. Hence the ātman's absolute infinitude in point of space. Similarly, not being an effect, Ātman is infinite in point of time; and owing to the absence of anything separate from Him, He is infinite in respect of things. Hence His absolute reality.

Since thus the threefold infinitude of Brahman and the unreality of all causes and effects have to be clearly shown in the sequel, we should understand that it is the true nature of Brahman as real, etc., which the śruti expounds in the sequel by way of describing the evolution of the universe, and that the evolution does not form the main subject-matter. —(S. & A.).

**Identity of Brahman and the Self.**

"From That" 'That' here refers to Brahman as described in the original aphoristic expression. "From This Self": 'This' here refers to Brahman as subsequently defined in the words of the mantra. From Brahman who has been first referred to in the aphoristic passage of the Brahmaṇa section and next defined in the words "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," — from Him, from Brahman here, from Him who is spoken of as the Self (Ātman), is ākāśa born. Brahman is indeed the Self of all, as the śruti elsewhere says "That is real, That is the Self. (Chan.Up. 6:8:7) And thus Brahman is Ātman. From Him, from Brahman who is here in us as our own Self, is ākāśa born. Since in the words 'the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme,' the śruti tells us that by mere knowledge of Brahman one attains Brahman and since the word 'wise' in the expression "as Brahman, the wise," is put in apposition to 'Brahman,' thus showing that Brahman and the wise man are one and the same, we understand that the Self and Brahman are identical. And in the passage we are now construing, 'That' and 'This' are put in apposition to each other; so that, here also, the śruti evidently implies the identity of Brahman and the Self. Indeed the word ‘Self’ does not primarily denote anything other than our own Inner Self. "From me all this is born; in me it is dissolved in the end alone I support all this" these words of the scripture also, speaking of the Self as the cause of the universe, point to the identity of the Self and Brahman, since there cannot be two causes of the universe.

The Thing spoken of as 'Brahman' and 'Supreme' in the aphorism is here referred to by the word 'That' signifying remoteness. And Thing spoken of as 'Real' etc. and as 'hid' — in the verse just preceding the passage we now interpret and forming a sort of commentary on the on the aphorism is here referred to by the word 'This' signifying proximity or immanence. 'Verily'

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146 What is real or not imaginary cannot be limited by what is imaginary; and that time, etc., are imaginary is shown in the śruti quoted here. (S)

147 and therefore one with all things.
shows certainty. These three words imply that the Thing spoken of in the aphorism and the Thing spoken of in the verse are one and the same.

Or, the word 'That' denoting remoteness (parokṣa) points to the Thing in Its aspect as Brahman which is revealed by Śruti. The word 'verily' signifies that such Brahman is declared in all Upaniṣads. The word 'this' implying immediateness (pratyaśkṣa) denotes the aspect of the Thing as one's own immediate consciousness. To make this clear, the word 'Self' is used. The words 'That' and 'This,' put in apposition to each other and referring to one and the same thing, imply oneness (tadātmaya.) of the Self and Brahman. It is this oneness that is signified in the preceding verse by the words 'Brahman' and 'wise' being put in apposition to each other and thus referring to one and the same thing.

**Brahman is the material cause of the universe.**

That the Supreme Brahman who is the Inner Self of all living beings is the prakṛti or material out of which the ether (ākāśa), air, and all other born things are made is denoted by the ablative-case-termination 'from.' Pāṇini says that the ablative denotes the prakṛti, the material, of which the thing that is born or comes into being is made up. "Ākāśa is born:" this means that ākāśa passes through birth, is the agent in the act of being born or coming into being. So, the ablative termination signifies that Brahman is the upadāna-kāraṇa, the material cause, of ākāśa. Prakṛti literally means that of which the effect is essentially made, and it therefore denotes the material cause, such as clay. It is true that even the potter, the efficient cause, has a share in producing the pot; still, in the production thereof, the potter's share is not so important. The potter, indeed, is not constantly present in the pot produced, in the same way as clay is present. Thus, because of the importance of its share in the production of the effect, the upadāna or material cause alone is meant by the word 'Prakṛti.'

(Objection):— It is Māyā, not Brahman, that is the material cause of the universe.

So the Svetasvataras read:

"Māyā, indeed, as prakṛti man should know, and as the owner of Māyā the Mighty Lord." (Op cit 4-10)

(Answer):— The objection has no force, because Māyā is only a śakti or power of Brahman and as such has no independent existence. That Māyā is only a śakti or power of Brahman is declared in the same Upaniṣad as follows:

"Of Him is no result, no means of action; none like to Him is seen, none surely greater. In divers ways His power (śakti) supreme is hymned, His wisdom (and) His might dwell in Himself alone." (op cit

" Such men, by art of meditation, saw, in its own modes concealed, the power of the Divine." (op cit 1-3)

No śakti or power can ever indeed detach itself from its seat (āśraya) and remain independent. Therefore, to say that Māyā, which is a power, is the prakṛti is tantamount to saying that Brahman who possesses that power is the prakṛti. The word ‘ātman’ in the ablative case here refers to the Paramātman (Supreme Self), the Maheśa (Mighty Lord), the Māyin (‘possession of the Māyā), the prakṛti of the Universe. From Him, from the Paramātman who is the Māyin, ākāśa was born. That is to say, it is the Paramātman Himself that is manifested in the form of the ākāśa, air, etc.

**The three Theories of Creation.**

The upadāna or material cause such as clay gives rise to a pot which is quite distinct from clay. The material cause such as milk is itself transformed into curd. The material cause such as a rope, combined with ignorance, turns out to be a snake. The philosophers of the Nyaya school declare, on
the analogy of clay and pot, that the universe comprising earth and so on is newly created out of atoms (*paramāṇus*); whereas the Sankhyas declare, on the analogy of milk and curd, that the Pradhāna composed of the guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, transforms itself into the universe composed of Mahat, Ahankara, etc. But the Vedāntins declare, on the analogy of rope and serpent, that Brahman Himself, the One Partless Essence, the Basic Reality underlying the whole imaginary universe, puts on, in virtue of His own Māyā, the form of the universe. Of these three theories, the theory of creation and the theory of transformation, the Ārambha-vāda and the Parināma-vāda, have been refuted in the śaṅkara mimāṃsā (the Vedānta-Sūtras).

**How far the Nyāya theory is right.**

How then, it may be asked, to explain the theories propounded by the two great Rishis, Gautama and Kapila? We answer thus: — The two theories have been propounded to help the dull intellects and refer to secondary or minor evolutions (avāntara-sṛṣṭis). The Great Rishi, Gautama, taught the creation of earth, etc., out of the atoms, with a view to impart instruction concerning jīva and Īśvara to him who, following the views of the Lokāyatas or materialists, identifies himself with the body; who, not knowing that there is a self distinct from the body and going to svarga or naraka, does not observe the Jyotiṣṭoma and other sacrificial rites; and who, not knowing that there exists Īśvara whom he should worship, does not practice the contemplation of Īśvara which leads him to Brahma-loka. Ākāśa, time, space, and atoms having been once evolved from the Supreme Brahman, the First Cause, the process of further evolution from that point may correspond to the account Gautama and others of his school. How is the Vedāntin's theory violated by it? — So far the Māyā theory is not vitiated by it, inasmuch as Gautama's false theory — false because it is drṣṭya, an object of consciousness external to the Self — has been generated by the very Māyā which gives rise to the illusion of samsāra of wonderful variety in all beings of life from Brahma down to plants.

**How far the Sankhya theory is right.**

On the same principle, — it may perhaps be urged, — the Evolution described in the Vedānta (Upaniṣad) is also an illusion. We admit that it is an illusion, and it is the very object of the Vedānta to teach that the whole creation is an illusion. Just as Gautama's endeavour is to teach to the duller intellects (*mandādhiśārinis*) that there is a soul distinct from the body who is the doer of actions and who is capable of going to svarga, so the great sage, Kapila, taught the Sankhya-sāstra with a view to impart to men of average intellect: (*madhyamādhiśārinis*) a knowledge of the Conscious Ātman, — the mere Witness, free from agency and attachment of every kind, and thus to prepare them for Brahma-jāna. In the Sankhya-sāstra, Evolution in some of its later stages prior to the Evolution of atoms is described in order to enable the student to distinguish between Chit and Achit, Spirit and Matter. Where there is Brahman alone who is the One Partless Essence, Māyā sets up two distinct things such as *chīt* (sentient) and *jāda* (insentient), sets up many individual souls distinct from one another, and sets up Guṇas such as Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. The subsequent process of evolution may correspond to the account given in the Sankhya system. Similarly, the Saivāgamas treat of the evolution of eleven tattvas or principles prior to the evolution of the twenty-five described in the Sankhya, with a view to clear the conception of Īśvara, the object of all worship.

**All accounts of Evolution contribute only to a knowledge of Brahman.**

The Śruti, however, has here described just a little of the Evolution beginning with ākāśa, only by way of illustration. An exhaustive description of the evolution is indeed impossible and is of no avail. This description of evolution is intended as a means to the knowledge of Brahman, and this purpose is served by a description of even a part of the evolution. That the evolution serves as a means to the knowledge of Brahman is declared by Gauḍapādācharya in his memorial verses on the Maṇḍukya-upanished as follows:

"Evolution as described by illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire, has another
implication; for, they are only means to the realisation of the Absolute; there being nothing like distinction." (Op cit 3-15)

No contemplation or knowledge of evolution in itself is declared anywhere as a means to a distinct end. Nowhere does the śruti say:— "Let a man contemplate evolution;" or "the knower of evolution attains to well-being." Hence it is that all accounts of evolution given in the śruti, the smrti, the Āgama, and the Purāṇa have been accepted by the Vārtikakāra:—

"By whatever account (of evolution) a knowledge of the Inner Self (Pratyagātman) can be imparted to men, that here (in the Vedic Religion) is the right one; and there is no one (process) fixed for all." (Bri. Up. Vārtika, 1-4-402.)

There can be no rule that, of the various dreams seen by many, a certain one alone should be accepted and not the rest. Let us not discuss more, lest we may say too much.

Unreality of Evolution.

Seeing that Brahman is inseparable from all, changeless, one, neither the cause nor the effect, it is not possible to maintain that evolution takes place in the Supreme Brahman Himself. All things other than Brahman should because of that very fact of their being other than Brahman be regarded as effects. And since Brahman is not the cause, there can be no cause of evolution. If the cause of evolution lies in the very essential nature of Brahman, then since Brahman's presence is constant, the universe must be constant, which cannot be; for (every thing that is born has its birth in time and space, and) there cannot be another time and another space in which that time and that space can have their birth. —(S).

Evolution (of the universe from Brahman) was not (in the past), because Brahman is not of the past; and Brahman was not of the past because He is the cause of time. —(S)

That is to say, Brahman, the alleged creator, is unrelated (asaṅga) to anything else and is therefore unrelated to the time past. And unlike pots, etc., Brahman is not conditioned or limited by time. Such association with time as is implied in the statement that He is the cause of time is a mere māyā. — (A).

And the evolution (of the universe from Brahman) will not take place in the future, since (Brahman) is not of the future; and He is not of the future because no change can ever arise in Brahman. Evolution does not take place in the present because Ātman is ever secondless and immutable. Therefore, from the standpoint of the real state of things, the evolution of the universe from Brahman never was, nor is, nor is yet to be. It is quite as meaningless to speak of the evolution as having taken place in the past or as taking place now or as yet to take place in the future, as it is meaningless to speak of an atom as a camel. Therefore avidyā alone is the cause of the evolution. —(S.)

The universe, again, must have been existent or non-existential as such before its birth. It could not have been non-existent, since then it could have no cause. If the universe were non-existent, how could there have been that relation between it and the cause, in virtue of which the universe should come into being? Neither could the universe have existed as such prior to its birth; for there would be nothing new in the effect. Moreover, birth, destruction and other changes to which all things in the universe are subject cannot themselves be subject to birth, destruction and so on, and must therefore be eternal and immutable; for, to speak of the birth of birth involves the fallacy of infinite regress (anavastha): which is absurd. — (S&A)

148 i.e., since Brahman is eternal and immutable (Kūṭastha) —(A)
As the triple time (past, present and future) has its origin in avidyā, it cannot be the cause of the universe. For the same reason, neither Karma nor Devas, nor Īśvara, nor anything else can be the cause. The birth of the universe, its continuance (sthiti) and its dissolution, all these occur every moment. The śrutī indeed declares that the creator (kartri,) generates the universe by his mind and acts. As a moon is generated by the eye-disease called timira, so is ākāśa born of Brahman tainted with avidyā, which has neither a beginning nor a middle nor an end. What is thus evolved cannot stand even for a single moment; whence its permanence? To the deluded vision it appears permanent like the snake generated by avidyā out of the rope. He who is attacked by the eye-disease (timira,) thinks of the moon-light born of it as something external to himself; similarly one looks upon the (universe) evolved (out of the Self) as distinct from the Self — (S).

Ākāśa.

Ākāśa is that thing which has sound for its property and which affords space to all corporeal substances.

The ākāśa thus evolved out of the material cause (upadāna) — namely, Brahman combined with Māyā, — partakes of the nature of both Brahman and Māyā. Brahman has been described as Real, and this means that Brahman is Existence; for, having started with the words "Existence alone, my dear, this at first was," the śrutī concludes "That, the Existence, is Real." (Cha. Up. 6.) Ākāśa partakes of (the nature of Brahman as) Existence, inasmuch as it presents itself to our consciousness as something existing. Māyā means wonder; for, when houses, mountains, etc., are swallowed by a juggler, people say "this is māyā." Just as the appearance of a reflected image of the vast expanse of heaven in an impervious mirror of solid bell-metal is a wonder, so the appearance of ākāśa in Brahman is a wonder, it being inconceivable how ākāśa can make its appearance in Brahman who is impenetrable, who is the pure essence of Bliss and Bliss alone, who is Real, Consciousness, and Infinite. Since none but a juggler can swallow houses and mountains, others call it a wonder; similarly, since none of the jivas can create ākāśa and other things which have been created by Īśvara, those things are a wonder to us.

In so far as ākāśa is thus something wonderful, it partakes of the nature of Māyā. But the power of ākāśa to afford space to all (corporeal) things constitutes its own peculiar nature. "Ākāśa, is a wonderful thing affording space:" in this form ākāśa presents itself to our consciousness as partaking of the nature of Brahman and Māyā. And it has sound for its property. The echo heard in mountain-caves etc., is supposed to be inherent in ākāśa and is therefore said to be the property of ākāśa.

Evolution by Brahman's Will and Idea.

The will (kāma) and idea (sankalpa) alone concerning the evolution of ākāśa which, as has been shown above, has mere sound for its property and affords space to all corporeal substances pertain to the Brahmān endued with Māyā. His will (kāma) takes the following form, "I will create ākāśa..." His idea (sankalpa) is the thought "let ākāśa, (of the said description) come into being." Brahman being devoid of mind, it is true that no idea in the form of a mano-vṛtti or mode of mind is possible. Still His Māyā, the unthinkable power (achintya-śakti), transforms itself into the two vṛttis or modes called kāma and sankalpa, will and idea. That in virtue of His unthinkable power (śakti) all experience is possible for Brahman though He is devoid of sense-organs is declared by the śrutī in the following words:—

Without hands, without feet, He moveth, He graspeth; eyeless He seeth; (and) earless He heareth." (Śveṭa-Up. 3-19)

149 The imagining
All acts (karmas), which were done by sentient creatures in a former evolution and were then unripe, remain during the time of pralaya (dissolution of the universe) in the Brahman endued with Māyā and slowly ripen. When the acts become ripe, He creates the world in order that the creatures may enjoy the fruits of those acts. This has been declared in the Tattva-prakāśika, a digest of the teaching of the Saiva-āgamas: —

"Out of mercy to all living beings who have been wearied in samsāra, the Lord brings about the Great Dissolution of all things for the repose of those very beings. Again, in virtue of their acts having become ripe, the Supreme Lord, out of mercy to the souls (paśus), brings about creation and fructifies the acts of the embodied beings."

Therefore, owing to the ripeness of the acts of living beings, there arises in the Supreme Lord a desire to create and an idea (sankalpa = the imagining) of the things that are to be evolved in the creation. The things that are to be evolved come into being just in accordance with the will and the idea of the Lord. Accordingly, the Paramātman, the Supreme Self, is described in the śruti as "One whose desires are true, whose ideas are true." Such being the case, all the things come into being one after another exactly as He thinks of them.

**Vāyu (the air.)**

Thence, i.e., from ākāśa, comes into being Vāyu, the air, with two properties, the property of touch which is its own, and the property of sound belonging to ākāśa already evolved. Of these elements such as ākāśa, each is said to be possessed of one, two or more properties according as it is the first, second, and so on, in the order of evolution; for, on the principle that every effect is pervaded by cause, each of the succeeding elements is pervaded by the element or elements preceding it in the order of evolution. The air (Vāyu) is not born of the ākāśa, because the latter is a mere effect (kārya).

The air (Vāyu) is born from Ātman assuming the form of ākāśa. Therefore it is from Ātman that the air takes its birth. The same is true in regard to the birth of other elements. — (S)

From Brahman associated with Māyā and having put on the form (upādhi) of ākāśa which was first evolved, the air was born. Māyā and Brahman are the cause of all things and, as such, are common to all, and therefore it is on account of the special relation of the air to Brahman's Upādhi of ākāśa as its proximate invariable antecedent, that the air is declared to be born of ākāśa. The property of the air is touch which is neither hot nor cold. To carry away is the function of the air just as it is the function of ākāśa to afford space. In the air, also, the attributes of its cause are all present. The attribute of existence expressed in the words "the air exists" pertains to Brahman. That peculiar nature of the air which is not found in other things and is therefore strange is an attribute of the Māyā. The noise made by the air blowing on the sea-shore and other places is the attribute of sound pertaining to ākāśa.

The sound which inheres in ākāśa as its property is present in the air, etc., and the undiscriminating person ascribes it to the air itself, and so on, just as a person ascribes all the attributes of a garland to the serpent when he has mistaken the garland for the serpent (S. 115).

**Fire.**

In the same way we should interpret the other passages, such as "from the air, the fire is born," and so on.

From the air was born fire having three attributes, composed of the two preceding attributes and (the attribute of) colour which is its own.

Luminosity is the special property of fire, and its function is to illumine. In this case also, the
existence of fire is the attribute of Brahman; its strangeness as something distinct from all other things is the attribute of Māyā. The "bhūg bhūg" sound of the blazing fire is the attribute of ākāśa. It is hot to the touch: this is the attribute of the air. Now the touch and the sound of the fire are peculiar, distinct from the touch of the air and the sound of ākāśa; and this peculiarity causes wonder and is therefore due to Māyā.

**Water.**

From fire was born water with four attributes, comprising its own attribute of taste and the three preceding ones.

The special property of water is sweet taste. The attributes of the cause are also present in it. Thus, water exists. Owing to liquidity which distinguishes it from all the rest, it is something strange. In a current of water flowing through rocky river-beds the "Bul! Bul! Is heard. It is cold to the touch and white in colour.

**Earth.**

From water earth came into being, with five attributes, comprising smell which is its own and the four preceding attributes.

From water, of the nature described above, was born earth. Smell is its special property. Earth exists. It is something strange on account of its solidity which distinguishes it from all the rest. By contact with a corporeal substance the "kata! Kata! " sound is produced. It is hard to the touch. It is of various colours, black, green and so on. Its taste is sweet and so on.

Thus has been described the evolution of the five elements of matter from ākāśa to earth.

**Primary elements are only five.**

(Question):— The Kaushitaki-Up. (3-8) speaks of ten bhūta-mātras or elements of matter. How is it that here the śruti speaks of only five? —(A)

(Answer):— There are only five primary elements of matter such as ākāśa mentioned above. Nothing else, we deem, exists besides the five elements, of which all causes and effects are made up. —(Ś)

**Brahman is not made up of matter.**

Though earth is possessed of the four attributes pertaining respectively to ākāśa and so on, yet it is not itself present in those four elements. Similarly though the whole universe is made up of Brahman, still Brahman is not made up of the universe. —(Ś)

Thus has been established the proposition declared above, that Brahman is Real, Consciousness, Infinite and Secondless, and that in Him nothing else is experienced. — (Ś)

**Evolution of material objects.**

From earth plants were born; from plants, food; and from food, transformed into semen, was born man (puraśa) with a form composed of the head, hands and so on.

Plants, food and man are formed of matter. Their evolution here stands for the evolution of the whole universe of material objects comprising mountains, rivers, oceans and so on. Though the bodies of cattle and the like which are born of sexual union are all 'formed of food' (Anna-maya), still owing to the importance of the human being as one qualified for the path of knowledge and works, the śruti has here spoken of man among others.

The importance of man is thus declared in the Aitareyaka:—

"But in man the Self is more manifested, for he is most endowed with knowledge.
He says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows what is to happen tomorrow, he knows heaven and hell. By means of the mortal, he desires the immortal; thus is he endowed. With regard to the other animals, hunger and thirst only are a kind of understanding. But they do not say what they have known, nor do they see what they have known. They do not know what is to happen tomorrow, nor heaven and hell."

**Evolution of theVirāj and the Sūtra.**

In declaring the evolution of matter and material objects the śruti tacitly implies the evolution of the Virāj whose body is made up of material objects in the aggregate. So, the Vārtikakāra says:—

Then came into being the Virāj, the manifested God, whose senses are Dis and other (Devatas or Intelligences), who wears a body formed of the five elements (quintupled = pañcikṛta), and who glows with the consciousness "I am all." And prior to the evolution of the Virāj must have occurred the evolution of the Sutra for, the Virāj could come into being after the Sutra had come into being. The śruti elsewhere speaks of the Sutra as the basis of the Virāj; and therefore, since the evolution of the Virāj is here mentioned, the evolution of the Sutra also must have been meant here. Moreover, the śruti will speak of the Intelligence (i.e., the Sutra) in the words "Intelligence increases sacrifice;" and this shows that the evolution of the Sutra also is implied here. Further the śruti will refer to the Sūtra as "Life, sight, hearing, mind, speech," distinguishing Him from "food (annā)" etc., and will also enjoin the contemplation (upāsana) of the Sutra in the words "Intelligence, as Brahman the eldest, do all the Gods adore." Here "Intelligence" cannot refer to the mere act (of knowing) since a mere act cannot be an object of contemplation and cannot be qualified as 'Brahman the eldest '.

Neither can it refer to the individual soul, because one cannot contemplate oneself. Nor does the word denote Brahman, the first cause, because the first cause cannot be spoken of as Intelligence (Vijñāna). Therefore, the word 'Intelligence' denotes the Sutra and it is the contemplation of the sūtra that is there enjoined. As the sūtra will be thus spoken of as an object of contemplation, the evolution of the Sutra, is also implied in this connection. Prior to the evolution of the Virāj (the effect) the Sutra remains undifferentiated from the one Existence, the Paramātman, the Cause of the Sutra; and, therefore, though an effect, the Sutra does not manifest Himself as an effect. After evolving the effect (the Virāj) as clay evolves the pot, the Sutra becomes as it were the effect. That is to say, in the form of the Virāj the Sutra becomes visible. But as long as the effect is not evolved, the Sutra is prajñāna-ghana, pure and simple consciousness; i.e., He abides as a mere potentiality of intelligence and motion (vijñāna and kriya) in Brahman, the first cause, because of the absence of a vehicle through which to manifest Himself as the Universal Intelligence or as individual Intelligences, as Samaṣṭi or Vyaṣṭi. When conditioned by the effect (Virāj), the Sutra. manifests Himself as the Universal Intelligence and the individual Intelligences —(S. & A.).

**Ākāśa is not unborn.**

The evolution of ākāśa from Brahman has been discussed as follows, in the Vedānta-sūtras (II. iii. 1-7).

(Question): — The question at issue is, whether ākāśa, is eternal or has a birth.

(Prima facie view):— The śruti says "From Him, from This here, from the Self, is ākāśa born." The ākāśa here spoken of is eternal and has no birth. For, it is hard to make out the three necessary causes of its birth, namely, the samavāyin or material cause, the nimitta or efficient cause, and the

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150 The Sutrātman (the Thread-Soul,), the Cosmic Intelligence, the Hiranyagarbha, having for His upādhi or vehicle the totality of the subtle bodies.
asamavāyin or other accessory causes. But the śruti speaks of it as having been born from Ātman simply because it possesses the attribute of existence like those things which are admitted to have been born of Ātman. Therefore the ākāśa, which has neither a beginning nor an end, is not born.

(Conclusion):— All Upāṇiṣads proclaim aloud, as if by beat of drum, that, the one Thing being known, all else is known. This dictum can be explained only if ākāśa also is born of Brahman and, as such, is one with Brahman in the same way that the pot is one with clay; but not otherwise. Moreover, ākāśa must have a birth because it is separate from other things, like a pot etc. The proof of its separateness from other things lies in the well-marked distinction between it and the other things such as the air. Against this it may perhaps be urged that Brahman is distinct from other things and yet has no birth. We answer that Brahman is one with all and that it is not possible to show that He is distinct from anything whatsoever. And, moreover, the śruti speaking of the birth of ākāśa will be respected if we maintain that it has a birth. As to the contention that it is impossible to make out the three necessary causes of its production, it is wrong to say so, because, though according to the Nyāya theory of new creation (ārambhavāda) the three causes are necessary, they are not necessary according to the theory of illusion (vivarta-vada). On these grounds we maintain that ākāśa is born from Brahman, the Cause.

The air is not unborn.

In the Vedānta-sutra (II. iii. 8) the question of the birth of the air is discussed as follows:

(Question):— Is the air (Vāyu) eternal, or is it born of anything else?

(Prima facie view):— It is only in the Taittiriya that the air is spoken of as born from ākāśa. And this birth is only figurative, inasmuch as, when treating of creation, the Chāṇḍogya speaks of the birth of fire, water, and earth, but not of the air. It may be asked, how can the Taittiriya passage be regarded as figurative in direct contravention to the well-recognized principle that omission in one place cannot render nugatory what is expressly declared in another place? In reply we say that the passage should be understood in a figurative sense because it contradicts another statement of the śruti. In the Brihadaranyaka, for instance, it is said "This Intelligence (Devatā) whom we speak of as Vāyu never vanishes" (Op. Cit. 1:5:22) Because the destruction of Vāyu is thus denied in the śruti, and because the denial of destruction is incompatible with birth, we maintain that the air is unborn.

(Conclusion):— It is true that the Chāṇḍogya doesn’t speak of its birth; still, on the same principle on which we understand in one place the attributes mentioned in another place though they are not expressly declared in the former, we may regard the birth of the air as declared in the Chāṇḍogya, seeing that all that is said in the Taittiriya have to be understood in the Chāṇḍogya. As to the statement of the śruti that Vāyu never vanishes, it should not be construed quite so literally. Occurring in a section devoted to upāsana or contemplation, it only serves to extol the Intelligence (Devata).

All the arguments, too, by which the birth of ākāśa has been established apply to the present case alike. It should not be supposed that, as having been evolved from ākāśa, the air is not comprehended in Brahman and that therefore by knowing Brahman we cannot know the air; for, it will be shown in the sequel that Brahman Himself takes the form of every antecedent effect and so forms the cause of the succeeding effect: so that, here too, as having assumed the form of ākāśa, Brahman Himself is the cause of the air. We therefore conclude that the air has a birth.

Brahman has no birth.

(Vedānta-sutra II. iii. 9).

(Question):— Now the question arises, has Brahman a birth or no birth.

(Prima facie view):— "Existence alone this at first was.": The Existence here spoken of, i.e.,
Brahman, must have a birth, because all causes must have a birth, as for instance ākāśa.

(Conclusion):— Brahman, the Existence, has no birth; for, it is hard to conceive a cause that can produce Brahman. In the first place non-existence cannot be the cause, because of the denial "how can existence be born of nonexistence?" (Cha, 6-2) Neither is existence itself the cause of Existence; how can a thing bathe cause of itself? can ākāśa or the like be the cause of Existence; for ākāśa, etc., are themselves born of Existence. And as to the induction that every cause must have a birth, it is invalidated by the śruti "That One, the Self here, is great and unborn." (Bri Up. 4-4-22.)

Therefore, Brahman, the Existence, has no birth.

**How fire is evolved from Brahman.**

The Vedānta-sūtra (II. iii. 10) discusses the birth of fire as follows:—

(Question):— "It created fire: " in these words the Chandogya speaks of fire as born of Brahman, while the Taittiriya declares fire to have been born of the air. There arises the question, Is fire born of Brahman or of the air?

(Prima facie view):— The Taittiriya passage admits of the interpretation that fire comes after the air, and it may therefore be concluded that fire is born of Brahman.

(Conclusion):— The word 'born' occurring in a previous sentence has to be understood in the sentence "from the air, fire;" so that the sentence cannot but mean primarily that fire is evolved from the air as its material cause.

By harmonizing the Chandogya and the Taittiriya statements, we arrive at the conclusion that it is out of Brahman assuming the form of the air that fire is evolved.

**Water is evolved from Brahman.**

With reference to the evolution of water, the Vedānta-sūtra (II. iii.11) discusses the question as follows:—

(Question):— Is water born of Brahman, or of fire?

(Prima facie view):— It is true that both the Chandogya and the Taittiriya upanishads declare that water is born of fire. But we cannot accept this statement, since two things so opposed to each other as fire and water, which can never coexist with each other, can be related as cause and effect.

(Conclusion):— Though the quintupled (panchi-kr̥ta) fire and water of our sensuous perception are opposed to each other, still we should not suppose that the unquintupled (a-panchikr̥ta) fire and water, which are beyond our sensuous perception and which are therefore knowable through the śruti alone, are opposed to each other. Further, we see that increase of heat produces perspiration. Therefore, as taught in the two upanishads, water is born out of Brahman assuming the form of fire.

'*Food' means earth.*

The Chandogya says, "they (waters) created food." This statement has been discussed as follows in the Vedānta-sūtra (II. iii. 12):

(Question):— What does 'food' mean? Does it mean the element of matter known as earth, or does it mean the eatable things such as barley?

(Prima facie view):— In common parlance the word 'food' is used in the latter sense.

(Conclusion):— The word 'food' means here the element of matter called earth, inasmuch as it occurs in a section treating of the evolution of the mahā-bhūtas or primary elements of matter. Further, the śruti says: "The red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour of water, the black colour of fire is the colour of food."! It is mostly in earth, not in barley or rice, that we meet with black colour. And the parallel teaching is expressed in the
Taittiriyaka in the words "from water, earth." On the strength of this parallelism, we may interpret 'food' to mean earth. It should not be urged that this interpretation is not warranted by the etymology of the word 'anna' (what is eaten); for, the element of earth and food being related to each other as cause and effect, they are looked upon as one. Therefore the word 'food' here signifies earth.

**Brahman is the essential cause of all evolved things.**

*(Vedānta-sutra, II. iii. 13)*

(Question):— In settling the various points discussed above, it has been assumed that every effect is evolved from Brahman Himself who assumes the form of the effect preceding. The question we how propose to discuss is: Is it the ākāśa, the air, etc., that produce their effects? or, is it Brahman assuming the form of the ākāśa, the air, etc., that produces the effects?

(Prima facie view):— The first of the two alternatives appears to be reasonable. In the words:— "from ākāśa, the air is born; from the air, fire," and so on, the śruti declares that from the ākāśa, etc., unassociated with Brahman, the succeeding things are evolved.

(Conclusion):— In the words "He who is within controlling the ākāśa," He who is within controlling the air," (Bri. Up. 3-7) the śruti denies the independence of the ākāśa, etc. Similarly in the words "the light saw", "the waters saw," (Chā. 6-2,) etc., the śruti teaches that light, etc., are creators endued with thought; and this power of thinking is not possible in the insentient things which are quite independent of the intelligent Brahman. Wherefore the cause of every thing is Brahman Himself assuming the form of ākāśa etc.

**Dissolution occurs in the reverse order of Evolution.**

*(Vedānta-sutra II. iii. 14.)*

(Question):— Does the dissolution of things take place in the same order in which they are evolved, or in a different order?

(Prima facie view):— The order in which the evolution of things takes place being once denned, the same order must apply to the process of dissolution.

(Conclusion):— If it be held that the cause is dissolved before the effect, it would follow that the effect will remain for a time without its material cause: which is absurd. On the other hand, the Purana says:

"O God-sage, the world-basis, namely, earth, is dissolved in water, water is dissolved in fire, fire is dissolved in the air."

Thus the reverse order of evolution is equally well defined in the Purana as the order in which dissolution takes place. We conclude therefore that dissolution takes place from earth upward, the order of evolution being reversed here.

**No Self-contradiction in the Śruti as to Evolution.**

*(Vedānta-Sutra, II. iii. 15.)*

(Question):— Is the foregoing order of evolution contradicted or not by the following passage of the śruti:

"From Him rise life, mind, and all the senses, ether, air, fire, water, and earth supporting all." (Mundaka-up. 2-1-3)

(Prima facie view):— The order of evolution from ākāśa downwards is violated by the order given in this passage wherein prāṇa, etc., are said to have been evolved prior to ākāśa, etc.
(Conclusion):— "For, truly, my child, mind comes of earth, life comes of water, speech comes of fire." (Cha. 6-5-4.)

In these words, the śruti declares that prāṇa, etc. are things composed of the elements of matter. They should accordingly be classed with the elements of matter, and therefore there can be no reference here to any special order of their evolution. Moreover, the passage quoted above from the Mundaka does not mean any particular order at all. There is no word or particle in the passage signifying order, as there is in the Taittiriya passage, "from ākāśa is born the air" and so on; whereas the Mundaka passage is a mere enumeration of things evolved. Hence no contradiction between the two passages.

CHAPTER 7.
MĀYĀ AND ĪŚVARA.

Māyā described.

Māyā is the upadāna or material cause of the whole universe which is made up of elements of matter and material objects, from ākāśa down to human. Being itself the material cause, Māyā makes Brahman also, in whom it inheres, the prakṛti or material cause. The peculiar nature of Māyā is clearly described in the Narasimha-Uttara-Tapaniya-Upaniṣad (9) in the following words:—

"And Māyā is of the nature of darkness (Tamas) as our experience shows. It is insentient; it is ignorance itself; it is infinite, void, formed of 'this!' pertaining to This here, and revealing It eternal. Though ever non-existent, Māyā appears to the deluded as if it were one with the Self. It shows the being and non-being of This here, as manifested and unmanifested, as independent and dependent."

To explain:151

Māyā as a fact of common experience.

Māyā is of the nature of Tamas, darkness, nescience (ajñāna). The proof of its existence lies in our own experience, as the śruti itself declares. So the common question how can ajñāna inhere in Brahman who is pure consciousness? Is answered by an appeal to our own experience. The association of Brahman (Consciousness) with Māyā or Avidyā (nescience) is a fact of experience, and there is no use putting the question. "It is insentient (jaṭa), it is ignorance;" in these words the śruti appeals to the facts of our experience to prove the existence of Māyā. All objects other than the Chit or Consciousness, such as pots, are insentient; and this insentienty of the external objects is none other than the insentient experience in suṣupti. When intellect fails to perceive a thing, people call it ignorance (moha). ‘I am ignorant’; ‘This is ignorant’; the ignorance which manifests itself in this form is none other than the ignorance which supervenes the Self in the state of suṣupti (deep dreamless sleep); and the ignorance of the suṣupti state, too, is a fact of every one's experience. Thus, the insentient and delusive Māyā is experienced by all people in their ordinary life.

As all persons, from the most intelligent down to children and cowherds, experience the Māyā, it is said to be infinite, i.e., universal. Likewise, the ignorance of the suṣupti state is all-comprehending; and there is nothing which does not come within the sweep of ignorance even in the waking state. Ignorance (moha) is therefore infinite (ananta). The infinite insentient Māyā, of the nature of

151 A clear explanation of this passage is given by Vidyāranya in his commentary on the Upanishad, as also in the Chitradipu, the sixth section in the Vedānta-Panchadasi. The accompanying explanation is derived from both.
ignorance, is thus a fact of every man's experience, and therefore the teaching of the śrutī that Māyā is the cause of the universe is not opposed to experience. And it is with a view to give us to understand the non-duality of Brahman that the śrutī teaches that the whole universe is nothing but Māyā (a strange inexplicable phenomenon), of the nature of Tamas (darkness) or avidyā (nescience)

Māyā as inexplicable.

Though Māyā is a fact of every one's experience, it is not real, because, from a rational point of view, it is inexplicable (anirvācanīya), as the śrutī has described it in the words "Then it was not 'asat,' it was not 'sat.' "(Taitt. Brah. 2-8-9) We cannot say that it is 'a-sat', that it does not exist: because it is present before consciousness. Neither can we say that it is 'sat,' that it exists: because it is denied in the śrutī in the words "there is no duality whatever here"!\(^{152}\) Māyā is inexplicable from another point of view. In the state of dreamless sleep there is in us no other light than the self-luminous Chit or Consciousness, and Māyā is experienced as inhering in that pure Consciousness, as we have already seen. We are at a loss to explain how the insentient Māyā can thus inhere in pure Consciousness (Chit).

Māyā as a non-entity.

It is from the stand-point of wisdom (vidyā) or right knowledge that Māyā is declared in the śrutī to be a non-entity (tuchha); for, in the vision of the enlightened, Māyā is ever absent.

It is in this Māyā or Avidyā experienced in the suṣupti that the whole universe, everything comprised in the vast Evolution, is contained in the form of vāsanas or latent tendencies and impressions. Thus Māyā is of three kinds differing with the three stand-points of view. It is at all times non-existent, a mere void (tuchha), from the stand-point of the śrutī, which represents the right knowledge of the enlightened. It is inexplicable from the stand-point of reason. It is a fact from the stand-point of ordinary experience.

Māyā is rooted in the pure Ātman.

(Objection):— Where does the root of this Māyā, or Avidyā lie? It cannot be in jīva, because jīva is subservient to Avidyā, he being a creature thereof. The question is, wherein, prior to the evolution of jīva and other things in the universe — does Māyā rest? and what is that thing which being an object (vishaya) of Avidyā, i.e., which being unknown, — jīva and other things in the universe come into being? Neither in Īśvara is Māyā rooted; for, He is omniscient in Himself and a product of Avidyā.\(^{153}\)

(Answer):— Yes; for the reasons adduced above, Māyā is rooted neither in Īśvara nor in jīva. On the other hand, it pertains to This here; it is rooted in the pure Chit, in the Absolute Consciousness, which shines forth self-luminous to the whole world in the suṣupti, constituting the basis as well as the object of Avidyā whereon rests all differentiation of jīva and Īśvara.

Māyā tends to make Ātman the more luminous.

It is no doubt evident from the fact of every one's experience expressed in the words "I do not know myself", that ajñāna or nescience is primarily rooted in the Ātman alone, in the Absolute Consciousness, and that it is this Absolute Consciousness which being primarily unknown, the universe presents itself to Consciousness. This relation, however, of Ātman to Avidyā never really detracts in the least from His purity: on the other hand, like clarified butter poured into the fire, it only tends to increase His luminosity as its Witness.

\(^{152}\) Katha-Up. 4-11.

\(^{153}\) That is to say, Īśvara as distinct from jīva is a being evolved from Chit by Avidyā.
(Objection):— Then, as the blazing fire burns up the clarified butter, Ātman may burn up Avidyā; so that there can be no Avidyā at all?

(Answer):— Yes: Avidyā is ever non-existent.

(Objection):— Then, how is it that Avidyā is spoken of as the cause of the universe?

(Answer):— Though Avidyā is really non-existent, the ignorant, who cannot discriminate, imagine that it exists and that it is one as it were with the Ātman. The non-existent appears to the ignorant as if it were existent. From the stand-point of the ignorant, therefore, Avidyā may be spoken of as the cause of the universe.

**Māyā differentiates Ātman into jīva and Īśvara.**

Māyā or Avidyā reveals the 'being' or existence of Consciousness, the locus as well as the object of Avidyā, by way of constituting the object witnessed by Consciousness and thus enabling Consciousness to shine forth, notwithstanding that the pure Consciousness cannot in Its self be spoken of either as being or non-being in the ordinary sense of these terms; while, in the case of the ignorant, Māyā renders Consciousness non-existent by veiling It.

When Consciousness is manifested, it is a being; when It’s unmanifested it is a non-being. The Absolute undifferentiated Consciousness, existing by virtue of Its own inherent power, becomes manifested by contact with Avidyā, by way of bringing that Avidyā into light, just as light diffused in space becomes manifested by bringing corporeal objects into light. Though Consciousness is self-luminous, still It becomes unmanifested when the sentient preponderates, such being the very nature of Avidyā. According as Ātman is manifested or unmanifested, He is independent or dependent, He is the Īśvara or a jīva. Ātman is independent with reference to Māyā in so far as, while able to manifest Himself, He makes it appear to exist and contributes to its creative power (arthakhriyakarins) And Ātman becomes dependent on Māyā when Consciousness appears to be subordinate to the Māyā which abides in Him, and as a result the Self is identified with the Māyā itself. Thus the One Consciousness appears in the differentiated form of jīva and Īśvara, according as It is or is not associated with ahankāra (egoism).

**Māyā and the Universe.**

Māyā exhibits the being and non-being of the universe by evolution and involution, by unrolling and rolling in, like a cloth with painted pictures. Māyā is dependent inasmuch as it is not perceived apart 'from Consciousness. It is also independent because it brings about a change in the Self who is unattached. It converts Ātman, who is immutable and free from attachment, into the universe, and has also created Īśvara and jīva out of a semblance of Consciousness.

**Māyā as a wonder-worker.**

Without affecting at all the Immutable Self (Kūṭastha) Māyā creates the universe and all. There is here naught that is surprising to us, since it is in the very nature of Māyā to bring about the impossible. Just as liquidity is an inherent property of water, heat of fire, hardness of stone, so also the achievement of the impossible is an inherent property of Māyā. It is not due to external causes. One's mind is filled with astonishment at a juggler's phenomenon so long only as one does not know that it is caused by the juggler; once it is known, one rests satisfied that it is a mere māyā.

All questions arise against those only who maintain the reality of the universe. No question can arise against Māyā because it is itself a question, a wonder. If you raise a question against this question itself, I raise another question against your question. Wherefore the question should be solved, but it should not be attacked by a counter question. Māyā, which is a wonder by its very nature, is a question by itself; and all intelligent persons should, if they can, try and find a solution
The Universe is a Mâyā.

(Objection):— That the universe is a Mâyā has itself yet to be made out.

(Answer):— If so, we shall proceed to determine it. Let us first see what sort of a thing that is which we call mâyā in common parlance. That which presents itself clearly to our mind, but which it is not possible to explain, people apply to that the term mâyā, as for instance, the indrajala, the phenomenon produced by a juggler. Now, the universe clearly presents itself to our consciousness; but its explanation is impossible. Therefore the universe is a mere Mâyā, as you may see if you view the matter impartially.

Even if all learned men were to join together and proceed to explain the universe, ignorance stares them in the face in some one quarter or another. What answers, for instance, can you give to the following questions? How are the body, its sense-organs and the rest produced from semen?

How has consciousness come to be there? — Do you say that such is the very nature of semen? — Then pray tell me how you have come to know it. The inductive method of agreement and difference fails you here; for there is such a thing as sterile semen. "I know nothing whatever:" this is your last resort. It is for this reason that the Great Ones regard the universe to be a magic. On this the ancients say: "what else can be a greater magic than that the semen abiding in the womb should become a conscious being endued with various off-shoots springing from it such as hands, head and feet, and that the same should become invested with the marks of infancy, youth, and old age following one another and should see, eat, hear, smell, go and come? " As in the case of the body, so in the case of the fig seed and tree and the like. Ponder well. Where is the tiny seed, and where is the big tree? Therefore rest assured that the universe is a mâyā. As to the Tarkikas (logicians) and others who profess to give a rational explanation of the universe, they have all been taught a severe lesson by Harshamisra and others. Manu says that those things which are beyond thought should not be subjected to argument, and it is indeed impossible to imagine even in mind how the universe has been produced. Be assured that Mâyā is the seed endued with the potentiality of producing what is unthinkable. This seed, Mâyā, is alone present to consciousness in susúpti or deep dreamless sleep.

Various views as to the origin and purpose of Creation.

The Svetāśvataras speak of the Mahesvara, the Great Lord, as one who owns this Mâyā and exercises control over it. That He is the creator is also declared by the Svetāśvataras in the following words:—

"From that, the magic Master (māyin) brings this all; in this another by His magic power (Māyā) is held in bonds." (Op. cit. 4-9.)

As to the origin and purpose of Creation, Gauḍapādācārya states in his memorial verses on the Māndūkya-Upanisad the various views on the subject in the following words:—

"Others who contemplate on Creation deem it an expansion (vibhūti). By others Creation is supposed to be of the nature of a dream (svapna) or mâyā, Creation is a mere will of the Lord; thus has been Creation determined (by some). Those who contemplate on Time think that all beings proceed from Time. Some say that Creation is for the sake of pleasure; others hold that it is for sport. It is the inherent nature of the Shining One (Deva): what desire can He have who has attained all pleasures? " (Op. Cit. i:7-9)
To explain: Several views are held as regards the nature and purpose of Creation. One view is that the Īśvara creates the world with the view of manifesting His own glory as the Lord of the Universe, i.e., with a view to show how great and mighty He is. This and other views to be explained below as to the nature and purpose of Creation are advanced only by those who study evolution, whereas those who study the Absolute Truth lay no stress on evolution. The śrutighṣṭa says that "It is the Lord who by His Māyā shines in all the various forms." (Bri. Up. 2:5:19) A juggler, for instance, projects the magical thread in space (ākāśa); and there by ascending into the air, weapons in hand, he goes far beyond our ken, is there hacked by the sword into pieces in battle, falls down in pieces on earth, and again rises up alive in the presence of the spectators; but these spectators do not care to find out the truth or otherwise of the māyā and the phenomenon produced by the māyā. Similarly, here, the three states of consciousness, namely, suṣupti, (deep sleep), svapna (dream) and jāgrat (waking state), are like the magic thread projected in space by the juggler. The reflections of Âtman in these states, called respectively the Prājñā (wise), the Taijasa (luminous), the Viśva (penetrating), and so on, may be compared to the juggler who appears to ascend into the air by the magic thread. Entirely distinct from the thread and from the one who ascends by it is the juggler (māyāvin), the real personage who has all the while been standing invisible on the earth, veiled by his māyā; and like him is the Supreme Reality, the Fourth One lying beyond the three states of consciousness. Consequently, those Âryas (noble persons) who seek liberation take to the study of the Supreme Reality alone, not to the fruitless study of Creation. Therefore the various views here referred to are the theories held by students of evolution. Accordingly, there are also persons who hold that Creation is, like a dream, a casual manifestation, occurring in the absence of enquiry: and there are others still who hold that evolution is a māyā, the sole purpose being the exhibition of a wonder-working power. These two theories are to be distinguished from the siddhānta or orthodox Vedântic view.

The things seen in a dream have a real counterpart in the waking consciousness; and as such they may be real in one sense. Similarly the māyā, inhering in the magical stone or the like which is a real substance, may be so far real in one sense.

According to the orthodox view, the universe has not even this much of reality in it.

A fourth view as to the nature of Creation is that it is controlled entirely by the mere will (ichha) of the Īśvara. When many dishes of sweet viands are placed before a man, it depends entirely on his own choice as to which one or more dishes he will partake of. So also here, Īśvara's will is unfailing, unobstructed. A pot, for instance, is a mere act of the potter's will and nothing more; for, he first forms within in his mind an idea of what its image and form and name ought to be and then produces the thing in the external world. So the Īśvara's creation is His mere thought and nothing more. Such is the view of Creation held by some Theists.

Others, again, namely, the jyotir-vids, the students of astronomy, maintain that Time, not the Īśvara, is the cause of the universe, the Īśvara remaining quite an indifferent impartial spectator. Trees put forth flowers and fruits at particular seasons of the year, so that this budding forth and ripening of fruits depends upon time. Similarly the manifestation of the universe depends on Time.

Thus various views are held as to the origin of the universe. Divergent views prevail even as regards the purpose of Creation. According to some, God creates the universe for His own enjoyment, in the same way that a man engages in agriculture or commerce for his own enjoyment; while according to some others, God engages in the creation of universe for mere sport, just as a man plays at dice or engages in other games as a matter of diversion.

154 The explanation is taken from the commentaries of Śaṅkarācārya, Ānandagiri, Vidyāranya.
Orthodox theory as to the nature of Evolution.

Last comes the orthodox theory of the Vedānta. Evolution is the very nature (svabhāva) of the Divine Being, and is a creation of Māyā which is inherent in Him, and which, as has been already shown, is a fact of universal experience. Just as Brahman is, in His essential nature, Real, Consciousness, and Bliss and nothing else, so birth, existence, and destruction of the universe are natural to Brahman endued with Māyā; so that no specific purpose need be sought for, as He is devoid of all desire. This is the orthodox theory.

The two theories as to the purpose of Creation just discussed are false. "What desire can He cherish who has attained all pleasures?" Thus does the Teacher (Gauḍapādācārya) set aside the two views regarding the purpose of Creation.

Or it may be that here the Teacher sets aside all the foregoing theories in the words, "what desire can He have who has attained all pleasures?" But for Māyā, the Supreme Self who is in possession of all pleasures can never be supposed to think of evolving the universe with the object of manifesting His own glory and lordly power. The universe created out of māyā and dream cannot but be of the nature of māyā and dream; and the words 'māyā' and 'dream (svapna') denote what is unreal. Neither is it ever possible for the Supreme One, who is essentially Bliss and Bliss alone, to cherish a desire (ichha) or longing to engage in a voluntary act. Being never subject to any change in Himself, He can never cherish a desire or engage in a voluntary act. To Brahman unaffected by Māyā, no pleasure or sport can be ascribed. Therefore all creation by the Lord is a mere illusion (māyā).

Now as to the theory that all beings proceed from Time (kala). The rope appears to be a serpent in virtue of its own nature, owing to our ajñāna, i.e., when we are ignorant of its real nature; similarly the Supreme manifests Himself as ākāśa and so on by virtue of His own inherent power, owing to Māyā or our ignorance of His true nature. The śruti nowhere declares that Time is the cause of all beings, whereas it expressly declares that ākāśa is born from the Self.

Īśvara is the Dispenser of the fruits of actions.

(Objection):— It is the former acts (karmas) of sentient creatures which generate the bodies in which those creatures reap the fruits of their acts.

Of what avail is the Īśvara spoken of?

(Answer):—Not so; Īśvara alone is the Dispenser of all fruits of actions as has been established in the Vedānta Sūtras III. ii. 38 — 41. There the point is discussed as follows:

(Question):—Is it the act (karma) itself that dispenses its fruit, or is it the Īśvara worshipped by means of the act?

(Prima fade view):— An act is no doubt of only a temporary duration. It does not, however, according to the ritualistic school of Jaimini, disappear altogether without generating something new called apūrva, which may be supposed to be either a form put on by the act after it has disappeared from view, or a form put on by the effect prior to its manifestation at a subsequent period. And through this apūrva the act done, which to all appearance is temporary, may itself produce the effect. To maintain therefore that Īśvara is the Dispenser of fruits involves a needless assumption.

(Conclusion):— The apūrva of karma is insentient in itself and has therefore no power to dispense the fruit of the act just in accordance with its specific nature and magnitude. In our own experience we see no such power possessed by an act of service, which is insentient. Therefore it should be admitted that, as it is the king to whom service is rendered that dispenses the fruits of the service, so it is Īśvara worshipped by works that dispenses the fruits of the works. Certainly, this view involves
no needless assumption; for, Īśvara is revealed in the Vedas and is therefore not an assumption. That Īśvara alone is the dispenser of the fruits of good and bad deeds, of dharma and adharma, and that He alone impels men to those acts is taught by the śruti in the following words:

"For, He makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom He wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed." (Kauś. Up. 3-8)

On the contrary, as Īśvara is thus proved by proper evidence, it is the objector's position that involves a gratuitous assumption, the alleged apūrva being nowhere spoken of in the śruti. Hence the conclusion that Īśvara who is worshipped by works is the dispenser of the fruits of those works.

**Īśvara is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.**

That Īśvara is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe has been established in the Vedānta-sūtras I. iv. 23-27, as follows:

(Question):— The Upaniṣads teach that Brahman is the cause of the universe. The question is: Do they teach that He is the mere efficient cause of the universe? or that He is the material cause as well?

(Prima facie view):— He is only the efficient cause of the universe. For, in the words " He thought" the śruti refers to His having thought of the universe to be evolved. Certainly the thinking of the effect to be produced makes Him the mere efficient (nimitta) cause.

(Conclusion):— "He thought, 'may I be born manifold’” in these words the śruti declares that the Thinker Himself becomes manifold by being born in various forms. Therefore, Īśvara is the upadāna or material cause as well. Further, the śruti declares that the One Brahman being known, the whole universe, though not taught, becomes known. That is to say, to know the One is to know all. This dictum can be explained only if Brahman is the material cause of all; for, then, it is easy to justify the dictum on the ground that the universe is evolved from Brahman. If, on the contrary, Brahman were the mere efficient cause of the universe, all things comprised in the evolved universe would be distinct from Brahman; how, then, could one be said to know all by knowing Brahman? Therefore the śruti means that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.

**No self-contradiction in the Upaniṣads as to the Brahma-vāda.**

In the Vedānta-sūtras (from I. i. 5 to I. iv 13) it has been shown that all the Upaniṣads teach, in one voice, that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. This interpretation has been justified in the Vedānta-sūtras I.i. 14-15, by way of explaining all apparent self-contradictions on the subject.

(Question):— Are we right or not in construing thus the Vedānta teaching as to the Cause of the universe?

(Prima facie view):— It would seem that this interpretation is not right; for, the Upaniṣads are full of self-contradictions and cannot be regarded as a pramāṇa or right source of knowledge at all. The Taittiriya-Upaniṣad, for instance, teaches that Brahman creates ākāśa, etc., whereas the Chāṇḍogya-Upaniṣad teaches that He creates light, etc. In the Aitareyaka it is said that He begins His creation with "these worlds," while the Muṇḍaka- Upaniṣad teaches that He starts with the creation of prāṇa and so on. Thus there are self-contradictions in the teachings of the Upaniṣads as to the things created by Brahman. Even their teaching as to the nature of the Cause involves a self-contradiction. The Chandogya speaks of the Cause as Existence in the words " Existence alone this at first was," whereas the Taittiri-aranyakas speaks of it as Non-existence in the words "Non-existence verily this at first was, " and the Aitareyaka says that the Self is the Cause, in the words " The Self, verily, this
at first was, one alone." Owing to such self-contradictions as these, it is not right to maintain that an harmonious self-consistent doctrine as to the Cause of the universe can be made out from the teaching of the Upaniṣads.

(Conclusion):— Granted that a difference exists in the teaching of the Upaniṣads as to the things created such as ākāśa and also as to the order in which they are created. Ākāśa and other created things are mentioned in the Upaniṣads not for their own sake, but solely with a view to impart a knowledge of Brahmā. On the other hand, there is no difference whatever in the teaching of the Upaniṣads as to the nature of Brahmā, the Creator of the universe, who forms the main subject of discourse. Brahmā spoken of in one place as Existence is designated in another place as the Self (ātman) with a view to teach that Brahmā Himself is in the form of the jīva or Ego in all. When the śruti speaks of the Cause as Non-existence, it refers to the Avyakṭa, the Undifferentiated, but not to an absolute Non-existence; for, elsewhere, in the words "How can existence come out of non-existence?" the śruti expressly teaches that Non-existence cannot be the Cause. All the apparent self-contradictions thus admitting of an easy explanation, we are right in maintaining that the śruti teaches in one accord that Brahmā is the Cause of the universe.

The Upaniṣads do not support other doctrines of Cause.

In the Vedānta-sūtras Līv.28, the same interpretation that we have put upon the teaching of the Upaniṣads as to the Cause of the universe has been upheld by way of showing that the śruti does not lend any support to the doctrine that the atoms, etc., are the cause of the universe.

(Question):— Does the Upaniṣad anywhere teach that, like Brahmā, the atoms, the void (sūnya), and the like are the Cause of the universe? Or does it teach everywhere that Brahmā alone, and nothing else, is the Cause?

(Prima facie view):— The śruti teaches also that atoms, etc., are the Cause of the universe, for, it illustrates the Cause by the example of a fig seed. To explain: In the sixth adhyāya of the Chāṇḍogya-Upaniṣad, where one Uddālaka instructs his pupil Svetaketu, the former refers by way of illustration to fig seeds which hold mighty trees in their womb, with a view to show how the vast external universe of gross physical objects is comprehended within the one subtle principle. From this we may understand that the śruti means that atoms (paramāṇus), corresponding to the fig seeds in the illustration, are the Cause of the universe. And the void (sūnya) also is directly declared to be the Cause of the universe in the words "Non-existence this in the beginning was." (Tait. Up. 2:7:1) The theories of Nature (svabhāva) and Time are also referred to in the words "Svabhāva, the inherent nature, is the cause, as some sages say; Time as some others hold." (Sve. 6-1) Therefore the śruti supports those theories also which respectively maintain that atoms, etc., are the Cause of the universe.

(Conclusion):— The dictum that, the One being known, all is known, cannot be explained in the light of nihilism (sūnya-vāda) or other theories. The ākāśa and the like incapable of producing Brahmā, Brahmā cannot be known by knowing the void (sūnya) and the like. The illustration of fig seeds and so on can be explained on the ground that Brahmā, who is beyond the ken of the senses, is very subtle. It has been said that the word "non-existence" denotes the Avyakṭa or the Undifferentiated, devoid of name and form. Nature (svabhāva) and Time theories are referred to in the śruti only as theories which should be rejected. Hence the conclusion that Brahmā alone, as taught in the śruti, is the Cause of the universe, not the atoms, or the like.
CHAPTER 8.
ON THE DEFENSIVE.

Defence of the Vedic Doctrine.

In the Vedānta-sūtras (in the Pada. i of the Adhyaya II) all objections raised against the doctrine of Brahman, which has been made out in the First Adhyāya as the one taught by all Upaniṣads in one voice, on the ground that it is opposed to the smṛtis or teachings of some individual sages and to the logic of experience, have been answered in thirteen disquisitions (adhikaraṇas), all of which together form a defense of the foregoing exposition of the Vedic doctrine. The first disquisition has been digested as follows:

**The Veda versus the Sankhya system.**

(Vedānta- sūtras II. i. 1-2).

(The opponent):— The Vedic doctrine of Brahman should make room for the Sānkhya teaching; for, as the Sānkhya teaching would otherwise have no scope at all, it must prevail as against the other. Of course the Sānkhya doctrine has been promulgated for the express purpose of teaching the nature of things as they are; it has nothing whatever to do with Dharma, i.e., with the teaching of what one has to do; and therefore, if the teaching of the Sānkhya system be set aside even in that matter, then it would have no scope at all.

If, on the other hand, the teaching of the Veda, which treats of Dharma as well as Brahman, be set aside so far as it concerns one of them, namely, Brahman, then it will have ample scope, so far as it treats of Dharma. Accordingly, it is but proper that the Vedic doctrine of Brahman should give in to the Sānkhya teaching, inasmuch as otherwise the latter would have no scope at all; whereas (as shown above) the Vedic teaching can afford to make room for the other.

(The Vedāntin):— As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: It is not right that the Vedic teaching should be made to give in to the Sānkhya doctrine; for, the latter has been falsified by the institutes of Manu and the like which speak of Brahman as the Cause of the universe. The institutes of Manu and the like are indeed more authoritative, inasmuch as they are based on the Vedic texts now extant, while Kapila's doctrine has no such basis. Certainly, we know of no Vedic text whatever supporting the doctrine that Pradhāna is the Cause; and it has been already shown that all extant Vedic texts point to Brahman as the Cause of the universe. Hence the impropriety of making the Vedic doctrine give in to the Sānkhya teaching.

**The Veda versus the Yoga system.**

(Vedānta-sūtras II i. 3)

(The opponent):—The Yoga doctrine is the science taught by Patañjali. The eight-stepped yoga therein taught is taught in the extant Vedic texts also. In the Śvetasvatara-Upaniṣad, for instance, yoga is taught at great length. Further, yoga is a means to knowledge; for, in the words "with the sharp and subtle mind He is beheld" (Katha. Up. 3-12) the sruti declares that the one-pointedness of mind which can be accomplished by yoga is a means to the immediate realisation of Brahman. Hence the authority of the science of Yoga. And this science teaches that Pradhāna alone is the Cause of the universe. Therefore the Veda should make room for the Yoga doctrine.

(The Vedāntin): Indeed the Yoga doctrine is an authority so far as it is concerned with its main aim, which is to teach the eight-stepped yoga; but it is no authority as regards the non-Vedic theory of Pradhāna, which lies away from the main aim of its teaching. To explain: Having started with the words "Now commences the teaching of yoga," the science then defines yoga in the words "yoga is the restraint of the modifications of the thinking principle", and expounds yoga at great length in the
The sceptical theories of Pradhāna and the rest as the main subject of its teaching. When in the second section which is devoted to an exposition of *yama, niyama*, and other steps on the path of yoga, the author explains the evil, the cause of evil, its abandoning, and the means of abandoning it, he makes a casual mention of Pradhāna, etc., as taught in the Sankhya. Pradhāna does not therefore form the main subject of its teaching. Hence no necessity for the Veda giving in to the Yoga doctrine.

**The Veda versus the Sankhya reasoning.**

(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 4 n).

(The opponent):— It should give in to the empirical reasoning such as the following: The insentient universe cannot have been born of Brahman who is intelligent; for the one is of quite a different nature from the other. What is quite opposed to another cannot be born of that other; as for example, the buffalo is not born of the cow.

(The Vedāntin):— The dictum that the cause and the effect are of the same nature fails in the case of scorpions and hair. We know that the scorpion, a sentient organism, is born of cow-dung which is insentient, and that an insentient thing such as hair is born of the human organism which is sentient. Therefore no dry reasoning independent of the Veda can take a final stand in any matter. Accordingly one of the teachers has said:

"A thing inferred with ever so great a care by logicians however expert is quite otherwise explained by other and greater experts." (Sloka-vārtika)

Therefore, the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the strength of the specious argument based upon the distinction between Brahman and the universe.

**The Veda versus empirical reasoning generally.**

(Vedānta-sūtra II. i. 12).

(The opponent):— Granted that the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the strength of the Sankhya and Yoga systems and their logic. There are, however, other systems, those of Kaṇāḍa, Buddha and so on; and the Vedic doctrine will have to give way to their teachings and their logic. Kaṇāḍa, a Mahārshi, a great sage, has taught that the atoms (paramāṇu) are the cause of the universe, and supports this theory by the following argument: All things produced are produced out of smaller parts; a cloth, for instance, is produced out of threads; and all molecules are things produce:!: therefore they must have been produced out of things which are smaller in magnitude. And Buddha, again, who is an incarnation of Vishnu, teaches that the universe has come out of *abhāva* or non-existence and supports that view by logic: Every existing thing is preceded by its non-existence; the dream-world, for instance, is preceded by suṣupti or dreamless sleep. Wherefore, the Vedic doctrine should give in to the mighty systems of Kaṇāḍa and the like.

(The Vedantin):— As against the foregoing we argue as follows:

When even the Sankhya and Yoga doctrines, treating of Prakṛti, Puruṣa and other things, and which are incidentally here and there cited by the authors of the Purāṇas, by the crest-jewels of Vedic teachers, have been set aside as weak and unwarranted so far as their teaching -as to the Cause of the universe is concerned, much more readily should we set aside as weak and unwarranted the theories of Kaṇāḍa and the like which are ignored by all wise teachers. Certainly, nowhere in the Puranas, — the Šānta, the Brahma and the like, is the theory of atoms and molecules cited even incidentally. On the contrary, in the words "One should not honor, even by a word of mouth, the sceptical rationalists and hypocritical devotees," such systems are altogether condemned. As

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to the generalization that all produced things are produced out of smaller parts, it does not apply to illusion (vivarta); for, we see mighty trees on a distant mountain-top giving rise to the illusory idea of the very minute tip of the grass-blade. Even as to the inference that the universe has come out of non-being, the example of the dream-world cited above does not warrant the general proposition that every produced thing is preceded by its non-existence; for suṣupti is only an avastha or condition of the Self (ātman), and since the existence of the Self during suṣupti has thus to be admitted, it follows that the dream-world is preceded by something existing. Wherefore the Vedic doctrine should not give way to the systems of Kanāda, Buddha and the like.

**The Vedānta versus sensuous perception.**

(Vedānta-sutra II. i. 13)

(The opponent):— The non-duality which has been made out by a connected interpretation of Vedic texts is proved false by pratyakṣa etc. by sensuous perception, empirical inference, etc. , which reveal a distinction between the perceiver and the things perceived.

(The Vedantin):— No. For, in the case of the ocean we perceive both duality and non-duality: in the form of waves it is dual; and as a body of water it is non-dual. Only, these opposites, duality and non-duality, cannot coexist in that thing which does not altogether admit of even a distinction of aspects and is absolutely one. Wherefore, when it is possible to distinguish two aspects non-dual as Brahmā, and dual as differentiated into the perceiver and the objects of perception, the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the ground of opposition to our perception of duality.

**Non-duality in duality — how far real.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. i. 14-20)

(Question): — Is this non-duality in duality absolutely real or only apparently so?

(Prima facie view):— It is absolutely real; for it never proves false in the case of Brahmā any more than in the case of the ocean.

(Conclusion):— "Here there is no duality whatever:" (Katha Up. 4-11) in these words the śrutī denies all duality. By reasoning, too, we come to the same conclusion. For, duality and non-duality, which are mutually destructive, cannot coexist in one and the same thing, just as the one moon cannot be two. As to the conclusion arrived at in the preceding article that duality and non-duality in the One Thing are due to difference in Its aspects, even this is not right; for, the non-dual Reality does not admit of different aspects. In the ocean or the like, however, both duality and non-duality are admitted because of a difference in its aspects, which is a fact of experience; and it is a well-established principle that no fact of experience can be dismissed as unreasonable. It cannot be said that, in the present case also, two different aspects, as Brahmā and as the universe, are facts of experience; for, Brahmā is knowable only through śastras (scriptures). Wherefore non-duality in duality in the case of Brahmā is opposed to both śrutī and reasoning and has only a relative (vyāvaharika) reality, i.e., it is real only from the stand-point of the unenlightened. It may be asked, then, what is the Absolute reality? We reply: Non-duality is alone real: apart from the cause, there is no effect therefore the cause alone is real. And accordingly the śrutī teaches that the cause alone is real, and illustrates the truth by clay and the like.

"By one clod of clay, for instance, my dear, all that is made of clay is known. A product of speech is the changing form, a name; what we call clay is alone real: so, my dear, is the one spoken of." (Chand. 6:1:4)

This passage maybe explained as follows: A big clod of clay is the cause, and pots and dishes, etc., are its changing forms. The Tarkikas (logicians) maintain that pots and dishes, etc. , are things quite distinct from clay.
To show that pots, etc. are not independent realities, the śruti speaks of them as vikāras or changing forms; which means that pots, etc. are only different forms of the one thing, clay, and that they are not independent realities any more than childhood, youth, and dotage are independent of Devadatta. So that even while it manifests itself in the form of pots, etc., clay alone is the independent reality. Therefore, when clay is known, the whole real essence of pots, etc., is known. Unreal as these are, they are not worth knowing. Though these changing forms manifest themselves through the eye, yet, when properly scrutinised, they are found to have no being whatever of their own apart from clay. They exist only in names, dish, pots, etc., which are but a creation of speech. Thus these changing forms have no real being of their own and yet present themselves to consciousness; that is to say, they are false appearances (mithya) and are therefore unreal; whereas clay has a being of its own even apart from its changing forms and is therefore real. It is in accordance with this illustration that we should understand the Vedic teaching regarding Brahman, and it is quite clear that in that teaching Brahman corresponds to clay, and the universe to pots, etc. Wherefore, the universe being one with Brahman, the truth is that Brahman is non-dual. Those persons, however, who have not thus investigated the matter learn on the one hand from the teaching of the Veda that Brahman is non-dual, while again they are convinced of duality by sensuous perception and empirical inference. As thus the twofold knowledge arises only at first sight, i.e., in the absence of a thorough investigation, we may conclude that the non-duality in duality presented to the mind in the case of Brahman and the universe, as in the case of the ocean and its waves, is but relatively true (vyavaharika), and that it is considered real only in the absence of investigation.

Īśvara untainted by good and evil.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 21-23)

(The opponent):— In the case of jīvas merged in the samsāra, the Paramāsvara or Supreme Lord does good to them by way of endowing them with non-attachment (vairāgya). He has also created evil in the form of sin (adharma) leading them to hell (narakā); and while doing so, He, as the Omniscient, knows His identity with the jīvas. This is to say that He does both good and evil to Himself, which is incongruous; for, no sensible person in the world neglects his own good or does evil to himself. The Vedic doctrine, therefore, is open to the objection that it makes the Lord neglect His own good.

(The Vedántin):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Īśvara is omniscient, and therefore knows that the jīva's sāṃśāra is unreal and that He is untainted in Himself. Hence no room for the objection that the Lord is affected by good and evil.

Duality evolved from non-duality.

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. i. 24-25.)

(The opponent):— "One alone without a second":* from these words we learn that Brahman is devoid of all duality; i.e., we learn that He is not in Himself made up of distinct parts and that there exists nothing else belonging to the same class as Brahman or to a different class. On the contrary, the things to be created, such as ākāśa, the air, etc., are various. When there is no variety in the cause, there cannot certainly be any variety in the effect; otherwise, from one thing, such as milk, might be evolved things of different kinds, such as curd, oil and so on. Moreover, the śruti describes the evolution of ākāśa, and other things in a certain order; and we are at a loss to know what there is to determine the particular order of evolution. Therefore, the evolution of the universe in all its variety and in a particular order cannot take place from Brahman who is one and secondless.

(The Vedántin):— In point of fact, Brahman is, no doubt, non-dual; but the śruti, reason, and
experience tell us that Brahman is associated with avidyā. The śruti says:

"Māyā verily is Prakṛti (cause), man should know; and Īśvara the possessor of Māyā." (Cha.Up. 6:2:1) Māyā is the same as avidyā, since both alike are characterised by indefinability. It should not be supposed that this admission of Māyā lands us in duality; for, nothing is real except Brahman. Thus, though one, Brahman can produce the universe in all its variety with the help of avidyā. Neither should it be supposed that there exists nothing to determine the particular order in the evolution of things; for, avidyā may possess potentialities which bring about the evolution of things in a particular order. Therefore, the evolution of things in the universe in all their variety and in a particular order can take place from Brahman, the secondless.

The theory of transformation maintained.

(Vedānta- sūtras II. i. 26-29.)

(The opponent):— In the sixth article (adhikāraṇa) it has been shown that cause and effect are one; so that, the Vaiseshika's theory of the production of an effect distinct from the cause is not acceptable to the Brahma-vādin. He is therefore obliged to accept the theory of transformation (parināma), as in the case of milk and curd. Then he may be asked this question: Is it wholly or in part that Brahman transforms Himself into the universe? In the former Brahman would be non-eternal; in the latter, Brahman would be made up of parts. Wherefore the theory of transformation cannot be maintained.

(The Vedantin):— Brahman's transformation of Himself into the universe is effected by the potentialities of Māyā, as the śruti says, "The Lord appears multiform through māyās (false ideas)"

156 It is not a reality. Therefore the Brahma-vāda cannot be caught between the two horns of the dilemma,—transformation as a whole or transformation in part. Thus, the theory of transformation is not difficult for the Brahma-vādin to maintain.

Though incorporeal, Brahman possesses Māyā.

(Vedānta-sūtras. II. i. 30-31)

(The opponent):— In the world we find all jugglers, who display magical powers, possessed of a body. Brahman being without a body, how can He have the power of Māyā?

(The Vedāntin):— Though the house-builders and other architects stand in need of earth, timber, grass and other external objects quite distinct from themselves, yet, a juggler can construct houses and the like without resorting to any external things. Similarly, though the worldly juggler stands in need of a body, still, without a body, Brahman may possess Māyā. Perhaps it may be urged that we have the authority of sensuous perception for maintaining that a juggler can produce houses, etc. without any external aids. If so, then, even as regards Brahman, we may rely on the authority of the śruti which says that "the Mahesvara is the possessor of Māyā," (Śvet. 4-10) and maintain that He is without a body and yet possesses Māyā.

Evolution as an act of sport.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 32 33)

(The opponent):— "Bliss is Brahman" (Tait. Up. 3:6:1) in these words the śruti declares that the Paramesvara, the Supreme Lord, is ever-contented. If we admit that such a being cherishes a desire for creation, it will detract from His ever-contentedness. If, on the other hand, we deny any such desire, then it is tantamount to saying that, as creating the universe without an intelligent purpose in view, the Īśvara behaves like a lunatic.

156 Bri. Up. 2;5;19.
(The Vedāntin):— Princes and others, who are quite intelligent, engage in hunting and other kinds of activity only as a matter of sport, with no specific end in view. And inspiration and expiration are facts of everybody's experience. There are innumerable instances of purposeless activities displayed by children. Like these, Īśvara, though ever-contented, may create the whole universe without any specific end in view and yet be not a lunatic.

Īśvara acquitted of partiality and cruelty.

(Vedānta-sūtras. II. i. 34 36)

(The opponent):— Īśvara creates most happy beings such as Devas, as also most unhappy beings such as cattle and other lower animals, and also men who are midway between the two. Thus bestowing happiness and misery of different degrees upon different classes of souls, how can Īśvara be other than partial? Or, bringing about the destruction of Devas, lower animals, men and other creatures in the whole universe, an act which is extremely reprehensible even to the meanest being, how can He be other than merciless? Thus, the Īśvara of the Vedānta is open to the charge of partiality and mercilessness.

(The Vedāntin):— In the first place Īśvara cannot be charged with partiality, inasmuch as the different creatures are born in the highest class or in the middle class or in the lowest class of beings just according to their respective karmas. It cannot, however, be urged that this detracts from the independence of Īśvara; for, as the Antaryāmin, the Inner Regulator and Controller dwelling in all beings, He rules all karma.

Here one may say: If, to avoid the charge of partiality against Īśvara, you say that karma is the cause of difference, and again if, to secure Īśvara's independence, you make Him the Regulator of karma's operations, in the end you make Īśvara Himself the cause of difference in the lots of different creatures.

In reply we say that this is not a fault at all. The act of regulating consists in the mere preventing of the potentialities of the different things in nature from getting into confusion. These potentialities form the very body or essence of Māyā; and Īśvara is not their creator. Since the respective karmas of the different beings are, by virtue of their inherent potentialities, the cause of the differences, Īśvara who is the mere regulator of their operations cannot be charged with partiality. Like suṣūpti or dreamless sleep, the destruction of the universe, is not a source of pain; on the contrary, it removes all pain; so that Īśvara only shows His mercy by this act.

(Objection):— Though Īśvara is not open to the charge of partiality when, in the minor evolutions, He creates the universe in accordance with the preceding karma, still He is open to the charge as regards His first creation, since there existed no karma preceding that creation.

(Answer):— No. The series of creations is beginningless, as the scriptures say, "no end, no beginning." (Bhag. Gita. 15-3)

The Attributeless as the material cause.

(Vedānta- sūtras II. i. 37)

(The opponent):— That is said to be the Prakṛti or material cause which changes itself into the effect. In our experience we find that all material causes such as clay are possessed of attributes. Then, how can the attributeless Brahman be the material cause of the universe?

(The Vedāntin):— It is true that etymologically the term 'Prakṛti' means that which undergoes change. But this change may take place in two ways: either by way of actual transformation as in the case of milk, etc., or by being mistaken for something else, as a rope is mistaken for a serpent. Now, though the attributeless Brahman cannot undergo actual transformation, He may be mistaken for something else. We do find that one jati or species, which is attributeless, is mistaken for
CHAPTER 9.

ON THE OFFENSIVE.

The second pāda (quarter) of the second Adhyāya of the Vedānta-Sūtras establishes in eight articles (adhikaranaḥs) the theory that Brahman is the cause of the universe, by way of condemning all other theories.

The Vedānta versus the Sankhya.

(Vedānta-Sūtras II. ii. 1—10)

(Saṅkhya):— Pradhāna which is composed of pleasure, and pain and ignorance is the Prakṛti or material cause of the universe, inasmuch as we find the universe made up of objects of pleasure, pain and ignorance. To explain: A pot, a cloth, and the like produce pleasure when they are obtained, since they serve the purpose of fetching water, covering the body, and so on. For this very reason, when a person is robbed of them by others, they form a source of pain. When, again, no water has to be fetched, then the pot is not a source of pleasure or pain; it remains an object of indifference. Ignorance (moha) concerning the pot consists in its being thus an object of indifference. Moha (ignorance) is derived from the root 'muh' = to be unconscious and with reference to objects of indifference no chitta-vṛtti or state of consciousness is seen to arise. Since pleasure, pain and ignorance thus run through the whole universe, Pradhāna is the cause of the universe.

(Vedāntin):— Pradhāna is not the cause of the universe, because, insentient as it is, it cannot have the power of designing and building the universe composed of such a variety of things as the bodies, the senses, mountains, and so on, each with a peculiar form and structure of its own. In the world we see that complex structures such as palaces, of which each part serves a distinct purpose of its own, are all the work of very highly intelligent authors. This incapacity for designing the structure of the universe apart, we cannot conceive how the insentient Pradhāna can ever so act as to bring the universe into existence; for, we see no carriages or other insentient things acting when not acted on by intelligent beings. If, then, to avoid this difficulty, the Sankhya should admit that the sentient spirit (Puruṣa) acts upon Pradhāna, the admission runs counter to his postulate that Puruṣa is unattached. As to the assertion that pleasure, pain and ignorance run through pots and other things in the universe, we say that the proposition cannot be maintained, because pleasure, pain and ignorance are internal (subjective states) whereas pots and other things are external objects. Therefore, Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the universe.

The Vedānta versus the Vaiśeṣika.

In the last chapter, when answering the Sankhya's objection against the theory that from the sentient Brahman is evolved the universe which is insentient and is therefore of quite a different nature from its cause, the Vedāntin illustrated his theory by the observed fact of the birth of a scorpion from the cow-dung. Thereby the Sankhya's objection was answered, and the Vedānta theory was so far maintained.

In the present chapter the Vedāntin has attempted a refutation of rival theories and has overthrown, in the first article the Sankhya doctrine of cause. He has now to refute the Vaiśeṣika theory.
How far the Vaiśeṣika theory supports the Brahmavāda.

(Vedānta-sutra II. ii.11.)

The Vaiśeṣika theory having been worked out in great detail, a person who has been thoroughly impressed with that theory, would pay no regard to the theory that Brahm is the cause, unless he is furnished with an illustration of a cause producing an effect differing in its nature from that cause, taken from his own system. Now, we shall proceed to enquire whether the Vaiśeṣika system furnishes an instance of a cause producing a dissimilar effect. It may at first sight appear that the system furnishes no instance; for, according to that system, a white cloth is produced out of white threads only, not out of threads of red colour. The Vedantin maintains that the system does furnish instances of causes producing dissimilar effects. To explain: a paramāṇu (ultimate infinitesimal particle) is, according to the Vaiseshika, of the size spoken of as all-round-ness, (pari-māṇḍalya). A combination of two paramāṇus as opposed to atoms which cannot be measured in terms of atoms produces a dvi-anuka (a molecule of two atoms) which can be measured in terms of an atom. This is one instance. Similarly, a dvi-anuka is short (hrasva) in measure, and has therefore no length; and a combination of three such molecules produces a tri-anuka (three-atom ed) molecule having the measure of length, and so far immeasurable in terms of atoms. This is another instance. So also other instances can be cited from the Vaiśeṣika system.

The Vaiśeṣika theory of creation overthrown.

(Vedānta-Sūtras II. ii.12—17)

(The Vaiseshika):— The universe of the last cycle is dissolved at the time of Pralaya; and again, when a desire to create arises in the Great Lord, then, in virtue of the karma of sentient beings, activity springs up for the first time in the unmoving paramāṇus (ultimate particles). As a result of this activity, one paramāṇu combines with another, and out of this combination a dvi-anuka is formed, and out of a combination of three dvi-ānukas, a tri-anuka is formed. In this way the whole universe is produced. In the absence of all contradiction to this theory, we maintain that paramāṇus combine together and produce the universe.

(The Vedāntin):— It has been said that activity first springs up in the paramāṇus. We ask: Has this activity a cause or not? If it has no cause, it may spring up at all times, since there is nothing to restrict it to a particular occasion; and then there can be no dissolution (pralaya). If it has a cause, then, again, we ask: Is that cause seen or unseen? Is it something suggested by our ordinary experience or something transcendental? In the first place the cause cannot be something seen or what our ordinary experience can suggest; for, no action or reaction (pratyāna or pratigāha) is possible prior to the creation of the bodily organism. As to Īśvara's action (pratyāna), it is eternal and cannot therefore be an invariable antecedent of the first activity which is occasional. In the next place, the cause of the first activity cannot be something unseen or transcendental; for, the transcendental or super-sensuous cause (adṛṣṭa or the latent force of the past karma) is said to inhere in the Ātmā and cannot, therefore, be related to paramāṇus. Being placed in such dilemmas as these, the Vaiseshika's explanation of the first activity in the paramāṇus cannot be accepted, and no combination of paramāṇus as a result of that activity is therefore possible. Thus the theory that the universe arose out of the paramāṇus combined together is forever cast away.

The Vedānta versus Buddhist Realist.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. ii. 18 27.)

(The Buddhists):— There are some Buddhists who maintain that external objects exist as such, and they hold as follows: There are two aggregates, the external and the internal. The external aggregate comprises the objects such as earth, rivers, oceans, and so on; and the internal group is made up of the mind and its modes. The whole universe consists of these two aggregates and no more. The
paramanus are the cause of the external aggregate. They are of four classes; some of them are hard and are spoken of as the atoms of earth. Some are viscid and are spoken of as the atoms of water. The atoms of a third class are hot and are spoken of as the atoms of fire. The atoms of the fourth class are mobile and are spoken of as the atoms of the air. Out of the ultimate atoms (paramanus) of these four classes combining together simultaneously is formed the external aggregate. The cause of the internal aggregate is made up of five skandhas (groups). These groups are

(1) Rūpa-skandha, the group of forms, composed of sounds, touch, etc., which are perceived through the mind;

(2) Vijñāna-skandha, the group of knowledge, which consists of cognitions of these forms;

(3) Vedana-skandha, the group of feeling, which consists of pleasure and pain caused by the cognitions;

(4) Samjña-skandha, the group of designations, which is made up of names such as Devadatta;

(5) Samskāra-skandha, the group of tendencies, made up of the latent impressions left by the four groups mentioned above.

Out of these five groups (skandhas) combined together is evolved the internal aggregate. Thus the two aggregates admit of an explanation.*

(The Vedāntin):— We ask: Is there an Intelligence external to these two aggregates and bringing about aggregations of atoms and skandhas? Or do they themselves aggregate together? Suppose the answer to the former question is in the affirmative; then we ask again, is that Intelligence an abiding entity or a momentary existence? To say that the Intelligence is an abiding entity is to contradict the fundamental doctrine of the Buddhists that everything is momentary. Suppose the Intelligence is momentary; then it is impossible to explain how, having not itself existed at one moment, it can bring about the aggregation at the next instant. If the Buddhist should say that there exists no Intelligence external to the aggregates and bringing about their aggregation, we then ask, how can the insentient skandhas and atoms aggregate together into their respective forms, of their own accord without a governing Intelligence. Thus the Buddhist doctrine of the two aggregates does not accord with reason.

The Vedānta versus Buddhist Idealism

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. ii. 28 32).

(The Buddhist): — Some Buddhists maintain that external objects do not really exist as such. They say that Vijñāna-skandha (group of cognitions) is alone real. It cannot be urged, they say, that this proposition is opposed to our ordinary experience (vyavahāra). For, in svapna (dream) experience of external objects is possible although at the time the mind alone really exists while the external objects do not really exist. So our experience of external objects is possible in the waking state, though they do not really exist at the time. Thus it stands to reason that Vijana-skandha alone is real.

(The Vedāntin):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The illustration of svapna or dream state does not apply to the case; for, our dream experience proves false in the waking state; whereas our experience of the waking state never proves false. Neither can it be said that there is no evidence for the existence of external objects; for it is witnessed by our consciousness. Pots, etc, are indeed experienced in consciousness as things existing in the external world. Perhaps it may be urged on the other side that it is our own mind (buddhi) that manifests itself as pots and other external objects, and that this idea is expressed in the words, "the reality that is knowable within manifests itself as if it were something external." If so, we reply that these very words constitute the evidence for the existence of the external world. If external objects now here exist at all, no idea of
external objects is possible, and the words "as if it were something external" would have no meaning at all. Therefore, as external objects do exist, it cannot be maintained that Vijñana alone is real.

The Vedantin versus the Arhats.

(Vedānita-sūtras, II;ii. 33-36)

(The Arhat):— There are in the main two padārthas (categories), Jīva and a-Jīva. Jīva, the soul, is intelligent, is of the size of the body in which it dwells, and is made up of parts. A-Jīva, the non-soul, is of six classes:— one class comprises mountains and the like, and the other five are: (1) āśrava, the aggregate of the senses, so called because it is through these senses that the soul moves among the sense-objects; (2) saṃvara, (non-discrimination, etc.,) which enshrouds the discriminating faculty; (3) nirjara (austerity) such as plucking of the hair, sitting upon a heated stone the means of causing the decay of desire, anger, and other passions; (4) bandha (bondage), the series of births and deaths brought about by the eight kinds of karma, four of them being injurious acts and constituting the four kinds of sins, and the four others being non-injurious acts and constituting the four kinds of meritorious action; (5) mokṣa (release) which consists in the soul constantly rising upward when, by the means pointed out in the scriptures, it has risen above the eight kinds of karma.

[In the Sarvadarsana-sangraha, Sāyaṇa explains this point further as follows:

If a thing absolutely exits, it exists altogether, always everywhere, and with every-body, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is being or non-being the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the thing cannot be being, for then you could not properly use the phrase — "It is a pot (ghato'sti)," has the two words "is" and "pot" would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in other questions. As it has been declared, "It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot' implies 'is' nor may you say; 'it is not a pot,' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.

Thus said the teacher in the Syādvāda-manjari —

"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the Omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation. When our reasoning based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed Syād-vāda, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."

"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which with no partiality equally favors all sects."[157]

The nature of these seven categories is determined on the principle known as the saptabhangi-nyāya, 'the system of seven paralogisms.' This principle is stated as follows:

(1) "Maybe, it is," (2) "Maybe, it is not," (3) "Maybe, it is and it is not," (4) "Maybe, it is indefinable," (5) "Maybe, it is and yet indefinable, (6) "Maybe, it is not and indefinable," (7) "Maybe, it is and it is not and indefinable." 'Syat' (may be) is here an indeclinable particle meaning

[157] Translated by Prof. Cowell,
‘a little.’ Now there are four classes of opponents (to the Jain doctrine) who severally hold the doctrine of existence, the doctrine of non-existence, the doctrine of existence and non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is indefinable (anirvacanīya). And again there are three other classes holding one or another of the three first theories in conjunction with the fourth. As against these seven classes of opponents, the seven kinds of reasoning should be employed. When, for example, the holder of the doctrine of existence comes up and scornfully asks the Arhata, "Does mokṣa exist in your system?" then the Ārhat answers "It exists a little." Similarly, as against other schools, he answers "It does not exist a little,' and so on. Thereby all opponents are abashed to silence. Thus, by the all-sufficient principle of sapta-bhangi-nyāya, the nature of jīva and other categories is made out, and so far there is nothing anomalous in the system.

(The Vedāntin):— This reasoning on the so-called principle of sapta-bhangi is illogical, inasmuch as it predicates existence of soul when answering the question of the holder of the doctrine of existence, and it predicates non-existence of the same soul when answering the question of the holder of the doctrine of non-existence. The Ārhat predicates two quite opposite attributes of one and the same subject. And it is not right to maintain that the soul is made up of parts; for, then it would be non-eternal. If the soul be non-eternal who is there to seek for mokṣa as an end? Wherefore, the nature of the soul and other categories cannot be determined by the illogical reasoning called the sapta-bhangi.

**The Vedānta versus Theism.**

(Vedānta-Sūtras, II. ii. 37 41)

It has already been shown, on the mere strength of scriptures, that Īśvara is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. The Tārkikas, Saivas and other theists do not assent to this doctrine and maintain on the contrary that Īśvara is the mere efficient cause of the universe. In support thereof, they resort to the following course of empirical reasoning: The potter is not the material cause of the pot which he makes; he is only the efficient cause, as the controlling agent operating upon the rod, wheel and other things. Like the potter, Īśvara only stands beside the universe of which he is the efficient cause.

(The Vedāntin):— It is not right to maintain that Īśvara is the mere efficient cause; for, then, it will be difficult to acquit Him of partiality, cruelty and other faults. It may be asked, how does the Vedantin acquit Him of those faults? We reply that Īśvara creates the universe in accordance with the karma of living beings; and we say so on the authority of Revelation (Agama). If the theist should seek refuge with Agama as the last resort, then he should abandon the doctrine of extra-cosmic God, inasmuch as in the words "Manifold may I become " (Tait. Up.2:6) the śruti declares, that Īśvara is the material cause. Hence the unsoundness of the theory of an extra-cosmic God."

**The Vedānta versus the Pancharatra.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. ii. 42 45)

The Bhagavatas of the Pancharatra school hold as follows:— The One Lord, Vasudeva, is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. The breaking of the bondage of mundane existence is effected by worshipping Him, by knowing Him and by meditating on Him. From Vasudeva, jīva who is spoken of as Sankarshana is born; from jīva is born manas spoken of as Pradyumna; from manas is born egoism (ahāṅkara) spoken of as Aniruddha. The whole universe is arrayed in the four forms of Vasudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.

(The Vedāntin):— As not opposed to the teaching of the śruti, the teaching of the Pancharatra regarding Vasudeva and His worship, etc., may be accepted. But the assertion that jīva is born is wrong and cannot be maintained for, if jīva were born it would lead us to the conclusion that a man will not reap what he has sown and that he reaps what he has not sown. To explain: since the
jīva of a former creation had a birth at the beginning of that creation, he must have been destroyed at the end of it, so that the acts of dharma and adharma done by him could not bear fruit, and it would therefore follow that they were destroyed. And the new jīva that is born at the beginning of this creation comes by pleasure and pain here, though he has not already done acts of dharma and adharma, and thus reaps what he has not sown. Thus the birth of the soul as taught in the Pancharatra is unsound.

CHAPTER 10.

THE EVIL AND ITS CURE.158

The seed of human organism.

From earth co-operated by rain, etc., all plants, such as rice, composed of the five guṇas or component parts, come into being in orderly succession. To say that the earth is co-operated by rain, etc. is to say that the earth becomes quintupled; i.e., it combines with the other four elements and thus forms a compound of all the five elements. And all food, all that is edible, is derived from plants. From the food, when digested, comes chyle (rasa); chyle generates blood, blood generates flesh, and flesh gives birth to fat (medas); from fat bones are produced, and bones give rise to marrow (majja); from marrow comes the semen, which, combined with the mother's blood (asrj), constitutes the seed (biṣa).

The seed developing into man.

"With his intellect enveloped by the mighty snares of avidyā or ignorance of his real Self, with his heart carried away by the fish-hook of insatiable kāma (desire) that is born of non-discrimination (mohā), man, the father of the one yet to be born, is assailed by darkness (tamas), struck down by the arrows of sense-objects that are poisoned with attachment and discharged from the bow of desire with all the force of purposeful thoughts. Then he is powerless as if possessed with a demon; and urged on by the karma of the person that is to be born, he falls into the woman-fire, as the moth rushes into a blazing fire, covetous of its flame. When the man has embraced the woman, the semen described above is extracted from every part of the body; and through the semen-carrying tube (nādi) it is soon let into the womb, in the manner determined by their karma and knowledge."159

The semen thus poured into the womb and acted on by the controlling force of the two causes namely, the former karma and knowledge passes successively through the embryonic states of 'kalala' and 'budbuda' in a few days. Then it passes on into the state of the foetus (peṣi) and then becomes a compact mass (ghaṇa).

This compact mass gradually assumes the form of a body endowed with various limbs, and from these limbs grow the hairs. With whatever elements of matter (bhūtas) and with whatever senses (karaṇas) the soul was associated in the former birth, the same elements and the same sense organs go to make up the organism in which the soul is to be born here in the present life;160 and this we maintain on the strength of the śrutis which declares as follows:

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158 The whole of this Chapter is a translation of the Vārtika and of portions of Ānandagiri's gloss thereon.
159 i.e. by the karma and knowledge of the parent and the offspring, or of the two parents of the forthcoming child. — (A)
160 That is to say, the same five elements of matter that entered into the composition of the former body form the material cause of the present body, and the same senses that functioned in the former body become manifested in the present one. — (A)
"As a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold, turns it into another newer and more beautiful shape, so does this self, after having thrown off this body and dispelled all ignorance make unto himself another newer and more beautiful shape." (Brih. Up. 4:4:4)

The action of five fires in the birth of man.

The śruti elsewhere says:

" Into the five fires of heaven, rain-cloud, earth, man and woman, the Devas pour the oblations of faith, soma (moon), rain, food, and semen; and when the fifth oblation has been made, the soul is born as man."

Here the śruti mentions the stages through which the constituents of human organism have passed. The Devas, i.e., the prānas or life-forces of the man, pour his faith (sraddha) into the fire of heaven. The matter of heaven, thus acted on by the faith of the individual and by the life-forces, becomes the luminous matter of heaven, the somarajan. The same life-forces of man then pour that matter of heaven (soma) into the fire of rain-cloud; and thence it comes as rain. Then the Devas pour this rain into the third fire called earth, and there comes the food. This food enters into man and is converted into semen, and this semen, when cast into the woman's womb, becomes man.

Limitation of the Self as man by avidyā.

The Virāj, the Universal Self manifested in His vesture of the gross physical matter of the universe, has been evolved from the Sūtra, the same Universal Self manifested in the subtle matter of the universe; and though infinite and coextensive with the whole universe, He yet becomes a limited being through ignorance (sammohā), and thinks "this much I am" — with reference to the physical body of man, in virtue of kāma and karma. In the same fashion the Sūtra, manifested both as the Universal Being and as limited beings in the subtle matter of the universe, becomes limited as the liṅga-śārīra or subtle body of man which is made up of the seventeen constituents.

The source of this twofold limitation is in the Avyakta, the Unmanifested Cause; and this Avyakta, as limited in the human organism, is identical with man's Ego in the susupti state. The Supreme Self who is beyond the cause and the effects above referred to, and who is infinite in Himself, becomes by avidyā what is called the Kṣetrajña, the knower of the body, the self-conscious Ego, as manifested in man, who is a mere semblance of the Supreme Conscious Self. Hence the words of our Lord, Sri Kṛṣṇa: "Do thou know Me as the Kṣetrajña."

Avidyā and its proof.

It is avidyā, — the consciousness 'I do not know,' bringing about the limitation of the Supreme Self as the self of man, which is the sole cause of the threefold limitation above referred to. Our consciousness is the sole evidence of its existence, just as the consciousness of the owl is the sole evidence of the night's darkness that it sees during our daytime. That is to say: nothing but Consciousness exists as an objective reality; and for the existence of avidyā in it, there is no proof other than our own experience (svānumbhava). He who seeks to prove avidyā by proper tests of truth is, indeed, like one who tries to see the darkness of a mountain-cave by means of a lamp. What the human consciousness knows as the non-self is all evolved from avidyā, and is looked upon as avidyā itself, as false knowledge. Vidyā or real knowledge is identical with the Self; it is Consciousness itself. Avidyā is the non-perception of the Self, the veil of the Self. It is not a mere

161 This is an abstract of the Chhan. Up. 5 - 4, et seq.
162 The yajamana, who in his former birth was engaged in the Sacrificial ritual.
163 These are manas, buddhi, five Jñānendriyas or organs of knowledge, five Karmendriyas or organs of action, and five prānas or vital airs.
164 Bh. Gita 13:2.
negative of vidyā, since the mere absence of vidyā cannot act as the veil of the Self. The negative prefix ‘a’ in ‘avidyā’ implies only that the thing denoted by the word is something opposed to or other than vidyā, as in ‘a-mitra’ (non-friend) and ‘a-dharma’ (deremit) not that it is the mere absence of vidyā. And, when properly examined, all differentiation perceived by the deluded minds in the nonself, in the external universe, as being and non-being, resolves itself into this non-perception, i.e., is finally traceable to the idea ‘I do not know’; and it is therefore proper to hold that it is all a manifestation of avidyā.

**The growth of the subtle body**

With his discrimination obscured by this avidyā, the human Ego (jīva) abandons his former body, and with the upādhi of the liṅga-śarīra enters the womb of the mother, wafted thither by the strong winds of karma.

The solid, watery, and fiery substances eaten by the mother are each resolved into three parts; and each of these three parts undergoes a definite transformation. Thus the subtlest portion of the solid food builds up manas, buddhi, and indriyas (senses); the subtest part of the watery food builds up prāṇa, or life-breath in all its various manifestations; the subtest part of the fiery food builds up speech and other organs of action. Their less subtle parts are transformed respectively into flesh, blood, and marrow; and the grossest parts are transformed into dung, urine, and bone.

**Evolution of manas, etc., from Consciousness.**

The several senses are evolved from the Ahankāra (Egoism) under the impulse of former impressions (bhāvanas) which are now brought up by karma; and the nature and efficiency of the senses so evolved depend therefore upon the former karma and knowledge of the individual concerned. To illustrate: The organ of hearing is evolved from the consciousness "I am the hearer" and this; principle should be extended to the evolution of the other indriyas or senses: from Egoism conjoined with the consciousness "I am the toucher" the sense of touch is evolved; and from the Egoism conjoined with the consciousness "I am the seer," the sense of sight is evolved. Thus it is from the Ahankāra acted on by Consciousness that the senses are evolved, not from the Ahankāra pure and simple as some Saṅkhyaś hold.

**The Self is unborn.**

Ātman is said to be born when the body is born just as when the pot is produced the ākāśa of the pot is said to be produced. Atman being thus really not subject to birth, He is not subject to other changes, inasmuch as all these changes presuppose the change called birth,

**Review of the past lives just before birth.**

As this visible physical body of the man lying in the womb develops, his liṅga-śarīra also develops itself more and more. In the ninth or tenth month after conception, when all his senses (karaṇas) have been developed, and prior to his birth into the world, all the vāsanas or latent impressions gathered up in the past innumerable births present themselves one after another to the view of the embodied soul who, in his liṅga-śarīra, has already entered into the womb under the impulse of his past dharma and adharma and is lying there awake in all his senses. Man, thus awakened as to his past experience stored up in him as vāsanas or latent impressions, becomes alive to the misery of existence in the womb and the like. "Ah, what a great misery has befallen me!" Thus feeling dejected, he then grieves about himself in the following wise: "Ere entering this womb, I often suffered intolerable excruciating pain; I often fell into the burning sands of the hell that burn the wicked souls; but these drops of the pitta fluid heated by the digestive fire of the stomach cause more excruciating pain to me who am held down in the womb; and the worms in the stomach, with
their mouths as sharp as the thorns of the kuṭaśalmali plant, torture me, who am already tormented by the saw-like bones on each side. The misery of the kumbhipaka hell looks very small by the side of the torture in the womb which is full of all malodors and is burning with the digestive fire of the stomach.

Lying in the womb, I suffer all the misery of the hells where the wicked souls have to drink of pus, blood and rheum, and to eat of things vomited; and I suffer all the misery of the worms that live in the dung. The greatest misery of all hells put together cannot exceed the pain now suffered by me lying in the womb.\(^{166}\)

**The misery of birth and infancy.**

Then squeezed by the net-work of bones, overwhelmed by the fire of the stomach, with all the limbs smeared with blood and liquid discharges, and enveloped in a membrane, tormented by excruciating pain, crying aloud, with the face downwards, he emerges out of the womb as if delivered from a snare and drops down lying on the back. Then the baby knows nothing, and remains like a mass of flesh and fetus. He has to be guarded from the grip of dogs, cats and other carnivores, by others with sticks in hand. He cannot distinguish the demon from the father and Dākini\(^ {167}\) from the mother; he cannot distinguish pus from milk. Fie upon this miserable state of infancy!

**The misery of youth.**

Then, on attaining youth, he grows haughty and is assailed with the fever of sexual passion. All on a sudden he sings aloud, and as suddenly he leaps or jumps and ascends a tree. He frightens the mild; and, blinded by the intoxicating love and anger, he pays no heed to anything whatsoever.

**The misery of old age.**

Then attaining to the age of decrepitude which is the object of all insult, he becomes miserable. With the chest choked up by phlegm, he cannot digest the food; with fallen teeth, with weak sight, having to eat of sharp and bitter and astringent things, with the loins, neck and hands, thighs and legs, bent down by the morbid humors of wind, he becomes quite helpless, assailed by myriads of diseases, insulted by his own kinsmen, precluded from all ablutions, smeared with dirt all over the body, lying on the floor, embracing the earth as it were. Having swallowed all the intelligence, memory, courage, bravery, and the strength of the youth, this damsel of a Jara\(^ {168}\) feels as if she has achieved all and dances with joy to the drum of asthmatic cough, to the kettle-drum of the roaring stomach, to the flute of the sonorous breath, with the garment-hem of white mustachios, with the petty-coat of the wrinkled and grey-haired skin, having a third leg as it were in the staff, again and again reeling and tumbling; brilliant in the gold-jewels of projecting knots of flesh, veiled in the thin skin, with the tinklings of moving anklets caused by the rubbing of the heel and knee-bones.

**The misery of death and the after career.**

To the death-pangs that succeed, there is no parallel. Creatures suffering from the direst maladies of the body are afraid of death. In the very embraces of kinsmen, the mortal creature is dragged away by death, as the serpent lying hidden in the depths of the ocean is dragged away by the kite. "Ah! my dear! my wealth! O my son!" While thus bitterly weeping, man is swallowed by death as a frog

\(^{166}\) with which the wicked are tortured in the world of Yama.

\(^{167}\) The samsāra in its hideous aspect as experienced in the womb is here described with a view to create a disgust for samsāra and to spur on the disciple to a strong endeavour to get out of it and to avoid future return to the womb. (A)

\(^{167}\) A kind of female imp.

\(^{168}\) Old age personified
by a serpent. It is meet that the seeker of mokṣa should remember the pangs of the dying man whose vitals are cut to pieces, and whose joints are unloosed. " When thy consciousness fails thee and with it thy perceptive faculty, when tied by the band of death, how canst thou find a savior? Encountering darkness everywhere, as when entering a deep pit, thou wilt see with distressed eyes, thy kinsmen beating their breasts. Thou wilt then find thyself dragged by kinsmen all around with their iron bands of affection." Tormented by hiccough, withering away by hard breathing, dragged by bands of death, man finds no refuge.

Mounted on the wheel of samsāra, and led on by the couriers of death, and bound fast by the death-band, man grieves, 'where am I to go?' As man goes alone after death, his karma alone leading him on, is he a wise man who in this world of māyā thinks that the mother, father, elders, sons and kinsmen are all his and will come to his help? This world of mortals is verily like a resting-tree. One evening birds meet together on a tree for the night's rest, and the next morning they leave the tree and part from one another and go their way; just so do men meet for a time as relatives and strangers in this world and then disperse. Birth leads to death, and death to birth; thus without rest man wanders for ever like ghaṭī-yantra (a machine for raising water).

The study of koṇas and its purpose.

Having described the evolution from Brahman of the universe including man, the śruti proceeds to show how to bring about the destruction of the great evil of samsāra. It is with this end in view that the five koṇas of man be described; and by resolving each koṇa into that which precedes it in evolution, each effect into its immediate cause till the Ultimate Cause is reached, man will be led on to a knowledge of Brahman who is neither the cause nor the effect, and of the unity of his Self and Brahman.

Samsāra is due to avidyā.

The dwelling in the womb and all other vicissitudes of existence described above as making up the evil of samsāra pertain to the liṅga-deha, or subtle body. Though the real Self of man has nothing to do with those vicissitudes, still, by delusion (sam-moha), by confounding together the two bodies and the real Self, he thinks that he himself is subject to the changes. Identifying himself with buddhi (understanding, intellect), man regards himself as the cogniser, and engages in the act of congnising. Identifying himself with manas, he regards himself as the thinker, and as a result of this confusion he performs mental acts. Identifying himself with prāṇa (up-breathing) and other forms of vitality he feels concerned in all outgoing activities. And identifying himself with sight and other senses, he is engrossed in thinking of color and so on. Similarly, when the physical body is burnt, he thinks himself burnt; the deluded man regards himself black and thus puts on the blackness of the body. By avidyā man becomes attached to cattle, wealth and the like and thinks himself the owner of them; and by attachment he ascribes to himself the affections of the physical body and the liṅga-śārīra, and thinks that he is a student, a householder, an ascetic, a sage, and so on. The body is in fact a product of the various elements of matter, quite foreign to the real Self of man, and man subjects himself to evil by mere delusion, by regarding the human organism as 'I' and 'mine'.

Brahma-vidyā is intended for man.

Though all beings alike the lower kingdoms as well as man, are products of food and are evolved from Brahman primarily, still, the human being is here made the subject of investigation, simply because it is man who is qualified for karma and jñāna, who is capable of acting and knowing aright. Man is plunged deep down in this ocean of saṃsāra, in this repository of all evil; and it is man whom the śruti seeks, by means of Brahма-vidyā, to unite to Brahman, to his own Innermost Self.
The process of imparting Brahma-vidyā.

The śruti tries to impart this Brahma-vidyā or knowledge of Brahmā by an exposition of the five kośas. By affording to man an insight into the nature of the kośas (the sheaths of the Self), it will be shown that Brahmā beyond the kośas is one with man’s real Self within. It is indeed by first pointing to the end of the tree’s branch that one points out the moon beyond. The human mind which is fully tainted with the vāsanas with the tendencies and impressions of past mundane experiences that have accumulated in this beginningless samsāra can realize the real Self within only by some peculiarly appropriate process, and it is this appropriate process which the śruti describes in the sequel.

The one Self differentiated into the Ego and the non-Ego.

The Pratyākṣatman, the real Self within, is one in Himself, untouched with any duality; neither does there exist anything whatever even outside the Self. The one Self is, owing to avidyā, differentiated into the two false categories of the Ego and the non-Ego. That is to say, when the one true Self is not realised in His true nature as one, that very Self appears differentiated as the Ego and the non-Ego; so that all the differentiation we are conscious of is due to avidyā and therefore false; and the Self remains all the while one in fact, untouched by duality.

The kośas, subjective and objective.

There are five kośas or sheaths in which the Self manifests Himself as the Ego, namely, the Anna-maya or the one composed of food, the Prāṇa-maya or the one composed of vitality, the Manomaya or the one composed of thought, the Vijñāna-maya or the one composed of intelligence, and the Ānanda-maya or the one composed of bliss; and corresponding to these there are five kośas or sheaths in which the same Self manifests Himself as the objective, as the non-Ego, namely, Anna or food, prāṇa or vitality, Manas or thought, Vijñāna or intelligence, and Ānanda or bliss. So that, ultimately, there are five principles, Anna, Prāṇa, Manas, Vijñāna and Ānanda. Anna is the Virāj (the radiant), that which is manifested to our senses, the physical. This has grown or evolved out of Prāṇa or vitality. Prāṇa, Manas, and Vijñāna constitute what is called the Śūḍrātman. This Śūḍrātman is made up primarily of two kinds of matter: one of them is the vehicle of all outgoing activity (kriya-śakti) and is called Prāṇa or life-principle; the other kind of matter is the vehicle of all intelligence or knowledge (vijñāna-śakti) and is of two kinds, Manas and Vijñāna. Manas is the antah-karana, that kind of matter in which all concrete (savikalpaka) thought expresses itself. It is in the cognitive form of matter that all concrete thoughts, such as those embodied in the Rig-Veda, the Yajur Veda, and the Sāma Veda, express themselves. And Manas is behind Prāṇa: that is to say, it is from Manas that Prāṇa has been evolved. Vijñāna or intelligence, too, is the antah-karana, the matter in which all abstract (nirvikalpaka) thought expresses itself. All determinate ascertained knowledge, such as that concerning the truths taught in the Veda, constitute the Buddhī, the understanding. These three kośas of Prāṇa, Manas, and Vijñāna constitute the Śūḍrātman. Ānanda is the bliss which results from knowledge and action, and is the ultimate cause of all. Thus, Anna or physical matter constitutes the Virāj-kośa; Prāṇa, Manas, and Vijñāna constitute the śūḍrātman; and ānanda constitutes the Kāraṇa-kośa (the Cause sheath). The same five kośas (sheaths or principles) are mentioned in the Brihadaranyaka under the names of Anna, Prāṇa, Manas, Vach (speech, corresponding to Vijñāna here) and Avyākta (the undifferentiated Root of matter). Prāṇa. Manas and Vach, spoken of as the three foods of Prajāpati, constitute the Śūḍrātman; Anna is the Virāj; and the Avyākta is the kāraṇa, the ultimate Cause of all.

The relation between the subjective and the objective kośas.

The five sheaths of the non-Ego or objective group constitute respectively the material essences of which the five sheaths of the Ego or subjective group are built up. On realizing the nature of the ten kośas of the Ego and the non-Ego groups, the student should first resolve in thought the five sheaths
of the Ego group into their respective material essences in the objective group; i.e., he should understand that the Anna-maya-kośa is made up of the matter on the plane of physical matter, that the Prāṇa-maya-kośa is made up of matter on the plane of Prāṇa or vital essence, and so on. He should then realize that, as the effect is not distinct from the cause, the Anna-maya is not distinct from Anna, its material cause. So, too, with regard to the other kośas. The student should now take the next step: he should see that as Anna has been evolved from Prāṇa., the one is not distinct from the other, its material cause, and is therefore one with it. In the same way he should see that Prāṇa is not distinct from Manas, that Manas is not distinct from Vijnāna, and that Vijnāna is not distinct from ānanda, the first Cause.

The Self beyond.

When the student has by this process risen above the level of effects and attained to the level of the Cause, he is taught the grand truth that the Self and Brahman are identical. In the light of this teaching he ceases to identify himself with the Cause and rises to the level of Brahman beyond the Cause, and thus realizes the unity of Brahman and the Self.

Contemplation of the sheaths as altars of sacred fire.

As Ānanda is the innermost essence of the remaining four principles of the non-Ego group, so, the Ānanda-maya-kośa is the pratyagātman or the innermost essence of the remaining four sheaths of the Ego group, inasmuch as these sheaths are all manifestations of the one jiva who is consciousness pure and simple (prajñana-ghana). The contemplation, however, enjoined in the sequel, of the Ānanda-maya-kośa which is consciousness pure and simple as made up of a head, two wings, a trunk and a tail may be explained as referring to the variety in the manifested forms of bliss resulting from the acts of the individual.

Each sheath is represented as made up of a head and so on for the purposes of contemplation. Accordingly, the teachers of old have explained that these are but imaginary representations of the kośas in the form of altars of the sacred fire. The Anna-maya-kośa, for instance, should be contemplated as the altar of the sacred fire arranged in the form of a bird:169 the head of the human physical body corresponding to the head of the bird, the arms to the wings, the middle portion to the trunk, and the remaining part to the tail of the bird.

The purpose of the contemplation of kośas.

By a constant contemplation of these kośas represented as altars of the sacred fire, the student attains wisdom. His buddhi or understanding becomes purer and acquires the faculty of true discrimination. With the growth of the faculty of true discrimination, he abandons the first kośa and recedes to the one next behind. Thus step by step he abandons one kośa after another, and receding behind all kośas and dissolving away all of them, he attains to a knowledge of his unity with Brahman and becomes liberated.

The śruti further declares that he who contemplates Anna or the Virāj obtains all food. This must be the additional fruit of the contemplation accruing to the devotee; for, so the Veda teaches, and no teaching of the Veda can ever be doubted. Doubt may arise only as to the matters known through sensuous perception or through inference there from, the vision in this case being distorted by the idiosyncrasies of the human mind. The Vedic revelation, on the other hand, is not subject to any such distortion.

Or, the purpose of the teaching of these upāsanas may be explained in another way:— Man naturally identifies himself with the kośas. The śruti, taking hold of this natural bent of the human mind, enables man to resolve, by Dhyana or meditation, each kośa into what is behind it, till he

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169 In sacrificial rites, the altars of the sacred fire are usually arranged in the form of a bird, such as a hawk.
reaches the Self behind all kośas, and then enjoins him to hold on to that Self alone. The fruits of the contemplation mentioned in connection with the several kośas should not be supposed to accrue as declared here. The unity of Brahman and the Self is the main point of teaching, and that alone therefore is the truth which the śruti seeks to impress in this connection. A parallel case is found in the Chāṇḍogya-Upaniṣad. There the śruti teaches the contemplation of name, etc., to which man resorts of his own accord, without the śruti enjoining it, only with a view to enjoin the contemplation of the Infinite (Bhūman), declaring it as the highest of the upāsanas therein taught.

Or, it may be that in speaking of the contemplation of food, etc., and the fruits thereof, the Taittirīya merely reiterates the teaching of the Brhadāraṇyaka concerning the contemplations of the Virāj and the Sūtrātman,—which are there enjoined as the means of attaining fruits ranging below mokṣa,—while the main object of the Taittirīya is to impart a knowledge of the Absolute Reality as the means of attaining the highest good.

CHAPTER 11
ANNA-MAYA-KOŚA.

Introduction.

In chapters 6 to 9, it has been well established that the whole universe from ākāśa down to human has been evolved from Brahman endued with Māyā. This being established, it becomes quite evident that Brahman is infinite; for, as the effect has no existence apart from the cause, Brahman Himself is in the form of space, time and all things. Having thus established the infinitude of Brahman declared in the words "Real, Consciousness and Infinite is Brahma," the śruti proceeds to establish the statement that He is 'hid in the cave,' by way of discriminating the real Brahman from the five kośas beginning with the Anna-maya and ending with the Ānanda-maya-kośa.

Composition of the Anna-maya-kośa.

To treat first of the Anna-maya-kośa:

4. He, verily, is this man, formed of food essence.

This human being whom we perceive is a vikāra or product of food-essence. It is, indeed, the semen, the essence of all parts of the body, bearing the (generator's) thought-impress of human form, that here constitutes the seed; and he who is born from that seed (which bears the thought-impress of human form) must be likewise of human form; for, as a rule we find that all creatures that are born, of whatever class of beings, are of the same form as the parents.

(Question) — All creatures alike being formed of food essence and descended from Brahman, why is man alone taken (for examination)?

(Answer) — Because of his importance.

(Question) — Wherein does his importance lie?

(Answer) — In so far as he is qualified for karma and jñāna, for acting and knowing aright. Man alone, indeed, is qualified for karma and jñāna, because he alone is competent to follow the teaching, and because he alone seeks the ends which they are intended to secure. Accordingly the śruti says elsewhere: "But in man the Self is more manifested " &c. 171 It is man whom the śruti

170 Op. cit. 7,
171 Aita. Ara. 2.3.2-5. The passage is quoted in full on page 311.
seeks to unite to Brahman, the Innermost Being, through Vidyā or wisdom.

With a view\textsuperscript{172} to transport man by the ship of Brahma-vidyā to the farthest shore of the great ocean of evil-producing kośas (sheaths), the śruti says "He, verily, is this man " etc. Here 'He' refers to the Ātman, the Self, the Primal Being; and 'verily.' shows that He is the Ātman taught in all Upanishads. In the words 'this man' the śruti teaches that the Ātman Himself has become the man of kośas by avidyā, by not knowing himself. Just as a rope becomes a serpent only by avidyā, so, a rope can never actually become a serpent, so, by avidyā Ātman becomes the man of five kośas and appears to suffer along with the kośas. 'Anna-rasa-maya' means a thing formed of food-essence. Reason\textsuperscript{173} as well as revelation\textsuperscript{174} teach that the Supreme Self is not formed of any material, unlike a pot which is formed of clay. But we know that the body is made of food-essence. The śruti says that "He (the Self), verily, is this man formed of food," simply because the physical body is an upādhi of the Self. — (S & A).

By "this man formed of food-essence" we should understand the pinda or individual human organism only; but that organism is one with the Virāj, with the whole visible universe constituting the physical body of the Cosmic Soul. Elsewhere, in the words "The Self alone was all this in the beginning, in the form of man,"\textsuperscript{175} the śruti teaches the unity of the body and the Virāj; and here, too, in the words "Those who contemplate upon Anna (food) as Brahmā," the śruti directs us to regard Brahmā and Anna as one. When by upāsana the organism which is limited to the individual is unified with the Virāj or Cosmic Organism Prāṇa (life) becomes also unified with Vāyu, the Hiranyagarbha; and then the Self in the upādhi of the Hiranyagarbha passes beyond the limits of individuality, in the same way that a lamp-light confined within a pot becomes diffused in space when the confining pot is broken to pieces—(S & A.).

The human organism, composed of a head, hands, feet, etc., and which at the beginning of creation was evolved after the evolution of ākāśa and other things mentioned already, that very human organism is the one which every man regards as 'my body.' Certainly, what a person now regards as his own body is not itself the one evolved at the beginning of creation; still, as both alike are formed of food element evolved in the course of the evolution beginning with ākāśa, man's body is of the same kind as the one evolved at the beginning of creation. Hence the words "He, verily, is this man. "The words" formed of food-essence (anna-rasa)" clearly point to this idea. There are six kinds of food-essence: sweet, acid, saline, bitter, acrid and astringent. The physical body is formed of these six essences of food. The essence of the food eaten by the parents is in due course converted into the seven principles of this body, namely, skin, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow and semen; and on entering the womb it is again changed into a human body. The Garbha-upanishad says:—

"The food-essence is of six kinds. From this essence blood is formed; from blood, flesh; from flesh, fat; from fat, bone; from bone, marrow; from marrow, semen. From a combination of semen and blood the fetus is formed."

The gross physical body mentioned here as formed of food essence includes also the subtle body lying within it, insomuch as this latter body is formed of simple (a-paṇci-kṛta, unquintupled, uncompounded) elements of matter (bhūtas) and is nourished and maintained by food, etc., eaten by man. That the subtle body is formed of elements of matter is declared by the Teacher in the following words:

"The five unquintupled primary elements of matter, and the senses which are

\textsuperscript{172} Here the Vārtikākāra's explanation differs from the Bhāṣyakāra's
\textsuperscript{173} The reason is: that He has no parts, that He is unattached, and so on.
\textsuperscript{174} "He is not born, He does not die," etc. (Katha-Up. 2-18)
\textsuperscript{175} Bri. Up. 1:4:1
evolved from them, constitute together the Liṅga-Śarīra composed of the seventeen constituents; the Liṅga-Śarīra thus being material."

That the subtle body is nourished and maintained by food, etc., is taught in the Chandogya:

"Formed of food, verily, is manas; formed of water is prāṇa; formed of fire is speech."\(^{176}\)

From our ordinary experience it can be shown that in the case of all beings, when manas is weakened by fasting, it is invigorated by breaking the fast. Similarly, we find in our experience that, when prāṇa or vitality is weakened by the fatigue of a journey, it is refreshed by drinking water. So also we see songsters purify their throats by drinking ghee, oil, and other tejasic (fiery) substances and thus improve their voice. The physical body which we perceive formed of food, and associated with the Liṅga-deha (subtle body) which is composed of manas, prāṇa, speech, etc., and whose nature has just been described, is the adhyatmika, i.e., belongs to the individual soul. From this we may also understand the nature of the Ādhidaivika, the body of the Cosmic Soul, the Vairāja body called Brahmanda — the Cosmic Egg. The Vārtikakara has described it as follows:

"Then came into being the Virāj, the manifested God, whose senses are Dis (space) and other (Devatās or Intelligences), who wears a body formed of the five gross elements of matter, and who glows with the consciousness 'I am all'."

The Anna-maya-kośa has been described by the śrutī only with a view to ultimately enable the disciple to understand the real nature of Brahman, just as the end of a tree's branch is first shown with a view to point out the moon over against it.

**Contemplation of the Anna-maya-kośa.**

The śrutī now proceeds to represent for the purposes of contemplation the five parts of the Anna-maya-kośa in the form of a bird as in the case of a sacrificial fire. The sacrificial fire arranged in the form of a hawk, a heron, or some other bird, has a head, two wings, a trunk and a tail. So also, here, every kośa is represented to be made up of five parts:

5. **This itself is his head; this is the right wing, this is the left wing, this is the self, this is the tail, the support,**

The disciple's mind having been accustomed to regard the non-self as the Self to regard as the Self the several forms, bodies, or koṣās which are external to the Self it is impossible for it all at once to comprehend the Innermost Self without the support (of its former experience),\(^{177}\) and to dwell in Him detached altogether from that support. Accordingly, the śrutī tries to lead man within (to one self within another till the real Self is reached) by representing (the inner embodied selves, the Praṇamāyā and so on) after the fashion of the physical body, of that embodied self with which all are familiar, i.e., by representing them as having a head, etc., like the Anna-maya self, in the same way that a man shows the moon shining over against a tree by first pointing to a branch of the tree.\(^ {178}\)

The Anna-maya-kośa is here represented by the śrutī as a bird, as having wings and a tail, in order that the Prāṇa-maya and other koṣās may also be represented in the form of a bird. The intellect will

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176 These seventeen constituents are: the five primary elements the five jñāna-indriyas (senses of knowledge), the five karmāṇdriyas (senses of action), manas, and buddhi.

177 i.e., independently of all reference to the koṣās formerly regarded as selves.

178 He who wants to show the moon to another first teaches that the end of the branch of the tree is the moon. When the eye has thus been directed towards the end of the branch, and has been withdrawn from all other directions, then the moon over against the end of the branch is shown.
thereby be divested of its engrossment in external objects and can then be directed steadily to the self. No contemplation of a kośa is intended for the specific fruit spoken of here. The present section starts and concludes with a discussion of the unity of the Self and Brahman; therefore this unity must be the aim of its teaching. To suppose that the contemplation for a specific purpose is also intended here is to admit that the present section deals with two different topics, which is opposed to all principles of interpretation. As to the śruti speaking of the specific fruits, it should be construed into a mere praise of the intermediate steps in the process of Brahma-vidyā, calculated to induce the student to push on the investigation with zest.

By meditating upon the kośas one after another, the student realizes their true nature. When the mind dwells steadily in one kośa and realizes its true nature, it loses sight of all objects of its former regard; and when thus divested, gradually, of the idea of one kośa after another, the student's mind is competent to dwell steadily in the Self. —(A).

Of the man formed of food-essence, what we call head is itself the head. In the case of the Prāṇa-maya and the like, what is not actually the head is represented as the head; and to guard against the idea that the same may be the case here (i.e., with the Anna-maya), the śruti emphasizes, "this itself is the head". The same is true with regard to wings, etc. This, the right arm of the man facing the east, is the right wing; this, the left arm, is the left wing; this, the central part of the body, is the self, the trunk, as the śruti says, "The central one, verily, is the self of these limbs." This, the part of the body below the navel, the tail as it were, because, like the tail of a bull, it hangs down, is the support, i.e., that by which man stands.

As to the Anna-maya which is to be meditated upon, what we call head, the part of the body situated above the neck, is itself the head. There is no figure here. The two hands themselves we see are to be meditated upon as the two wings. The part of the body situated below the neck and above the navel is the self, the middle part of the body, the suitable abode of jīva ........ It is plain that the part of the human body below the navel is the support of the upper part. In the body of the bull and other animals, the tail forms a support in so far as it serves to drive away flies and mosquitoes and the like. This idea of the tail being the support of the bodies is presented here for purposes of contemplation.179

As fashioned after the mould of the physical body, the Prāṇa-māyā and others to be mentioned below are also represented to be of the same form, having a head and so on; the molten mass of copper, for example, poured into the mould of an idol takes the form of that idol.

Though the Prāṇa-maya and the other three kośas are not actually made up of a head and so on, still, as the molten metal poured into a mould takes the form of that mould, so the Prāṇa-maya and other kośas which lie within the Anna-maya-kośa may be imagined to be molded after the latter. Such are presentation is only intended to facilitate the meditation and discrimination of the four kośas — (S&A)

A Mantra on the unity of the Virāj and the Anna-maya.

Thus has been taught the form in which the Anna-maya-kośa should be contemplated. Now, the śruti quotes a mantra with a view to confirm what has been taught in the Brahmaṇa here regarding the kośa and its upāsana:

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179 That is to say, the value of the idea consists in the fact that a contemplation thereof leads to a comprehension of the true nature of Brahman in man, which is here the main subject of discourse. Brahman will be spoken of as the support of the Ānandamāyā self. — (Tr.)
6. On that, too, there is this verse: \(^{180}\)

[Anuvāka 2]

1. "From food indeed are (all) creatures born, whatever (creatures) dwell on earth; by food, again, surely they live; then again to the food they go at the end. Food, surely, is of beings the eldest; thence it is called the medicament of all. All food, verily, they obtain, who food as Brahmān regard; for, food is the eldest of beings, and thence it is called the medicament of all. From food are beings born; when born, by food they grow. It is fed upon, and it feeds on beings; thence food it is called."

Bearing on this teaching of the Brahmāna, there is the following mantra which refers to the nature of the Anna-maya-Ātman, the self of the physical body. The verse is quoted here in corroboration of the teaching of the Brāhmaṇa, with the benevolent idea of impressing the truth the more firmly.— (S).

Just as a mantra was quoted before with reference to what was taught in the aphorism "the knower of Brahmān reaches the Supreme," so also a verse is quoted here in corroboration of what has been just taught. This verse consists of fourteen padas or lines. Though no such metre is met with in ordinary language, this extraordinary metre must have been current in the Vedic literature.

**The Virāj.**

From food,\(^{181}\) indeed, converted into ṛasa (chyle) and other forms, are born all creatures, moving and unmoving (sthāvara and jaṅgama). Whatever creatures dwell on earth, all of them are born of food and food alone. After they are born, by food alone they live and grow. Then again, at the end when their growth, their life, has come to an end, to food they go; i.e., in food they are dissolved. Why?

For, food is of all living beings the eldest, the first-born. Of the others, of all creatures, of the Anna-maya and other kośas,\(^{182}\) food is the source. All creatures are therefore born of food, live by food, and return into food at the end. Because such is the nature of food, it is therefore called the medicament of all living creatures, that which allays the scorching (hunger) in the body. Food, the Virāj, was evolved before all creatures on earth, and is therefore the First-born. Hence the assertion of the Purāṇa "He verily was the first embodied one". Those who know the real nature of food call it the medicament (aushadha) of all, because it affords a drink that can assuage the fire of hunger which would otherwise have to feed upon the very dhātu or constituents of the body. This cow of food suckles her calf of the digestive fire in all beings, through the four udders of the four food-dishes.\(^{183}\) — (S)

All creatures, the womb-born, the egg-born, and so on, all creatures that dwell on earth, are born of food (ānna), as has been already shown The bodies of animals, etc., form the food of the tigers and the like; hence the assertion that they dissolve in food at the end. Because food is the source of the bodies of all living beings, it is the medicine of all, as removing the disease of hunger. By removing the disease of hunger, food forms the cause of a creature's life, of its very existence.

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\(^{180}\) According to the division current among the students of these days, the first anuvāka ends here. Some students give to these divisions the name 'khāṇḍas' or sections. Sayana, does not recognise this division and even condemns it as not founded on any logical division of subject-matter. He looks upon the whole Ānandavalli, beginning with "The knower of Brahmān reaches the Supreme", us the second anuvāka, the Peace-Chant being the first anuvāka. These two anuvākas with the Bhrigu-vali, the third anuvāka constitute what Sayana calls the Vārūṇi Upanishad.

\(^{181}\) i.e., from the Virāj.

\(^{182}\) The Praṇāmāyā and other kośas are certainly not constituted of Anna, the physical food; but they attain growth by the food eaten.

\(^{183}\) The four kinds of food are those which have to be eaten respectively by mastication, by sucking, by swallowing, and by licking.
The śruti speaks of food as the remover of hunger simply to show that it is the cause of the existence of all creatures. The śruti has described the Annā-maya-kośa at length by speaking of food as the cause of the birth, existence and dissolution of all living creatures.

**Contemplation of the Virāj and its fruits.**

The śruti then proceeds to declare the fruit that accrues to him who has realised the Food-Brahman, the unity of food and Brahman. They who contemplate the Food-Brahman as directed above obtain all kinds of food. Because "I am born of food, I have my being in food, and I attain dissolution in food," therefore, food is Brahman. How, it may be asked, can the contemplation of the Self as food lead to the attainment of all food? The śruti answers:— For, food is the eldest of all beings, because it was evolved before all creatures; and it is therefore said to be the medicine of all. It therefore stands to reason that the worshipper of Ātman as food in the aggregate attains all food.

The śruti speaks of food as Brahman because food is the cause of the birth, existence, and destruction of the universe. He who contemplates this Brahman, the Virāj, for a long time with great reverence and uninterrupted devotion and contemplates the Virāj as one with the devotee himself, he becomes one with the Virāj and attains all food that all individual creatures severally attain. That is to say, the devotee of the Virāj partakes of all food, like the Virāj Himself. In the words "This here is the Virāj " the texts declare that the Virāj is the eater of all food. How this is possible the śruti explains by declaring that the whole visible universe is pervaded by the Virāj as the eater thereof, as every effect must be pervaded by its cause. —(S)

Those men who contemplate Brahman in food, taking food as a symbol of Brahman, i.e., those who elevate food in thought to the height of Brahman and contemplate it as having assumed the form of the physical body made up of ahead, a tail and other members, these devotees attain nil food. Or, the food which was at first evolved from Brahman through the evolution of ākāśa and so on is now manifested as the physical bodies of individual souls, such as human and other bodies, as also in the form of the Virāj, i.e., as the body of the Universal Soul. Those who contemplate Brahman as manifested in the upādhi of food thus transformed attain unity with the Universal Being, the Virāj, and partake of all kinds of food which all the different classes of living beings, from Brahma down to plants, severally attain, each class attaining the food appropriate to it.

Addressing at first the disciple who seeks to know the Truth, the śruti has declared "food, surely, is the eldest of beings," etc., with a view to describe the nature of the Anna-maya-kośa, the physical body, since knowledge of the body is a step on the path to knowledge of Brahman. And the śruti repeats the same statement again with a view to extol the Being to be contemplated upon. The passage means: Because food (Anna) is the eldest born, the cause of all living beings from man to the Virāj, therefore it is the medicament of all, as removing all diseases of samsāra. For, by practicing contemplation on the line indicated above, one attains the Virāj, and in due course attains salvation as well.

"From food are beings born; when born, by food they grow." This repetition of what has been already said is intended to mark the conclusion of the present subject.

The Virāj, here presented for contemplation, is a lofty Being, for the further reason that He is the cause of the origin and growth of the bodies of all living beings.

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184 Food is Brahman, because it is the cause of the birth, existence, and dissolution of all Anna-maya-kośas. The disciple should contemplate on the idea "I am the Food-Brahman," because it is impossible to attain all food without being embodied in the body of the Virāj, the Food-Brahman, and because the disciple cannot attain to that state without contemplating his unity with the Virāj.

185 See the Vārtikakara's explanation on page 398
The Virāj as the nourisher and the destroyer.

The etymology, too, of the word 'anna' points to the loftiness of Food as the cause of all bodies.

Now the śruti gives the etymology of the word 'anna'. It is so called because it is eaten by all beings and is itself the eater of all beings. As eaten by all beings and as the eater of all beings, Food is called Anna.\(^{186}\) The word "itī" (in the text) meaning 'thus' marks the close of the exposition of the first kośa.

'Anna' (Food) is so called because it is eaten by all beings for their living existence; or because it destroys all beings. It is a well-known fact that all bodies die of diseases generated by disorderly combinations of food-essences in them. Here, the śruti marks the close of the verse quoted, as well as the end of the exposition of the Anna-maya-kośa.

Knowledge of the Anna-maya-kośa is a steppingstone to knowledge of Brahman.

To the man who seeks to know the nature of Brahman 'hid in the cave', the śruti has expounded the Anna-maya-kośa as a step to the knowledge of Brahman. The exposition forms a step to the knowledge by way of removing all attachment to external objects such as sons, friends, wife, home, land, property, and confining the idea of self to one's own body. Every living being naturally identifies himself with his sons, etc., as if they form his very self; and this fact is admitted by the śruti in the words "Thou art the very self, under the name 'son'." \(^{187}\) In the Aitareyaka also it is said "This self of his takes his place as to the good acts; while the other self, reaching the (old) age and having achieved all he had to do, departs.\(^{188}\)

The meaning of the passage is this: A householder, gifted with a son, has two selves, one in the form of the son and the other in the form of the father. His self in the form of the son is installed in the house for the performance of the purificatory rites (puṇya-karma) enjoined in the śruti and the smṛti; whereas his self in the form of the father, having achieved all that he has had to do, dies, his life-period having been over. The Blessed Bhāshyakāra (Sṛ Sankarāchārya) has also referred to this fact of experience, in the following words: "when children, wife, etc., are defective or perfect, man thinks that he himself is defective or perfect, and thus ascribes to the Self the attributes of external things." Since every man is aware that the son is distinct from himself, the notion that the son is himself is like the notion that "Deva-datta is a lion." Therefore the Anna-maya-kośa has been expounded here with a view to show this kind of its superiority as self, i.e., with a view to confine the disciple's idea of self within the limits of one's own body by withdrawing the idea from the whole external world composed of sons, friends, etc. The śruti will explain this clearly in the sequel, in the following words:—

"He who thus knows, departing from this world, into this self formed of food doth pass." (Tai. Up. 2:8)

There may be a person who, owing to the preponderance of the deeply ingrained seeds of attachment for external objects, does not, when once taught, take his stand in the Anna-maya self. It is to enable such a man to do it that the contemplation of the Anna-maya self has been taught. He who practices this contemplation, constantly fixing his thought on the Anna-maya self, withdraws altogether from the external objects and takes his stand in the Anna-maya self. If a devotee of this class be short-lived and die while still engaged in this contemplation without passing through the

\(^{186}\) This etymology is intended to show that the Prajāpati, who is manifested in the form of Food, exists in two forms, as both the eaten and the eater.

\(^{187}\) The Taittirīya Ekgānikāṇḍa. 2:11:33

\(^{188}\) Aita-Up. 4:4
subsequent stages of investigating the real nature of the Prāṇa-maya and other selves and thus perfecting the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, then, he will attain all food as declared above. It is this truth that the Lord has expressed in the following words:—

"Having attained to the worlds of the righteous and having dwelt there for eternal years, he who failed in yoga is reborn in a house of the pure and wealthy." (Gita 6:41)

Thus with a view primarily to remove all attachment for external objects, the śruti has treated of the nature of the Anna-maya-kośa, and has incidentally spoken of its upāsana and the fruit thereof.

CHAPTER 12
PRĀṆA-MAYA-KOŚA.
The purpose of the sequel.

Now the śāstra proceeds to show, by means of wisdom, i.e., by way of removing the five sheaths of the Self which avidyā has set up, that Brahman, who is behind all the illusory selves from the Anna-maya down to the Ānandamāyā, is one's own true Inner self, in the same way that, by threshing the many-sheathed seed of kodrava (Paspalum scrobiculatum), one brings to view the grain within.

First, with a view to lead the mind which has lost its longing for external objects to the inner being which is behind food and the food-sheath, the śruti proceeds to expound the nature of Prāṇa or vital air and the Prāṇa-maya-kośa or the vital body — (S)

The Prāṇa-maya-kośa.

2. Than that, verily, — than this one formed of food-essence, — there is another self within, formed of Praṇa; by him this one is filled.

Distinct from that, — from the gross physical body (pinḍa) formed of food-essence, which has been described above,189 — there is a self within formed of Prāṇa or vital air, and quite as falsely imagined to be the self as the gross body. The self formed of Prāṇa, the vital air (Vāyu), fills the self which is formed of food essence, as the air fills the bellows.

The effect is one with the cause.

"Than that": here 'that' refers to the Virāj, being the one at a distance, i.e., manifested as food or gross physical matter which is external to the individual being formed of that food. "Verily": This particle serves to call back to memory the Virāj described. "Than this one"— The word ‘this’ here denotes the immediate, individual being. By this appositional use of ‘than that’ and ‘than this one’ the śruti teaches that the individual being (the effect, the product,) is one with the Virāj, the Cosmic Being, is in truth identical with the cause. So, too, in similar contexts in the sequel, the appositional use of ‘than that’ and ‘than this one’ shows the oneness of the effect (such as the Prāṇa-maya) with the cause (such as Prāṇa).190 Otherwise, i.e. if the effect be not one with the cause,

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189 and represented as a bird.

190 For, on the principle of the oneness of effect with the cause, the whole external universe can be resolved into Brahman, the Cause. And on realising the identity of Brahman with the Self as taught by Revelation, Brahman the Cause becomes the Infinite Being who is neither the cause nor the) effect.—(S)
Brahman and the universe would be two distinct things; and this is nothing but the duality of the Sankhya system. — (S). Moreover, the cause, such as the Prāṇa -maya, is said to exist independently of the effect, such as the Anna-maya, while the effect cannot exist independently of the cause. This also points to the same conclusion, namely, that the effect is one with the cause, is not distinct from the cause, is the cause itself. — (S)

The Composition of the Prāṇa -maya-kośa.

And the Prāṇa-maya-kośa is of a distinct nature from the Anna-maya, and is within it as its basic substance. It is a self, because like the Anna-maya it is also falsely identified with the Self. (S)

Now the first mentioned sheath, the Anna-maya-kośa, is permeated by four kośas, by the Prāṇa-maya and the rest. Similarly the Prāṇa-maya is permeated by three kośas, the Mano-maya by two kośas, and the Viṣṇu-maya by one kośa. — (S)

The Anna-maya is filled by the Prāṇa-maya as the serpent is filled by the rope, (where the latter is mistaken for the former). The Anna-maya is an effect of the Prāṇa-maya; it is a mere imagination, as the śrutis say:— "all effect is a mere name, a creation by speech." 191 — (S).

In the words of the Brāhmaṇa it was declared that the Paramātman (the Supreme Self) Himself attained the state of the Anna-maya-kośa in the course of evolution beginning with ākāśa; and the same truth was then confirmed by quoting a verse. Distinct from the self first spoken of in the words of the Brāhmaṇa, and then in the verse, as the one experienced in the consciousness "I am a man", distinct from this self is the Prāṇa-maya self, dwelling within it. By the Prāṇa-maya self the Anna-maya is filled. Within the physical body dwells the body of vital airs, pervading it from head to foot.

In the Liṅga-śarīra, there are two śaktis or potentialities, Jñāna-śakti and Kriyā-śakti, the potentiality of consciousness, and the potentiality of action. What we call Prāṇa, is a substance evolved from the kriya-śakti of the Liṅga-śarīra. A form built of Prāṇa is the Prāṇa-maya-kośa, the aggregate of the five vrittis or functions of Prāṇa. These vrittis are peculiar functions of the principle of Prāṇa, known as prāṇa (out-breathing), apāṇa (in-breathing), vyāna (diffused breathing), udāna (up-breathing), and samāna (essential or complete breathing).

And the functions are manifested each in its appropriate region, such as the heart. Accordingly, it is said: "In the heart lies prāṇa; in the anus lies apāṇa; samāna is established in the navel; udāna lies in the throat; vyāna pervades the whole body." This aggregate of vital functions, — this Prāṇa-maya-kośa — is falsely ascribed to the Self, and we see it identified with the Self by him who thinks 'I breathe'; it is therefore here spoken of as ātman, the self. Now, just as sons and other external objects are regarded as non-self when the idea of self has been confined to one's own physical body,— which, when compared with sons, etc., is the immediate self of man, so also, the physical body ceases to be regarded as the self when the Prāṇa-maya self within the Anna-maya has been clearly presented to view. Though neither the son nor the physical body is the real Self, still, in common parlance, they are distinguished from each other. The son is gauna-ātman; that is to say, a man speaks of his son as the self only in a figurative sense; whereas when a man speaks of his body as the self, he actually mistakes the body for the real Self; that is to say, the body is a mithyā-Ātman, is a false self, is actually mistaken for the real self. In the one case, man is conscious that the son is distinct from himself, while, in the other, he is not conscious that the body is distinct from himself. This difference is referred to by the Bhāṣyakāra (Śrī Sankarāchārya) in the following words:—

"When the son and the body are regarded as the non-self, the figurative self and the false self cease to be. On the rise of the knowledge that 'I am Brahman, the

191 Chhan. 6-1-4.
Existence, 'where is room for action?"

The physical body is not the Self.

The philosophers of the Lokāyata or materialistic school, as well as those among the laity who are not aware of the distinction between the body and the Self, regard the body itself as the Self. That this view is false is here indirectly taught by the śruti teaching of the Prāṇa-maya self. This point has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtra III. iii. 53.

(Question):— In the article preceding the one under reference, it has been determined that the contemplation of the sacred fires constituted of manas, etc., does not form part of any sacrificial rite, and that a man may practice it independently of any sacrificial rite. Then the question arises, What is man? This question has to be answered in connection with the Ritualistic section as well as in connection with the section of Brahma-vidyā; for, it deals with the existence of the Self independent of the body and attaining svarga and mokṣa.

(The Materialist):— The body itself is the Self; for consciousness is invariably found in connection with the body and the body alone. Consciousness is manifested only where there is a body, but not in the absence of a body. It should not be urged that consciousness is a thing quite distinct from the body and that therefore the Self is quite independent of the body. For, like the power, of intoxication arising from a combination of areca nut and betel leaf and lime, consciousness, too, is born of the elements of matter combining together so as to form the physical body; how can consciousness be quite a different kind of thing? Wherefore, the Self is no other than the physical body which is found to have the power of sensation.

(The Vedantin):— The consciousness we have of earth and other elements of matter must be distinct from those elements of matter, because it is their perceiver. In every case of perception, the perceiver must be distinct from the thing perceived; the sense of sight, for instance, is distinct from colour. Such being the case, when a person says that the perceiving consciousness is the Self, how can the Self ever be identified with the body which is made up of matter? As to the argument that consciousness is found where there is a body, and that it is not found where there is no body, we say that the negative part of the argument cannot be maintained, inasmuch as the scriptures speak of the intelligent Self passing into the other world without the physical body. And the authority of the scriptures must be upheld by all.

Prāṇa has a birth.

That the vital principle (Prāṇa) dwelling within the physical body which has been proved to be the non-self has a birth has been determined as follows in the Vedānta-sūtra II. iv. 8:

(Question):— In man there is the vital air traversing the aperture of the mouth and causing him to breathe in and out. Has it a beginning or no beginning?

(Prima facie view):— It has no beginning; for, in speaking of the state of things prior to creation, the śruti refers to the activity of Prāṇa, in the words "It breathed airless."

(Conclusion): —The word 'breathed' does not here denote the action of the vital air, inasmuch as the existence of the air has been denied by the Veda in the words "it breathed airless." There the śruti speaks only of the existence of Brahman; for, that passage is of the same tenor as many other passages of the śruti speaking of the state of things prior to creation, such as "Existence alone this at first was." But the passage "Hence come into being Prāṇa," etc. speaks very clearly of the

192 Cha 6-2-1
birth of Prāṇa. Therefore, like the senses, Prāṇa has a birth.

**Prāṇa is a distinct principle.**

(Vedānta-sūtras II. iv. 9-12).

(Question):— Is Prāṇa, the vital air, identical with Vāyu, the air outside? Or is it a mere function of the five senses? Or is it something else?

(Prima facie view):— The external air itself, entering through the aperture of the mouth into the body just as it enters into the aperture of a bamboo stick, is termed Prāṇa. There exists no distinct principle (tattva) called Prāṇa; for, the śruti says "What we call Prāṇa is the air itself." (Bri. Up. 3:1:5.)

Or, just as the several birds that are confined in one cage cause that cage to move while they themselves are moving, so also the eleven senses the five organs of sensation, the five organs of action, and manas cause the body to move while they are engaged in their respective activities. This common function of all the senses, which results in the bodily motion, is what is called Prāṇa or vitality. And accordingly, the Sankhyas teach that "the common function of the senses constitutes the five airs such as prāṇa or out-breathing." 194 Therefore, Prāṇa is not a distinct principle.

(Conclusion):— "Prāṇa, verily, is Brahman's fourth foot; it shines by the light of Vāyu." 195

In these words, the śruti, speaking elsewhere of the contemplation of the four-footed Brahman, clearly points out a distinction between the ādhyatmika Prāṇa (the vital principle in the individual organism) and the Ādhidaivika Vāyu (the cosmic principle of air), the one being helped by the other. Therefore the unity declared in the words "what we call Prāṇa is the air itself" should be explained as referring to their unity as cause and effect. As to the contention of the Sankhyas, we say that it is quite untenable, since there can be no function which is common to all the senses. In the case of the birds, however, the motion generated by them all is of one kind and contributes to the motion of the cage. Not so, indeed, are the functions of seeing, hearing, thinking, etc., all of one kind. Neither are they all such as can contribute to the movement of the body. Therefore, we conclude as the only alternative left that Prāṇa is a distinct principle.

**The limited size of the principle of Prāṇa.**

(Vedānta-sūtra I. iv. 13.)

(Question):— Is this principle of Prāṇa (in the individual organism) all-pervading, or small in size?

(Prima facie view):— Prāṇa pervades all bodies, from that of the lowest animalcule up to that of the Hiranyagarbha, as the śruti says—

"He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this universe." (Bri. Up. 1:3:22)

Therefore Prāṇa is all-pervading.

(Conclusion):— The cosmic principle, the Prāṇa of the Hiranyagarbha, exists as the śruti says "Vāyu (the air) itself is the Cosmic Being" both as a principle in the Cosmic Being and as a principle in the separate individual beings, and it may therefore be regarded as all-pervading. It is this all-pervadingness that the śruti quoted above refers to, for the purpose of contemplation. The principle of Prāṇa in the individual being is, like the senses, invisible and limited in size.

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194 Sankhya-Karika, 29.
195 Chha-Up. 3-18-4,
Contemplation of the Prāṇa-maya.

Now with a view to enjoin another contemplation on him who, in virtue of the strong sub-conscious idea (vāṣana) that the body itself is his own self which has been cherished through many births, feels unable to shake off that notion, the Śruti proceeds to present the form in which the Prāṇa-maya-kośa should be contemplated.

3. He, verily, this one, is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him Prāṇa itself is the head, vyāna is the right wing, apāna is the left wing, ākāśa is the self, the earth is the tail, the support.

He, verily, —namely, this Prāṇa-maya self — is certainly of man's shape, having a head, wings, etc. Is it in itself (possessed of a head, etc)? No, says the śruti. The self made of food-essence (anna-rasa) is human in form, as every one knows. This Prāṇa-maya self is fashioned in human form not by himself, but only after the human shape of the Anna-rasa-maya self; just as an icon is fashioned after the mould into which the melted metal is poured. Similarly, every succeeding self becomes fashioned in human form after the human form of the preceding one; and the latter is filled by the former.

That one, who has been said to dwell within the physical body, is verily this one, namely, the Prāṇa-maya self, who presents himself to consciousness in the idea "I breathe." This one, no doubt, is devoid of a head and other members; still, one should imagine these members and contemplate him as human in form. It should not be supposed that even this imagining is impossible. For, it is quite possible to imagine that the Prāṇa-maya self, abiding within the Anna-maya in full, is molded into human form after the human form of the Anna-maya, just as the melted copper poured into a mould assumes the form of an idol.

How, then, is he of human form? The śruti answers:— The head of the Prāṇa-maya is prāṇa itself. The Prāṇa-maya self is formed of Vāyu (the vital air), and prāṇa (the outward breath), that particular aspect (vrittis) of the vital air in which it traverses through the mouth and nostrils, is to be imagined as the head, on the authority of the scriptural teaching. The imagining of wings, etc., is in all cases here based entirely on the scriptural teaching. The vyāna aspect (of the vital air) is the right wing, and the apāna aspect is the left wing. The ākāśa is the self: that is to say, that particular aspect of vitality which is known as sāmāna is the self as it were. 'Ākāśa' here denotes sāmāna, which abides in ākāśa or the middle of the body, as the word occurs in a section treating of Prāṇa-vritti or aspects of vitality. As occupying a central position with reference to the other aspects of the vital air, sāmāna is the self; and that the trunk or the central part is the self is declared by the śruti in the words, "Indeed the middle one of these members is the self." The earth is the tail, the support. The earth, i.e., the Devata or Intelligence so called, is the support of the principle of Prāṇa in the individual organism, as the cause of its stay. The śruti elsewhere says:— "She props up man's apāna," etc. But for this support, the body may be carried aloft by the udāna aspect of vitality, or it may have a fall owing to its weight. Therefore the Prithivi-Devata, the Intelligence called Earth, is the prop of Prāṇa-maya self.

The Prāṇa (out-breathing) aspect of the Prāṇa-maya-kośa is represented as its head because of its eminence as abiding in the mouth. The vyāna aspect is represented as the right wing because of its superior strength (as pervading the whole body), while the apāna aspect is represented as the left wing because it is not quite so strong. The sāmāna aspect is termed ākāśa because of its similarity to ākāśa (as all-pervading), and it is said to be the self of the prāṇas or life functions, because therein, according to the śruti, abide all prāṇas. —(S)

196 because the Prāṇa-maya is incorporeal -(S).
197 apāna here stands for the Prāṇa-maya-kośa —-(V)
The vitality in its prāṇa (out-breathing) aspect passes upward from the heart and traverses through the mouth and the nostrils. This should be contemplated as the head of the Prāṇa-maya. In its vyāna aspect the vital principle traverses through all the nādis; and in its apāna aspect it passes from the heart downwards. These two aspects should be regarded as the right and left wings. ‘Ākāśa’ here denotes the space in the middle of the belly about the navel, and it stands for the vital principle in its sāmana aspect abiding in that region. The sāmana-vāyu is the centre of the Prāṇa-maya -kośa. The word ‘earth’ stands for the remaining aspect of Prāṇa, namely, the udāna-vāyu.198

To understand here the word ‘ākāśa’ in its primary meaning would be to depart from the main subject of discourse, namely, the Prāṇa-maya-kośa. The earth is the preserver of all living beings and is therefore said to be their support.

Similarly, the udāna air preserves prāṇa and other vital airs in the body, these last remaining in the body only so long as the udāna-vāyu does not depart. It is therefore said to be their support. The independence of the vital principle in its udāna aspect, as causing the stay or departure of the principle in all its aspects, is declared by the Ātharvanikas in the following words:

"He thought: on what now going out, shall I go out; or, on what staying, shall I stay? Thus thinking, He evolved life." (pras. Up. 6:3)

Therefore the udāna aspect of the Prāṇa principle forms the tail of the Prāṇa māyā-kośa represented for the purposes of contemplation in the form of a bird. The principle of Prāṇa as well as its five aspects, represented as the head, wings and so on, are clearly described in the Maitreya-upanishad 2:6 as follows:

"In the beginning, Prajāpati (the lord of creatures) stood alone. He had no happiness when alone. Meditating on himself, he created many creatures. He looked on them and saw they were, like a stone, without understanding, and standing like a lifeless post. He had no happiness. He thought, I shall enter within, that they may awake. Making himself like air (Vāyu), he entered within. Being one, he could not do it. Then dividing himself five-fold, he is called Prāṇa, Apāṇa, Sāmana, Udāna, Vyāna. Now, that air which rises upwards is Prāṇa. That which moves downwards is Apāna. That by which these two are supposed to be held is Vyāna. That which carries the grosser material of food to the Apāṇa and brings the subtler material to each limb has the name Sāmana. That which brings up or carries down what has been drunk and eaten is the Udāna."

That is to say, having found no amusement in Himself when He was alone, the Prajāpati created bodies for the purpose, and with a view to attain conscious experience in those bodies, He has entered into them as their Jīvātman in the upādhi of the vital air, and He leads a conscious life in the upādhi in its five aspects.

Prāṇa, the Universal Life.

4. On that, too, there is this verse:

As to the teaching concerning the Prāṇa māyā self, there is the following verse:

(Anuvāka 3.)

1. After Prāṇa do Devas live, as also men and beasts. Prāṇa, verily, is the life-duration of beings; thence it is called the life-duration of all. The whole life-duration do they reach, who Prāṇa as Brahman regard. Prāṇa, verily, is of beings the life-

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198 Here Sayana differs from Sankaracharya.
duration; thence it is called the life-duration of all. Thus (ends the verse).

After Prāṇa, — after Vāyu in whom inheres the life potentiality, i.e., ensouled and informed by Prāṇa, do Agni and other Gods (Devas) breathe, i.e., they do the act of breathing, i.e., again, they become active by way of breathing. Or, since the present section deals with microcosmic or individual (adhyatmika) organisms, "Devas" here denotes senses (indriyas). Only when the life proper functions, the senses also can function. So also do men and beasts function only when the life-principle functions. So that the living creatures have their being, not in the Anna-maya self alone, which is heterogeneous (parichhinnā) or made up of distinct and well-defined parts; on the other hand, men, etc., have their being in the Prāṇa-maya self also, which lies within the Anna-maya self, and which (unlike the other) is a homogeneous undivided whole (sādharaṇa), permeating the whole physical body (sarva-piṇḍa-vyāpin).

Similarly, all living creatures are informed by the Mano-maya and other subtler and subtler selves, one abiding within another, inclusive of the Ānanda-māyā; the internal permeating the external selves which lie outside, and all of them alike being set up by avidyā and formed of ākāśa and other elements of matter. And they are ensouled also by the true Self lying within them all like the Kudrava grain in its many coats, that Self who is All, the cause of ākāśa and all the rest, who is eternal, unchanging, all-pervading, who has been defined as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite," who transcends the five koṇās. He, indeed, — that is to say, is really the Self of all.

It has been said that "after Prāṇa do Devas live." How so? — The Śruti says: because Prāṇa is the life-duration of all beings. The Śruti elsewhere says, "Life is possible only so long as Prāṇa. Dwells within this body " (Kaushitaki-Up. 3-2.) and therefore Prāṇa is the life-duration of all. On the departure of Prāṇa death takes place, as everybody knows; and everybody understands that Prāṇa is the life-duration of all. Wherefore, those who, departing away from this external Anna-maya self, — which is asadāraṇa or made up of various distinguishable parts, retire to the Prāṇa-maya self within, which is sadharana or made up of homogeneous parts, and contemplate him as Brahman — i.e. those who contemplate: "I am Prāṇa who, as the source of life, as the life-span of all, is the Self of all beings," — they attain the full life-period in this world, they do not die an unnatural death before the allotted period. By the full life-period, we should, of course, understand one hundred years, as the śruti declares. — How so? — The śruti says "Prāṇa, verily, is of beings the life-duration; thence it is called the life-duration of all." This repetition is intended to explain how this Vidyā (upāsana) can yield the fruit mentioned here. The explanation lies in the principle that with whatever attributes a man contemplates Brahman, he is, as the result, endowed

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199 i.e., the other Gods are only different aspects of the Sutrātmā, as the Sakalya-Brāhmaṇa says. Or, these Gods have attained to the state of the Sutrātmā in virtue of their past contemplation of the Sutrātmā. Or, like ourselves, these Gods have, for their upadhi, Prāṇa, the seat of Kriya-śakti.

200 i.e., the Prāṇa-maya-koṇa.

201 i.e., their physical bodies

202 That is to say, the Prāṇa-maya-koṇa is not cut off into distinct regions as the piṇḍa or microcosmic physical body is. Unlike the latter, it has no specialised organs, each discharging a specific function. It is a unity present in every part of the body. Or, the idea here intended may be that the Prāṇa-maya, in the cosmic aspect as the Sutrātmā, pervades all the piṇḍas or individual physical bodies.

203 One koṇa has been spoken of as the self of another only relatively, i.e., without reference to the absolute truth. In reality all koṇas are illusory aspects of the one real Self. — (A)

204 i.e. abandoning the idea that the Anna-maya is the self.

205 Vṛṣṇītta-svarūpa, not of one and the same nature in all its parts.

206 i.e., common to all senses (indriyas), because the food eaten by Prāṇa serves to nourish all the senses.

207 in the form of the Sutrātmā (A).

208 At birth, the present body is allotted a certain length of life-duration.

209 "Man lives one hundred years." (Taittiriya Sanhitā).
with the same attributes. As in the case of the Anna-maya self, there is a verse treating of the Prāna-maya self also. Devas live only when Prāna breathes; they do not live by themselves. "When thou rainest here, then alone do these live." (Prasna-Up. -2-10.) Others, too, such as men and beasts, depend for their life on Prāṇa. The śruti says that all senses, both in the microcosm and in the macrocosm, have cast off death by attaining to the being of Prāṇa or Cosmic Life (Adhidaivata). All this does, in truth, apply to Prāṇa, because a creature lives only so long as there is Prāṇa, informing it. Thence Prāṇa is often called by sages the life-duration of all. Those who devoutly contemplate the Prāṇa-māyā self as endowed with the attribute of being the life of all attain to that very Prāṇa who is the life of all. —(S)

The Sattvic beings such as Agni, Indra and other Gods, the Rajasic beings such as the Brahmmins, kṣatriyas and other men, the Tamasic beings such as beasts, all these discharge their functions only so long as the prāṇa-Vāyu or the vital air, abiding within their respective bodies, functions. It is indeed the vital air that puts the body in motion. Accordingly, the Kaushitakins declare:—

"But Prāṇa alone is the conscious self (prajñātman) and has laid hold of this body; it makes it rise up." (Kau. Up. 3:3)

In the course of His speech concerning His part in the support of the body which the God of Prāṇa addressed to the Gods of the elements of matter such as ākāśa, and to the Gods of the senses such as speech, the Atharvanikas declare:—

"Life — and life is best — said unto them: 'Straight into error do not step. It is I who by this quintuple division of myself together keep and hold this arrow.'" (Prasna Up. 2:3)

Just as an arrow is propelled by a bowman, so this body is propelled by Prāṇa and is therefore denoted by the word ‘arrow.’ Because Prāṇa, produces activity in the bodies of Devas, men and beasts, and because thereon depends the life-duration of all creatures, therefore it is called the life-duration of all. Those who, by this mere knowledge of the Prāṇa-maya-kośa, are unable to give up altogether their tendency to regard the Anna-maya-kośa as the Self, and who, with a view to get rid of that tendency, resort to the contemplation of Brahman in the upādhi of Prāṇa, they attain full life-duration in this birth without meeting an unnatural death, as the result of their contemplation of Brahman in the upādhi of the microcosmic (ādhyātmika) Prāṇa, and by their contemplation of Brahman in the upādhi of the Hiranyagarbha, the ādhyātmika or macrocosmic Prāṇa they become themselves the Hiranyagarbha in the future birth and attain full life-period reaching up to Mahapralaya, the Great Cosmic Dissolution, " Prāṇa, verily, is of beings " etc: in these words, at first, the Prāṇa-maya-kośa has been extolled; here again they are repeated with a view to extol the upāsana or contemplation taught here.

The outcome of the study of the Prāṇa-maya-kośa.

Now, the śruti shows the aim of all this teaching regarding the Prāṇa-maya-kośa:

2. Thereof, of the former, this one, verily, is the self embodied.

Thereof, of the former, i.e. of the Anna-maya, this one namely, the Prāṇa-maya is the self, having the Anna-maya for his body.

The Prāṇa-maya which has been just described is the self dwelling in the Anna-maya-kośa. When the idea that the Prāṇa-maya is the self is deeply ingrained, the illusion that the Anna-maya is one's own self disappears. Then there arises the conviction that the Anna-maya is the body, and that the Prāṇa-maya is one's own self dwelling in that body, there being no room for two selves.

The Prāṇa-maya just described is the self of the Anna-maya, is the self embodied therein, because

210 Bri. Up.
the latter is ensouled by the former.—(S)

Or,²¹¹ the 'self' refers here to the one described above as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite." Any self other than the one thus defined in the śruti is such only in a secondary sense of the word. That Self alone lies within all. This interpretation gives a rational meaning to the words "yah pūrvasya (the Self of the former)" in the original.²¹² We hold that the real Self underlying all false selves is the One described above as "Real" etc., who is devoid of all saṁsāra. Certainly, the real basis of the illusory serpent is in the rope; it cannot be in any other false appearance such as a rod which illusion may set up in the place of the real rope — (S).

Chapter 13

Mano-maya Kośa

From Prāṇa-maya to Mano-maya.

The śruti now proceeds to unite to the Mano-maya self him who, on the ground that all creatures have their birth and being and dissolution in Prāṇa as declared in the sequel,²¹³ has abandoned the false Anna-maya self and has taken his stand in the Prāṇa-maya, in the consciousness "I am prāṇa."—(S)

3. Than that, verily,— than this one formed of Prāṇa — there is another self within formed of Manas (thought-stuff). By him this one is filled.

Manas.

Manas is the antah-kārana, the internal organ or instrument, consisting of sankalpa (fancies, purposes, impulses) and vikalpa (thoughts of distinct objects, doubts). Formed of this stuff is the Mano-maya, as the Anna-maya is formed of food-stuff. And this is the inner self of the Prāṇa-maya. The rest may be interpreted as before.

Māyā, which resides in Brahman and is the material cause of the universe, is made up of three guṇas or principles. The guṇa of Tamas being the cause of the Anna-maya, inertness is found to predominate in that kośa; there exists in it neither the kriya-śakti nor the jñāna-śakti, neither the power of action nor the power of cognition. The guṇa of Rajas being the cause of the Prāṇa-maya, the power of action inheres in the Prāṇa-maya. The guṇa of Sattva being the cause of the three kośas from the Mano-maya upward, the power of cognition inheres in those three kośas. The cause of the Man-omaya is Sattva mixed with Tamas; and therefore we find in it the Tامasic qualities, such as attachment and hatred.

The cause of the Vijñāna-maya is Sattva mixed with Rajas, and therefore we find in it the agency with reference to all Vedic sacrificial rites and all secular acts such as agriculture. The pure guṇa of Sattva is the cause of the Ānanda-māyā, and therefore we find therein only joys of various kinds, termed love and so on. No doubt, the jñāna-śakti, the essence of cognition, is in itself only one; still it appears threefold owing to a difference in its aspects or functions, as the instrument (kārana-

²¹¹ Sri Sankarachārya has interpreted this passage in accordance with the view of the Vṛttikāra, who holds that the Ānandamāyā is Brahman. Here, as in the Vedānta-sūtras (I.12-19), the Bhāṣyakāra first gives the Vṛttikāra's interpretation, only to set it aside later on.

²¹² Then the whole passage should be rendered as follows:— The same Cit-dhātu or Principle of Consciousness that is the real Self of the former (Anna-maya) is the Self of the Prāṇa māyā.

²¹³ Tai. Up. 3:3
śakti), as the agent (kartri-śakti), and as enjoyment (bhoga-śakti). Manas is a product of jñāna-śakti, or essence of cognition in its aspect as an instrument; and formed of this Manas is the Mano-maya, the aggregate of the vṛttis or states of mind such as desires, fancies, and the like. These states of mind are enumerated by the Vajasaneyins as follows:

"Desire, representation, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness, shame, reflection, fear, all is mind." (Bri. Up. 1:5:3)

In this connection may be cited other passages such as the following:

"Thirst fondness passion, covetousness" etc.

The Mano-maya lies within the Prāṇa-maya, so that, on account of proximity, the Ātman's Consciousness, which permeates all, is manifested in Manas; and because of this manifestation of Ātman in it, the Mano-maya is the self of the Prāṇa-maya. The Prāṇa-maya is permeated by the Mano-maya, the external by the internal. Just as the kriya-śakti or the power of action pervades the whole body from head to foot, so also is the jñāna-śakti found to pervade the whole body. Manas, the internal sense, stands here for the ten external senses also, such as those of sight, speech, etc. It should therefore be observed that all senses, both of cognition and of action, are included in the Mano-maya-kośa.

**Senses are born of the Paramātman.**

The origin of these senses has been thus discussed in the Vedānta-Sūtras II. iv.1—4:

(Prima facie view):— Are the senses beginningless, or have they been created by the Supreme Self?

(Prima facie view):— The senses are beginningless, because their existence prior to creation has been declared by the śruti in the following words:—

"Those Rishis alone at the beginning were existent. Who are those Rishis? Prāṇas (the vital powers, senses) verily are the Rishis." (Maitri-Up. 3-5)

(Conclusion):— In the first place the proposition that, the One being known, all is known, cannot be true unless the senses (indriyas) are included among created things. And the statement that "mind comes of food, breath of water, and speech of fire" (Chan. Up. 6-5-4.) shows that the senses are products of the elements of matter. The birth of the senses is clearly declared in the words "hence is born prāṇa, manas and all senses." (Mund.Up. 2-1-3)

As to the passage which speaks of their existence prior to creation, it should be interpreted as referring to a minor creation. We therefore conclude that senses are born from the Paramātman.

**The senses are eleven in number.**

(Vedānta-sūtras. II. iv. 5—6).

(Prima facie view):— How many are the senses, seven or eleven?

(Prima facie view):— The senses are seven in number; for the śruti says in general "seven senses are born thence." (ibid 2:1:8) The śruti speaks also specifically of them as dwelling in the seven apertures of the head, in the words "Seven, indeed, are the prāṇas located in the head." (Tait. Sam. 5:1:7)

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Senses other than those located in the head, such as hands and the like, are mentioned in the Veda "Both hands and what one must handle, both organ of joy and what must be enjoyed." (Prasna. Up. 4:8) So, in determining the number on the sole authority of the Vedas, we find there are eleven separate functions namely, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, speaking, taking, going, enjoying, excreting, and thinking; and there must be eleven separate sense-organs concerned severally with these eleven functions.
The senses are not all-pervading.

(Vedānta-sūtras. II. iv. 8—13.)

(Question) Are the senses all-pervading or limited in extent?

(The Sankhya):— The senses are all-pervading; but their functions are confined to particular regions of the several organisms in order that therein the several jīvas may enjoy the fruits of their respective actions.

(The Vedantin):— This involves a needless assumption. When all our experience can be explained by supposing that the senses are of the same extent as the bodily regions where they function, of what avail is the needless assumption that the senses are all-pervading without functioning throughout. Moreover, the śruti speaks of the ascent, departure, and return of jīva; and since these are not possible in the jīva who in himself is all-pervading, it has been assumed that the senses form the upādhi of the jīva and that it is by this upādhi or vehicle of the senses that he really ascends, departs, and returns. If even this upādhi were all-pervading, what then is it which really ascends, departs, and returns? Wherefore, the senses are not all-

When the Sūtrakāra author of the Vedānta (the pervading sūtras) speaks of these middle-sized senses as anus (=atoms, subtle ones), he only means that they are invisible, so subtle that they transcend the ken of ordinary men.

The senses are dependent on Devas.

(Vedānta-sūtras: II. iv. 14—16)

(Question):— Are the senses quite independent in their working or dependent on Devas?

(Prima facie view):— Speech and other senses perform their respective functions quite independently; they are not dependent on jīvas. Otherwise, the Devas would be the enjoyers or sufferers by the experience acquired through the senses, and the jīvātman (individual embodied soul) would derive no experience at all.

(Conclusion):— In the words "Agni became speech and entered the mouth" and so on, the śruti declares that speech and other senses are under the influence respectively of Agni and other gods; and their operation therefore depends entirely upon the Devas. From this it by no means follows that the Devas are the enjoyers of the fruits of the experience. Certainly, it is not right that the Devas, who have attained to the state of Devas as the fruit of their highly meritorious karma, should be affected by the experience so low in its kind; on the contrary, a very high enjoyment accrues to them in their Devatā bodies. It is the human soul that enjoys the fruits of his karma in the form of the experience gained through the senses working under the influence of the Devas. We therefore conclude that the senses are dependent on the Devas for their action.

The senses are distinct from Prāṇa proper.

(Vedānta-sūtras II. iv. 17—19).

(Question):— Are these senses mere functions of Prāṇa, or are they principles quite distinct from Prāṇa?

(Prima facie view):— Speech and other senses must be mere functions of Prāṇa proper; for, the śruti declares that they are only forms of Prāṇa, in the words "They were all of this one alone." (Bṛi. Up, 1:5:21.) Moreover, in common parlance, they are designated by the very term Prāṇa: as for instance, it is sometimes said, "the prānas of this dying one have not as yet gone." The śruti also speaks of speech and other senses under one and the same designation ‘prāṇa’:

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214 Ait. Up. 2-4.
"And the people do not call them the tongues, the eyes, the ears, the minds, but the breaths (prāṇas)." (Chan. Up. 5:1:15)

Therefore the senses are not distinct from Prāṇa.

(Conclusion):— One distinction between them is this: while speech and other senses are overcome with weariness in their respective spheres of work, Prāṇa is unwearyed in its operation. The śruti says:

"Death having become weariness, took them and seized them ........ Having seized them, death held them back from their work. Therefore speech grows weary."!
(Bri. Up. 1:5:21.)

Again, in the dialogue between Prāṇa and the senses, the śruti declares first that the body did not perish or rise as speech and other senses departed from or entered into it; and then, that the body perished or rose as Prāṇa departed from or entered into it. Because of these distinguishing features declared in the śruti, it is only in a figurative sense that speech and other senses are said to be mere forms of Prāṇa and are spoken of under the designation 'prāṇa.' And the senses are spoken of as Prāṇas because of their following Prāṇa so closely as servants follow their master. There is a vast difference in their functions. The senses are limited in their respective spheres of action and are instruments of thought; whereas Prāṇa is the leader of the senses and the body. Accordingly, because of their weariness and other distinguishing features, the senses are principles quite distinct from Prāṇa.

**Manas is the chief among the senses.**

Of these eleven senses Manas is the chief, and therefore the Mano-maya-kośa is named after it. And Manas is the chief of the senses because speech and other senses depend on it for their respective functions. Indeed in all their respective functions they invariably presuppose a state of mind called prajña (consciousness) such as a desire to speak to see, to hear, or the like. This truth has been stated at length by the Kaushitakins, viewing the matter both in its positive and negative aspects. Viewing the matter in its positive aspect, they declare:

"Having by prajña (consciousness) taken possession of speech, he reaches by speech all words ........ Having by prajña taken possession of the eye he reaches all forms ........ (Kau. Up. 3:6)

The negative side of the proposition is declared as follows:—

" For, without prajña, speech does not make known any word. 'My mind was absent,' he says, 'I did not perceive that word'........Without prajña the eye does not make known any form. ' My mind was absent,' he says, ‘I did not perceive that form.' " (Ibid. 3:7)

**Contemplation of the Mano-maya.**

Having taught that the Mano-maya, the aggregate of all senses, is one's own self, the śruti now proceeds to enjoin the contemplation thereof, in order to strongly impress the idea in the heart; and with a view to this end the śruti first teaches the form in which it should be contemplated:

4. **He, verily, this one, is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him, the Yajus itself is the head, the Rik is the right wing, the Sāman is the left wing, the ordinance is the self, the Atharva-Angirases are the tail, the support.**

* The Mano-maya which has been declared to abide within the Prāṇa-maya as the self, and which we feel in the consciousness "I think, I imagine," is represented, for contemplation's sake, to be of
human form made up of five members. As explained above, the human form of this kośa follows from that of the Prāṇa-maya, after the fashion of the melted metal assuming the form of the mould into which it is poured.

**What the Veda in reality is.**

Of him, the Yajus is the head. Yajus is that class of mantras which are not subject to any definite rule as to the syllables, lines and endings. All speech of this kind is here referred to by the word ‘Yajus.’ It is here represented as the head because of its importance; and the importance lies in its being of immediate use in sacrificial rites, etc. For, it is with the Yajus — with the words svāhā, etc., that an oblation is offered. Or the representation of the Yajus as the head and other like representations should always be based entirely on the authority of the śruti.\(^{216}\)

What we call Yajus is only a mano-vṛtti, a state, a mode, a function, an act, of mind, and consists in thinking of the particular syllables, words and sentences as uttered by particular organs, with particular effort, pitch and accent, as constituting the Yajurveda; and it is this thought that manifests itself through hearing and other organs and is given the appellation of Yajus. The same thing applies to the Rik, and to the Sāman.

The word 'yajus,' is generally used to denote an aggregate of external sounds known by that name. But, lest the criticism of the śruti might be carried too far, we should absolutely accept its authority and understand that 'yajus' here denotes a particular state of mind which may be expressed in the words "we now study the Yajurveda; these syllables occurring in this particular order constitute the Yajurveda which we should study."\(^{(A)}\)

So that what we call Yajus is a particular state of Manas woven into the consciousness of Īśvara, and which, in the form of words and sentences, becomes manifested through hearing and other organs.—(S).

That is to say, the Yajus, the Rik, etc., are only particular states of mind impregnated with consciousness; or they are all mere consciousness in the form of particular states of mind. — (A).

Mantras being thus only *vṛittis* or functions of mind, and since a function can be repeated, we can understand how a mental repetition of mantras is possible. Otherwise, as incapable of repetition, a mantra could not be repeated (in mind) any more than a pot; so that it would be absurd to talk of a mental repetition of mantras.

If mantras were not functions or acts of mind, were something other than acts, like pots, etc., no such thing as a repetition of the mantra would be possible; for, it is only an act or function, which every state of consciousness is, that can be repeated, but not an external thing such as a pot. The mind cannot directly act upon objects which are external to it and therefore beyond its scope; so that, if the mantras were something external to the mind, to speak of a mental repetition of them would be absurd.—(S & A).

But a repetition of mantras is often enjoined in connection with sacrificial rites.

And such injunctions show that mantras are acts or functions which alone, unlike external objects such as pots, are capable of repetition.— (A).

(Objection):— The mental repetition of a mantra may be effected by way of repeating the thought (smṛti) of its syllables.

That is to say, though the mantra cannot itself be repeated (in mind), as beyond its direct reach, the

\(^{215}\) The other words are vaṣaṭ & svadhā — (S).

\(^{216}\) Inasmuch as the śruti is of a higher authority; whereas all attempt to seek for an analogy as the basis of the representation is human. — (S.)
repetition may be effected by revolving in thought the meaning of the Mantra —(S).

(Answer):— No, because it would involve a departure from the primary sense of words. To explain: the formula "let him thrice repeat the first (verse) and thrice the last" enjoins a repetition of certain verses. If the verse cannot itself be the subject of repetition, if, on the other hand, the mere thought of it were repeated, it would be tantamount to a neglect of what is primarily enjoined in the words "Let him thrice repeat the first verse."

To repeat the mere idea of what is taught in the verse is to resort to a secondary sense of the injunction; for, the idea of what is taught in the verse is different from the verse itself, of which a repetition is here enjoined. Moreover, in the words "mental repetition is deemed a thousand times more effective," it is said that a mental repetition of mantras is more fruitful, and that the external repetition — i.e., the repetition of mantras through word of mouth, is less fruitful. Wherefore the mental repetition is what is primarily enjoined; while the other i.e. repetition by word of mouth can be made out by understanding the text in its secondary sense. When a passage is capable of a literal interpretation, it is not right to understand it in a secondary sense. —(S & A)

Therefore, the mantras are nothing other than the Ātman's Consciousness limited by the upādhi of the states of mind and manifested in these states of mind; that Consciousness of Ātman which has neither a beginning nor an end, and which is here spoken of as Yajus. And so, we can explain how the Vedas are eternal. Otherwise,—i.e., if they are objects external to consciousness, like colour, etc., — the Vedas would be non-eternal; and this conclusion is quite unsound. And the śruti which speaks of the unity of the Veda with the Eternal Self, in the words "He is the ātman abiding in Manas," in whom all Vedas become one," will have a meaning only if the Rik and other portions of the Veda are eternal. There is also a mantra which reads as follows:

"The Riks are seated in Aksāra (the Indestructible), in the Supreme Heaven, wherein all Devas sit on high." (Taitt. Aran.)

Since it has been established that mantras are mental states, and since all mental states are found invariably permeated by the Conscious Self, the mantras are one with the Conscious Self. Thus the view that mantras are mental states or acts explains not only the possibility of their repetition, but also the eternity of the Vedas which are ultimately one with Ātman. Further, as the Veda is one with Consciousness, as it is not a mere silent word, it is capable of throwing light upon Dharma and other things worth knowing. This view obviates the necessity for the unwarranted postulate of 'Sphoṭa' or eternal sound that form of the Veda in which it is said to be distinct from the silent syllables of which it is composed, and in which it is supposed to be able to throw light upon truth.—(S & A)

The 'ordinance' here refers to the Brāhmaṇa, (that section of the Veda) which ordains things requiring specific directions. The Atharva-Angirases, i.e., the mantras seen by Atharvan and Angiras, including their Brāhmaṇa, is the support, because they treat mostly of rites which promote man's well-being by conducing to his peace and strength. The Brāhmaṇa section of the Veda consists of ordinances and is therefore here referred to by the word "ordinance." Or, the Brāhmaṇa is so called because it is the command of the Supreme Brahman. —(S).

The three Vedas here designated as the Yajus, etc., refer to the mantras comprised in them, while the Brāhmaṇa portion is referred to by the word "ordinance" ....... The mantras of the Atharva-Veda are represented as the support, because, as contributing to the attainment of what is desirable and to the avoidance of what is undesirable here in this life, they promote man's well-being. It is true that

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217 Īśvara's — (S).
218 as the witness thereof — (A).
219 Taitt. Aran. 3-11
the Yajus and other Vedas are formed of words, not of mind; but here the words 'yajus,' etc., stand for the states of mind concerned with the thought of those words.220

5. On that as well there is this verse:

As in former cases, this verse throws light upon the Mano-maya self.

**Brahman beyond speech and thought.**

Anuvāka 4.

1. Whence all words turn back as well as Manas, without reaching; he who knows Brahman's bliss fears not at any time.

This verse is cited as evidence concerning the nature of the Mano-maya-kośa described above. That is to say, this verse is quoted here to show that the Vedas are of the nature described above. It is Brahman that is inaccessible nothing else is inaccessible to words. As to words; Brahman is the Eternal Consciousness, even Manas has no access to Him. The śruti declares that Brahman is beyond the reach of mind, by describing Him as " that which one thinks not by Manas." (Kena-Up. 1-5) —(S)

Or, the śruti has quoted this verse with a view to teach that the wise man should understand that the Mano-maya is composed of speech and thought (Manas), beyond whose reach nothing lies except Brahman, the Untainted. Brahman is not the main thing referred to in this verse, inasmuch as there is no occasion to treat of Him in this chapter.—(S.)

As this chapter relates to the Mano-maya-kośa, it cannot be the Supreme Brahman that is described here. Now to explain the verse as descriptive of the Mano-maya-kośa: Manas may be said to lie beyond the scope of speech, because it is immediately witnessed by consciousness and does not therefore stand in need of speech or other senses to manifest itself in consciousness. It is also beyond the reach of Manas; for, it is impossible to think that Manas is reached by its own vyṛti or state. As the Sutrātman is Great or Unlimited, and as Manas is one in essence with the Sutrātman, even the word 'Brahman' may be applied to Manas. That man has nothing to fear at any time who knows that bliss is the fruit of the contemplation of this Mano-maya Brahman, and who, by contemplation, has attained Brahman's bliss and dwells in the state of the Hiranyakarñah.—(A).

He has never anything to fear, who contemplates Brahman's bliss in the upādhi of the Mano-maya, that bliss which is the essential nature of Brahman, whom no words nor thought can reach, though speech and mind can speak and think of all else. In the first place, no words can denote Brahman as He belongs to no particular genus and is devoid of qualities, etc. On this the Naishkarmya siddhi221 says:

"Relation, qualities, action, genus, and usage, these make a word applicable to a thing. None of these exists in Ātman: thence Ātman is never denoted by a word."

When Manas thinks of things, it thinks of them as of this or that form. In neither way can Brahman be thought of. Therefore Manas recedes from Brahman. This idea has been expressed in the Pancha-kośa-viveka (in the Vedānta-Panchadas) as follows:

" Under what form then does Self exist? If one were to ask this, we would reply that the notion of this or that mode does not apply to Self. That which is not like this nor like that, you must regard with certainty as Self in its essence. An object known through the senses is commonly spoken of as "like this," and that which is not

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220 Sayana's interpretation is somewhat at variance with the Bhāsyakara's.

221 a work of Suresvaracharya; III. 103
presented to consciousness as "like that." The cogniser (vishayin) is not known through the sense-organs; nor is there a non-presentation of Self; for, the nature of Self implies presentation." (Op. Cit 26—27.)

**Fearlessness, the fruit of the contemplation.**

Just as the śruti has taught in the preceding chapters the contemplation of Brahman in the upādhis of the Anna-maya and the Prāṇa-maya, so here it means to teach the contemplation of Brahman in the upādhi of the Mano-maya. Otherwise, it would be of no use to represent the Yajus, etc., as the head and so on. Here the root 'vid' of the word "vidvān" (knower) denotes contemplation (upāsana), inasmuch as the two verbs "vid" and "upa-as" are used synonymously in the sections treating of upāsana. This has been clearly shown by Sri Sankaracharya in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras(IV.i. i):

"In some passages the verb 'vid'—'to know' is used at the beginning and the verb 'upa-as' — 'to contemplate' at the end. For example, we have at the beginning 'He who knows what he knows is thus spoken of by me' and then 'Teach me, sir, the deity which you contemplate.' In some passages the verb upa-ās occurs at the and the beginning and the verb 'vid' at the end; as for example, we have at the beginning 'let a man contemplate on mind as Brahman' and at the end; 'He who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame and glory of countenance.'

Accordingly the verb 'vid,' to know, here denotes contemplation. As a result of this contemplation, there will be no fear either here or hereafter. In him who is incessantly engaged in the contemplation, there is no room for the feelings of attachment and hatred, and the devotee is therefore free from all fear of the world. As he has thereby secured mukti which will accrue to him in due course, (i.e., after passing through the state of the Hiranyakagbha, the Lower Brahman), he is devoid of all fear of the future. The absence of both kinds of fear is indicated by the words "at any time."

**The outcome of the study of the Mano-maya.**

Now the śruti proceeds to point out the main purpose of this teaching concerning the nature of the Mano-maya:

2. Thereof, — of the former, — this one, verily, is the self embodied.

Thereof, of the former, i.e., of the Prāṇa-maya, this one, namely the Mano-maya, is the self, having the Prāṇa-maya for his body.

Then arises the strong conviction that the Prāṇa-maya is the body and that the Mano-maya is its lord. The Brihadaranyaka records a dialogue between Bālāki and Ajatasatru. Bālāki regards Prāṇa, as the Self; and in order to prove that Prāṇa is not the Self, Ajatasatru takes him to a man who is asleep. He calls the man out by the four scriptural names of Prāṇa. The man not awaking at the call, it is concluded that the insentient Prāṇa is not the Self. And then, to show that the self is self-conscious, something other than Prāṇa, Ajatasatru rubs the man in hand and wakes him up. Then the conscious Ātman rises. And accordingly the śruti says:

"And the two together came to a person who was asleep. He called him by these

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222 Chhan. 4:1:4.
223 Ibid. 4:2:2.
225 Ibid. 3:18:6.
names, ‘Thou, great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, king.’ He did not rise. Then rubbing him with his hand, he woke him, and he arose.” (Bri. Up. 2:1:15)

CHAPTER 14.
VIJÑĀNA-MAYA-KOŚA.

To him who has completely withdrawn from the Prāṇa-maya, the śruti teaches the Vijñāna-maya with a view to lead him still farther within, beyond even the Mano-mayakośa.

The relation between the Mano-maya and the Vijñāna-maya.

3. Than that, verily, than this one formed of Manas, — there is another self within, formed of Vijñāna. By him this one is filled.

This should be interpreted as before. The inner self of the Mano-maya is the Vijñāna-maya. It has been shown that the Mano-maya is made up of the Vedas.

Vijñāna or Intelligence is the knowledge of what is taught in the Vedas, the certain or determinative knowledge (niścaya). And this determinative knowledge²²⁶ (adyavasāya) is an attribute (dharma) of the antah-kāraṇa, the inner sense. Made up of this, i.e., formed of these determinative cognitions, which are regarded as pramāṇas or right cognitions is the Vijñāna-maya self. Indeed,²²⁷ the sacrificial rites, etc., are performed by one only after ascertaining their nature from right sources of knowledge; and the śruti says in the verse (to be quoted below) that Vijñāna is the source of all sacrificial rites.

The Mano-maya, which has been described to be made up of the Vedas, is mainly composed of vrittis or states of mind, while the next one is the owner of those states. Buddhi, which is made up of determinative cognitions (vyavasaya), is regarded as the owner of the states of mind. The śruti says, " Intelligence performs the sacrifice " this will have no meaning unless Intelligence (Vijñāna) is regarded as an agent, as the owner of the mental states, as one who passes through those states. Buddhi or Intelligence itself, not the Ātman, because He is immutable, containing within it a semblance of Ātman's Consciousness, is the agent. Since the Ātman cannot be the agent, Vijñāna must be the performer of the sacrificial rites. If Vijñāna were not the agent, no sacrificial rite would be possible.— (S).

The nature of the Vijñāna-maya.

The Mano-maya is made up of mental states such as kāma and saṅkalpa, desires, impulses and formative thoughts. Being the upādhi of the Pratyagātman, i.e., being a medium or vehicle in which the Inner Self manifests Himself, the Mano-maya has been spoken of as the self. Behind this self, which manifests itself in consciousness as "I desire, I imagine " and so on, there is another self called Vijñāna-maya the Intelligence-made. By the Vijñāna-maya lying within, the Mano-maya the external one, is filled.

When the jñaṇa-śakti or the knowing principle which is evolved out of the Sattva-guṇa is influenced by the Tamas, Manas or thought-principle is formed, with its Tamasic attributes of attachment, hatred, etc. So Vijñāna or the cognising principle, with its Rājasic attribute of agency, is formed out of a combination of the knowing principle and

²²⁶ including the determinative knowledge gained in ordinary experience. —(A).
²²⁷ This is to show that "Vijñāna" here means knowledge of the truths taught in the Veda concerning the sacrifices to be performed.
the Guna of Rajas. Among the states of consciousness, there is a particular one in the form "I am the agent," and the principle apprehended in this particular state of consciousness with the attribute of agency pertaining to it is the thing denoted by the word Vijñāna; and Vijñāna-maya means "formed of Vijñāna." Vijñāna, which is evolved from Sattva associated with Rajas, assumes the form of the Ego, apprehended as 'I' in consciousness. It is this principle of Ego that all people think of as 'I'. There are two sets of ideas, this idea of 'this' and the idea of 'I'. The idea of 'this' refers to what is known, to something distinct from the knower, to something that is outward; whereas the idea of 'I' refers to the inward, to the knower himself. This analysis should not be objected to because of the fact that the knower (pramātri) and the known (prameya) are always found mixed up; for, this mixture is a fact of experience, and it cannot therefore vitiate our analysis. It is a well-recognized principle that no ascertained fact of experience should be dismissed on the ground of its inexplicability. The Ego apprehended in consciousness as 'I', who is the cogniser of all knowledge through whatsoever organ obtained, is the one here spoken of as the Vijñāna-maya.

Having in view this principle, the Atharvānikas first enumerate all instruments of knowledge and all things knowable through them, and then mention quite separately as distinct from them all him who experiences them:—

"Both sight and what must be seen, both hearing and what must be heard ………. He is the seer, toucher, hearer, smeller, taster, the mind of impulse and of reason, the agent, the knowing self, the man." 228

And the Kaustitakins also first declare, from both the positive and negative points of view, that all experience of objects through senses depends upon Manas, and then mention, as distinct from them all, the subject of all those experiences:

" Having by praṇā (self-conscious knowledge) taken possession of speech, he obtains by speech all words ………. Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker." 229

(Objection):— The subject of all experiences is Ātman Himself, not the fourth sheath called Vijñāna-maya. Hence, it is that in discussing the nature of the jīvātman, the Blessed Badarayana has said " (Ātman) is the agent (kartri) because then the scriptures will have a meaning "(II. iii-33).

(Answer):—There is no room for such objection; for, the agency of the Ātman is due to an upādhi, as has been shown in the Vedānta-sutra II. iii. 40. This sutra says: Just as a carpenter can build a house with external implements, such as a hatchet, and cannot at all build without them, so also, Ātman is in Himself quite unattached and becomes an agent when associated with the senses, such as the sense of speech.

(Objection):—Then the Ātman becomes an agent in association with the Mano-maya composed of the inner sense (antah-karaṇa) and the external senses. What purposes does the Vijñāna-maya serve?

(Answer):— Not so; for on this principle, one might urge that even the carpenter is useless. Since the brāhmaṇas and others may build a house with hatchets and other implements, the carpenter would be quite useless. If the carpenter is necessary because of the absence, in others such as brāhmaṇas, — of the requisite knowledge and skill concerning the structure, then, here, too, there is a necessity for the Vijñāna-maya which has the power of knowing and acting in all matters of experience. And this two-fold power cannot pertain to Ātman, the real Self, except by false imputation; and we say that an attribute is falsely imputed to a thing only when that attribute really pertains to some other thing. A serpent, for instance, really exists in a hole, and it is for a serpent, actually existing in a hole, that a rope is mistaken. Accordingly, here too, the two-fold power of

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228 Prasna. Up. 4:8:9
229 Kaush. Up. 3-6, 8.
knowing and acting, which really inheres in the Vijnana-maya, is falsely imputed to the pure Conscious Atman. This is what the Vajasaneyins mean when they read:

"He is within the heart, surrounded by the pranás (senses), — the self-luminous Spirit (Puruṣa) consisting of knowledge. Becoming equal with it, He wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving." (Bri. Up. 4:3:7)

To explain:—Puruṣa (Spirit) is in Himself the pure self-luminous Consciousness; but, when in association with the upādhi of the Vijnana-maya, He becomes coextensive with it, i.e., limited by that upādhi; and with the wandering upādhi, He Himself wanders through the two worlds. Though Puruṣa does not Himself wander at all, He appears to wander because of the upādhi wandering. Indeed when a pot is carried from one place to another, the ākāsa within the pot is carried as it were to that other place, whereas in fact the ākāsa is not carried from the one place to the other. This idea is clearly conveyed by the words "as if." When the upādhi thinks, one imagines that the self-conscious Atman Himself thinks.

Similarly, when the upādhi moves, one imagines that the Ātman Himself moves. This wandering of Ātman in saṃsāra, this departing (from the body), going and returning, as caused by His connection with the upādhi, has been explained by the Blessed Bādarāyaṇa in the Vedānta sūtra (II. iii. 29). So that we must admit that even agency (karttva) really abides in the upādhi of the Vijnana-maya and is falsely imputed to the Ātman. The Vijnana-maya endured with agency is the inner self of the Mano-maya which arts only as an instrument.

(Objection): — The Mīmāṁsā-śāstra (the Vedānta-sutra) treats of the Liṅga-śarīra as made up only of the eleven senses (including Manas) and of prāṇa in its five aspects: No such principle as Vijnana has been spoken of in the work.

(Answer):— Though not described in connection with the prāṇas or senses (II. iv.), still it has been discussed in the previous section (II. iii. 29, et seq.) as the principle which is the source of the imputation of the attributes of saṃsāra to the jīvāman. Moreover, it is only by admitting the principle of intellect (Buddhi or Vijnana) that the number seventeen of the Liṅga-śarīra can be made up. The number enters into the Blessed Teacher's description of the Liṅga-śarīra: "the primary unquintupled elements of matter and their products make up the liṅga-śarīra composed of seventeen principles." And these seventeen principles have been enumerated by Visvarūpācārya230 as follows: "Five organs of perception and as many organs of action, five airs, with Buddhi and Manas, are the seventeen principles, as they say."

(Objection):— Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, and Chitta, these four are four different vṛttis or modifications of the one antah-kāraṇa or inner sense. Manas is the state of mind called doubt (saṃśaya); Buddhi, is that known as niścaya or determinate knowledge Ahaṅkāra is that known as Egoism; and Chitta is that known as imagination. These vṛttis or states of mind, as well as the objects they relate to, are enumerated by the Atharvanikas in the following words:

"Both impulse (Manas) and what impulse must seek, both reason (buddhi) and what one must reason, both that which makes things 'mine' and things that must be referable to 'me,' imagination (chitta) too and what must be imagined………"

(Prasna-Up. 4-8.)

All these different states of mind are momentary, and arise only at different times. Indeed, everybody knows that one characteristic feature of Manas is the non-simultaneity of its cognitions. Thus, the Mano-maya and the Vijnana-maya are mere vṛttis or states of mind and cannot therefore be regarded as distinct principles (tattvās) like the Anna-maya and the Prāṇa-maya; and since those states of mind arise at different moments, it is not right to regard the one as informing the

230 alias Suresvarācārya
(Answer):—You cannot say so; because, we hold that, as the agent (kāraṇa) and the instrument (kāraṇa) respectively, they are distinct principles. The four states of mind above referred to namely, doubt, determinate knowledge, egoism, and imagination are different functions of the instrument (kāraṇa). But the agent is quite a different principle from the instrument; and it has been here and there designated as Vijnāna (intelligence), or as Buddhī (understanding), or as Ahankara (Egoism). The Kaṭhas, for instance, designate the agent as Buddhī in the following passage:—

"Know the Self as the lord of the chariot, the body as only the car, know also the reason (buddhi) as the driver, and the impulse (Manas) as the reins. The senses, they say, are the horses, the objects for them are the roads." (Kaṭha-Up. 1:3:3.4.)

To explain:— The Chidātman, the Conscious Self, is the lord of the chariot. The charioteer is Buddhī, which is sentient in itself, the seat of agency, or the medium in which Consciousness (chaitanya) is reflected. Buddhī becomes sentient when impregnated with a semblance of the Chit or Consciousness; and thus becoming an agent, it is independent, and, like a charioteer, controls the senses by means of manas, as the charioteer controls horses by means of reins and thus drives the chariot of the body. Thus Buddhī and Manas are two distinct principles (tattvas). We are further given to understand that Buddhī is permanent and coeval with Manas. The word 'vijñāna' is also applied to the same thing in the same context:—

"Aye, the man who hath reason (vijñāna) for driver, holding tight unto impulse's reins, he reacheth the end of the journey, that supreme home of Vishnu." (Ibid. 1:3:9.)

In the same context, with a view to show that Buddhī lies within Manas, it is declared that the one is superior to the other:

"Beyond the senses are the rudiments; beyond the rudiments, impulsive mind (Manas); beyond this mind, the reason (Buddhi)." (Ibid 1:3:10)

So also, when the teaching of the Nirodha-samādhi, the samādhi which consists in the entire suppression of Manas, as a means of intuiting the Pratyagātman, the śruti declares that Buddhī lies inside Manas:

"The wise should sink speech into mind; this he should sink in the jñānātman (reason)." (Ibid 1:3:10)

That is to say, speech and other external senses should first be sunk in the internal Manas. Then Manas should be sunk in the conscious self, (jñānātman) which lies farther inward than even Manas. Here the term jñānātman denotes the Vijnāna-maya, not the Chidātman, the Supreme Conscious Self; for the latter is in the sequel mentioned as the sānta-ātman, the Tranquil Self. The first upādhi in which the Supreme Brahman, the True Self (Pratyagātman), enters into saṁsāra or transmigratory existence, is Vijnāna, the next is Manas, and outside even this Manas is Prāṇa. This order has been adopted by the Vājasaneyins in their description of saṁsāra:—

"The self is indeed Brahman consisting of reason (vijñāna), impulsive mind (manas), life (prāṇa), etc." (Bri. Up. 4:4:5.)

It is the principle designated as Intellect (Vijnāna or Buddhī) that, in common parlance, is spoken of as 'I.' While explaining, in His commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, the adhyāsa or false imputation, the Bhāṣyakara (the Commentator, Sri Sankaracharya) first illustrates the imputation in the case of son, wife, the physical body, the senses and manas; and then, as a further illustration, he refers to the imputation of the Vijnāna-maya in the following words:—

"Thus falsely identifying Aham-pratayin — the subject that feels as 'I with the Pratyagātman, the True Self, the Witness of all its conduct,' etc.
And so also, when commenting on the Vedānta-sutra I. i. 4, he says:—

"By the same Aham-kartri or principle of Ego, by the Aham-pratyayin— the subject that feels as ‘I,’ — all acts are accomplished, and he alone is the enjoyer of their fruits."

It is this agent and enjoyer or experiencer (kartri and bhoktri) that the [followers of the Nyaya school regard as the jīvātman. And the Saṅkhya say that the antaḥ-karaṇa is threefold: Manas, the eleventh of the senses, being one, Ahankāra the second, and the principle of Mahat the third. They define Ahankāra as "Egoism (abhimāna)." It is the Ahankāra, impregnated with a semblance of Chit or Consciousness (Chit-chhayā), which is here spoken of as Vijñāna-maya. The Mano-maya is penetrated by the Vijñāna-maya; and the Anna-maya is penetrated by the Prāṇa-maya which is itself penetrated by the Mano-maya; so that there arises, throughout the Anna-maya from head to foot, the notion of egoism, that " I am a human."

**Contemplation of the Vijñāna-maya.**

With a view to enjoin the contemplation of the Vijñāna-maya as a means of confirming the notion that the Vijñāna-maya is the self, the śrutis proceed to describe the form in which it should be contemplated:

4. He, verily, this one, is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him faith surely is the head, righteousness is the right wing, truth is the left wing, Yoga is the self, and Mahāḥ is the tail, the support.

He who has acquired (through Vedas) a determinate knowledge, first cherishes faith (sraddhā) as to the things he has to do. As faith is a primary element in all things to be done, it is the head as it were of the Vijñāna-maya.

Faith is the head because of the smṛti "Whatever is sacrificed, given, or done, and whatever austerity is practised, without faith, it is called unrighteous, O Partha; it is naught here or hereafter."231

'Srat' means truth, and 'dha' means to hold. Sraddhā is according to the Mahātmans, the conviction that the Pratyagātman (the Inner Self) alone is true. —(S)

'Reighteousness' and 'truth' have been already explained. Yoga — composure, meditation — is the self, the trunk as it were. As limbs serve their purposes when resting in the trunk, so it is only when a man is self-composed by the practice of meditation that faith, etc., enable him to acquire a knowledge of the Reality. Therefore, meditation (yoga) is the self (the trunk) of the Vijñāna-maya. Mahāḥ is the principle of Mahat,232 the First-born, "the Great Adorable One, the First-born" as the śrutis elsewhere says. As the support of the Vijñāna-maya, Mahat is the tail. Certainly, the cause is the support of the effects, as the earth is the support of the trees, shrubs &c. And the principle of Mahat is the source of all knowledge possessed by Buddh. Therefore Mahat is the support of the Vijñāna-maya self.

The agent who, as has been shown above, is so universally recognised by the Śrutis, by the Nyāya and other systems of philosophy, as well as by the ordinary experience of people, is the same principle that we all experience in consciousness as " I am the agent"; and that agent is here spoken of as the Vijñāna-maya. After the pattern of the Mano-maya represented in contemplation with a head, wings and so on, the Vijñāna-maya is of human form, represented alike with a head, wings, etc.

232 The Hiranyagarbha, the Sūtra — (A.).
Though faith, etc., are only vrittis or states of mind, and are, as such, functions of the Mano-maya, still, inasmuch as the Vijñāna-maya is the agent and is therefore the owner of the instrument (manas) and its functions, these states of mind may also form part of the Vijñāna-maya and may be represented as the head and so on. Sraddha is the highest faith that what is taught by the teacher and the scriptures is true and that the knowledge of the teaching and the means to that knowledge as prescribed in the śruti are fruitful. 'Righteousness' and 'truth' here stand for the agency concerned with those two states of mind. Yoga is the samādhī of both kinds, (1) the samprajñāta-samādhī and (2) the asamprajñāta-samādhī i.e., (1) the samādhī in which there still remains a consciousness of the distinction as cogniser, the cognised and cognition, and (2) the samādhī in which there is no such consciousness, the mind being entirely en rapport with the object of meditation and putting on the form of that one object exclusively. Yoga is, indeed, defined "as the restraint of all modifications of the thinking principle." 233 'Mahat' here means the principle of Mahat, the Hiranyagarbha, the first thing evolved out of the Avyakrita, — out of that Undifferentiated Root of matter which is described in the śruti as lying beyond the Mahat. This principle is the aggregate of all agents presenting themselves in the consciousness of individual beings as 'I,' and is therefore the support of the Vijñāna-maya. It is this principle of Mahat that is described in the Nrisimha-Uttara-Tapaniya as "The Universal Ego, the Hiranyagarbha." 234

5. On that as well there is this verse:

**Contemplation of Vijñāna as the Hiranyagarbha.**

(Anuvāka V.)

1. Intelligence accomplishes sacrifice, and deeds as well does it accomplish. Intelligence do all Gods worship as Brahman, the Eldest. If Intelligence as Brahman one knows, if from That he swerves not, in body sins forsaking, he all desires achieves.

Just as there are verses throwing light on the teachings of the Brahmaṇa concerning the Anna-maya, etc., so there is a verse concerning the Vijñāna-maya.

"Intelligence accomplishes sacrifice." It is indeed a man of intelligence who in due faith performs a sacrifice. Hence the agency of Vijñāna or Intelligence. And it performs deeds 235 as well. Because all is done by intelligence (Vijñāna), therefore the Vijñāna-maya self 236 is Brahman. All Gods such as Indra 237 contemplate the Intelligence-Brahman, who is the eldest because He is the First-born or because He 238 is the source of all activities. When thus contemplating, they identify themselves with the Vijñāna-maya Brahman. It is in virtue of the contemplation of this Brahman, the Mahat, that they are endowed with higher knowledge and power (jñāna and aisvarya). 239

It is the very Supreme Brahman, wearing of His own accord the coat of Buddhi or Intelligence, that

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233 Yoga-Suras 1:2.
234 Op. cit. 9
235 i.e., worldly acts.
236 Vijñāna has been described as the agent of all acts, with a view to establish a point of similarity between the "Vijñāna-maya and Brahman i.e., SūtrĀtman, the Cause of the universe, so that the former may be contemplate as one with the latter.
237 The Vanamala, a gloss on the bhāṣya, explains this to mean that the Devas practised this contemplation in a former birth and have become Devas in virtue of the contemplation.
238 as the Sūtrātman.
239 That is to say, this higher knowledge and power which they possess indicates that Brahman has been worshipped in their former birth.
is here spoken of as the Intelligence-Brahman. Buddhi illuminates pots and other objects by putting itself en rapport with them. Accordingly Buddhi should place itself en rapport with Brahman, the Absolute Conscioness, so that it may illumine Brahman. — (S). By speaking of Brahman as associated with Buddhi, the śruti shows that the seeker of mokṣa may easily attain a knowledge of Brahman— (A). Agni and other Devas always worship this Being, the Firstborn, the Intelligence-Brahman, with a view to attain Him. And the śruti says:

"He behind whom the year (samvatsara-Prajāpati) revolves with the days, Him the Gods worship as the Light of lights, as immortal Time." (Bri. Up. 4:4:16.)— (S).

It is this Intelligence (Vijñāṇa), acting as the agent of all works, that performs the Jyotishtoma and other sacrificial rites. What intelligence performs is falsely imputed to the witness thereof, the pure Conscious Ātman. Similarly, all worldly acts, such as those concerned with industry, trade, etc., are achieved only by Vijñāṇa. This intelligence in the individual, the agent in all worldly and spiritual activities, is worshipped by Indra and other Gods as one with Brahman, the First-born, the principle of Mahat designated as the Hiranyagarbha, whose body is the first-born and therefore the eldest.

"This one, the Mahat, the First-born, the Adorable" (Ibid 5:4:1)

"The Hiranyagarbha came into existence first." (Taitt. Sam. 4:1:8)

"He, verily, is the first embodied one; He verily is called Puruṣa; Brahma the first creator is He of all beings; He came first into being."

**The fruits of the contemplation of the Hiranyagarbha.**

If a person realizes this Intelligence-Brahman, and further, if after realisation he never swerves from that Brahman, for, it is possible that, in virtue of the external non-egos having been long regarded severally as the Self, he may fail, on occasions, to regard the Vijñāṇa-maya Brahman as the Self, that is to say, if he ceases to regard as Self the Anna-maya and the like, and dwells constantly in the thought that the Vijñāṇa-maya Brahman is the Self, then the following will be In this body he abandons sins. Indeed, all sins arise only from self-identification with the body; and it stands to reason that their cessation should be brought about by self-identification with the Vijñāṇa-maya Brahman, just as the shade is removed by the removal of the umbrella. Accordingly he leaves in the body itself all sins born of the body, all sins arising from self-identification with the body, and, becoming one in essence with the Vijñāṇa-maya Brahman, he attains completely all desires, remaining all the while as the Vijñāṇa-maya self.

Since the seat of all sins is the body, which is made up of nāma, rūpa, kriya—names (or thoughts), forms, and deeds, the removal of the body puts an end to all sins. Firm in the idea that "I am Intelligence and Intelligence alone," he deposits all sins in the body itself and attains all wishes. The devotee, becomes one with the Intelligence, the Hiranyagarbha, endued with all the wonderful powers of *Anima* and the like, and, as such, he attains all objects of desire in the world of effects, inasmuch as the world of effects is pervaded by the Cause, the Hiranyagarbha, the source of all fruits of action.— (S)

He who, like Indra and other Gods, is devoted to a contemplation of Brahman in the upādhi of Vijñāṇa, and he who, thus contemplating till death, never turns away from that Brahman, he, that is to say, who never breaks the continuity of the thought that "I am the Intelligence-Brahman," and who never feels like ordinary men that " I am a man, I am the doer and the enjoyer, I am happy, I am miserable" — he, while remaining in the body, is rid of all sins leading to the misery of future birth; and then, after enjoying in the Brahma-loka all pleasures, which he will compass by merely willing them, he will attain true knowledge and be finally released.

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240 Vide Minor Upanishads Vol 2. P. 135 - 136
How Brahma-vidyā is acquired by persons other than the twice born.

Though Indra and other Gods have no occasion to study the Veda, any more than women and the śūdras, still they have access to the Brahma-vidyā as taught in the Veda. The śūdras and women, on the other hand, are not entitled to receive Brahma-vidyā through the Vedas, though it may be taught to them through the smṛtis, puranas, and so on.

Devas acquire Brahma-vidyā through the Veda.

(Vedānta-sūtras I. iii. 26 – 33)

(Question):— "Whoever among Devas awoke, he indeed became That; and so with Rishis and men." Whoever among Devas knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman. Now the question arises, Are Devas qualified for Brahma-vidyā or not?

(Prima facie view):— It would seem that Devas, Rishis, and the like are not qualified for Vidyā. It is said that a Vedic command is meant for him alone who seeks the fruit of the act enjoined, who is competent to observe the command, who has the requisite knowledge to do the act enjoined, and who does not belong to the class of persons specifically excluded by the scripture. These qualifications are not all found in disembodied beings such as Devas. It cannot be urged that the Vedic hymns (mantras) and explanatory passages (arthavādas) speak of Devas as embodied beings; for, these texts are intended to point to what is taught in the main injunction, but not to what their words literally mean.

(Conclusion):— The arthavādas or explanatory passages which are subsidiary to injunctions (vidhis) are of three kinds: (1) Guṇa-vādas, figurative speech; (2) Anuvādas repetition; (3) Bhūtārthavāda, narration of real facts or past events.

To explain: The śrutis says:— "The sun is the sacrificial post;" "The Sacrificer is the prastara (the handful of kusa grass)." These texts being opposed to observed facts when literally understood, they should be interpreted in a figurative sense. The sacrificial post is spoken of as the sun because of its lustre, and the sacrificer is spoken of as the kusa grass because of his important share in the achievement of a sacrifice. Such passages are Guṇa-vādas. Again, "Fire is the antidote for frost", "The air is the swiftest God" such passages as these repeat merely what we have ascertained from other sources of knowledge and are therefore classed as Anuvādas. "Indra raised the vajra (thunder-bolt) against Vṛtra" since passages like this describe things as they are or as they happened and are opposed to what we have learnt from other sources, there is nothing to prevent the impression that what they teach is true, so long as we admit that the Veda is an independent source of knowledge. Such passages as these, which are spoken of as bhutarthavādas, incidentally teach as truths the ideas which they convey when their words are construed by themselves, while their main purpose is to contribute, to the meaning of the main injunctions, that part which can be made out by construing together the whole sentences. The same principle applies to the " mantras or original chants. Accordingly, on the authority of the mantras (hymns) and the arthavādas (explanatory and illustrative passages), we understand that the Devas and the like are embodied beings, and that, as such, they are competent to receive instruction. We can also easily conceive how, on seeing that their own glory is perishable and that there is a still higher one beyond, the Devas may seek for Brahma-vidyā. Even the requisite knowledge is within their reach; for, though they neither undergo the ceremony of upanayana nor study the Vedas, still, the Vedas present themselves to their vision. It is not, therefore, possible to exclude Devas from Brahma-vidyā. It may be granted that the

241 Bri. Up. 1-4-10.

242 The arthavādas come under the Brahmaṇa portion of the Veda, which is intended to explain the meaning and purpose of the mantras. Vide ante pp. 201-292
Saguna-Brahma-vidyā (contemplation of the conditioned Brahman), involving as it does the contemplation of a particular Deva as, for instance, Āditya, the sun is not meant for that particular Deva, because there exists no other God of the same description, and because the state of Āditya to be attained as the fruit of the contemplation has been already attained by him; but the title of the Devas to Nirguna-Vidyā, to the contemplation of the Unconditioned, is beyond all question. So, Devas are qualified for Brahma-vidyā.

**Is Brahma-vidyā accessible to the Śūdras?**

The title of the Śūdras (the caste of labourers) to the Brahma-vidyā is discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras (I. iii. 34-38) as follows:

(Question): — Is the śūdra, entitled or not to instruction in the Vedic wisdom?

(Prima facie view): — In the Samvarga-vidyā occurs a passage which reads as follows:

"Thou hast brought these, O śūdra, that by that means alone thou mayst make me speak." (Chan. Up. 4:2:5)

The meaning of the passage may be explained as follows: A certain disciple, named Janaśruti, approached the teacher named Raikva and offered to him, as presents, one thousand cows, a daughter, a necklace of pearls, a car, and a certain number of villages. Then Raikva addressed him thus: — "O Janaśruti, O śūdra, thou hast brought these things, one thousand cows, etc., thinking that, by thus presenting the daughter, etc., to me, thou wilt please my mind and make me impart instruction."

From this passage it would seem that even the śūdra who is beyond the pale of the three twice-born classes is qualified for Vedic Wisdom; for, like the Devas who are beyond the pale of the three higher castes, the śūdra also may be qualified for Brahma-Vidyā, though he is beyond the pale of the three higher castes.

(Conclusion): — There is a difference between Devas and the śūdras. Though Devas do not undergo the process of upanayana and adhyayana, of formal initiation and study, still the Vedas present themselves immediately to their minds as a result of good acts they had done in the past. The śūdra, on the contrary, has done no such deeds in the past, and the Vedas, therefore, do not present themselves immediately to his vision. Neither has he any occasion to study the Vedas, inasmuch as he is not entitled to initiation (upanayana). In the absence of one of the qualifications for treading the path of Vedic Wisdom, namely, the requisite knowledge, the śūdra cannot tread the path.

(Objection): — Then, how is it that Janaśruti, who is addressed as a śūdra, has been taught Vedic Wisdom?

(Answer): — The word 'śūdra' as applied to Janaśruti should not be understood in the sense in which it is commonly used. The word should be understood in its etymological sense, It then means he who, owing to the grief (Sk. 'sac') that he was wanting in wisdom, has run (Sk. 'dru') to the teacher to obtain it. It should not be urged that common usage should prevail as against etymology. For, the common usage can convey here no sense at all. In the whole story there are many indications, such as the ordering of the charioteer and other signs of wealth and power, showing that Janaśruti is a Kṣatriya.

(Objection): — If the śūdra be not qualified for Vedic Wisdom, then he cannot attain mokṣa despite his intense aspiration for it.

(Answer): — Not so; he may acquire Brahma-vidyā through the smrtis and the puranas and thereby attain mokṣa. Therefore we conclude that the śūdra is not qualified for the Vedic teaching. The Upāsaka liberated before death.
That the devotee who has realised by contemplation the Saguṇa (conditioned) Brahman is rid of merit and demerit even before death, has been established in the Vedānta-sūtras (III. iii. 27-28):

(Question):— Does the release from good and bad karma take place after death or before it, in the case of one who has by contemplation realised Saguṇa Brahman?

(Prima facie view):— It takes place after death on the way to Brahma-loka. The śruti teaches that it takes place after the crossing of the river that lies close to that loka: "He comes to the river Virājā and crosses it by the mind alone, and there shakes off his good and evil deed." (Kaushi. Up. 1-4.)

(Conclusion):— It is useless to carry the karma till the crossing of the river, since on the way to the loka there remains no fruit to accrue from the good and bad deeds, the attainment of Brahman being the only fruit yet to be realised. Moreover, in the case of the disembodied, there could be no means whereby to shake off the good and bad deeds which are alleged to have not been shaken off before death, inasmuch as it is impossible for the disembodied to do an act whereby to shake them off. It cannot be urged that the assertion that they are shaken off before death is unfounded; for the Tandins declare that the soul shakes them off as "the horse shakes off the hair." On these considerations, we should set aside the Kaushitakin's teaching that the good and bad karma is shaken off after the crossing of the river. Accordingly we conclude that it is before death that the upāsaka is released from his good and bad deeds.

The outcome of the study of the Vijñāna-maya.

Now the śruti proceeds to show that the realisation of the Vijñāna-maya by the upāsaka leads to the conviction that the Mano-maya is but a body:

2. Thereof, of the former, this one is the self embodied.

Of the former, i.e., of the Mano-maya, this one, namely, the Vijñāna-maya, is the self, having the Mano-maya for his body. In ordinary experience we know that a hatchet or other instruments cannot be the self. So also, as a mere instrument, the Mano-maya cannot be the self and must therefore be counted as a body.

CHAPTER 15.

The nature of the Ānanda-maya self

With a view to teach that even this Vijñāna-maya kośa is not the Self, the śruti proceeds to teach the Ānanda-maya kośa:

3. Than that, verily,— than this one formed of Vijñāna,— there is another self within formed of bliss: by him this one is filled.

To bring about the removal of the idea of agency from the Self, the Śruti proceeds to speak of the Ānanda-maya kośa, the consciousness of the Pratyagātman or the True Self, conditioned by the upādhi of the anta-karana manifested as joy, the fruit of knowledge and action. In the last chapter the Self has been described in His aspect as the agent, under the designation of the Vijñāna-maya; and now the śruti teaches of the Self in His aspect as the enjoyer, as the inner self of the Vijñāna-maya. Though pure in Himself, the Self becomes the enjoyer by avidyā as He identifies Himself with the upādhi of the Buddhi (antah-karana), this latter taking the form of love and so on.—(S)
The Ānandamāyā is not Brahman.

(Objection):— There are some soi-disant scholars,243 who contend as follows: This one, the Ānanda-maya kośa, is the Supreme Being Himself; for (in the sequel) Bhrigu and Varuna close their investigation at this stage, i.e., with the Ānanda-maya kośa. Further, the śruti often declares that ānanda or bliss is Brahman; and hence, too, the appropriateness of the designation Ānanda-valī given to this portion of the Upāniṣad. — (S)

(Answer):— We understand that the Ānanda-maya self here treated of is one of the evolved principles,244 as shown by the context and by the termination "māyā". The present section has, indeed, hitherto spoken of evolved principles, those formed of food and other material elements; and in the same series occurs this one, the Ānanda-maya kośa. And here the termination 'māyā' is used in the sense of product (vikāra), as it undoubtedly is in 'Anna-maya,' that which is produced out of food. We should therefore understand that the Ānanda-maya kośa is a product. If, on the contrary, we understand the termination māyā to mean 'abounding in,' the termination would be understood in two different senses in the same context. —(S) And without resorting to any such deviation, it is possible to make out a consistent meaning of the passage. —(A)

And also because of (the liberated one) passing into it. To explain: The śruti will teach (in the sequel) that he (who has realised Brahman as his own true Self) "passes into the Ānanda-maya self."245 We see (in the section whence the passage is quoted) that it is only into things outside the Real Self, only into the things of the evolved universe, that he is said to pass: and he passes into the Ānanda-maya self in the same way that he passes into the Anna-maya. And it cannot be that he passes into the Real Self; because it would be exposed to the context.246 And such a thing is also impossible:it is not possible for one to pass into one's Self, simply because there is no duality in one's own Self; and Brahman is the very Self of him that passes.

The act of passing, too, spoken of in the śruti, points to the conclusion that the Ānanda-maya is a product. That all products pass into or become merged in the Cause is a thing which we all can understand. To pass into the Paramātman must be either to pass beyond Him or to attain him. None, indeed, can pass beyond Brahman, the Supreme Self, as the śruti itself has clearly taught.247 And Brahman, the Supreme Self, is already attained, because He is the very Self: Iśvara never passes into His own Self by Himself; no athlete, however clever, can mount upon his own shoulder.— (S)

And also because of the incongruity of representing the Ānanda-maya 248 as possessed of a head and so on. — It is not of course proper to imagine a head and other members in the One described above,249 who is the cause of ākāśa, etc., who does not fall under the category of products. And the śruti expressly excludes from Him all specific attributes in such passages as the following:

"Transcending sight and self, beyond defining, void of base." (Tai. Up. 2-7.)

"Not great, not small." (Bri. Up. 3:8:8)

"Not thus, not thus." (Bri. Up. 2-3-6.)

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243 The Vṛttikara. — (A)
244 not the Supreme Brahman —(S)
245 Tait. Up. 2-8
246 In that section, the other things that the knower of Brahman is said to pass into are all outside the Real Self.
247 Kaṭha, Up. 4:9.
248 alleged to be identical with Brahman.
249 As the Real, Consciousness, the Infinite, i.e., as having no specific attributes and therefore not forming an object of contemplation.
Since the Supreme Reality is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, we cannot imagine Him as possessed of a head, etc. Moreover, Brahman will be described as "transcending sight and self", which is opposed to what is said here of the Ānanda-maya. — (S)

And also because of the incongruity of the mantra quoted here. Since no doubt can ever arise as to the existence of Brahman if He were identical with the Ānanda-maya self that is immediately experienced as composed of love and other parts, we cannot explain why the śṛuti quotes the mantra "Non-being verily does one become if he doth Brahman as non-being know." (Tai. Up. 2-6.)

Since the Ānanda-maya has a definite form, there is no room for doubt as to its existence. The śṛuti speaks of a doubt as to the existence of Brahman, and therefore Brahman is not identical with the Ānanda-maya. — (S&A).

Further, it would be incongruous to speak of Brahman as the support, i.e., as something distinct (from the Ānanda-maya) in the words "Brahman is the tail, the support."

Therefore, the Ānanda-maya falls under the category of products; it is not the very Supreme Self.

Bhrigu's closing of the investigation with the Ānanda-maya can be explained even on the theory that the Ānanda-maya is a product. Brahman is first described in the Ānandavalli'. And then with a view to teach the means of realizing Him, the śṛuti makes Bhrigu ask Varuna "Teach, Brahman, O Lord." Brahman, the end, having been already explained, the means of attaining the end remains to be taught. And these means are the five kośas (sheaths), because it is by an (investigation of) these kośas that one attains Brahman. By anvaya and vyatireka, by the method of conjoint presence and absence, applied to the five kośas, the Ātman is realised; and they are therefore regarded as the means of attaining Brahman. Thus, the Ānandavalli having explained the end, namely, the unity of the Self and Brahman, and the Bhrigu-valli having to concern itself only with the teaching of the means of attaining that end, it is but right that Bhrigu should close the investigation with Ānanda, which is the last step on the path of investigation.—(S)

(Objection): — The Bhrigu-valli does not enjoin the investigation of Brahman. On the contrary, it is concerned with the knowledge of Brahman Himself. Hence the reference at the outset (upakrama) to the knowledge, in the passage "The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme." — (S)

(Answer): — A person can be commanded to do only that thing which altogether depends on his will. But the right knowledge of Brahman does not altogether depend on any one's will.

The connection of the Bhrigu-valli with the knowledge of Brahman spoken of at the outset in the words "The knower of Brahman reaches 'the Supreme" — may be explained as merely pointing to the relation between knowledge and investigation as the end and the means. — (S)

Accordingly Varuna has taught to Bhrigu only the five kośas as the means by which to realize the nature of Brahman described in the Ānanda-valli; and as the remainder, — namely, the real nature of Brahman to be realized — can be known from the passages where it is described, Bhrigu stopped his investigation with Ānanda, the fifth kośa; but not because he ever meant that the Ānanda-maya is Brahman. — (S)

We even grant that the Ānanda, last spoken of in the Bhrigu-valli, is identical with the Supreme Brahman. Who has ever denied that the Bliss (Ānanda) which in its nature admits of no difference whatever is the same as Brahman? Bliss is verily the essential nature of the Supreme Self (Paramātman). But that bliss which manifests itself as love and so on cannot be identical with the Supreme Brahman. We call that Bliss Brahman, in which such distinctions as love and so on have no place, and which is quite beyond the reach of manas. As the five kośas have been excluded from Brahman as having their origin in ajñāna, it does not stand to reason to identify the Ānanda-maya-kośa with that Bliss which is beyond the reach of thought and word. — (S)

Just as the other kośas, such as the Anna-maya which are products evolved from Brahman, are
permeated by Brahman, the Supreme Bliss, so also is the Ānanda-maya permeated by the Supreme Bliss and hence spoken of as Ānanda-maya evolved from Ānanda.— (S)

Therefore the Ānanda-maya self here spoken of is the self associated with an upādhi, with the upādhi of Buddhī manifesting itself in the form of love and so on as the result of thought and action.— (S)

The bliss (Ānanda) here spoken of is the happiness which results from thought and action. Formed of this bliss-stuff is the Ānanda-maya. And this lies within the Viśeṣa-maya, because the śrutī declares that it lies within the Viśeṣa-maya, the source of all sacrificial rites and the like. The result of all thought and action being indeed mea-sūnt for the enjoyment of the enjoyer, it must lie within the Viśeṣa-maya, the source of all sacrificial rites250 And so the Ānanda-maya self must lie in the innermost recesses of the former kośas. Further, Vidyā (upāsana, contemplation) and karma are intended to secure love and other forms of bliss. It is a fact, indeed, that the object of all contemplation and action is to secure love and other (forms of happiness). Therefore, since love and other (forms of happiness) resulting (from thought and action) are very dear to the Self, it is but proper to say that this Ānanda-maya is within the Viśeṣa-maya. And, indeed, the Ānanda-maya, made up of the vāsanas (latent impressions) of love and other forms of happiness, presents itself to consciousness in svapna (dream) in association with the Viśeṣa-maya.

Being thus an object witnessed in svapna by the Pratyagātman, this Ānanda-maya cannot be Brahman Himself (S&A).

The bliss of the Ānanda-maya-kośa.

Bliss is the essential nature of the Supreme Brahman as declared by the śrutī in the words "Bliss as Brahman he knew;" (Taitt. Up. 3:6) "Consciousness and Bliss is Brahman." (Bri.Up. 3:9:8)

A form (vikāra) of this Bliss is the Ānanda-maya, the aggregate of love, joy, etc., to be mentioned below. It is true that the Bliss which is identical with Brahman undergoes no change; still, as ākāśa is imagined to undergo limitation through the upādhi or medium of pots, etc., so in the case of Bliss we may imagine a limitation through the sattvic vrittis of antah-kārana, through the states of the mind in its purity; and in virtue of this limitation Bliss puts on the form of love, joy and so on. This Ānanda-maya self is interior to, and is quite distinct from, the Viśeṣa-maya looked upon as the agent in all actions. By this Ānanda-maya is filled the Viśeṣa-maya described before. Just as motion which is a function of Prāṇa is experienced through-out the body permeated by the Prāṇa-maya, just as sentiency or sensation (jñāna-sakti) which is a function of manas is experienced throughout the body which is endowed with Prāṇa, and permeated by the Mano-maya, and just as the consciousness of agency "I am the doer" is experienced throughout the body which is endowed with both Prāṇa and Manas and permeated by the Viśeṣa-maya, so also special forms of pleasure are experienced throughout the whole body, in the hands, feet, etc., which are endowed with Manas and Prāṇa, and permeated by the Ānanda-maya. This is the idea conveyed by saying that the Viśeṣa-maya is permeated by the Ānanda-maya.

(Objection):— Like pleasure, pain also is experienced in the hands and other parts of the body.

(Answer):— What if it be experienced? It is experienced by reason of the body being permeated by the Mano-maya, which gives rise to the state of pain. Pain is a property of the Mano-maya, and pleasure is a property of the Ānanda-maya as will be clearly explained in the sequel.

Bliss is a positive state.

Now we have to discuss the question, what is Ānanda or pleasure? Is it a mere cessation of pain, or is it a positive state?

250 That is to say, the enjoyer comes after the agent. (A.)
(Prima facie view):— At first it may be supposed that pleasure is a mere cessation of pain, inasmuch as sensation of pleasure is felt on the cessation of the pain caused by hunger, thirst and sickness.

(Objection): — Pleasure is a positive state in itself; only it is lost sight of during the existence of pain, the opposite state; so that, if pleasure should manifest itself, it is necessary that pain should cease. Thus since the manifestation of pleasure and the disappearance of pain are simultaneous, the one is mistaken for the other.

(Answer):— No. On being rid of fever, we have no experience of any positive state of pleasure apart from the cessation of pain. Therefore, pleasure is nothing but the cessation of pain,

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: we conclude that pleasure is a positive state because of the consciousness of pleasure, experienced on hearing all on a sudden the musical strain of a lute when there is no consciousness of pain preceding. But if pleasure were a mere negative state, it should be felt as the absence of some pain, and the consciousness should therefore include a memory of that pain, since every consciousness of a negative state, such as the absence of a pot, the absence of a cloth, includes the consciousness of the thing that is absent. This point has been well established by the teachers of old.

Thus, because pleasure is presented to mind without any reference to pain, it is not the mere cessation of pain. That which is presented to mind without reference to pain, as for example, a pot cannot be the absence of pain.

Or, pleasure is a positive state because, like pain, it admits of higher degrees of intensity and these higher degrees of intensity of pleasure will be enumerated later on at length when dealing with the pleasure of an emperor, etc.

Theories of pleasure.

Having thus determined that bliss is a positive state, we have now to discuss the following point: what is bliss? Is it an act? Or a quality? Or a reflection of something else? Is it a conditioned form of something? Or is it unconditioned and independent?

(Prima facie view):— At first sight it may seem that it is of the nature of an act because the word 'ānanda' is derived from the verb 'nad,' to be pleased.

And when the Kaushātakins, enumerating the organs of action, speak of the organ of generation, they include, in the scope of its activity, the act of enjoying: "Having by consciousness taken possession of the organ of generation, he obtains enjoyment, amusement and offspring." (Kaush. Up. 3-6) Here the word 'enjoyment ' denotes the union of the several parts of the bodies in contact, pervaded throughout by the activity called enjoyment (Ānanda-kriyā) produced by the organs of generation. 'Amusement' is the pastime that is the natural concomitant of the union; the offspring is the generation of children which is the result of the union. Just as speaking and other kinds of activity are generated by the sense-organ of speech and the like, so also enjoying is a kind of activity generated by the sexual organ. Accordingly the Sāṅkhyaśas say: "Speaking, taking, walking, excreting and enjoying are the functions of the five organs." (Sāṅkhyā Karika 28) And the Atharvānīkas have also declared the objects reached by these organs of action along with their activities mentioned above:

"Both voice and what must be voiced, both hands and what one must handle, both organ of joy and what must be enjoyed, both organ of voiding and what must be voided, both feet and what must be footed." (Prasna Up. 4:8)

This act of enjoying generated by the sexual organ should properly be included in the Mano-maya, and it is not therefore right to speak of the Ānanda-maya as something interior to Vijñāna-maya.
(Conclusion):— No, because by ‘Ānanda’ we mean here something different from the act of enjoying you have referred to. As to the nature of this Ānanda different views are held by different schools of philosophers.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, ānanda or pleasure is a momentary affection produced in the ātman by contact with Manas, the ātman or Soul being himself the doer and the enjoyer. They hold that the nine affections such as under-standing, pleasure, pain, desire, etc., are characteristic attributes of the ātman.

The Sāṅkhyaśas hold as follows: The Ātman being free from all ties, desire and other affections are only modifications (parināma) of the three Guṇas of Prakṛti. Pleasure is a modification of the Sattva-guṇa, activity is a modification of the Rajo-guṇa, and error is a modification of the Tamoguṇa. And accordingly the Lord has said:

"Sattva attaches one to pleasure, Rajas to action, O descendant of Bharata; while, veiling knowledge, Tamas attaches one to error." (Gitā 14.9.)

Some followers of the Nyaya system hold as follows: The sensual pleasure is a mere pain because of its association with pain. What with the trouble of securing the objects of pleasure, what with the different degrees there are of pleasure, and what with its liability to destruction, one can easily see that sensual pleasure is necessarily associated with pain. But in the state of liberation (mokṣa) the eternal bliss which is an inherent attribute of Ātman is perceived in consciousness, which is likewise an inherent attribute of Ātman. Mokṣa is therefore an object of aspiration.

**The Vedantin's theory of pleasure.**

The Vaiśeṣika and other theories of pleasure which have been just described are founded on human speculation. But the śrutī has declared that the sensual pleasure is but a chip of that eternal Bliss which forms the very being of the Self and which is an entity by itself. The śrutī says:

"This is His highest Bliss; all other creatures live on a small portion of that Bliss."
(Bri.Up. 4:5:82)

While giving expression to his wisdom, a certain Yogin has stated this truth in the following words:

"Abiding all the while in the midst of the milk-ocean of bliss, I have foolishly spent all this time, tasting only such drops of the ocean as come forth from the fire of the sense-objects."

This chip of Bliss may be either a reflection of the original Bliss, or a bit of it chopped off. The theory of Reflection has been stated by the teachers of old as follows:—

"Now we shall discuss the sensual pleasure which contains within it a portion of Brahman's Bliss, and which forms the gateway to it. The śrutī has declared that the sensual pleasure is a fraction of Brahman's Bliss; that the Supreme Bliss, which is one indivisible homogeneous essence, is of this Self, that all other creatures enjoy but a portion of this Bliss. "Manas is subject to three kinds of states: namely, tranquil (śānta), violent (ghora), erring (mūḍha) The tranquil states are dispassion (vairāgya), endurance, generosity, and so on. The violent states are thirst, fondness, attachment, covetousness, and so on. The erring states are delusion, fear, etc. In all these states of mind Brahman's Consciousness is reflected, while in the tranquil states of mind His Bliss as well is reflected. The śrutī says that 'He becomes in form like to the various forms.' (Katha Up. 5:9)

"The Vedānta-sutra (III. ii.18) compares Brahman's manifestations in the various forms to the reflected images of the sun. 'The Self of all creatures is one alone, and He
appears in one and many ways like the moon in water. The image of the moon is imperfect when reflected in dirty water, whereas it is quite perfect when reflected in clear water. Similarly, Brahma reflected in mental states is of two sorts. Owing to the impurity of the violent and erring states of mind, Brahma's bliss is unmanifested in them, while, owing to their partial purity. His consciousness is reflected in them. Or, to illustrate more aptly: It is only the heat, not the light, of fire that passes into water, however pure it may be; similarly, consciousness alone is manifested in the violent and erring states of mind. On the other hand, both the heat and the light of fire pass into a piece of wood; and, just so, both Consciousness and Bliss are manifested in the tranquil states of mind.252

Thus the theory of Reflection has been described. Now as to the theory of Separation. That bliss which constitutes the essential being of the jīvātman, and which is self-manifested in the upādhis or vehicles of Consciousness the body, the senses, etc., is the bliss that has been chopped off, as it were, from Brahma. As the object of highest love, jīvātman is bliss itself. That the bliss is the essential being of the jīvātman and that he is the object of highest love is declared by the Vājasaneyins as follows:

"This Self, who is nearer to us than anything, is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else." (Bri. Up. 1:4:8)

This Self,— who is immediately experienced in the notion "here I am," who is the witness of the body, senses, etc., this self is the innermost principle of our being; and surely it is dearer than wealth, sons and all else, these being of varying degrees of nearness. These varying degrees of nearness are explained by the Vārtikakāra as follows:

"Sons are dearer than wealth; dearer than sons is one's own body; the senses are dearer than the body; and prāṇa is dearer than the senses; dearer even than prāṇa is the Self beyond."

Wealth and other things which are outside the Self are objects of love because of their being subservient to the Self. But love for the Self is the highest because it is absolute. All this has been illustrated in the Maitreya Brahmana by many examples such as the following:—

"Verily, a husband is dear to one, not because of love for the husband; but, because of the love for the Self, the husband is dear."(Bri.Up.2:4:5)

And all the examples mentioned in this connection have been compiled by a writer as follows:—

"A husband, a wife, a son, wealth, cattle, Brahmans, Kṣatriyas, worlds, Devas, Vedas, creatures all these are beloved for the sake of the Self."

As the object of genuine love, the Self is in his essential nature the true Bliss itself; and as dwelling in each body separately, the Bliss-ātman becomes divided as it were. As the genuine Bliss, the Bliss-ātman is the original, whose reflections enter into tranquil states of the mind when thinking of agreeable objects such as wealth, sons, etc. These reflections are as false as the images reflected in water or in a mirror; and though the bliss which has become separated by the upādhis is real, still, it has the fault of limitation. Consequently, neither the reflected image of Bliss nor its detached bits can constitute the genuine Bliss. On the contrary, that Bliss is real which constitutes the essential nature of Brahma, and which is not subject to any kind of limitation. Accordingly in the dialogue between Nārada and Sanatkumara, the Chandogas declare as follows:—

"...... This bliss, however, we must seek to know.'

251 Brahmabindu-Up
252 Vedānta-Panchadasi, 15:1—11
'Sir, I desire to know the bliss,'  
'The Infinite is bliss. There is no bliss in the finite, The Infinite alone is bliss, and the Infinite alone, verily, we must seek to know 'Sir, I desire to know the Infinite.'  
'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, cognizes nothing else, that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, cognizes something else, that is the finite. The Infinite is immortal, and the finite is mortal.'" (Chan. Up. 7:23:1)  

Nārada asked Sanat-Kumara how he might reach the end of grief; and the latter said that, to reach the end of grief, the real nature of bliss should be investigated. Nārada undertook to investigate it, and the master taught him that the Bhūman, the Infinite, was Bliss. "Bhūman" means infinity. It has been said above that since neither the context nor any accompanying word suggests a limitation in its literal sense, the word 'Brahman' denotes absolute or unlimited greatness. So here, too, the word 'Bhūman' means absolute infinity. We see that, people find pleasure, not in limited wealth, but only in the vastness of wealth. So, the Infinite is Bliss, and certainly the Infinite alone should be investigated. Seeing that Nārada was prepared for the investigation, Sanat-kumara defined the Infinite in the words "Where one sees nothing else," etc. In our ordinary experience, one sees colour by the eye, i.e., one sees something distinct from oneself. This is one aspect of the triputi or triple consciousness, made up of the seer, what is seen, and the act of seeing. There are other aspects: such as the one made up of the hearer, what is heard, and the act of hearing; the one made up of the cogniser, what is cognised, and the act of cognising; and so on. That which does not admit of triple consciousness in any one of its aspects is the Infinite. The triple consciousness in its several aspects obtains only in forms set up by Māyā; and all such forms are finite. Of the two, the Infinite is imperishable and the finite is perishable. The finite things in this universe of duality contain seeds of pain and are therefore painful in their nature; whereas the Non-dual, is devoid of all seeds of pain and is therefore Bliss itself. This Infinite, in Its genuine nature as Bliss, is felt in the suṣupti and samādhi states in which the triple consciousness is altogether absent. But on awaking from suṣupti and samādhi, i.e., in the jāgrat and vyutthāna states which are associated with triple consciousness, the universe of finite objects, embraced in the consciousness of the ordinary world, is experienced in its painful nature by the enlightened sage as well as by the unenlightened man of the world. Thus as they are mixed with pain, both the limited bliss, which constitutes the essential nature of the jīva, and the reflections there of in the mental states are not genuine. The Infinite alone is the genuine Bliss.  

**Contemplation of the Ānanda-maya.**  
Now the śruti proceeds to teach of the form in which the Ānanda-maya, —which is a vikāra or modified form of the genuine Bliss just described, composed of love, joy and other forms of Bliss should be contemplated, so that the conviction that the Ānanda-maya is the self may be strengthened.  

4. **He, verily, this one, is quite of man's shape. After his human shape, this one is of man's shape. Of him, love itself is the head, joy is the right wing, delight is the left wing, bliss is the self, Brahman is the tail, the support.**  

Love, which springs up at the sight of a beloved son and the like, is the head, as it were, of the Ānanda-maya self, because of its prominence. Joy is the exultation caused by the acquisition of a beloved object. The same exultation raised to a high pitch is called delight.  

The Ānanda-maya, lying within the Vijñāna-maya, is none other than he who feels "I am happy, I am the enjoyer." After the pattern of the Vijñāna-maya, made up of a head, &c., the Ānanda-maya, too, is of human form. Love, joy and delight are reflections of Bliss manifested in the Sattvic states of mind. Delight is caused by the benefit derived from a beloved object.
Bliss is happiness in general; and it is the self,\textsuperscript{253} as it were, of love and other forms of bliss, because it runs through them all. Bliss (ānanda)\textsuperscript{254} is the Supreme Brahman. And this Bliss is manifested is that state of mind (antah-kāraṇa) which is brought about when sons, friends, or such other objects of regard, are presented to consciousness in virtue of good karma, when the veil of Tamas (darkness) has been lifted and the mind is tranquil.

Under the action of Dharma, darkness vanishes from Buddhi. The more does it vanish, the more is the Buddhī self-collected, and the greater is the happiness.—(S)

This is what is known among people as the sensual pleasure (vishaya-sukha). And this pleasure is impermanent because the karma which brings about such a state of mind is impermanent.

As the antah-kāraṇa is more purified by austerity (tapas) which is calculated to dispel darkness, by contemplation (vidyā), by chastity and pious devotion (brahma-charya), and by reverential faith (sraddhā), it becomes more and more free (from Tamas) and becomes more and more tranquil; and then the Bliss manifests itself in a higher and higher degree and expands more and more. The śruti says in the sequel:

"Nectar, indeed, is he. Nectar, indeed, possessing, he becomes a thing of Bliss."

(Tait. Up.2-6.)

"He, verily, it is who bestows bliss." (Ibid)

"All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss." (Bri.Up. 4:3:32)

Thus bliss is of different degrees of intensity, owing to the variety of karma producing it.—(S)

The bliss here referred to is that which is reflected in ajiṇāna, the upadāna or material cause of the vrittis or vehicles of consciousness described above. Or, it maybe that the limited bliss, forming the essential nature of the jīvātman, the original counterpart, is reflected in the vehicles described above, (namely, love, joy, delight, etc.).

Accordingly the śruti will describe in the sequel different degrees of bliss, rising in scale a hundredfold higher and higher as the subjugation of desire (kāma) is more and more complete. Of the Ānanda-maya self, thus admitting of different degrees of intensity, the Supreme Brahman Himself the object of the śruti being to give us to understand what Brahman, the Supreme Reality, is I is the tail, the support.

That one perfect Brahman wherein this increasing bliss attains its highest degree, is the tail, because it is the basis of all. — (S).

It is the Supreme Brahman, forming the main subject of discourse, that has been described as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite;" and it is to impart a knowledge of the Supreme Brahman that the five kośas, beginning with the Ānā namaya, have been described. The Supreme Brahman, the Innermost One lying within them alibis also the Self of them all. It is this non-dual Brahman that constitutes the support, i.e. the ultimate basic reality underlying all duality which avidyā has set up.

Since the Ānanda-maya leads ultimately to unity, there does exist the One, the non-dual Brahman, who is the ultimate basis of duality imagined by avidyā, who is the tail, the support, of the Ānanda-maya.

The infinite and genuine Bliss is Brahman, and is the basis of all the rest; thence come the finite bliss of jīvātman and the reflections thereof. Love, joy and delight are no doubt states of the mind which is an instrument, and are therefore external to the Vijñāna-maya who is the agent. Still, inasmuch as they contain the reflections of the inner finite bliss of jīva or of the inner infinite bliss of Brahman, the Ānanda-maya Self is regarded as interior to the Vijñāna-maya.

\textsuperscript{253} i.e., the centre.

\textsuperscript{254} which is devoid of all duality.
Concentration in Brahman attained.

On realizing intuitively by contemplation the Ānanda-maya Self, the mind attains concentration in Brahman Himself who has been figuratively spoken of as the tail of the Ānanda-maya; and then, as conveying no reflection of any kind, the mind surely realizes the true nature of Brahman, as the śruti says, "With sharp and subtle mind is He beheld." (Kaṭha Up.3:12) It is like one who mistakes the radiant rays of a gem for the gem itself, and who, on approaching, out what the real gem is. This circumstantial realisation of the true nature of Brahman is the fruit of the contemplation (of the Ānanda-maya), and therefore, without mentioning any other fruit, the śruti concludes by merely teaching the true nature of Brahman, — who is the basis of the whole universe, in the words "Brahman is the tail, the support." Accordingly, the śruti proceeds to cite a verse which describes Brahman, the chief element in the Ānanda-maya-kośa:

5. On that, too, there is this verse:

As bearing on this teaching, too, the following verse may be cited:

The śruti cites the following verse, in order that, through that verse, the student may understand what has been already taught.—(S)

Brahman, the one Being.

(Anuvāka 6.)

1. Non-being, verily, does one become if he as non-being knows Brahman. If one knows that Brahman is, then they regard him as being. Thus (reads the verse).

He who knows Brahman to be non-being becomes equal to a non-being himself. That is to say, he attains no human aspirations, any more than one who is non-existent.

If a person knows that Brahman is non-being, though He exists in the form of the Self, he, as identifying himself with the kośas, surely becomes non-existent. The Self does not indeed exist as a kośa without existing as Brahman. How can the (illusory) serpent have a being except as the rope which alone is real? —(S).

If, on the contrary, a man knows that there exists Brahman, who is the basis of all differentiation, who is the seed of all evolution, and who in Himself is characterized by no distinguishing features (we know of ...)

Now, it may be asked, whence at all arises the supposition that Brahman does not exist? We reply: it arises from the fact that Brahman is beyond sensuous experience. The mind (buddhi), trained as it has indeed been to regard that as existing which falls within the range of sensuous experience and which is but a creature of speech, has also come to believe that what is contrary thereto, i.e., what is beyond sensuous experience is non-existent. People, for instance, understand that a pot exists, when it is brought within the range of experience, and that it does not exist, when it does not come within the range of experience. Similarly, here too, one may suppose that Brahman does not exist. Hence the supposition "if one knows that Brahman is."

What of him who knows that Brahman exists?

The śruti says:— Because of his knowledge that Brahman exists, those who know Brahman regard him as being; they regard that, being one with Brahman, he is the Supreme Being and Reality. That is to say, others regard that he is Brahman Himself.

Suppose a person knows Brahman, the One, the Existent, as distinguished from the kośas which are non-existent; then, the Self (the witness) being none other than Brahman, the Brahmattas (i.e., devotees of Brahman) regard him as Being. Such being the case, one should abandon all thought of the kośas which have been created by ajñana, and should resort solely to the Paramātmans, the
Supreme Self, who is free from all change, who has neither a beginning nor an end. Being Paramātman, the Self can never be a non-being, because there is no non-being except as kośas; hence the śruti "Death, verily, is the non-being;" (Bri.Up. 1:3:28) "He exists' thus alone should one regard;" (Kaṭha Up. 6:13) "Existent, verily, this at first was." (Chan. Up. 6:2:1). Nothing can really have a being anywhere except in Brahman, the Self. –(S)

So far as sensuous experience goes, all living beings think that a pot exists, only with reference to that pot which can be used for bringing water, which can be seen by the eye, and so on. If the contrary were the case, they think that no pot exists. So, with this kind of experience firmly ingrained in his nature, man thinks that Brahman, who is beyond sensuous experience, does not exist. As opposed to him, he who has the power of discrimination thinks that all matter and all material things which fall within the range of sensuous experience are non-existent, because of his conviction of their illusory nature, founded on the śruti, reason and experience. He believes in the existence of Brahman beyond sensuous experience, as proved by the śruti and other authorities. The man who regards Brahman as non-being will be himself non-existent; for, it has been shown that the Anna-maya and other kośas are non-self, and he does not admit the existence of Brahman beyond the kośas. Suppose a man knows Brahman who is beyond the five kośas; then, that very Brahman is his essential being, and therefore, in virtue of his knowledge of the existence of Brahman, those who have exhaustively studied the scriptures say that he, this discriminating man, has a being, has a Self.

Or, (to interpret the verse in a better way): He who understands that Brahman does not exist has no faith in the righteous path of any kind based upon distinctions of caste and social order (varṇa and āśrama), and he therefore comes to believe that there is no such path, the path being in fact intended solely for the realisation of Brahman. So that, being an heretic (nāstika), he is regarded by people as unrighteous. As opposed to him, he who understands that Brahman exists believes in the righteous path based upon the distinction of caste and religious order, and therefore resorts to it in accordance with the ordinance; and consequently the wise call him a righteous man, a follower of the right path. This is, in effect, to say that we should know that Brahman exists.

He who believes that Brahman is non-existent is certainly unrighteous. Since the whole path of righteousness based upon distinctions of caste, religious order, and the like is intended to lead to a knowledge of Brahman, he who condemns the whole path of righteousness by way of denying the existence of Brahman is a thorough unbeliever. On the contrary, him who believes in the existence of Brahman, they regard as righteous, as the pillar of the righteous path. This is the idea which the Kaṭhas express in the words "He exists: thus should one regard."

Brahman, the Innermost Self.

Now the śruti proceeds to direct the upāsaka to firmly dwell in the idea that the Ānanda-maya is his Self, while teaching the aspirant of right knowledge that the Self is identical with the Real Brahman:

2. Thereof, of the former, this one, verily, is the Self embodied.

Thereof — of the former — i.e., of the Vijaṇā-maya, this one, surely, — namely, the Ānanda-maya, — is the embodied Self, i.e., the Self dwelling in the Vijaṇā-maya body.

That one who has no body, who is the one Existence, the Non-dual, the Partless, is the Self of all other selves mentioned above, ending with the Ānanda-maya. There is no other Self beyond —(S).

There can never arise a doubt that this one (the Ānanda-maya) does not exist. But, as to Brahman, there is room for the doubt that He does not exist, since He is devoid of special conditions of
existence and is common to all alike.\(^{255}\)

This very Ānanda-maya is the master of the Vijñāna-maya, the latter being the body of the former. So far as the upāsaka is concerned, the passage should be construed to mean that the Ānanda-maya is the Self. As to the aspirant after true knowledge it should be construed as follows: The Brahman just spoken of as the tail is the Self of the former i.e., of the quaternary made up of love, joy, delight and bliss; the quaternary constituting the body, and Brahman who has the quaternary for His body being the Self. The self-same idea has been expressed by the Vārtikākāra. Vide ante p. 425 11. 4-10.

**The Ānanda-maya construed as the Paramātman.**

The meaning of this section has been discussed in the Brahma-sūtras (I.i.12—19). One school of commentators has interpreted the sūtras as follows:

(Question): — In the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad, five principles the physical body, Prāṇa, Manas, Buddhi, and Ānanda, have been mentioned under the designations of Anna-maya, Prāṇa-maya, Mano-maya, Vijñāna-maya and Ānanda-maya, every succeeding one being interior to the one preceding it. Now a doubt arises as to whether the Ānanda-maya, the innermost of them all, is an entity of the world (samsarin) or the Supreme Self (Paramātman).

(Prima facie view):— It would seem that the Ānanda-maya is an entity of the world; for, the word "Ānanda-maya" means a modified form (vikāra) of Ānanda and is therefore applicable only to an entity of the world. This word cannot be applied to the Supreme Self, the Immutable one. Moreover, the Ānanda-maya has been spoken of as made up of five members: "Love is the head, joy is the right wing, delight is the left wing, Bliss is the self, Brahman is the tail, the support." Love is the pleasure which arises at the sight of an object of desire. The pleasure caused by the acquisition of that object is joy, and that which arises from its enjoyment is delight. Bliss is pleasure in the abstract, which manifests itself in the upādhi of ajñāna during suṣupti and the like.

That bliss which is unconnected with any upādhi or condition whatsoever is Brahman. The five members of the Ānanda-maya, spoken of as love and so on, are represented in imagination as the head, etc., only to facilitate our contemplation and comprehension. Of the Ānanda-maya thus represented in imagination, the head and the two wings form three members; the central portion is spoken of as the self and constitutes the fourth member; while the tail, the lower part, the support, the basis, constitutes the fifth member. Certainly the partless Paramātman can have no parts. Therefore, the Ānanda-maya is surely a samsarin, an entity of the world.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing, it is argued as follows: The Ānanda-maya is the Paramātman, because of the repetition. Again and again the Ānanda-maya is referred to in this section of the Upaniṣad, in the passages like the following:

"This is the enquiry concerning bliss." (Taitt. Up. 2:8)

"Into this self formed of bliss he passes on." (Ibid)

Frequent reference is a mark of the main subject of discourse; and we have shown that the one main theme of all Upaniṣads (Vedānta) is Brahman, and Brahman alone. Moreover, the section opens with Brahman in the words:— "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," (ibid) and again He is spoken of as the creator of the universe in the words "He created all this;" and therefore the Ānanda-maya is Brahman. It should not be urged that the word ending in the termination "maya," and meaning "formed of bliss" cannot be applied to Brahman; for, the word may also mean

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\(^{255}\) Here the commentator tries once more to impress the notion that the mantra quoted above refers to Brahman, but not to the Ānandamāyī as the Vṛttikākāra contends.
"abounding in bliss." And as to love, etc. being spoken of as members of the Ānanda-maya, it is due to the upādhis, such as perception of the sense objects. Wherefore the Ānanda-maya is Brahman.

Such is the construction put upon the Vedānta-sūtras (I.i.12—19) by one school of the Vedāntins.

The Ānanda-maya construed as the jīva.

Now the same sūtras will be interpreted according to the orthodox (Sankarācharya's) school of the Vedānta:—

(Question):— It has been said that "Brahman is the tail, the support." Here, a doubt arises as to whether the śrutī means that Brahman is a member of the Ānanda-maya, or that Brahman is to be known as an independent entity in Himself.

(Prima facie view):— It would appear that Brahman should be comprehended as a member of the Ānanda-maya, inasmuch as in common parlance the term 'tail' is applicable only to a member of the body.

(Conclusion):— The word 'tail' does not mean a member of the body. It is that long appendage which is attached to the bodies of some animals. And the Ānanda-maya cannot be said to be possessed of a tail, which is only a part of the Anna-maya or physical body of animals such as the cow. Since the word 'tail' does not thus admit of a literal interpretation here, we should understand it in a figurative sense the cow 'basis'. Brahman is the basic reality underlying the Ānanda-maya or jīva, since Brahman is mistaken for jīva. And the Ānanda-maya cannot be the Supreme Self (Paramātman); for, even if we understand the word "Ānanda-maya" as signifying "abounding in bliss" it would imply some admixture of pain. Wherefore, as the basic reality underlying jīva, Brahman is presented here as the main thing to be comprehended. Hence the frequent reference to Brahman in such passages as "Non-being verily does one become if he as non-being knows Brahman;" as also the opening words of the section, "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme." So that, on the principle of interpretation discussed in the case of the Puruṣa spoken of in the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad, it is Brahman alone that is here presented for comprehension, but not the evolution of ākāśa, etc., nor the Anna-maya and other koṣas.

Brahman, the sole theme of the Upaniṣads.

The principle of interpretation above referred to is discussed as follows in the Vedānta-sūtras (III. iii. 14-15).

(Question): In the Katha-Upaniṣad, occurs the following passage:

"Beyond the senses, verily, are objects; and beyond objects is Manas; even beyond Manas is Buddhi; beyond Buddhi is Ātman, the Mahat; beyond the Mahat is Avyakta; beyond Avyakta is Puruṣa; beyond Puruṣa there is nothing whatsoever; That is the farthest, That the Supreme Goal." (Op. cit. 3-10,11.)

The meaning of the passage may be explained as follows: A person first craves in manas for sense-objects and then reaches them through the senses. Now, the senses being internal with reference to external objects, every-body can understand that the former transcend the latter. But as objects of desire, these sense-objects are internal, or subjective, in relation to the senses. And beyond these objects of desire is the desire itself, a state of mind, which is quite internal or subjective. Buddhi, the subject experiencing these changes of manas, transcends the changes of manas, and beyond even Buddhi is the Self, the Hiranyagarbha, designated as Mahat, the upādāṇa or material cause of Buddhi. Transcending even Mahat is the material cause thereof, called Avyakta, the Ajītāṇa lying at the root of all; and even beyond Avyakta is Puruṣa, the Supreme principle of Consciousness, the basic Reality underlying Avyakta. And there exists naught beyond Puruṣa. Puruṣa is the last rung in the ladder of ascending transcendentality and is the Supreme Goal to be reached by all aspirants of
the Highest Good.

Now a doubt arises as to whether the whole series of things enumerated here, or Puruṣa alone, is presented by the śruti for comprehension.

(Prima facie view):— The whole series of things beginning with the senses is presented by the śruti for comprehension, equally with Puruṣa, the main subject of discourse. Otherwise, the exposition of the series would be in vain. It may perhaps be urged that to hold that the section expounds so many things would tantamount to the admission that it treats of different propositions. We answer that the section certainly treats of different propositions, it being impossible to make out that only one single proposition is here treated of.

(Conclusion):— Since knowledge of Puruṣa brings about the cessation of ajñāna which is the source of all saṃsara, it is Puruṣa alone that forms the subject of discourse. Accordingly, as a means of attaining this knowledge of Puruṣa alone, Yoga has been specially taught in the sequel in the following words:

"This one, the Self, hid in all beings, shines not; but He is seen with sharp subtle buddhi by them that see the subtle." (Ibid 3:12)

This passage may be explained as follows: As the innermost being in all, the Self lies hidden and does not manifest Himself to him whose mind is turned outward. On the contrary He manifests Himself to Him whose mind is turned inward. For him whose mind is thus turned inward and who always seeks to see the subtle Reality, it is possible to see the Self by means of Buddhi which by practice of Yoga has attained to one-pointedness and is able to grasp the subtle. It cannot be objected that, if Puruṣa alone be the subject of exposition, the description of the whole series of things would be useless; for, this series is the means whereby the mind which is turned outward is enabled gradually to approach Puruṣa. Therefore, Puruṣa alone is the thing to be known.

Conclusion.

In accordance with this principle of interpretation, we understand that the evolution of ākāśa, etc., has been expounded with a view to show that Brahman is the Infinite, and that the five kośas the Anna-maya, etc., have been described with a view to show that Brahman lies in the cave. It is Brahman, and Brahman alone, that is presented everywhere for comprehension. We therefore conclude that Brahman is Real, Consciousness, and Infinite, and that, as lying in the cave, He is also the inner-most Self of all.
PART 2
(ANANDAVALLI OR BRAHMAVALLI)
(CONTINUED)

BRAHMA-VIDYĀ EXPLAINED.

CHAPTER I.

QUESTIONS.

The purpose of the sequel. It has been said that "the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," not the ignorant man who holds to the unreal (asat).

With a view to demonstrate this truth, the śruti proceeds with the sequel.—(S).

Now the following question arises: — If Brahman is common to — is the essential being of— both the enlightened and the unenlightened alike, the attainment or non-attainment of Brahman may apply to both alike, there being apparently no ground whatever for a distinction between the two. Now, the purpose of the sequel is to show wherein the distinction between the two lies.— (S & A).

Or, since the mind (antah-karana) of the one in the darkness (of ignorance) is wedded to mere forms of Evolution (kāryamātra), i.e., since the unenlightened man identifies himself with the sheaths (kośas), he cannot recognise the existence of the Supreme Self, though He is a self-evident Being. So the sequel is intended to prove the existence of the Self who is beyond all creation, as also to answer the two questions that follow here. — (S & A).

Having finished the exposition of Brahman, i.e., the section of śravaṇa (hearing), the śruti next proceeds with the section of manana (reflection) dealing with the rationale of the Brahma-vidyā, for the benefit of those who are engrossed in outward forms. Now, at the beginning of the section, the śruti formulates the questions that arise in the mind of the disciple.

Owing to perversity of the disciple's intellect (buddhi), many doubts arise in his mind with reference to the teachings of the master; and the śruti therefore raises here such questions as are naturally suggested by what has been taught already. That the process of manana (reflection) follows that of śravaṇa (hearing master's exposition), as suggested here by the word 'then,' is quite clearly expressed elsewhere by the śruti:

"The Self, verily, my dear, should be heard, reflected and meditated upon." (Bri. Up.2:4:5)

These two processes are further explained by the smṛti in the following words:

"The Self should be heard (studied) through the words of the śruti, and reflected upon in reason."

Their purposes are distinguished by the śruti in the following words:

"The heart's knot is dissolved, all doubts are cut asunder." (Mund. Up. 2:2:8)

When the true nature of Brahman has been learnt from instructions (upadeśa), the heart's knot, i.e. the illusion of oneness of the Inner Self with the antah-kāraṇa, is dissolved. Doubts are cut asunder by reflection (manana), in the process of finding the rationale of what has been taught in the instruction. Therefore questions are raised here embodying the doubts to be cut asunder.

**The Questions of the Disciple.**

Hence, then, the questions that follow: whether does any one who knows not, departing, goes to that
region? Or, does any one who knows, departing, attain that region?

Because such is the case\(^{256}\), these then are the disciple's questions following upon the teacher's exposition.\(^{257}\)

Because Brahman is the Self of both the enlightened and the unenlightened and is unknowable, the disciple addressed the following questions to the teacher after hearing his exposition. — (S).

Brahman, indeed, is the same in the enlightened and the unenlightened, as He is the cause of ākāśa,\(^{258}\) etc. Therefore, it may be supposed that the attainment of Brahman is possible even in the case of the unenlightened. Hence the question: “Does even he who knows not, hence departing\(^{259}\), attain that region, the Supreme Self (Paramātman)? Or does he not attain?” This second question should be here understood, because of the (Sanskrit) plural\(^{260}\) "questions"; two other questions referring to "him who knows."

If, though Brahman is the cause of both alike (of him who knows and of him who knows not), he who knows not does not attain Brahman, one may suppose that even he who knows does not attain Brahman. Hence arise two questions:— Does he who knows Brahman, hence departing, attain that region? Or does he, like him who knows not, not attain? This latter question is the second one (concerning him who knows).

...... Brahman who is the cause of the whole, universe and who, as jīva, has entered all bodies, is present in the unenlightened as well as in the enlightened. If, therefore, the latter attains Brahman, the former too may attain Him. If the unenlightened cannot attain Brahman, even the enlightened may not attain Him.

Or,\(^{261}\) I only two questions are here meant, concerning (respectively) him who knows not and him who knows. The plural, however, holds good, as embracing a third question suggested by implication.— To explain:

The words "if he as non-being knows Brahman" and "if , one knows that Brahman is," (vide ante p. 491), give rise to the doubt whether Brahman exists or not. Hence the first question which naturally arises close upon the master's instruction is: “Does Brahman exist or not?” Brahman being the same in all, a second question arises, Does he who knows not attain Brahman or not? If he who knows not does not attain Brahman who is the same everywhere, then, even he who knows, it may be supposed, does not attain Brahman. Hence the third of the questions which follows: Does he who knows attain Brahman or not?

That is to say, if the unenlightened does not attain Brahman, what evidence is there to show that the enlightened attains Brahman.

\(^{256}\) because Brahman is the same in all.

\(^{257}\) From the foregoing exposition, the disciple has come to understand that the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme and that He who is thus attainable through knowledge is the source of all being, is the essence of all, is the all.

\(^{258}\) as He is the source of all jīvas associated with matter (bhūtas)— (A).

\(^{259}\) i.e. after death.

\(^{260}\) showing that three or more questions are meant here.

\(^{261}\) The answer begins with the words "He desired," which cannot be construed as an answer to any of the four questions. Hence the alternative interpretation.
CHAPTER 2
BRAHMAN'S EXISTENCE AS CREATOR.

The purpose of the sequel.

In the sequel, the Upanishad proceeds to answer the foregoing questions. And now, first of all, it proceeds to establish the very existence (of Brahman)

As the two other questions presuppose the existence of Brahman, the śruti proceeds to establish, first of all, the existence of Brahman. — (S).

It has been said, "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman." Now, as it is necessary to explain how Brahman is Real, the śruti proceeds with this, the present section. Brahman's existence being once established, His reality is also established. It is, indeed, taught that "The Existent is the Real;"\(^{262}\) so that, existence being proved, reality also is proved.

(Question):— How do you know that the sequel is intended for this purpose (of proving the reality of Brahman by proving the existence of Brahman)?

(Answer):— By closely following the tenor of the texts. It is, indeed, this idea\(^{263}\) (of existence) which runs through the succeeding passages such as the following:

"They declare That as Real."
"If this Ākāśa, (this) Bliss, existed not."

As an answer to the disciple's first question, i.e., the question concerning the existence of Brahman, the Guru proceeds to describe creation (sṛṣṭhi) with a view to prove the existence of Brahman.

Brahman exists.

(Objection):— Now, it may be supposed that Brahman is altogether non-existent. Why?—Because, that which exists, such as a pot, is perceived in actual experience; that which does not exist, such as the rabbit's horn, is not perceived. Brahman, likewise, is not perceived; and so, not being perceived in actual experience, He does not exist.

(Answer):— Not so; for, Brahman is the Cause of ākāśa &c.

(To explain):— It cannot be that Brahman does not exist. Why? For, it is taught (in the śruti,\(^{264}\) that ākāśa and all else in the creation have been born of Brahman. It is a fact of common experience that that thing exists from which something else is born, as, for example, clay and the seed, which are the sources of a pot and a tree. So, being the cause of akāśa &c-, Brahman exists. Nothing that is born is ever found to have been born of non-existence. If the whole creation, comprising names and forms and so on, were born of non-existence, it would likewise be non-existent and could not therefore have been perceived (as existing). But it is perceived (as such). Therefore Brahman exists. If the creation were born of non-existence, it would, even when perceived, have been perceived only in association with non-existence (i.e., only as non-existent). And such is not the case. Therefore Brahman exists. Elsewhere in the words "How can existence be born of non-existence?" (Chha. Up. 6-2-2.) the śruti has declared from the point of reason\(^{265}\) the impossibility of the birth of existence from non-existence. It therefore stands to reason to say that Brahman is existent and

\(^{262}\) i.e. existence and reality are synonymous. —(V).

\(^{263}\) But not the idea of the wise or the unwise attaining or not attaining Brahman. —(V).

\(^{264}\) In the words, "All this He created."

\(^{265}\) By adding the fact that non-existence does not run through the objects of experience. —(V).
existently only.

Moreover, the non-existent cannot be the Cause, because it has no existence. The Cause is that which exists before the effect. Non-existence (the void, sunya) cannot therefore be a cause.

(Objection):— Brahman, too, cannot be the Cause, because He is immutable (kutastha).

(Answer):— Just as the magnet, while immutable in itself, can produce an effect, so also, Brahman may be the Cause. If the cause be a thing that is ever active, then, where is room for anything new?

(To explain):

If it be held that the cause is a thing which is ever active, then, it is tantamount to saying that the cause is immutable, not undergoing change. If, on the contrary, again, it be held that the cause is a thing which is active only on a particular occasion, the cause must have been previously inactive, i.e., immutable. (S&A).

Brahman's Creative Will.

(Objection):— If Brahman be the cause like clay and the seed, then He would be insentient.

(Answer):— No; for, Brahman is one who has desires. Indeed, in our experience, there exists no insentient desires. And we have stated\(^\text{266}\) that Brahman is Omniscient; and it is therefore but right being having to speak of Brahman as one who has desires.

Brahman is independent of desires.

(Objection): Then, as one having desires, Brahman, like ourselves, has unattained objects of desire.\(^\text{267}\)

(Answer): No, because of His independence. Brahman's desires do not rouse Him to action in the same way that impure desires influence others and guide their action. How then (are they)? They are true (satya) and wise (jñāna)\(^\text{268}\); in themselves, one with Himself\(^\text{269}\), and therefore pure. By them Brahman is not guided. It is, on the other hand, Brahman who guides them in accordance with the Karma of sentient beings. Brahman is thus independent as regards desires. Therefore, Brahman has no desires unattained.

And also because Brahman is independent of external factors. (That is to say), unlike the desires of other beings — (the desires) which lie beyond them\(^\text{270}\), which are dependent on the operation of Dharma and other causes, and which stand (for their realisation) in need of additional aids such as the body (karya, the effect, the physical body) and the sense-organs (kāraṇa, the Līṅga-śārīra) distinct from the beings themselves, Brahman's desires are not dependent on external causes and the like. -What then? They are one with Himself\(^\text{271}\).

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\(^{266}\) While commenting on the passage "Real, Consciousness, and Infinite is Brahman."

\(^{267}\) If Īśvara had desires caused by Maya, then, like the jīva. He would not be ever-satisfied as He is said to be.

\(^{268}\) Like Brahman, (V).

\(^{269}\) Brahman as reflected in māyā is the cause of the Universe. His desires are forms (parināmas) of māyā and are ensouled by Consciousness which is not overpowering by ignorance, avidyā, &c. They are therefore true and wise, like Brahman. As onewhith Brahman, as the upadhi of Brahman, they are unaffected by sin (adharma) and are therefore pure. — (A).

\(^{270}\) Beyond the control of those beings. — (V).

\(^{271}\) i.e. Their fulfilment is dependent on Himself alone. — (V.)
The Mimamsa\textsuperscript{272} answers the foregoing objection by comparing His desires to sportive acts and the respiratory process. He is also distinguished from jīvas by the fact that His desires are never frustrated. So says the śruti: Of unfailing desires and of unfailing purposes He is." (Chan.Up.8:1:5) It is this truth that the Upanishad teaches in the following words:—

4. **He desired: many may I be, may I be born!**

He, — the Ātman, the Self, — from whom ākāśa was born, — desired, many may I be!

It is the Pratyagātman, associated with Avidyā i.e., the Pratyagātman not fully realizing Himself, and who was spoken of before as the source of ākāśa, —it is this Pratyagātman that is here said to have desired; for, without avidyā, kāma (desire) cannot arise in any being whatever. — (S & A).

_He:_ That Brahman who was spoken of as "the tail", “the support” of the Ānanda-maya-kośa, and who was described as "the Self embodied" of the five sheaths from the Anna-maya to the Ānanda-maya. He, this Ātman, who, prior to _srṣṭhi_, was one alone without a second, desired, in virtue of association with His own potentiality (śakti).

That is to say, the Maya-śakti, that wonder-producing potentiality which is ever present in Ātman, modified itself into the form of desire. Certainly, without Maya, there can arise no desire in the One Immutable Principle of Consciousness.

**Duality is an illusion.**

The śruti describes the form of His desire in the words "many may I be".

(Question):— It may be asked, how can one thing become many, except by association with other things?

We see that the multiplicity of ākāśa arises from association with upādhis, with other things such as a pot. But, how can Brahman, who was without a second, become many?

(Answer):— The śruti answers in the words, "may I be born."

That is to say, may I reproduce Myself increasingly, may I assume more forms than the one which has been hitherto in existence.

Brahman does not indeed multiply Himself by giving birth to things quite distinct, (as the father multiplies himself) by giving birth to a son. How then? It is by the manifestation of the name and form which have remained unmanifested in Himself.

The father who gives birth to a son remains a separate being. He himself is not born as the son. Similarly, in the present case, one may suppose that Brahman, the Creator of the universe, is not Himself born as the universe, and ask, how is it that the śruti represents Brahman as having desired to be so born? The answer is that name and form which come into being are not quite distinct from Brahman. Just as the waves manifesting themselves in the ocean are not quite distinct from the ocean, so also, name and form, which first reside unmanifested in Maya, Brahman's inherent potentiality (śakti), come into manifestation afterwards, and remaining one with Brahman in His essential nature as existence, become themselves manifested as existent. This very idea is expressed by the Vajasaneyins in the words "All this was then undeveloped. It became developed by name and form." (Bri. Up. I-4-7.) Hence the propriety of the words "may I be born," the māyah of Brahman manifesting itself in the form of the universe.

When name and form which have remained unmanifested in the Ātman become differentiated in all their variety,\textsuperscript{273} in no way abandoning their essential nature as Ātman, \textsuperscript{274}not existing in space and

\textsuperscript{272} Vide Vedānta-Sutras, II. i. 33.

\textsuperscript{273} As Tanmatras, as gross elements of matter, as the Mundane Egg, and as various forms of being within It.— (V).
time apart from Brahman, then, by this differentiation of name and form, Brahman becomes manifold. In no other way can the partless Brahman become manifold, or become small. It is, for instance, through other things that ākāśa appears small or manifold. So it is through them alone that Ātman becomes many. Indeed there exists nothing other than Ātman, no not-self however subtle, removed and remote, whether of the past or the present or the future, as distinguished from Brahman in space and time. Therefore name and form in all their variety have their being only in Brahman. Brahman's being is not in them. They have no being when Brahman is ignored and are therefore said to have their being in Him. It is through these upādhis (of name and form) that Brahman is manifested to us as all categories of being, as the knower, as the objects known, as knowledge, as words, as objects.

Just as a burning faggot, while remaining of one shape, puts on various shapes owing to some external causes, so also the multiplicity of the Supreme Ātman is due to the illusion of names and forms. So, it is only by way of manifesting Himself in these illusory names and forms that the Lord must have desired to be born. These names and forms residing in the Ātman spring forth into manifestation in all variety from the Ātman, the Lord, in their due time and place, subject to the Karma of the (sentient beings in the) universe. It is this daily differentiation of names and forms from out of Vishnu which the śruti represents as Brahman becoming manifold, and which is like a juggler (mayin, magician) putting on manifold forms. Indeed, Brahman being without parts, it cannot be that He actually becomes manifold. Wherefore, it is only in a figurative sense that Brahman is spoken of as becoming manifold, in the same way that ākāśa becomes manifold through jars and other objects extending in space. — (S).

**Brahman's Creative Thought.**

5. He performed tapas.

With this desire, He, the Ātman, performed tapas. 'Tapas' here means 'thought', as śruti elsewhere says "whose tapas consists of thought itself" (Mund. Up. 1-1-9.). As he has attained all desires, the other kind of tapas cannot be meant here.

The tapas (penance) of the common parlance, belonging as it does to the world of effects, cannot be meant here. The penance the śruti here speaks of is the Īśvara's thought concerning creation.— (S).

To the Supreme Lord (Paramesvara) the various forms of the penance of self-mortification can be of no avail.

Such tapas He made; that is to say, He thought about the design of the universe to be created.

Sa taptvā

6. Having performed tapas, He sent forth all this, and what of this more.

Having thus thought, He emanated all this universe, as the karma, or the past acts of sentient beings, and other operative circumstances determined, in time and space, with names and forms as we experience them, as they are experienced by all sentient beings in all states of being. He emanated all this and whatever else is of the same nature.

The Īśvara, having pondered according to the śruti, emanated the universe, according to the desires and acts of the sentient beings to be born, in their proper forms and shapes. (S).

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274 i.e., remaining all the while as one with the Self, their source, not existing as distinct from the Self.

275 Through name and form.

276 When it is shaken or whirled round

277 Self-mortification through body and mind.
A summary of the foregoing argument.

Here the existence of Paramātman is established on the following grounds:

- that He is the Being who willed.
- that He is the Being who thought.
- that He is the Being who created.

The Nihilist (asad-vādin) holds as follows: It may be inferred from experience that all that exists is composed of names and forms, as, for instance, ākāśa and other elements of matter, and the bodies composed of those elements of matter such as those of Devas and animals. But the Paramātman is distinct from name and form, as the śruti elsewhere says:

"He, who is called Ākāśa, is the revealer of name and form. He, in whom these are, is Brahman." (Chan.Up.8:14:1)

As to the assertions such as "Paramātman is Brahman," they cannot go to establish His existence, inasmuch as they are mere fancies (vikalpas) any more than the words "the rabbit's horn" can establish the existence of the rabbit's horn. Patañjali says: —

"Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but corresponding to which there is no object in reality." (Yoga Śūtras 1:9)

So, Brahman, being devoid of name and form, is also devoid of existence which is always associated with a name and a form. This view is quite on all fours with the statements of the śruti such as the following:

" Non-existent, verily, this at first was." (Tait. Up. 2:7:1)

"Whence words recede." (Ibid 2:9:1)

"Then follows the teaching 'not thus, not thus"'. (Bri. Up. 2:3:6)

"Neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long." (Bri. Up. 3:8:8)

So, we conclude that Brahman does not exist.

As against the Nihilist who argues thus, the śruti establishes the existence of Brahman by an argument in the following form:

The Paramātman, as the Being who desired, must be existent, just as a man who desires svarga and the like exists.

He is also the Being who thought, and therefore, like other thinkers such as a king's minister, He must be existent. He is also the creator, and therefore, like all other creators such as a potter who makes pots, He must be existent. The very existence you have asserted of names and forms is itself Brahman as we understand Him, the names and forms being mere illusions set up by māyā in the substratum of Brahman who alone is existent. As to the texts of the śruti referred to as supporting the Nihilist's position, their meaning will be explained in the sequel.

CHAPTER 3.

BRAHMAN'S EXISTENCE AS JĪVA.

Brahman entering the Universe.

The śruti now presents another argument to prove Brahman's Existence. Brahman, as the Being who entered the creation, is existent, like a person who enters the house or the like.
7. This having sent forth, into that very thing He then entered'

Having emanated the universe, what did He do? In answer the śruti says: Into that very universe which was created, He then entered.

He, the Lord of Lords, the Mayvin, the Wonder-worker, having created the universe, then entered that very universe by the same māyā or mysterious power, in the same way that a garland is said to enter the serpent, &c., for which it is mistaken. —(S).

Having emanated all forms (sarīras) in existence, from the Hiraṇyagarbha down to unmoving objects, the Paramātman entered those very forms which He brought into being.

No literal interpretation of entering is possible.

Now we have to enquire278 how He entered into the creation. Did He who emanated the universe enter into it in the self-same form (as the Emanator) or in a different form?

(Question):— Which of the two appears to be reasonable?

(Answer):— The participial form, 'having sent forth', indicates that the Emanator Himself entered into the universe.

(The opponent):— This does not stand to reason if Brahman is the Cause (of the universe) as clay (is of pots &c.), inasmuch as the effect is one with the cause. (To explain): Since the cause itself is transformed into the effect, it does not stand to reason to say that the cause enters once more, separately, (into the effect), subsequent to the production of the effect, like one that had not already entered it. Indeed, over and above the transformation of clay in the form of a jar, there is no entering of clay into the jar. So we explain as follows: Just as clay may enter into the jar in the form of dust, so also, the Ātman may enter in a different form into the universe composed of names and forms. And the śruti also says elsewhere "Having entered in this form, in the form of jīva." (Chha. Up. 6-3-2)

(Answer):— This does not stand to reason, for Brahman is one. No doubt a cause like clay may, in the form of dust, enter the jar, because clay is multiple in its constitution and is made up of parts, and there is a place not already filled in by dust. On the contrary, Ātman is one, and is, moreover, partless; and there is no place not already filled in by Him. Wherefore the entering of Brahman cannot be explained (in the way suggested above).

(The opponent):— Then, how is the entering to be explained? And the entering must be a thing not opposed to reason, as it is taught in the śruti, in the words "into that very thing He then entered." So, let us explain it by supposing that Brahman is made up of parts. As having parts, it is quite possible that He entered into the names and forms in the creation in the form of jīva, like the hand entering the mouth. As to the śruti speaking of Brahman's entrance, let us suppose that Brahman is finite. Then, like the hand entering the mouth, the entering of Brahman is possible.—(S).

(Answer):— This explanation will not do; for there is no void.

(To explain): When the Ātman transformed Himself into the effect (universe'), there can exist no place for Him to enter in the form of jīva, no place which is devoid of Ātman, over and above the place of the effect (universe) consisting of names and forms.

Whether finite or infinite in space, the cause does pervade the effect and so there is no place devoid of Ātman which the Supreme may enter in the form of jīva.— (S).

(The opponent):— He enters the cause itself. That is to say, the Lord (as jīva) so enters the universe

278 This enquiry is put in a simpler and clearer form by Sayana in the sequel. Vide.p.532,ff.
which He created that it finally assumes the form of the cause. — (S).

(Answer):— Then he would no longer be the jīvātman, just as a jar ceases to be a jar when it enters into clay (i.e. when it becomes clay).

The opponent's suggestion is tantamount to saying that this passage teaches that the effect is not an effect, that it is one with the cause, just as the passage " I am Brahman " teaches that the Ego is one with Brahman. Then where is the effect, the universe, for Iśvara to enter? — (S. & A.)

Besides, as the śruti itself says "Into that very thing (the universe, the effect] He then entered ", it will not do to hold that He (as jīva) entered into the cause.

(The opponent):— It may be that Brahman becomes another kind of effect. (To explain): By the words "Into that very thing He then entered", the śruti means that Brahman first becomes an effect in the form of jīva and then becomes transformed into another kind of effect consisting of names and forms.

The Brahman's entering may be explained to mean that jīva, an effect of Paramātman, becomes transformed into ahankāra and other effects. — (S. & A).

(Answer):— No, because it is opposed to reason. A pot, for instance, cannot become another pot. Moreover, it is opposed to the śruti which speaks of distinction: it is opposed to the texts which presuppose a distinction between jīva and the universe consisting of names and forms. And also because of the impossibility of mokṣa if jīva becomes (the universe of names and forms). Certainly no one becomes that very thing from which he is to be released; no person, such as a robber, who is bound (with a chain), becomes that chain itself.

(An opponent):— Let us explain the passage to mean that Brahman transformed Himself as the external and the internal; that is to say, that Brahman Himself, the Cause, became at once transformed in the form of the receptacles such as the bodies (śarīra) and also in the form of the jīvas who are to be contained within those bodies.

(Answer):— This will not do; for entrance is possible only in the case of one who stands outside. We cannot indeed conceive that, when one thing lies within another, the same thing enters into that other. One can enter a thing only when he is outside that thing; in that sense alone is the word 'enter'

'understood in common parlance, as when we say, 'he built the house and entered it.'

(An opponent):— The entering may be likened to reflection, as in the case of water and sun's reflection in it.

(Answer): — No; for Brahman is infinite and incorporeal. We can only conceive a finite and corporeal object being reflected in another object which is transparent, as the sun is reflected in water. On the contrary, we cannot understand how the entrance of Ātman may be likened to reflection, seeing that He is incorporeal, that He is the Cause of ākāśa &c., that He is infinite, and that there can exist no object removed from Him in space, which may serve as the reflecting medium.

The true import of the passage.

(The opponent):— If so, then there is no entering at all. Neither do we find any other way (of explaining the passage). But the śruti says, "into that very thing He then entered;" and for us the śruti is the source of knowledge as regards super sensuous matters. However much we try, we cannot make anything out of this passage.

(Another opponent):— Ah! then, as conveying no meaning, we have to ignore279 altogether the passage, "This having sent forth, into that very thing He then entered."

279 like a child's babble. (S).
(Answer):— No; for the passage is intended to treat of quite a different thing altogether. Why all this discussion beside the point? For, this passage is intended to treat of quite a different thing with which the śruti is at present concerned. We should call that to our mind. The śruti (Anandavalli) started with the following words:

"The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme."

"Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman. Whoso knoweth the one hid in the cave .... "

This last passage is intended to teach that Brahman is no other than the Ātman, the Self. And to show that Ātman is no other than Brahman, Ātman is qualified "This Self is Brahman." Thus, when these two negative aspects of their identity have been recognized, then liberation is attained. Because the knowledge productive of this result is intended to be taught here, therefore the non-dual Brahman is said to be hidden in the ' cave, ' is said (in the mantra and brāhmaṇa) to have entered the mind (antah-kāraṇa). (S).

It is knowledge concerning Brahman that is to be imparted here; and it is the subject with which the śruti is concerned. And with a view to impart knowledge of Brahman, the śruti treated of the emanation from Him of the effects, from the ākāśa down to the physical body; then the knowledge of Brahman was begun (in the section which treats of the five kośas or sheaths). There the śruti taught that within the Anna-maya self there is another self formed of Prāṇa, that within the latter there is the Mano-maya self, and that within this latter there is the Vijñāna-maya self, and thus the śruti taught that Brahman dwells in the cave of intelligence (Vijñāna). Again the śruti taught that therein lies the Ānanda-maya self, the Self in a specific form. Further on, seeing that it is only through cognising His manifestation as the Ananda-maya that the Ātman the finality of ever-increasing bliss, " Brahman, the tail, the support ", the basis of all differentiated manifestation, (in Himself) devoid of all differentiation can be recognised in that very cave, He is represented* to have entered into it.  

It is the Undifferentiated One who is to be cognized in this cave of intelligence (buddhi) which is the source of all differentiation; the entrance is therefore an imaginary representation, not an actual fact. — (S).

Not elsewhere, indeed, is Brahman cognized, because He is in Himself devoid of all special manifestation. Our experience shows that it is only association with a specific condition that enables us to cognize Him. Just as Rahu (the eclipsing shadow) is cognized only when in association with a specific object such as the sun or the moon, so also it is association of the Ātman with the cave of intelligence (anta-karāṇa) that causes the cognition of Brahman, because of the proximity and luminous nature of the intelligence (antaḥ-karāṇa). And, just as the cognition of jars and other objects is associated with light, so also the cognition of Ātman is associated with the light of a buddhi-pratyaya or intellectual state.

Because in the luminous intelligence (antaḥ-karāṇa), we perceive Brahman by illusion as the seer, hearer &c., therefore the Upanishad represents Him as having entered the intelligence, with a view to teach the identity of the Self and Brahman. (S&A).

So the theme with which the Upanishad started in the passage "the one hid in the cave", in the cave which causes cognition of Brahman, is again treated of in the words "this having emanated, into that very thing He then entered," this latter passage forming a sort of commentary on the former. He who emanated ākāśa etc., emanated this universe around us and then entered into it. He is cognized

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280 In the passage under consideration — (V)
281 The cave of Vijñāna-maya.— (V).
within, in the cave of intellect (buddhi), in such specific forms of manifestation as seer, hearer, thinker, knower, and so on. It is this which constitutes His entrance.

Moreover, in the words "Thereof, this one is the Self embodied," the sruti teaches that He who has entered the heart and He who has not entered the heart are identical, for the Supreme Brahman Himself has assumed the form of jiva by entering into the five kośas. This explains why the sruti, in the sequel of this Anuvāka, teaches the absence in the Supreme Self of all conditions ascribed to Him such as agency connected with the act of entering. Therefore, with a view to teach the oneness of Kṣetrajña and Īśvara by discarding all distinction between the two, He who has not actually entered the universe is represented to have entered it.—(S).

Therefore, Brahman, the Cause, exists. So we should know Him as existing only.

**A clear summary of the discussion.**

[The foregoing discussion is put in a simpler and clearer form by Sāyāṇa as follows:]

Let us now enquire: Did the Paramātman, who was the Creator, enter the universe in the same form as Creator or in a different form?

(One answer):—The participial form, "having emanated" shows that creation and entrance are the acts of one and the same agent and that therefore Brahman entered as Creator Himself.

(Objection):—This view cannot be maintained; for, in the case of a material cause (upadāna), like a clod of clay, the entering is impossible. The same clod of clay which has been transformed into a pot cannot itself enter the pot. Similarly, how is it possible for the Creator, who transformed Himself as bodies, to enter into those very bodies?

(Another answer):—Then, let us suppose that Brahman entered in a different form. Just as clay, in the form of dust, may enter a pot produced out of a clod of clay, so also, if Brahman's entrance as Īśvara is not possible, let Him enter in the form of the jīva.

(Objection):—Not so. The non-dual cannot have two forms. Even granting this possible, there can be no place for Brahman to enter. As the material cause, He is already present in all the bodies; and therefore, as there is no place devoid of the Paramātman, where can He enter?

(Another answer):—It may be that He as jīva enters the Paramātman (the cause) Himself who is present in those bodies (as their material cause).

(Objection):—No; for, in the words "into that very thing He then entered," the sruti teaches that He entered the bodies that were created.

(Another answer):—The effect, namely, the body that was created, is again transformed into another effect in the form of jīva, and this transformation is spoken of as entrance.

(Objection):—No; for, we do not find one transformation such as pot being itself transformed into another transformation such as a dish.

(Answer):—Brahman's entering may be likened to reflection, like the sun's reflection in water.

(Objection):—No; for Brahman is infinite and incorporeal, and there is no medium of reflection removed from Him in space. The orb of the sun, which is limited in space and corporeal, becomes reflected in a medium such as water removed from it in space. On the contrary, Brahman is not limited in space, nor corporeal; neither is there any medium (upādhi) whatever which is removed from Brahman in space. Therefore in no way can Brahman's entering be explained.

(Conclusion):—This entering should be explained like the creation of the universe. Just as the Supreme Lord (Paramesvara) created by the power of His māyā this universe of inconceivable design, so also by the same power of māyā He may have entered it.
Here one may say: The śruti does not mean that this mysterious (māyāmaya) creation of ākāśa, etc., should be regarded as real. The śruti only means that the effect does not exist apart from the cause any more than a jar exists apart from clay, and merely refers to the universe as set up by illusion (bhṛantī), with a view to establish the infiniteness of Brahman already stated. Similarly, then, we argue that the śruti, having first explained the proposition that Brahman is 'hid in the cave' by teaching at the end, in the exposition of the five sheaths, that 'Brahman is the tail,' refers to the entering of Brahman, which is a mere illusion, only with a view to explain more clearly the same thing over again. Just as a person who builds a house and enters it is found to remain within it, so also, Brahman is perceived, in the intellect (buddhi) situated in the heart-lotus, in specific aspects as seer, hearer, knower, and so on, as though He created ākāśa and other things in the universe and then entered within it. This truth is figuratively represented as Brahman entering the universe.

Another passage of the same import.

This entering is taught by the Vajasaneyins in the following words:—

"He, this one, here entered, up to the very tips of the finger-nails, as a razor in a razor-case, or as fire in a fire-place (fire-wood)" (Bri.Up. 1:4:7)

The meaning of this passage is explained very clearly in the Vārtika-sara as follows: —

The One Life and Its aspects.

'He' refers to the Witness (Śaksin), the illuminator (Witness) of the Unmanifested 'this one' refers to him who dwells in (or limited by the upādhi of) the body immediately perceived by all.

(Objection): — The Adhiṣṭhāna, the Supreme or Basic Consciousness, being non-dual, whereas the dweller in the body is associated with duality (body), it is impossible to speak of them as one, in the words "He, this one."

(Answer): — No; for, in the case of one who (by illusion) does not know the true nature of the Real, nothing is impossible, as witness the ether (ākāśa) perceived by the eye as blue like a cloth of blue colour. The question of possibility or impossibility arises in the case of things known through proper evidence, not as regards things set up by illusion.

By the word 'here' are denoted the bodies, from the Sutra (Hiranyagarbha) down to unmoving objects. In these bodies, this one, the jīva, is very clearly perceived; and this perception of Chit (Life, Spirit, Consciousness) as jīva, — made up of a semblance of Consciousness (chidābhāsa) and nescience (tamas)— is denoted by the word 'entered.' Life (chit) in its semblance enters into becomes directly associated with the Pratyak-moha, the ignorance of the True Self; and this semblance is present in all transformations or effects of that ignorance and constitutes the upādhi or condition in which Life (Chit) enters the universe. Justas the scarlet colour of the japa flower is falsely ascribed to the white crystal (sphatika) stone, so also this entering of the semblance of Life is falsely ascribed to Life. Thus, the Supreme One, having created by His own māyā the universe from the Sutra down to unmoving objects, entered it in a form which is a mere semblance of Himself. How far He entered is taught in the words "to the very tips of the finger-nails," the presence of Life in the body up to the very tips of the finger-nails being indicated by the body being felt warm up to that limit.

Life exists in the body, pervādīng it both in a general aspect and in particular aspects: and this twofold existence is referred to in this passage by the two illustrations. Just as fire exists in the firewood, pervādīng the whole of it, so also the Ātman exists in the body pervādīng the whole of it;

282 i.e., it is not impossible that he should regard his Self as limited by the upādhi.
and just as a razor lies in a razor-case without pervading the whole of it, so also, dwelling within the auditory and other specific nādiś (nervous tubes), the Ātman lies without pervading the body in those specific aspects. Just as different razors occupy different places in the razor-case, so also Consciousness in different aspects occupy different nādiś. In the jāgrat (waking) and svapna (dream) states, jīva presents both forms; and in susupti (dreamless sleep) jīva exhibits Life in its general aspect alone. Life in its general aspect serves the purpose of keeping the body alive here, and Life in its particular aspects functioning in the body is concerned in thinking of objects such as sound.

Thus the passage speaking of Brahman's entrance has been clearly explained word by word and in its main purport.

**Brahman does not literally enter the Universe.**

Now, let us enquire into the rationale of the teaching.

Does Brahman enter (the universe) (1) as Devadatta enters a house, or (2) as a serpent enters a stone, or (3) as the sun's orb enters water, or (4) as qualities enter a substance, or (5) as seeds enter the fruit.

The first illustration does not apply, for Devadatta is limited in space and has parts, whereas the Ātman is not so. As the Ātman, in His very nature, is absent nowhere and pervades all, any limitation of Ātman is inconceivable, the śrutī denying it in the words "not thus, not thus." (Bri. Up. 2-3-6.) Accordingly in the case of the Ātman who is infinite and devoid of parts, there can be no such thing as entering a new and different place by leaving the former one.

Neither is the second illustration applicable, because of the Ātman's not being subject to transformation. The bhūtas or elements of matter are transformed into the serpent lying within the stone. But the Ātman is not subject to transformation (parināma).

Nor is the third illustration appropriate. Unlike the water and the sun, the body and the Conscious Ātman cannot unite and disunite, and cannot therefore enter (the body in the way suggested).

The fourth illustration, too, does not apply, because of the Ātman's being not dependent on another. Attributes (guṇas) and the like are dependent on substances; but the Ātman is not dependent on the body, the śrutī speaking of Him as "the Lord of all."

The fifth illustration is not more apt, because of the Ātman's immutability. The seed is associated with change; but the Ātman is declared conclusively in the scriptures to be devoid of the six changes to which all things in the universe are subject.

No tautology is involved in the second and fifth illustrations being separately given; for, there is a difference between the two. The serpent and the stone are related as container and contained, whereas the fruit and the seed within are related as whole and part.

Then, one may say, it is the limited jīva or individual self who enters the bodies. So there can be no objection.

You cannot say so, because it is the Creator that entered. As the śrutī says "this having sent forth, into that very thing He then entered," the Creator and the enterer must be one, as when one says "Having eaten he goes."

Thus it would at first sight appear that Brahman's entrance is in no way explicable.

**Entering means manifestation.**

As against the foregoing, we will now show how Brahman's entrance is explicable. Devoid as He is of space, direction and the like, it is not in His essential nature to actually enter into another. In His case, the entering is a mere imaginary representation, as in the case of the solar orb reflected in a
vessel of water. Though the two cases differ in so far as the latter, unlike the former, admits of separation &c., yet they are analogous in those points wherein analogy is intended. Who can deny the analogy between the two in so far as both alike are capable of perception only when associated with an upādhi? The two the illustration and the illustrated agree in the following respects: they are both capable of perception only in association with an upādhi, i.e., only when they are limited or conditioned; they then appear otherwise than what they really are; and they are then manifested as many.

Firstly: the solar orb is too bright in itself for us to see, but the same orb is clearly seen when reflected in water; similarly, the self-luminous Ātman cannot be perceived when unassociated with an upādhi; but when conditioned by the sentient physical body, &c., He is clearly perceived.

Secondly: when a man's vision, obstructed in its course by a mirror and turning its way back towards his own face, comprehends the face, an inverted image of the face is presented to view. Similarly, when the intellect influenced by the body comprehends the Self, it makes out the Immutable One as subject to change.

Thirdly: the sun, though one, appears as many, because of the multiplicity of the vessels of water; so, too, owing to the multiplicity of the bodies, the Self, though one, appears as many. Though He is devoid of all multiplicity and its cause283, though He is not divisible, though there is no witness other than Himself, yet, in virtue of the illusion of entering, He seems to be endowed with such attributes.

Prior to it, the true Inner Self (Pratyagātman) was devoid of all form, — was not a seer, or a hearer, or the like. On the birth of Name and Form.284 He was endowed with form, became a seer, a hearer, and so on. He who is endowed with form he who is the seer, hearer, and so on, and He who has no form, conditioned respectively by mind (buddhi) and its cause (maya) are respectively designated as Kṣetrajñā and Īśvara, the individual soul and the Supreme Lord. Through these indirectly is to be comprehended the One who, immutable, knows "I smell this odor," the One who is the mere Witness of all. Just as the sun in the heavens is comprehended through the sun reflected in the vessel of water, so is the All-Witness to be comprehended through him who dwells in the intellect as the doer and the enjoyer. And just as the luminary, the moon, is comprehended through the extremity of a tree's branch which is not luminous, so is the Ātman, the Conscious One, to be comprehended through the upādhi of the Cause, which is not conscious.

It is this very illusion of separate individuality (jīvātman) which, because of its use in the comprehension of the True Inner Self, is here represented as the entering (of Brahman), analogously with the sun's image reflected in the water in a vessel. Certainly, the Supreme One, devoid as He is of time, space, or direction, cannot be said to enter, in the literal sense of the word, like a serpent entering a hole; this entering must therefore be a mere imaginary representation from the standpoint of avidyā or ignorance.

Though a mere witness, uncontaminated by any, He is, owing to avidyā, for want of discrimination, perceived with the attributes of mind (buddhi) and other creatures of ignorance (avidyā), as though He were reflected in them. In illustration of this, the scripture has cited the analogy of fire, the sun and air,285 thereby showing that the Ātman is said to have entered the universe, though by nature He cannot have entered it. As fire, (the śruti says), though one, entering the world composed of firewood, stomach and the like became in form like them, (so does the Inner Self of all creation,

283 Objective perception.
284 the subjective and the objective universe,
285 Kaṭha-Up. 5:9,10,11
though one, became in form like the various forms H entered); but as a matter of fact fire does not enter them.

As the air, (the śruti says again), though one, entering the world composed of different sorts of fans, assumed various forms, (so did the Self); but in point of fact the air has not entered them. Again the śruti speaks of the sun as entering water in different vessels though it remains quite outside them all. Similarly, the Ātman, too, though He has not entered the universe, looks as though He has entered it.

As creation and the like are imaginary representations, so should the entering be regarded as a mere fiction. Creation does not admit of a reasonable explanation and is therefore a fiction. What is non-existent cannot take birth; and what is existent cannot take birth either, because it already exists. In the Immutable One there can be no change. Therefore birth is due to ignorance. As for the verse of the śruti just quoted it decidedly speaks of creation &c., with the mere view of giving an insight into the true nature of the Pratyagātman, the Inner Self. The entering of the Self in the particular parts of the body, as illustrated in the śruti by razors and the razor-case, points to His clear perceptibility even in the senses, while the entering into the body as a whole, as illustrated by fire and firewood, points to His pervād into the whole creation as the substratum thereof. Nowhere do we find one thing altogether co-extensive with another except when one of them is the substratum of which the other is a false appearance. Two things which are quite distinct, such as the cow and the horse, cannot be altogether co-extensive with each other. Neither can two things which are altogether identical be said to be co-extensive with each other, inasmuch as we cannot conceive one of the two as co-extensive with the other. And it is impossible to find two things which are distinct as well as identical. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that a thorough-going co-extensiveness can exist only between a substratum and its false appearances. Just as a garland enters i.e., is mistaken for a serpent only on account of darkness, but not in reality, so also, it is by the power of māyā that our Self has entered the things set up by the ignorance of the Inner Self. Thus the Self has entered the universe in two ways, (i) by way of pervād into the whole universe and (2) by way of revealing Himself (as jīva or the individual soul).

**Brahman in manifestation is unaffected by multiplicity.**

Now we shall answer the objections that are leveled against this doctrine of entering. *Firstly*, it has been said: If the Supreme One Himself entered the universe, then, because of the multiplicity of the things wherein He has entered, and with which He has become identical, it would follow that the Supreme Lord becomes manifold.

Our doctrine is not open to this objection; for, we may turn the table by asking: As the many things in the universe have become identical with the One, why do you not say that there must be a unity? In this case, where both the alternatives are possible, the scripture is the determining authority, and it denies all multiplicity. A rope does not become manifold in virtue of the multiplicity of the objects for which it is mistaken, such as a serpent, etc. and the śruti286 says that the One Deva has entered the universe in the various forms. We have therefore to regard the Īśvara, the Supreme Lord, as One alone, like the ākāśa.

**Brahman as the Ego is unaffected by pleasure and pain.**

Secondly, it has been also said: Since those into whom He has entered are worldly beings (sāṃsarins), and since the Supreme has become one with them, it would follow that He also is a being of the world (sāṃsarin) and is subject to its sorrows.

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286 Sve. Up. 6:11.
We answer: The śruti\textsuperscript{287} says that He has risen above hunger, etc.

(Objection):— It cannot be so; for we see in Him pleasure pain, extreme delusion, and the like.

(Answer):— No; the śruti\textsuperscript{288} says, He is not tainted by the world's sorrows, He is quite outside the world. The experience of sorrows and the like can find room in that one who is created by the upādhi, it pertains to that semblance of Consciousness (chidabhasa) which manifests itself in the upādhi. If Ātman were to experience pain, who is the witness of that sufferer? The sufferer cannot be a witness; and so also the witness cannot be a sufferer. Without undergoing change, one cannot suffer pain; and how can one be a witness when one undergoes change? Wherefore I, who am the witness of the thousands of changing mental states, am subject to no change. Pleasure and pain affect the mind which has the semblance of Consciousness (chidabhasa) in it and regards the aggregate of the body and the senses as the self. Like a spectator regarding the man who is ready to fight with a club in hand, so does the witness regard the mind, which is subject to pleasure and pain, standing apart away from the aggregate. Accordingly, the pain that is felt through the senses pertains only to the not-Self.

The Veda declares that senses do not comprehend the Inner Self: the śruti says, " whereby can one know the Knower?\textsuperscript{289}" Further, it says, "It is quite distinct from the known and quite distinct from the unknown".\textsuperscript{290} The knowledge "I feel pain," which affects only the semblance of the Self, is ascribed to the Self by the deluded; and with the wise it has only a secondary sense. Moreover, how can pain pertain to the Self, since it is felt in particular parts of the body, thus 'I feel great pain in the tip of the nose, in the tip of the foot-thumb' and so on? If pain pertained to the Inner Self, it would pervade the whole body like consciousness, and would not as pertaining, like consciousness, to the very nature of the Seer be repulsive to us.

Against this it may be said as follows: Since the śruti says that all things are dear only as causing pleasure to the Self, pleasure pertains to the Self.

We answer: this is not right; for, in the words "when there is a creation of other things, then one sees another,"\textsuperscript{291} the śruti teaches that all duality including pleasure pertains to the illusory self; and in the words " when to him all has become the Self, then, whereby has one to see and what?"\textsuperscript{292} all duality including pleasure and pain is denied when the Self has been known. If this is not convincing to you, it is on account of your sin; but to me, it is a matter of direct experience. To the vision turned solely towards the Inner One, there is no evil of any kind in the Self.

It is true that the Tārkikas lay 'down the dogma that qualities such as desire and hatred pertain to the Self; but it cannot stand the test of reason. If the Self be always a matter of mere inference, then his suffering cannot be perceived through mind. If the Self be perceived, then there can be no perceiver.

Being devoid of parts, He cannot be both the perceiver and the perceived. If made of parts, He would be impermanent. Wherefore, the Ātman is not the sufferer of pain.

(Objection):— If the Supreme Self be not subject to pain, and as no other being really exists, where is the sufferer of pain? It is for the cessation of pain that you study the Upanishads.

(Answer):— We study the Upanishad for the mere annihilation of the illusion that I am the sufferer
of pain, an illusion caused by ignorance of the True Self. Just as that one among ten persons who, seeing only the nine others, does not, on account of illusion, see himself as the tenth, though all the while he is the tenth man seeing the nine others, so also, while seeing all that is not-self, he who does not know the real nature of the Self does not know of the oneness of the Self, though as the one Self he sees all that is outside the Self. When the ignorance of the fact that he is the tenth man is burnt up in the fire of the true knowledge which arises when another man tells him 'you are the tenth,' then the tenth man sees that he is the tenth. Similarly, having burnt up the Self-ignorance in the fire of the knowledge which arises from the teaching of the śruti "That thou art," (Chan. Up. 6:9:4.) one attains the oneness of the Self, as the result of that knowledge. By means of the scripture and the teacher, set up by the ignorance of the Inner Self, one attains to the unity of the Self, a unity which is opposed to the very means by which it is attained; and all this is due to Maya.

Thus, it is not possible for schoolmen to level against our system any objection whatsoever based on the doctrine of entrance. Hence the soundness of our doctrine of entrance.

Other passages, too, speaking of the entrance of Brahman should be explained in the same way. The Nṛṣimha-Uttara-Tāpāniya, for instance, says:—

"Having created and entered the Virāj, the Devatas, and the sheaths, the Undeluded acts as if He were deluded, only by Maya."

**Liṅga-deha is the upādhi of Jīva.**

The upādhi of the vital breath (prāṇa-vāyu) is the means whereby the All-pervading enters the physical body. And accordingly the Maitreya-Upanishad says:—

"He, having made Himself like the air, entered within." (Op.cit.2:6)

The entrance and the departure of that vital air are ascribed to the Ātman. The Atharvaṅkās say:—

"He thought, on what going out, shall I go out, or on what staying, shall I stay? Thus thinking, He life evolved." (Prasna-Up. 6-3.)

No doubt, the whole of the Liṅga-deha constitutes the upādhi by which the Ātman effects His entrance into the gross physical body (sthula-sārīra); still, we must bear in mind that prāṇa or the vital principle is the most prominent factor in it. This upādhi of the Liṅga-deha enters the body at the tips of the feet; and, ascending upwards, it establishes itself in the two thighs lying above, in the abdomen, in the chest, and in the head. This has been declared by the Aitareyins as follows:

"Brahman entered into that man by the tips of his feet." (Ait-Aranyā. 2:1:4:1.)

(Objection):— Elsewhere in the words " He had the thought: By which (end) should enter it," the same Aitareyins start with an enquiry into the gate by which the Supreme Self entered the body, and then read as follows:—

"Having cleft apart this end, He entered by this door." (Ait-Up. 3:12)

Here they teach that He forced open the gate in the head, i.e. the tip of the suṣumna, and entered within the body by that door. There is thus a contradiction between these two passages.

(Answer):—They are not mutually contradictory; for the two passages are intended to convey two distinct ideas, according to two distinct standpoints. The Liṅga-deha subserving us in perceiving the ordinary world is said to have entered the body through the tips of the feet; whereas, the one-pointed mental state termed 'samādhi,' which reveals the True Being, being attainable in the suṣumna, the Liṅgadeha in that condition is said to have entered the body at that end. Bearing this in view, the śrūti says:

"Suṣumna, forsooth, merged in the Supreme, taintless, and one in form with
Brahman." (Kṣura-Up. 15.)

Now there is a passage in the Aitareya Upanishad which reads:


This means simply that speech and other constituent parts of the Liṅga-deha, which entered the body through the tips of the feet, sustained by their respective Devatās or presiding deities, are situated in the respective regions of the body such as the cavity of the mouth. And the Chandogas also read:

" Let Me now enter those three beings in the form of this jīva, in the form of this self, and let me then reveal names and forms." (Op.cit. 6:3:2)

‘Jīva’ means the sustainer of life and the passage means that Brahman enters the body in the form of jīva.

Thus, then, after a consideration of the meaning of this and such other passages, we conclude that the Supreme Self enters the body as jīva.

CHAPTER 4.

THE JĪVA.

Now, to discuss some points concerning the nature of jīva.

**Jīva is not the Creator.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iv. 20-23.)

In the Vedānta-sūtras, it has been shown that jīva is not the creator of Names and Forms. The disquisition is digested in the following form:

(Prima facie view):— The five elements having been created by Īśvara, it must be jīva and none else who creates Names and Forms, the material objects we perceive, such as the mountains and the like. For, in the words, " Let me now enter these three beings in the form of this jīva, who is myself, and let me then reveal Names and Forms," (Chha.-Up. 6-3-2.) the śrutis declares that it is in the form of jīva that Īśvara is engaged in the creation.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: In the śrutis we see that it is only in the act of entering that Īśvara assumes the form of jīva; for, the expression "in the form of jīva" should be construed with "enter" owing to their mutual proximity. To construe the expression with "reveal" would be to connect it with a more remote verb. Indeed, jīva has not the power of creating mountains and rivers; whereas Īśvara has all powers, as the śrutis says "Supreme is His power, and of all sorts."293 Besides, the verb "I shall reveal" in the first person admits of a better interpretation when construed with Īśvara. Wherefore Īśvara is the creator of Names and Forms. As to the potter and the like being the makers of jars, cloths and the like, they become such only when impelled to the acts by the Lord. Therefore we conclude that Īśvara Himself is the creator of all.

In the same work, the Vedānta-sūtras, the nature of jīva has been discussed in eight disquisitions. Their digests are given hereunder.

**Jīva is not subject to birth and death.**

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293 Sve.-Up. 6-8.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 16.)

(Question):— Is jīva or the body that undergoes birth and death?

(Prima facie view):— In common parlance we say "a son is born to me;" and the śāstra prescribes sacraments such as the birth-ceremony. So birth and death pertain to jīva.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Birth and death which really pertain to the body are, by courtesy, spoken of as pertaining to jīva; for, if it be admitted that birth and death pertain to jīva, it would be impossible to avoid the two fallacious conclusions that jīva's acts in this birth vanish without producing their effects, and that he reaps in this birth the fruits of acts which he never did. The common parlance and the scriptural ordinance of the birth-ceremony are based upon birth and death ascribed by mere courtesy to jīva. In the words "when devoid of jīva, forsooth, this body dies, jīva never dies," * the Upanishad teaches that it is the body devoid of jīva that really dies, and denies jīva's liability to death. Therefore birth and death pertain to the body.

**Jīva is not of the Creation.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. ii. 17.)

(Question):— Is jīva born, as ākāśa, &c., are born, at the beginning of the Kalpa? or is he not born?

(Prima facie view):— The non-duality of Brahman prior to creation, taught by the śruti in the words "One alone without a second" (ibid. 6-2-1) cannot be explained if jīva, as distinguished from Brahman, had no birth. And the śruti, moreover, refers to the birth of jīva by comparing it to the sparks of fire:

"As from fire small sparks start up around, just so, from this one, the Self, all vital energies, all worlds, all gods, all beings, all these selves, start up around." (Bri Up. 2-2-20)

Therefore, at the beginning of the Kalpa, jīva is born from Brahman, like the ākāśa, &c.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Brahman, who is non-dual, Himself enters as jīva into the mind (buddhi) that is born, as the śruti says, "This having sent forth, into that very thing He then entered." (Tait. Up. 2-6-7.)

Whence it cannot be said that in the absence of jīva's birth, the non-duality taught in the śruti does not hold good. As to the passage in which jīva is compared to the sparks of fire, it must simply refer to the birth of the jīva as related to the upādhi; otherwise, we would be driven to the fallacious conclusion that acts done here undergo annihilation and the fruits of acts not done before are reaped here in this birth. From the stand-point of reality, however, the śruti teaches the eternality of jīva: "the eternal of the eternal, the sentient of the sentient." 294 Therefore, jīva is not born at the beginning of the kalpa,

**Jīva is the self-conscious principle.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 18.)

(Question):— Is Jīva a conscious or an unconscious principle?

(Prima facie view):— As Tarkikas (the followers of Vaiseshika and Nyaya systems) maintain, jīva is an unconscious principle; for, consciousness fails in the states of suśupti, swoon, and samādhi; and in the waking state, the quality of consciousness is produced by the conjunction of Ātman with mind (manas).

(Conclusion):— This view is wrong; for, the śruti says that the conscious Brahman Himself has entered the body as jīva. And consciousness does not fail in suṣupti and such other states; it is still present as the witness of these states, inasmuch as, otherwise, there could be no subsequent reference to the experience thereof. Now it may be asked, how is it that there is then no consciousness of the external world of duality? It is, we answer, because of the nonexistence of duality. Accordingly the śruti says:

"As to the saying that then He sees not, (we say that) while seeing, verily, He then sees not. For, no failure there is of the Seer's sight, as it is undying; but no second one exists, distinct and separate from Him, which he might see." (Bri. Up. 4:3:23.)

This passage means:— What the people aver, — that then, in suṣupti, jīva sees nothing,— is not true. While jīva then actually sees, it is merely through illusion that people say that jīva does not see. Whence his vision? The śruti explains thus: There is indeed no failure of the Self's inherent vision, because in itself it is never-failing. Otherwise, even for him who maintains that consciousness fails in those states, it is not possible to speak of a failure not witnessed by consciousness. How is it then, it may be asked, that people think, though erroneously, that jīva is not conscious? The śruti explains thus: The duality of the universe, as distinguished from the conscious principle of Brahman, made up of action, of various factors in action, and of the fruits of action, does not then exist, because it has become merged in the cause; so that there is no consciousness of the perceiver, perception and objects of perception, as in the waking state.

Hence the erroneous belief of the people that jīva does not see. Therefore, jīva is a conscious principle.

**Jīva is all -pervāding.**

(Vedānta-sūtras,II. iii. 19-32).

(Question):— Is jīva infinitesimal (aṇu)? or is he all-pervāding?

(Prima facie view):— "This One, the Self, is very small (aṇu); He is to be known by mind"295 thus the śruti says that jīva is very small. His departure is also spoken of in the words "from this body he departs"296 words "to the moon verily do they all go",297 and his return in the words "from that world he again comes back."298 Of course, the departure, &c., are not possible in case jīva is all-pervāding. They can, no doubt, be explained on the supposition that he is of a middling size; but then it would be opposed to the śruti which teaches that he is very small (aṇu), and his impermanency would then be inevitable. Therefore jīva is very small.

(Conclusion):— The mind (buddhi) containing reflected consciousness is not all-pervāding. Jiva being conditioned by the mind as his upādhi or vehicle, it is easy to explain the śruti speaking of his smallness, departure, &c. In himself, however, jīva is one with Brahman and is therefore all-pervāding. The śruti declares that he is all-pervāding in the words "He, verily, this One, the Self is a great being;"299 "he is all-pervāding, the inner Self of all beings."300 Therefore jīva is all-pervāding.

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296 Chha. Up. 8:6:5
297 Kaush. 1-2.
298 Bri. 4:4:6.
299 Bri. Up.4:4:22
300 Sve. 6-11.
Jīva is the agent.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 33-39).

(Question):— Is jīva the agent or not?

(Prima facie view):— The Sankhyas hold that agency, which means engagement in action, pertains to the mind (buddhi) because it is subject to transformation (parināma), but not to the jīva or self who is unattached.

(Conclusion):— This view is unsound. It being evident that the mind serves as an organ or instrument, it cannot be regarded as the agent. Instruments such as an axe never act as agents. If the mind were the agent, we would have to look out for something else which might serve as its organ. You cannot say, let there be no agent at all; for, the sacrificial acts enjoined in the first section of the Veda, the study of theosophy and the like enjoined in the second, and all worldly occupations such as cultivation, presuppose an agent. Therefore jīva is the agent.

Jīva's agency is illusory.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 40).

(Question):— Is jīva's agency which has been established in the previous article, real or illusory?

(Prima facie view):— Being uncontradicted, it must be real.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we say: Agency which is an attachment is denied by the śruti in the words, "Devoid of attachment, verily, is this one, the Puruṣa." (* Bri. 4-3-15)

Just as, owing to the proximity of the white crystal stone to the china-rose (japa) flower, the red colour of the latter is ascribed to the former, so also, agency is ascribed to the Self owing to His proximity to the mind (antaḥ-karaṇa).

Jīva is impelled to action by Īśvara.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 41-42).

(Question):— Is it the Supreme Lord or passion that impels jīva to action?

(Prima facie view):— In the ordinary affairs of the world we see likes and dislikes alone impelling cultivators and other agents to action. In accordance with this, we should regard that likes and dislikes alone impel jīva to action when he engages in righteous and unrighteous acts, dharma and adharma. If Īśvara were the impeller, the conclusion would be inevitable that He is partial, as impelling some jīvas to righteous acts, and some others to unrighteous acts. Therefore it is riot Īśvara that impels jīva to action.

(Conclusion):— In the first place, Īśvara does not become guilty of partiality, inasmuch as He is a general cause like rain. Though rain is the cause of the growth of corn, still it is the seeds that make them different, as rice, barley, and so on. Similarly, though the Lord is the general impeller of jīvas to action by way of willing "let the jīvas act each in his own way," still He is not partial, inasmuch as differences in their lots are due to their respective acts in former births and their respective vāsanās or tendencies.

(Objection):— Acts bring forth only their fruits; they do not cause other acts.

(Answer):— True. As impelling jīva to action with a view to yield their own fruits in the form of pleasure and pain, they indirectly bring about other acts, and thus we are forced to the conclusion that one act causes another act.

Vāsanās or tendencies, however, are the direct causes of acts. Such being the case, where is room for the charge of partiality against Īśvara?
As to the assertion that passion is found to impel men to action, we grant that it is so. This, however, cannot in any way vitiate the view that Īśvara impels jīva to action; for, even passion is subject to the control of Īśvara who is the Antaryāmin, the Ruler of all from within. Therefore it is Īśvara that impels jīva to action.

**Jīva as distinguished from Īśvara.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 43).

(Question):—Is there any distinction between jīva and Īśvara, or are they indistinguishable?

(Prima facie view):—The śruti teaches identity of jīva and Īśvara in such words as "That thou art." Again in the words "the Ātman should be seen," (Bri. Up. 2:4:5) they are distinguishable as seer and the one to be seen. So that, in the first place, as the śruti speaks of them as distinct, it is not possible to ignore the existence of jīva; since the śruti speaks also of their identity, neither is it possible to maintain the existence of jīva as distinct from Īśvara. The inevitable conclusion is that jīva exists, but that he is indistinguishable from Īśvara. And as a corollary of this, jīvas are mutually indistinguishable, because of their identity with Īśvara. Therefore, in the Brahmavādin's theory, jīva and Īśvara are indistinguishable.

(Conclusion):—Though there is no real absolute distinction between jīva and Īśvara such as there is between a cow and a buffalo, still the scriptures define the nature of jīva in three ways in accordance with his distinctive features arising from the upādhis or conditions with which he is associated in our ordinary experience. It is taught that he is an aṃśa or constituent portion of Īśvara in the words, "A portion of Myself, in the world of jīva, constituting the very life and eternal." (Gita 15:7) In the words "He, being equal with it, both regions he traverses," (Bri.Up.4:3:7) the śruti represents jīva in his aspect of intelligence (vijñāna) as of equal extent with the mind (buddhi) designated as intellect, and thus gives us to understand that he is Īśvara limited by intellect, as aṅkāśa is limited by a jar. It is also taught that he is a reflection of Īśvara in the following words:

"One alone, verily, is the Self of all beings, separate in each being; in one way as also in many ways is He seen, like the moon in water." (Brahmabindu Up. 12)

Therefore the Brahmavādin can easily distinguish the jīva and the Īśvara from each other. And it is easier still for him to explain the mutual distinction among jīvas themselves as observed in our experience, on the analogy of the manifold images of the sun reflected in manifold vessels of water. Thus this doctrine is open to no objection whatever.

**CHAPTER 5.**

**JĪVA'S CAREER AFTER DEATH.**

In the Vedānta-sūtras six articles (adhikaraṇas) are devoted to a discussion of jīva's passage from this to other worlds and back. They are summarized in this chapter.

**Jīva carries to the other worlds the seeds of the future body.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. i. 1—7).

(Question):—Does jīva, when departing from this world, carry with him elements of subtle matter (bhuta-suksma), or not?

(Prima facie view):—When the jīva conditioned by the upādhi of praṇa or vital principle departs from this world to pass into another body, he does not carry with him elements of subtle matter constituting the root-principles of his future body; for, the five elements of matter being easily
available everywhere, it is unnecessary to carry them from here.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Though mere elements of matter are easily available everywhere, those that constitute the root-elements of the body are not easily available in all places and are therefore to be carried from here. Moreover, the senses (indriyas) which constitute the upādhi of jīva cannot pass into other worlds without material elements, as they are never found disjoined in life. Further the śruti says, "In the fifth oblation, the waters are termed man." (Chan.Up.5:9:1) The meaning of this passage may be explained as follows: Heaven, rain-cloud, earth, man, and woman, these five objects are represented as fires for the purposes of contemplation. The jīva, going to svarga and returning again, is represented as an oblation in those fires. The jīva who has performed sacrificial and charitable acts ascends to svarga. On the exhaustion of the fruits of the acts, he descends into the rain-cloud and is precipitated to the earth as rain. In the form of food he enters man; and then through man's semen he enters the woman and there puts on the body. Therefore the five elements of matter which are the root-elements of the body and which, by metonymy, are here, in the passage just quoted, spoken of as water, pass with jīva into the five regions beginning with heaven and are transformed in the fifth region into the body called man. Therefore, when passing into the other world, jīva does carry with him the root-elements of the body.

Jīva descends to earth with residual karma.

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. i. 8 — 11).

(Question):— When descending from svarga, does or does not jīva bring with him any residual karma (anusaya)?

(Prima facie view):— The man who descends from svarga after enjoying its bliss, comes to earth without anusaya. 'Anusaya,' — literally, that which clings to jīva, — means residual karma. No one has any residual karma to carry with him when descending from svarga, all the fruits of karma having been enjoyed in svarga. Accordingly, speaking of man's descent to earth, the śruti says "Having lived as long as their works (sampāta) last, then, by this very way they again come back." (Chan.Up.5:10:5) Sampāta, — literally, that by which one ascends to svarga, — is the aggregate of one's karma. So the passage means that jīva lives in svarga until the fruit of all his karma is enjoyed. Wherefore, when descending from heaven, he brings with him no residual karma.

(Conclusion):— Though the karma which has to yield its fruits in svarga has been exhausted by enjoyment of the fruits thereof, there is still left with jīva an accumulation of righteous and unrighteous acts, whose fruits have not yet been reaped. Otherwise, in the absence of righteous and unrighteous deeds done in this birth, it would be hard to explain why the body that is just born is subject to pleasure and pain.

As to the view, maintained by some, that the whole aggregate of the acts done in one birth is exhausted by enjoyment of the fruits thereof in the next succeeding birth alone, we say it is wrong, because this view, that the whole karma is exhausted in one birth, is untenable, inasmuch as the asvamedha (the horse-sacrifice) and the like which take the doer to the position of Indra, and the sinful acts such as those which make one born in the body of a hog and so on, cannot both of them yield their fruits in one and the same birth. So that, though, out of the acts done in one birth, the fruits of the acts such as jyotishṭoma have been enjoyed, there should remain other acts whose fruits have not been reaped. The word 'sampāta' (in the passage quoted above) refers only to the svarga-yielding act, not to other acts. The śruti speaks of the souls who, descending from svarga, put on the human body in the fifth oblation, as also of the existence of the acts of merit and sin which bring about the body:

"Whoso have been of good conduct here, they soon attain good birth, the birth of a brahmaṇa or the birth of a kṣatriya or the birth of a vaśya. But whoso are of bad
conduct here, they soon attain evil birth, the birth of a dog, or of a hog, or of an outcaste (chāndala)." (Chan.Up. 5:10:7)

Thus we are to conclude that souls descend to earth carrying with them the residual of their past karma.

**The sinful do not reach svarga.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. i. 12 — 21).

(Question):— Does the sinful man reach svarga or not?

(Prima facie view):— "Whoso from this world depart, to the Chandramas (moon), verily they all go", in these words the śruti teaches that even the sinful go to svarga which is here termed Chandramas (lit., a lovely region). It is true that the sinful are not destined to enjoy the bliss of svarga; but we must suppose that they pass into heaven, so that, the fire of woman wherein the souls, on their return to earth, put on the body, may count as the fifth fire.

(Conclusion):— Souls pass into svarga, only for the enjoyment of bliss, not because it is necessary to pass through the five fires named. For, the number of fires vary in certain cases. In the case of Droṇa, for instance, the fire of woman is absent, while in the case of Sita even the fire of man is absent. The words "they all", in the śruti quoted above, refer to men of good deeds. As to the sinful, the śruti says that they go to the world of Yama:

"Worship with oblations Yama, son of Vivasvat, the goal of men." (R.V.10:14:1)

This passage means: "Do ye propitiate Yama to whom the sinful men will have to go." Therefore, the sinful do not go to svarga.

**Jīva's return from svarga.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. i. 22).

(Question):— The descent from svarga is described in the śruti as follows:—

"They return again that way, as they went, to the ether (ākāśa), from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer, having become air, becomes smoke; having become smoke, he becomes mist; having become mist, he becomes a cloud; having become a cloud, he rains down." (Chha. Up. 5:10-5-6.)

Here the question arises: Does jīva, in his descent from svarga, become of the same nature as ākāśa &c.? or does he become merely similar to them?

(Prima facie view):— He becomes one in nature with them, inasmuch as the śruti, in the words "becoming air" and so on, teaches that the jīva becomes one with them.

(Conclusion):— It being impossible for one thing to become another, we hold that to attain to ākāśa means to attain the subtlety of ākāśa; to become air means to come under its control; to become smoke, etc., is to come in contact with them.

**The relative speed of jīva when returning.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. i. 23).

(Question):— After coming down as rain, jīva unites with rice, etc., as the śruti says:

"Then he is born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans." (Chan.Up.5:10:6)

The question is: Is jīva's return from ākāśa, prior to his union with rice, &c., slow or rapid?

(Prima facie view):— Nothing in the śruti points to either way. Hence no definite rule.
(Conclusion):— In the words "from this, verily, it is hard to escape," (Ibid) the śruti speaks of the difficulty of passage on uniting with rice, &c., and so teaches definitely that on uniting with rice, &c., jīva's passage is tardy. By implication, therefore, this leads us to the conclusion that, prior to this stage, his passage is rapid.

**Jiva is not born as a plant.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. i. 24—27).

(Question):— Are jīvas born as rice, &c., on their descent from heaven? or do they merely unite with them?

(Prima facie view):— The śruti means that jīvas do not merely unite with rice, sesame, etc., as they do with ākāśa, etc., but that they are actually born as such; for, the śruti says that they are 'born' as such. It cannot be contended that it is impossible for the soul descending from svarga after enjoying there the fruit of the meritorious acts to be born as a plant (sthāvara), which birth is the effect of very sinful acts; for, there exists the cause of such a birth, namely, the killing of animals for sacrificial purposes. Therefore we conclude that jīvas are actually born as plants.

(Conclusion):— Being enjoined by the śruti, the killing of animals for sacrificial purposes is no sin. Therefore the word "born" in the śruti means simply that they unite with the plants mentioned. On the contrary, no actual birth is meant, inasmuch as the śruti does not speak of it as due to the operation of any acts. And where actual birth is meant, the śruti refers to it as the result of acts, as when speaking of "men of good deeds" and "men of evil deeds." Therefore we conclude that, when descending from svarga, jīvas merely unite with rice, etc.

**CHAPTER 6.**

**STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.**

**The objects seen in svapna are unreal.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 1—6)

(Question):— Is the creation of objects in dream real or unreal?

(Prima facie view):— The śruti speaks of the creation in dream (svapna) of carriages and other things, in the words "he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads." (Bri. Up. 4-3-10.) This creation must therefore be real so far as our ordinary experience goes, like the creation of ākāśa, &c. We do not find any distinction between the waking state and the dream state, since the act of eating and the like occurring in the latter serve alike the actual purposes of appeasing hunger, &c. So we hold that the creation in question is as real as the creation of ākāśa, both being alike the acts of Īśvara.

(Conclusion):— The dream-creation must be false, as there are no appropriate time and place. Certainly, within the nāḍīs which are very narrow like the thousandth part of the hair, there is no sufficient room for mountains, rivers, oceans and the like; and in the case of one who goes to sleep at midnight, there is no appropriate time for the occurrence of a solar eclipse. Neither are there, in the case of a boy who has not undergone the ceremony of upanayana, occasions for exultation at the birth of a son. Moreover, the objects seen in dream prove false in dream itself. The object perceived to be a tree at one moment comes at the next moment to be regarded as a mountain. As to the allegation that dream-creation is taught in the śruti, it may be seen that the śruti speaks of the creation as fictitious:—
"There are no (real) chariots in this state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads." (Bri.Up 4:5:10)

Therefore the śruti means that the cars, &c., which in reality are non-existent, are mere illusory appearances like silver in the mother-of-pearl. As to its similarity with the jāgrat state adduced above, even that is not of much avail here, inasmuch as we have pointed out points of disparity such as want of appropriate time and place which preponderate over those of similarity. It has been also alleged that dream-objects are created by Īśvara; but this is untenable, for, in the words "The man that wakes when others sleep, dispensing all desires," (Kaṭha Up. 5:8) the śruti also teaches that it is jīva who is the creator of the objects of dream-consciousness. Therefore the dream-creation is illusory.

**Where jīva lies in suśupti.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 78.)

(Question):— Regarding the suśupti state, the śruti says:

"Then he has entered into these nāḍīs." (Chan.Up.8:6:3)

"Through he has moved forth and rests in the purītāt." (Bri.Up. 2:1:19)

"He lies in the Ākāśa which is in the heart." (Bri.Up.2:1:7)

In these passages the śruti declares that in suśupti jīva lies in the nāḍīs, in the purītāt, and also in Brahman, here designated as Ākāśa. The question is, Is it separately or conjointly that these places the nāḍīs, &c., constitute the seat of jīva in suśupti?

(Prima facie view):— They constitute the seat of jīva separately, each by itself, inasmuch as all of them severally serve the one purpose in view. When the śruti says "let a man sacrifice either with rice or with barley," we understand that two alternatives are meant by the śruti, inasmuch as either one of them serves the one purpose of furnishing the sacrificial oblation. So also, the purpose to be served here being one and the same, namely, suśupti, we should understand that three alternatives are meant here by the śruti; that jīva attains suśupti in the nāḍīs at one time, in the purītāt at another time, and in Brahman at yet another time.

(Conclusion):— We do not admit that they all severally serve one and the same purpose; for it is easy to show that they serve distinct purposes. Now the nāḍīs serve as the paths by which the jīva who has been wandering in the sense-organs of sight, &c., may pass to Brahman dwelling in the heart. Hence the words of the śruti, "through them he moves forth," showing that nāḍīs are the means by which jīva passes. The purītāt, the envelope of the heart, serves as an enclosure, like a bed-room, and Brahman forms the seat, like a bed-steal. Accordingly, just as one enters by the gateway and lies on a bed in a room, so jīva passes through the nāḍīs and lies in Brahman within the purītāt. Distinct purposes being thus served by them severally, they conjointly constitute the abode of jīva in suśupti.

(Objection):— If jīva lies in Brahman during suśupti, then how is it that we are not then conscious of their relation as such?

(Answer):— Because they have become one, we say. When a pot of water is immersed in a reservoir of water, we do not see its existence as distinct from the reservoir; so also, we are not conscious of jīva, conditioned by the upādhi of antāḥ-karaṇa, as distinct from Brahman, inasmuch as he as well as his enshrouding darkness is then merged in Brahman. It is for this reason that the śruti elsewhere speaks of jīva becoming one with Brahman during suśupti: "With the Existent, my dear, he then becomes one."
Identity of jīva who sleeps and wakes.

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 9)

(Question):— Is the jīva who wakes from sleep necessarily the same as he who went to sleep? or, may he be a different one?

(Prima facie view):— When a drop of water has been cast into the ocean, the identical drop cannot again be unfailingy taken out from the ocean; similarly when one jīva has been merged in Brahmā during suṣūpti, it is not possible that necessarily the identical jīva wakes from sleep. Therefore it may be that any one of the many jīvas wakes from sleep.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: The two cases are not quite analogous. The jīva is a conscious entity, and when he becomes merged in Brahmā, he is still enveloped in his karma and avidyā; whereas when the drop of water is cast into the ocean, it is unenclosed by anything. When a glass filled with the water of the Ganges and with its mouth covered, is thrown into the sea, the glass can be taken again out of the sea, and we can clearly identify the water of the Ganges therein contained. Similarly, the identical jīva may wake from sleep. Therefore the śruti says:

"Whatever these creatures are here, whether a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a mosquito, that they become again and again." (Chha. Up. 6-9-3.)

That is to say, whatever bodies the tiger and other jīvas have severally occupied prior to sleep, the same bodies are occupied by those jīvas on waking after sleep. Neither can it be contended that the jīva who attains Brahmā during sleep cannot again come into being, in the same way that the liberated one does not come into being; for, in the case of the former, the limiting upādhi still exists, so that when the upādhi starts up into being, the jīva must start up into existence. Therefore, when a jīva goes to sleep, it is the same jīva that wakes from sleep.

Swoon is a distinct state of consciousness.

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 10)

(Question):— Is swoon (mūrchha) comprehended in any one of the three states above referred to, or is it distinct from them all?

(Prima facie view):— We are not aware of a state of consciousness distinct from jāgrat, svapna and suṣūpti. Therefore, swoon is comprehended in one of those states.

(Conclusion):— As it stands quite alone, we must admit that it is a distinct state. It cannot be included either in jāgrat or svapna, for, unlike these states, there is no consciousness of duality in it. Nor can it be included in suṣūpti; because the two states appear to be quite different. When a man is asleep, his face is calm, his breath balanced, and his body motionless; whereas, in the case of one who is in a fit of swoon, the face becomes agitated, his breath is uneven, and his body shakes. It is true that swoon is not a state quite familiar to children and the like because it is not of daily occurrence like jāgrat and other states; still experts do know the state of swoon occurring on rare occasions and apply proper remedies. Therefore, it is a distinct state of consciousness.

Elimination of foreign elements from jīva.

Thus, in these four articles, the nature of the jīva the 'thou' in "That Thou art" has been divested of all foreign elements. In the first place, by showing that the world of dream is an illusion, it has been shown that though we are then conscious of pleasure, pain and agency, jīva remains free from attachment; and so far, the foreign elements have been eliminated from jīva's nature. It has been further taught that this absence of all attachment in jīva's nature is to be found in our own
experience during sleep, because, it has been shown that jīva becomes then one with Brahman. By showing that the same jīva that goes to sleep wakes also from sleep, it has been impressed upon us that he is not impermanent. Lastly, by way of discussing the state of swoon, it has been taught that, though breathing and all other signs of life fail at death, it should not be supposed that jīva is then dead.

CHAPTER 7.
BRAHMAN AS EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

Having thus proved the existence of the Paramātman by referring to His presence in the body as jīva, the perceiver, the śruti, with a view to afford a further proof of His existence in the form of the objects of perception, now proceeds to teach that He has transformed Himself as the objects of perception.

8. That having entered, both the being and the beyond He became, the definite and the indefinite, the abode and the non-abode, the conscious and the unconscious; both the real and the false did the Real become, and what-ever else is here. That, they say, is the Real.

Form and the formless.

Having entered the creation, He became the being and the beyond, the corporeal and the incorporeal, form and the formless, mārtā and amārtā.

All things from the A vyākṛta or Unmanifested Being down to the bodies are included in these two classes of objects, form and formless.— (S).

Having entered in the form of the perceiver (bhoktri) the bodies that were created, He then transformed Himself into the objects of perception, the being and the beyond, &c.

'The being' refers to the visible objects, the three states of matter, namely, earth (prthivi), water (ap) and fire (tejas); and 'the beyond' refers to the two invisible states of beyond matter, air (vāyu) and ether (ākāśa). The Brihadaranyaka-upanishad teaches, in the words "Form comprises this, what is distinct from air and from ether, "that the three states of matter other than air and ether, namely, earth, water and fire, are corporeal, and describes them as sat or the being, "this is the being"; air and ether being described as tyad or the beyond. Under these two categories are brought together all objects which are distinguished as the visible and the invisible. To these two categories should be added two other categories composed of their abhāvas or negations. Thus, Brahman transformed Himself into the four categories of things.

These, forms and the formless, which, prior to creation, resided in the Ātman, undifferentiated in name and form, are (now, at the beginning of creation) differentiated by the Ātman dwelling within them. Though thus differentiated and spoken of as form and formless, they still remain one with the Ātman in time and place, and therefore He is said to have become the being and the beyond.

The definite is that object which is distinguished from other classes of objects and from other objects of the same class, and known as existing at a particular time and a particular place; that which can be specifically pointed out "this it is." What is opposed to the definite is the indefinite.

The definite: What can be fully defined, as, this pot which is here before me with its body widely bulging out, which is made of clay, a tangible object capable of holding water. What is opposed to this is the indefinite, that which can be spoken of only in vague terms, as for example, the minute distinctions of a particular taste such as sweetness or of a particular odor, and so on; these
cannot be fully described.

These two, the definite and the indefinite, are only descriptive attributes of form and the formless respectively. Thus, form and the formless are respectively the definite and the indefinite, the visible and the invisible. So also they are the abode and the non-abode. A bode constitutes an attribute of form and the non-abode of the formless.

*The abode:* the seal, such as the flower, sugar. That which is opposed to this is non-abode, that which dwells in another, such as odor and taste.

Though "the beyond," etc., are spoken of as the attributes of the formless, still they pertain to objects in the differentiated world, inasmuch as they are said to have come into being after creation. 'The beyond' denotes Prāna (vāyu or air), etc.; and these namely, air and ether are indefinite and also constitute the non-abode. Wherefore, these attributes of the formless pertain only to the category of the differentiated being.\(^301\)

**The conscious and the unconscious.**

'The conscious' means the sentient beings, and 'the unconscious," the insentient objects such as stone.

**The real and the false.**

*The real and the false:* 'The real' here means the realities commonly so-called, on account of the context: it does not mean the Absolute Reality, for Brahman, the Absolute Reality, is one alone. As to the real here referred to, it is only relatively so, what we commonly speak of as real.

Water, for instance, is said to be real as compared with the mirage, which is illusory. 'The false' means the so-called unreal.

That which never fails in our ordinary experience is real, and what in our ordinary experience is erroneously ascribed is false. For example, the mother-of-pearl, a rope, a pillar, etc., are real; and when they are mistaken for silver, a serpent, a thief, &c., these latter are said to be false.

The categories of things here mentioned stand for the whole universe, including these and other categories of being such as heat and cold, pleasure and pain, honor and dishonor, &c.

**The One Reality.**

(Question): — What is it that has become all this?
(Answer):— The Real, the Absolute Reality.
(Question): — What, again, is that Reality?
(Answer):— Brahman, the subject of treatment here, wherewith this Book began in the words "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman."

The Creator became by avidyā all this which has sprung from avidyā. It is by denying all that is composed of "the being and the beyond" that the truth is presented to us in the sequel,— the truth that; "I am Brahman", the truth that all duality is absent in the true Self. Because all that we speak of as existing and as not existing have their origin in ignorance (moha), the Lord of the World says also, "It is not said to be being or non-being"\(^302\) Be it known that it is the One Inner Self who, witnessing the mind's manifestation and disappearance, is unfailing. Therefore there must exist that Supreme Brahman, by whose existence all creatures of avidyā, manifesting themselves as causes and effects, appear to exist. Whatever involves intelligent design presupposes an intelligent being,

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301 but not to the Unmanifested Brahman, the Cause, who is also formless. — (V)

302 Bhagavadgita XIII.12. The meaning of this as well as the Śruti is, not that nothing exists, but that cause and effect, which are not constant, are not Brahman. — (A).
as for instance, a pot; so also, the subject of contention here namely, the universe — involving as it does a complicated design, presupposes an intelligent being. — (S).

Brahman transformed Himself as the universe made up of things classed as "the being and the beyond," and so on. By this the śruti means to teach that Brahman must exist, as having transformed Himself in the form of the objects of perception, just as milk exists prior to its transformation as curd, &c.

**Brahman experienced by the wise.**

Because the one Brahman alone, who is called the Existence, became "the being and the beyond" and whatever else is included in the two categories of form and the formless, in short, all that is comprised in the category of phenomena (vikāra), without any exception, there existing no phenomena of name and form outside Brahman, therefore the knowers of Brahman say that all this is Brahman, the Real.

Having established Brahman's existence by inference, the śruti proceeds here to establish the same by an appeal to the experience of the wise.

Whatever we see in this universe, whether it be the perceiver or the object perceived, it is not really the universe as such; but it is the never-failing Brahman. So say the wise. Wherefore it is wrong to say that Brahman does not exist, since His existence is a fact of wise men's experience.

**The bearing of the present section.**

Now to show the bearing of this section: The section started with the question/ does Brahman exist or not? In answer to this question, it has been said that the Ātman " desired, many may I be!" And in accordance with this desire He emanated ākāsa and other things in the universe, comprising 'the being and the beyond' and so on; and entering the universe so created He became many, as the seer, as the hearer, as the thinker, as the knower. So that, we should understand that this Brahman the very Brahman who is the cause of ākāsa, etc., He who dwells in all creatures, who lies hid in the highest heaven of the heart-cave, revealing Himself in all the cognitions of the mind, in all His specific manifestations (as hearer, seer, and so on),— does exist.

**Brahman, the self-cause.**

9. On that, too, there is this verse.

Just as, in the case of the five sheaths described above, verses were quoted descriptive of the Self in the Anna-maya-kośa, etc., so also, a verse is quoted here which speaks of the existence of the Innermost Ātman in all, by speaking of the universe.

[Anuvāka 7.]

1. Non-being, verily, this in the beginning was. Thence, indeed, was the being born.
That created itself by itself; thence is That the self-cause called.

'Non-being' means the unmanifested Brahman, as distinguished from the universe with specific names and forms manifested;\(^303\) it does not mean absolute non-existence. 'This' refers to the universe composed of specific names and forms. Prior to creation, this universe was Brahman Himself, here spoken of as 'non-being'. Thence, from that Non-being,\(^304\) was born the being, with specific names and forms distinctly marked.

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\(^{303}\) The manifested universe being called *sat* or being.
\(^{304}\) From the Cause.
The universe composed of names and forms are in themselves non-existent, because they are not-Self. What is existent came, verily, from that One Existence, namely Brahman.— (S).

Was the creation quite distinct from Him, as the son is distinct from the father?

The śruti answers:— That created itself by itself. Brahman spoken of as non-being, created Himself by Himself.  

That one who is "Real, Consciousness, Infinite," creates Himself by Himself into "the being and the beyond," when associated with avidyā.

This all-powerful Lord created all this by Himself: and therefore, the Mahātmans call Him as the well-doer (su-kṛta) —(S).

Indeed there exists nothing — neither a material cause of the universe similar to clay, nor an efficient cause like the potter — over and above Brahman. On the contrary, Brahman takes the place of both.

Such being the case, Brahman is called 'su-kṛta,' the Cause par excellence, the self-cause. It is well known to the world that Brahman is the independent cause, for, He is the cause of all.

Those who are versed in the śāstras say that Brahman is an agent by Himself. On the other hand, the jīvas are not agents by themselves; they are impelled to act by the Antaryāmin, the Inner Ruler, as the following passages of śruti and smṛti show."

"Who from within rules the self." (Bri. Up. 3:7:22.)

"He is thy Self, the Inner Ruler, the Immortal." (Bri. Up. 3:7:3)

"It is He who makes one do a good deed." (Kau. Up. 3:8.)

"In what way I am impelled by that unknown God residing in the heart, in that way I do."

Brahman, the Good Deed.

Or, to interpret the passage in another way: Because Brahman created all out of Himself, remaining one with the whole universe, therefore, as an embodiment of such a meritorious act (punya), Brahman, the Cause, is called 'su-kṛta' the good or meritorious act.

'Su-kṛta' literally means that which is well done, a good act; it refers to the act of the Lord, not to the Lord Himself who is the agent. Even in common parlance, whatever is done by the master himself with effort, that alone is said to be well done, but not that which is done by the servants — (S).

In either case, however, there exists, as is well-known in the world, what is here termed su-kṛta, that which brings about the effects (of former acts) etc., be it the Good Deed itself (punya), or the other one and this well-known truth can be explained only on the supposition that an Intelligent Eternal Cause exists. Accordingly, it being well-known that there exists an Independent Agent, or that there exists the Good Deed, we conclude that Brahman exists.

BRAHMAN THE SOURCE OF JOY.

To prove Brahman's existence in yet other ways, the śruti teaches that Brahman is Bliss (Ananda).

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305 e., without being impelled by any one else, He made Him-self as the universe — (V).
306 The independent cause.— (V)
307 The world here refers to the śāstra or scriptures.
308 namely, Brahman, the independent cause.
Brahman, the source of the super-sensuous pleasure.

2. That one, verily, called the self-cause, He is the Flavour. Flavour, indeed, this one having got, blest becomes He.

On the following ground also, Brahman exists. On what ground? — Because He is the Flavour. Whence is Brahman known to be a Flavour? The śruti says: He who is known as the self-cause, He is, verily, the Flavour. 'Flavour' in common parlance, means that which causes satisfaction, that which causes pleasure, i.e., an object which is sweet, acid, etc. Having got the Flavour, man here becomes blest or happy.

Brahman who manifests Himself as 'the being and the beyond' is said to be the Supreme 'Rasa' or Flavour in this creation which in itself is destitute of flavour means essence, the Immortal Brahman, the Bliss, the Joy. By this Flavour it is that the universe, which in itself is flavourless, appears to be flavoury. How, it may be asked, can this supersensuous Flavour be the Bliss? The śruti answers in the words "Flavour, indeed," etc. (S).

In our experience no non-existent object is found to cause pleasure. Though possessing no external sources of happiness, the wise brahmanaḥ (devotees of Brahman) who do not work for happiness and who cherish no desire are found full of happiness as though they have obtained external objects of pleasure. To them, certainly, Brahman and Brahman alone is Flavour, the source of pleasure.

These pure ones, the sannyāsins, those who have renounced all, attain supreme Bliss, which is super-sensuous. In them, certainly, there must reign that Supreme Peace which thoroughly delights their minds; in them, certainly, we find all marks of delightful minds. In those who have realised the Self we find such outward symptoms of peace as we find in a man who, diseased with itch, sits near the fire scratching his body with his mind immersed in joy. This inference of Bliss is meant for those only who have not realised the true nature of the Bliss-Self; but, for those who have realised the true nature of the Self, it is a fact of immediate experience — (S).

Therefore that One, the source of their bliss,— namely Brahman, does exist, as flavour exists.

Brahman is Flavour, because He is the source of the sage's happiness, of his feeling that he has achieved all, and so on. Brahman is so called because He is to be tasted with love, relished in the knowledge — the state of mind — produced by the flavoury Vedantic teaching. Brahman is indeed approached with love by all who seek the knowledge.

Love for Brahman cannot arise if He were not of the nature of bliss. Hence the word 'flavour' points to Brahman being the Bliss itself. Against this it may be urged that those who seek to know Dharma approach it with love, though Dharma is not the Bliss itself. We answer thus: men do not indeed love Dharma for its own sake; they love it as the means by which to attain the bliss of svarga. On the contrary, Brahman is not a means to any bliss superior to Himself; so that, as the primary object of love, Brahman is the Bliss itself. Hence it is that we find the sage who, having realised the Flavour, is filled with joy and regards himself as blest. The sage does not possess the worldly objects of pleasure, such as flowers, woman, &c. He possesses only the Self, and does not regard other things, such as flowers, as a possession at all. The scripture says "Beyond the gain of the Self, there is nothing higher."309 Wherefore we should admit that Brahman exists as the Bliss which is the source of the happiness of the sage.

Brahman is the source of activity and sensual pleasure.

Further, with a view to show that Brahman exists even as the source of our physical activity and sensual pleasure, the śruti proceeds to show that Brahman is the cause of both:

3. Who indeed could live, who breathe, should not this Bliss be in ākāśa? This verily it is that bestows bliss.

For the following reason also Brahman exists. — For what reason? — Because of the breathing and other kinds of activity we see. Our body, for instance, when alive, breathes up and down by the aid of prāṇa and āpāṇa, the vital airs; and thus we see that vital functions and sensational activities are carried on by the body and the senses combined. This conjunction in mutual dependence for the benefit of one single entity is not possible in the absence of an Intelligence outside the combination; for, it is not found possible elsewhere.

So the śruti says: If in Ākāśa in the Supreme Ether, in the cave (of the heart), this One, the Bliss, do not exist, who indeed in the world could breathe in and who could breathe up? Therefore there exists that One, namely, Brahman, whose enjoyment, indeed all the activities of the body and the senses as well as all the vital functions subserve; and it is He who causes the pleasure of (all beings in the) world. — Why so? — For, it is this One, the Supreme Self, who makes (all beings in) the world happy according to their merit (Dharma). The Supreme Self is the Bliss, which is revealed only in its limited forms to sentient beings on account of their avidyā or ignorance.

This bliss, which the sentient beings in the world attain in different degrees according to their meritorious acts, reaches its culmination in the Infinite Bliss; and therefore there must be in existence that Supreme Bliss, that Flavour, which is the object of our absolute love. — (S).

Ākāśa: the text may be construed also to mean "should this one, the Ākāśa, the Bliss, exist not." For the word "Ākāśa" literally means that which shines everywhere by itself, the self-luminous One. If this Bliss, the Self, previously spoken of as the Flavour, do not exist, whence then is the agent who within this body acts through the senses and breathes? The Atharvaṇikas teach that Ātman is the agent who acts through the eye and other sense-organs:

"He is the seer, toucher, the hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, knower, the agent, the conscious self, the Puruṣa." (Prasna. Up. 4-9.)

In common parlance, birth and death being found concomitant with the presence and the absence of the vital air in the body, the ignorant believe that prāṇa itself, the vital air, is the Self. Relying on this belief, Balaki regarded prāṇa as the Self and argued with Ajatasatru who held that Brahman was the Self.

Accordingly, with a view to remove the illusion that it is prāṇa that sees and does other acts, the śruti here separates prāṇa from the real Self, in the words " who could breathe? " In the absence of the Bliss-Ātman, who is to do the act of breathing by means of prāṇa? That prāṇa is a mere instrument while the Self is the agent is also clearly taught in the Ushasti-Brahmaṇa:

"He who breathes by prāṇa, He is thy Self and within all." *

It is true that the Bliss-Ātman who is devoid of all attachment, cannot in Himself be the agent of the acts done through the senses &c.; still, He can be the agent when associated with the upādhi of the Viṇāna-maya-kośa. Therefore, as the cause of all activity, Brahman does exist. It is this Bliss-Ātman, the cause of all activity, who bestows pleasure on all beings. On obtaining an object of desire, the mind withdraws its attention from the object, and, turning inwards before the rise of a desire for another object, it enjoys the Bliss of the Inner Self (Pratyagātman). This is what is usually called sensual pleasure. This truth is known only to the people who are endued with

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310 as well as the bodies of the Devas or Cosmic Intelligences

311 For instance, earth, timber and other materials out of which a house is built, do not combine together without an intelligent being, quite outside them all, who is to occupy the house as its lord. =

312 Vide. Bri. Up. 2-1,
CHAPTER 9.
WHO ATTAINS BRAHMAN?

The purpose of the sequel.

Arguments for the existence of Brahman have been clearly stated. The Śruti now proceeds to answer the questions "Whether does any one who knows not, departing, go to that region? Or does any one who knows, departing, attain that region? "It is indeed the man of wisdom that reaches Brahman, in whom there is no fear, but who is the source of fear; for, the tamas, the darkness of ignorance, is the only obstacle to the attainment of Brahman; and certainly there exists no other obstacle. Whatever obstacle there may exist, it is caused solely by avidyā, and therefore avidyā alone prevents the attainment of liberation (mokṣa). Though the True Self within is the witness of avidyā, i.e., though Avidyā itself exists to us only as witnessed by the True Self within, whose light ever shines and never sets, still He is screened by avidyā; and this is due to the power of avidyā. The question as to why the ignorant one does not attain Brahman who is present in both the wise and the ignorant alike would arise only if it be held that Brahman could be attained without knowledge: but no such question could arise when we hold that knowledge alone leads to the attainment of Brahman, by removing avidyā, the cause of samsāra. We do not indeed deny that Brahman, who is the Self of all and is therefore present in the ignorant as well as the wise, is in fact attained as such by both alike. We have already said * that, inasmuch as Brahman is the very Self of all, knowledge leads to the attainment of Brahman who in Himself is ever present in us by way of removing ignorance (avidyā). Accordingly the Śruti now tries, in the following passage, to prove with great assiduity this truth, that it is the wise man, not the ignorant one, who attains Brahman. — (S).

The question as regards the ignorant man attaining or not attaining Brahman, though first in order, is for the moment set aside inasmuch as there is much to be said about it. The Śruti first removes the doubt as to the wise man's attainment of Brahman.

Even as the cause of the ignorant man's fear and the wise man's fearlessness, Brahman exists. It is only by resorting to an existing being that one can attain fearlessness. Cessation of fear cannot accrue from resort to a non-existent being. How is Brahman the cause of fearlessness? — The Śruti proceeds to answer:

True knowledge leads to fearlessness.

4. When in truth this (soul) gains fearless support in Him who is invisible, selfless, undefined, non-abode, then has he the Fearless reached.

When the aspirant finds his support in Brahman without fearing, i.e., when he finds that Brahman is his own Self, then, he attains fearlessness, inasmuch as he perceives in Him no duality generated by avidyā, the cause of all fear.

Brahman's real nature.

(Question):— Of what nature is Brahman?

313 in chapters 2—8.
314 i.e., He does not perceive duality as real; for, it is admitted that even the wise man does perceive duality which, however, he regards as unreal.—(V).
Invisible: Visible means what is capable of perception, i.e., a phenomenon (vikāra); every phenomenon subserves perception. Brahman is not visible, i.e., He is not a phenomenon, no object of perception.

Self-less: formless, having no body. Because Brahman is invisible, He is formless. Because He is selfless, He is undefined. It is only a vīsesha, a specific or particular thing, that can be defined; and every particular is a phenomenon (vikāra). But Brahman is not a phenomenon, because He is the source of all phenomena. Whence He is undefined. Because such is Brahman, He is the non-abode. He is no abode or substratum of attributes. This is tantamount to saying that Brahman is devoid of all attributes of the objects of creation.

According to the common usage, perception means the consciousness of objects obtained through any of the senses; and in interpreting the scripture we are to understand its words in accordance with their common usage. The visible or perceptible is a thing which possesses individuality; for, an individual or particular object alone can be an object of perception. Neither the Eternal Consciousness nor mere negation (abhāva) can be an object of perception. Brahman has nothing that is perceptible in Him and is therefore invisible. Self (in 'selfless') means what can be imagined to have self-existence, i.e., the universal (sāmānya) running through the particulars which are perceptible. Having no existence in itself, it exists to us only through the particulars. Selfless therefore means devoid of universals. —(S).

Or,— the visible or perceptible means the universe we perceive in the waking state — which is usually regarded as the perceptible,— the physical body, the Anna-maya-kośa, the Virāj, the universe composed of the physical compounded or quintupled matter. The self in (self-less) refers to the Prāṇa-maya, Mano-maya, and Viśṇu-maya-kośas, which are all subservient to the Self; that is, it refers to the subtle body, the Sutrātman, the universe composed of subtle, uncompounded, or unquintupled matter. Then remains the fifth one, the Ānanda-maya-kośa, the repository of the experiences resulting from the other kośas, the jīva, the semblance of the One Consciousness, and this is here spoken of as defined. Brahman the Supreme is undefined, transcending the Ānanda-maya, beyond the cause and the effect, the Pure Consciousness, referred to by the word “Thou” in ‘That, Thou art.’ — (S).

The abode means the unknown, the cause of the five sheaths, wherein the universe is merged (at pralaya) and whence the submerged universe come into being (at the time of creation). The non-abode means Brahman beyond the Cause, referred to by the word 'That,' the One who is Eternal, Pure, Intelligent and Free, and identical with the one referred to by 'Thou.' — (S).

Or, these negative epithets such as ’invisible’ are meant to deny what has been above spoken of as “the being and the beyond”, and so on. It was said that Brahman became 'the being and the beyond'; and from this one may suppose that the universe actually exists in Brahman. The removal here of this idea which is uppermost in the mind of the student is quite in its proper place. The two categories, namely, forms and the formless, have been spoken of as 'the being and the beyond,' and so on; and it is the denial of these that is here meant, inasmuch as the śruti elsewhere makes the same denials. In this case we should understand 'abode' as meaning — not the Primary Cause, but — the antah-karaṇa, the abode of all tendencies (vāsānas), inasmuch as the denial of the Primary Cause is included in the denial of 'the formless.' Thus, these being denied, one can directly see what is Brahman's real nature.— (S).

For a firm knowledge of the Self it will not do merely to get an idea of what the Self is in Himself. The mind (buddhi) being drawn away from the Self when it is engrossed in the being and the non-being in the not-self, in the objects of the external world, in causes and effects the śruti denies the being and the non-being and thereby diverts the mind from them and causes it to dwell firmly in
the Inner Self. — (S).

**Brahman is the Self.**

By denying the visible, the śruti means to teach that the Inner Self is one with Brahman, that Brahman is no other than the Self. How can anything other than the Self be absolutely real? Neither negation nor an illusory phenomenon is conceivable except through association with the Absolute Reality, the Immutable Eternal Consciousness — (S).

Brahman here described as invisible is in reality identical with the Self. It is because of this identity, that the śruti which starts with the words "The Knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," concludes\(^{315}\) with the words "when this soul gains his support in Brahman," etc. When a man intuitively perceives Brahman who is beyond perception, etc., i.e., when one realizes the identity of the Self and Brahman by direct intuition "I am Brahman," then, at that very moment, he is free from avidyā and attains the Supreme, the Fearless. The words "gains his support" show that this passage refers to Brahman, who has been described as "Brahman, the tail, the support" — (S).

The four epithets beginning with 'invisible' qualify Brahman. He is invisible, cannot be reached by the senses. As having no specific marks He is unknowable through inference. Though the three bodies are the specific mark of jīva, as creatorship is of the Īśvara, there are no specific mark or marks through which the real nature of Brahman transcending the universe can be inferred. Brahman cannot be fully described. There is no word that can denote the real nature of Brahman. Thus, Brahman cannot be reached through perception, inference and revelation. Brahman is therefore of a different nature from the whole universe of effects. Further, He is abodeless, inasmuch as the śruti speaks elsewhere of Him as being "established in His own greatness." (Chan.Up. &a:4:2) Though the Primary Avidyā cannot likewise be known through perception, inference or revelation, still, as it abides in Brahman, it is distinguishable from Him who has no abode. When the aspirant of Brahma-vidyā attains the firm conviction that this Brahman — the Brahman whose existence has been established and whom one can realize in one's own experience — is identical with his own Self, then he attains Liberation, a state in which there is no fear of birth and death. His Liberation is coeval with knowledge: he attains Brahman at the very moment he knows Him, a truth to which all sages bear testimony.

When the aspirant finds that Brahman is his own Self, he attains fearless state. For, then he is established in his True Self; then he sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else. Indeed one's fear arises from some one else; it is not right to say that one's fear arises from one's own Self. Therefore it is something outside the Self that causes fear to the Self. Despite the sources of fear\(^{316}\) existing all around, the brahmaṇas, those who have known Brahman, are found to be afraid of none anywhere. This cannot be explained in the absence of Brahman affording to them shelter from fear. Because we find them fearless, we conclude that Brahman does exist as the cause of their fearlessness.

(Question):— When does the aspirant attain the Fearless?

(Answer):— When he sees nothing else. When he sees no duality in the Self, then he attains the Fearless.

**Knowledge of duality causes fear.**

\(^{315}\) Thus showing that to know Brahman is to gain Him, will not hold good unless Self and Brahman are identical. None but the Self can be gained by more knowledge. — (A).

\(^{316}\) Such as serpents, tigers, &c.
Now the śruti proceeds to explain clearly how the ignorant man, departing hence, does not reach the Supreme Goal. — (S).

The doubt regarding the wise man having been removed by the śruti asserting that he attains Brahman, the śruti proceeds now to remove the doubt regarding the ignorant man, by asserting that he does not attain Brahman.

5. When indeed this (soul) makes in this One even the smallest break, then for him there is fear.

When, on the contrary, in the state of ignorance, the ignorant man sees 'in this One,' in the Ātman, in Brahman, things set up by avidyā, as the timira affected eye sees a second moon, when he sees even the smallest difference, to make difference means to perceive it then, because of that perception of difference, there is fear for the perceiver of the difference. Thus the Self is the cause of the Self's fear.

Duality is a creature of avidyā.

Because ignorance makes what is ever attained appear as unattained, therefore, the śruti has emphatically asserted that the wise man alone attains Brahman. Such being the case, the ignorant cannot attain Him, the Īśvara; for, when screened by avidyā, what is actually attained becomes unattained. Though the One Self who transcends the visible ever remains one with Brahman, He is deceived by avidyā. Just as by ignorance one thinks an object in hand as unattained, so also, by ignorance one does not attain Brahman, one's very Self. By ignorance, man separates himself from the One Consciousness, and regards himself as doer and enjoyer, in the same way that, by illusion, a rope itself becomes a serpent. On account of ignorance he makes a distinction between himself and Brahman, as the knower and the known, and regards that the Īśvara, the Lord, is one being and that he himself is another being, quite powerless. Thus making a distinction where there is no distinction, he comes by the evil of fear which arises from that distinction. Though in fact he has no cause of fear, still he imagines, through ignorance, the One Self as many, and is afraid of Him. Fear arises when there is a second object, as the śruti itself has loudly declared elsewhere "From the second, verily, fear arises." (Bri. Up.1-4-2.)— (S).

There is no real distinction of any kind between jīva and Brahman; and therefore when the man of the world sees the smallest difference between them, when he sees that Brahman is in any way distinct from himself, then he is subject to the fear of birth and death, as the śruti elsewhere says:
"From death to death he goes who here below sees seeming difference." (Katha Up.4:10)

"Whosoever looks for Brahman elsewhere than in the Self shall be abandoned by Brahman." (Bri.Up. 2:4:6)

Now one may suppose that a person who has mastered the ritualistic section of the Veda, or a person who has realised the Sa-guna or Conditioned Brahman by contemplation, attains liberation in virtue of the knowledge he possesses, in the same way that the knower of the Nir-guna or Unconditioned Brahman attains liberation by his knowledge. This supposition is removed by the śruti in the following words:

6. That, verily, is fear to the knower who does not reflect.

Because the Lord is the source of fear to him who imagines himself to be subject to His control and distinct from Him, therefore the very Brahman in whom there is nothing to cause fear becomes the source of fear. Ah! None lies beyond the power of avidyā which causes fear even to Brahman whom Agni and other Devas fear. The Divine Lord is fearless and causes fear even to the Lords; even in Him avidyā generates fear. Nothing is beyond its scope. — (S).

Brahman, whom having known, the wise man attains fearlessness,— the very Brahman who thus causes fearlessness forms the source of fear to the Self owing to ignorance. That One who is invisible, etc., and in whom there is nothing to fear, proves, when screened by ignorance, when He becomes subject to the control of avidyā, a source of fear to Himself. If the knower of Brahman should, by ignorance, separate the Inner Self from Brahman to so small an extent as the tip of the hair, then his very Self proves a source of fear to himself— (S).

Brahman's Existence as the source of fear.

Brahman Himself is the cause of fear to him who sees distinction, who thinks "The Lord is distinct from me; I am distinct from Him, a being of the world (samsāra)." When thus regarded as distinct, Brahman causes fear to him who makes the smallest distinction, not seeing the identity. Therefore, though knowing, yet ignorant is that man who sees not the one True Self that is identical with himself.

It is by perception of the cause of distinction that one cherishes fear, regarding oneself as liable to destruction. 317 It is he alone who is not himself destructible that can be the cause of destruction, 318 In the absence of the Cause of all destruction who is not Himself liable to destruction, it would be hard to account for fear, which can arise only when the cause of danger is seen. In point of fact there is fear in the whole world. Wherefore, as there is fear in the world, we understand that there must certainly exist He who is the Cause of fear, who, being Himself indestructible, is the cause of all destruction, and of whom the whole world is afraid.

The non-dual Self.

The passage admits of another interpretation:— Brahman is the source of fear to the unreflecting knower of Brahman, to him who thinks that he has known Brahman, who regards Brahman as knowable by him and therefore distinct from himself. The True Self who is one with Brahman is neither the knower nor the knowable; and therefore, to regard oneself as the knower is an illusion, in the same way as it is an illusion to regard the mother-of-pearl as silver; and a person who so

317 It is indeed he who believes that Paramesvara will destroy him or cast him into the hell that has any reason to fear.—(A)

318 To say that the Cause of destruction is destructible involves the fallacy of infinite regress (anavasthā), and therefore the cause of all destruction is eternal and cannot be other than Brahman. — (A).
regards himself is therefore said to be unreflecting. The śruti says:

"He thinks of It, for whom It passes thought." (Kena, Up. 2 - 3.)

"Other than known is That, beyond the unknown too." (ibid 1 – 3)

These passages mean: —It is quite distinct from the knowable, It is quite distinct from the unknowable; It is distinct from the knowable and the knower. It is words and nameable things that become either known or unknown.

They are insentient and subject to transformation. So, too, is the knower of the known, the knower being a particular transformation of the mind (antah-kārana with semblance consciousness in it). But Ātman who is pure Consciousness cannot be the known or the unknown or the knower; otherwise He could not be one with the Immutable, Non-dual Brahman. Having separated the Self from the known and knowledge as also from the knower, which are all set up by ignorance, and having also separated Him from the unknown, from ignorance and the ignorant, one should know "I am Brahman" as taught in the śruti. — (S).

He who does not know the real nature of Brahman sees distinction between himself and Brahman, and therefore Brahman is the source of fear, the fear of samsāra, of birth and death as well to him (who knows the Conditioned Brahman) as to him who is quite ignorant. He does not attain liberation.

**Brahman as the Ruler of the Universe.**

To confirm the assertion that there is fear for him who has no knowledge of the real nature of Brahman, though he may possess other knowledge, the śruti quotes a verse:

7. There, too, there is this verse.

[Anuvāka 8.]

1. From fear of Him does Wind blow, from fear of Him does Sun rise, from fear of Him Agni and Indra (act) and Death the fifth does run.

Wind and others here mentioned, who are very noble beings and lords in themselves, discharge their respective functions of blowing and the like, which involve much trouble, according to a certain law. This, their regular discharge of their respective functions, is possible only when there is a Ruler outside them. Therefore, we conclude that there is Brahman, their Ruler, of whom they are afraid, and from fear of whom they perform their functions like the servants of a king.

For want of the knowledge of unity described above, even the lords of lords do their respective acts, afraid of Brahman, the true Inner Self. Wind and others here, mentioned are very powerful beings, self-reliant, full of physical strength and very mighty. They are still afraid of Brahman and discharge their respective functions from fear. — (S).

He who has in a former birth done very noble acts and practised a lofty contemplation is born in this birth as the Wind-God. Though endued with such greatness, and though he is a God, he is ever unweariedly engaged in the act of blowing, from fear of Brahman, the Antaryāmin, of Him who rules all from within. So, too, do the Sun, Agni and Indra, perform their respective functions. Death is the fifth God, in reference to the four gods already mentioned. He runs always here and there towards those living beings whose life period has been over, with a view to kill them. Though the Unconditioned Brahman, who in Himself is without attachment, cannot be the cause of fear, still, when associated with the upādhi of maya, He may, as the Antaryāmin, be the cause of fear, as the Vārtikakara says: "He, conditioned by Tamas or Avidyā, is the Ruler of the universe, which is subject to rule." Elsewhere the śruti says: —

"Who rules the air within, He is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal." (Bri, Up. 3:7:7.)
"By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart." (Ibid. 3-8-9)

That Brahman is the Cause of fear, the Regulator, the Ruler from within, is settled in the following disquisition:

(Vedānta-sūtras. I. ii. 5.)

(Question):— In the Brhadaranyaka-Upanishad, Yajñavālkya said to Uddalaka as follows:—

"He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who rules the earth within, He is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal." (Op. cit. 3-7-3.)

Now the question arise?, who is the Ruler of the universe, comprising the earth, etc.? Is it the Pradhāna, or Jīva, or the Īśvara?

(Prima facie view):— Being the material cause of the whole universe, the Pradhāna may be supposed to be the Ruler of its emanations. Or, Jīva may be the ruler, for, it is he who has done acts of merit and sin (dharma and adharma); and these acts bring the universe into existence so that their fruits may be reaped through that universe. Being thus the creator of the universe through his acts, Jīva may be its ruler.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: In the words "He is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal......" the śruti teaches that the Ruler is one with Jīva and immortal. So, as the śruti teaches that He is the Inner Ruler of the earth, the mid-air and all things, we learn that He is all-pervading. For these reasons, the Paramesvara, the Supreme Lord, is the Ruler. The Pradhāna cannot be the Ruler, inasmuch as the śruti speaks of the Ruler as the seer and hearer, "Unseen, He is the seer; unheard, He is the hearer." —

The insentient Pradhāna cannot be a seer or a hearer. Neither can Jīva be the ruler, as he is classed among the ruled: "who, being within, rules the self." Wherefore the Supreme Lord is the Antaryāmin, the Inner Ruler. From this it will be seen that it is the ignorant alone who has to fear, not he who knows the Real.

CHAPTER 10.

BRAHMAN THE INFINITE BLISS.

The purpose of the sequel.

In Chapters 2—9, all the questions have been answered. In the words "he attains all desires together," it has been said very concisely that the knower of Brahman attains all objects of desire at once; and it has been also said in the words "That One, verily, is the Flavour," — that Brahman is Bliss. With a view to establish these two propositions the śruti starts an enquiry.

Is Brahman's Bliss inherent or generated?

2. This is the enquiry concerning bliss.

Brahman, the Source of fear, is Bliss. Here follows the enquiry concerning Brahman the Bliss.

(Question):— What is there concerning Bliss which has to be inquired into?

(Answer):— The question concerning bliss which has to be settled by enquiry is this: Is (Brahman's) Bliss generated by the contact of the subject and the object like the worldly pleasure,

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319 Brahman has been spoken of before as such in the passage "That One, verily, is the Flavour."
or is it inherent in Him?

In other words: Is it generated by the contact of the senses and sense-objects like the worldly pleasure? Or, is it quite independent of all external means?—(S).

**Brahman's Bliss to be comprehended through sensual pleasure.**

The enquiry that follows here is treated of by the śruti elsewhere. The Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad has discussed at great length and determined the nature of Bliss in the section which begins as follows:

"If a man is healthy, well accomplished, and lord of others, surrounded by all human enjoyments, that is the highest blessing of man." (4:3:3)

'Healthy' means sound in body and the senses; 'well-accomplished' means possessed of knowledge and other such attainments.

Now the highest worldly pleasure is occasioned by the combination of the necessary external means and personal accomplishments, and this is here pointed out for a comprehension of Brahan's Bliss. It is, of course, through this bliss which is familiar to us, that it will be possible for us to conceive Brahan's Bliss attainable through the mind (buddhi) from which all sense-objects have turned away.

The word 'bliss' in the text means the worldly pleasure generated by the combination of external objects and personal accomplishments. By means of this bliss within our ken, raised to the highest point, we shall indicate that Bliss which is un-generated and does not depend on any external means. We see that whatever admits of higher and lower degrees culminates in what is infinite in itself; so, too, in the case of bliss. Whatever admits of a higher measure culminates in what is immeasurable in itself; so our bliss culminates in the Supreme Bliss. The śruti itself teaches this here to those whose vision is directed outwards and who are therefore unable to comprehend the Inner Self. —(S).

Even the worldly pleasure is a part (or semblance) of Brahan-Bliss. When wisdom is screened by nescience (avidyā) and ignorance is in the ascendand, the Brahan-Bliss becomes the worldly pleasure admitting of various degrees as experienced by Brahma and other beings of the world in accordance with their deeds (karma), their wisdom, and the external means at their command. The same Brahan-Bliss, the Bliss which is present to the mind of the man who has realised Brahan and who is unassailed by desire, is the bliss which is experienced a hundredfold more and more in the ascending orders of beings, rising from man, gandharvas and upwards, according as avidyā or ignorance, desire and karma decrease, till the culminating point is reached in the bliss of Brahma, the Hiranyakarshana. When the distinction of the subject and the object caused by avidyā has been set aside by vidyā or wisdom, then there will remain the one inherent, perfect non-dual Bliss.

The Brahan-Bliss which has to be determined by enquiry does not admit of higher and lower degrees. It is the bliss generated by karma which we find in the world admitting of higher and lower degrees, from the bliss of Brahma down to that of man. Where this bliss, rising higher and higher from man upwards, reaches its culminating point, we should understand that to be Brahan, having no beginning, middle, or end. It is a drop of this Brahan-Bliss which the whole world from Brahmā down to man enjoy according to their purity and meritorious deeds. So, rising higher and higher from man upwards, we can see face to face the inherent infinite Bliss of our Self.

**The unit of human bliss.**

With a view to make us understand this truth, the śruti proceeds as follows:

3. Suppose a youth, a good youth, learned in the sacred lore, promptest in action, steadiest in heart, strongest in body, suppose his is all this earth full of wealth. This
is one human bliss.

Youth: one in prime of life. Though a youth, one may not be good; and though good, one may not be young. Hence the qualification "good youth."

In childhood man cannot appreciate the objects of pleasure and is therefore incapable of experiencing the sensual pleasures derived from flowers, good scents, women, and so on. In old age, though man can appreciate things, still, he lacks capacity for enjoyment; and therefore there is no pleasure for him either. So that youth alone is the period of enjoyment. A youth who is ugly and cherishes feelings of enmity and the like suffers much pain: hence the qualification 'good.'

Though a good youth, a man will have to suffer pain if he lacks the knowledge of any one of the fourteen sciences and the sixty-four arts: hence the epithet "learned in sacred lore." Though learned in all lore, he who is slow in action, or he who, owing to slowness of digestion, does not relish food, cannot enjoy: hence the qualification 'promptest,' or 'best-eater' (as the word 'āśīṭha' is otherwise rendered), i.e., one who can eat all articles of food with great relish. Even such a man, if wanting in fortitude, cannot exhibit courage in war and the like affairs: hence the epithet "steadiest in heart." Though endowed with courage, he who lacks physical strength cannot be equal to such tasks as horse-riding: hence the epithet strongest."

Thus all personal accomplishments have been spoken of. If to such a man belongs the whole earth endued with all wealth with material objects necessary for enjoyment in this visible world and with all materials necessary for those rituals by which to secure the pleasures of the unseen world i.e., if such a man be the king, the ruler of the whole earth, then his bliss is the highest pleasure of man, the unit of human bliss.

The possession of external objects of pleasure is referred to by the śruti in the second supposition. To this should be added such qualifications as "the lord of others" spoken of in the Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad. If a ruler of the whole earth should ever possess all the qualifications, then his bliss would represent the unit of human bliss.

The pleasures which are lower than these are no bliss at all, as they are mixed with pain. Certainly, no man other than a ruler of the earth described above, is found anywhere to enjoy satisfaction in all respects. Bliss means satisfaction; satisfaction is incompatible with desire for external objects; and desire for an object of pleasure necessarily springs up if the object is not already possessed. But, in the case of a ruler of the earth, nothing mars his satisfaction, inasmuch as all objects in this world of man are in his possession.

Such being the case, as desire grows less and less, bliss also rises higher and higher. Having this in view, the śruti proceeds to treat of the bliss which is higher than the one described above:

The bliss of the Manushya-Gandharvas.

4. What is a hundred times the human bliss, that is one bliss of human fairies, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

The bliss of the human fairies (manushya-gandharvas) is a hundred times superior to the human bliss. The human fairies are those who, while they are men, have, in virtue of works and knowledge of a superior sort, have become Gandharvas. They indeed have the power of making themselves invisible and the like, and they have very subtle bodies and senses.

These Gandharvas of the human world emit sweet odours; they can assume whatever form they like; they possess the power of making themselves invisible and other powers of the kind, and they are experts in dancing and music. – (S).

The conditions of higher bliss.

They have accordingly fewer obstacles; they possess power to resist the pairs of opposites (such as,
pleasure and pain, heat and cold), and they command all materials of pleasure. Therefore, being unobstructed and able to counteract obstruction, the human fairy has peace of mind. Owing to greater peace of mind, there is a better manifestation of pleasure. Thus, we see that, owing to the superior tranquility, the bliss attainable at a higher stage is a hundred times superior to the bliss attainable in the next lower stage.

Of the stages mentioned here up to Brahmā, each succeeding stage is a hundred times superior to the one preceding it.—(S.)

By omitting the epithet "not smitten by passion" in the first instance when speaking of human bliss, the śruti shows that a man of sacred lore who cherishes no longing for human pleasures can attain a pleasure which is a hundred times superior to the human pleasure, i.e., a pleasure which is equal to the pleasure of a human fairy.

A man of sacred lore who is averse to all human pleasures, but who cherishes a desire for the pleasures of the next higher stage, can realize the pleasure which is a hundred times superior to the unit of human pleasure.—(S).

The qualification "a good youth, learned in the sacred lore" implies sacred knowledge and sinlessness, and they are common to all stages, whereas the absence of desire differs (at different stages) tending to a high or low bliss according as the object (of desire) is high or low.

Accordingly, insomuch as from a superior development of this last attribute accrues a hundred times superior pleasure, the śruti teaches by the epithet the attribute of being unsmitten by passion is the means for the attainment of Supreme Bliss.

The śruti teaches that the means of attaining the Supreme Bliss are three, namely, sacred lore, righteousness, and absence of desire. The first two are common to all stages from the human stage up to Brahmā, while the third rises higher and higher with the ascending orders of beings and is therefore superior to the other two.—(S).

The king being a human being, his pleasure can become an object of our aspiration, and therefore the qualification of ‘sacred lore’ has not been mentioned in connection with human pleasure. The human fairies dwell in the antarīkṣa or mid-region, as the śruti says elsewhere "By the Yakṣas, the Gandharvas and hosts of the Apsaras the antarīkṣa inhabited;" so that, the pleasure of human fairies, is not familiar to man, and the qualification ‘man versed in the Vedas’ is therefore intended to show how that pleasure comes to be known in the world of man. Indeed by a study, of the scriptures and by his own experience, such a man sees many defects in the enjoyment of pleasure-giving objects in all regions, namely, that it has to be secured with much trouble, that it is impermanent, and that there are yet higher pleasures, and cherishes no longing for that kind of enjoyment. So that a man versed in the sacred lore and unassailed by passion enjoys all the pleasure that accrues to one from possession of the objects peculiar to the region of human fairies. Though an ignorant man who is unaware of the region of human fairies may at present remain unassailed by a desire for the pleasures of that region, still, at a subsequent period when he will know more of the region through the scriptures, a desire for its pleasures may spring up in him, and then he will cease to be indifferent. But since the man of the sacred lore who sees evil in those pleasures never cherishes a longing for them, he always remains unassailed by desire.

Peace is the essential condition of bliss.

(Objection):— In the case of a Gandharva, dancing, music and the like, cause now and then a welling up of mind and gives rise to delight; but this is not possible in the case of the man of sacred lore who is free from passion.

(Answer):— Let there be no such delight for him. Being but a momentary passing state of mind, it is not a genuine bliss. The genuine bliss consists in the peculiar satisfaction which prevails in the
mind when, on the attainment of the object desired, the desire for it ceases, and the delight and other passing states of mind subside. It has been said:

"Neither the sensual pleasure in this world nor the great pleasure of heaven is equal to a sixteenth part of the pleasure of the extinction of desire."

Bliss in the form of satisfaction, equal to that of the fairy, exists for him who is versed in the sacred lore unassailed by desire.

What has been said in these two instances namely, that the bliss of satisfaction manifests itself more and more as greater tranquility prevails in the mind, should be understood in the other cases that follow here.

**The bliss of the Deva-Gandharvas.**

5. What is a hundred times the bliss of human fairies, that is one bliss of celestial fairies, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

These are fairies (Gandharvas) by birth.

They are singers of the celestial regions (Deva-loka) born as such at the very beginning of creation.

**The bliss of the Pitris.**

6. What is a hundred times the bliss of the celestial fairies, that is one bliss of the Pitris who dwell in the long-enduring world, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

Those who dwell long in the Pitri-lokas are here referred to, and such are the departed souls of those who, while here, perform the ceremonies such as the Pitr-sraddha (offering to the Pitris).—(S).

**The bliss of the Devas born in the Ājāna.**

7. What is a hundred times the bliss of the Pitris who dwell in the long-enduring world, that is one bliss of the Devas born in the Ājāna, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

The Ājāna (lit., birth) is the region of the Gods (Devaloka). As a reward for the performance of the acts (of public charity) enjoined in the smṛti, souls are born in the region of the Gods (Devas).

The Ājāna is a Devaloka so called, lying just above the region of Pitris.

**The bliss of the Karma-Devas.**

8. What is a hundred times the bliss of the Devas born in the Ājāna, that is one bliss of the Devas (known as) Karma-Devas, those who have reached Devas by work, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

They have reached Devas by mere work, by mere Vedic ritual such as fire-worship, Agnihotra. They are unenlightened; i.e., they possess no knowledge of Brahman.

**The bliss of Devas proper.**

9. What is a hundred times the bliss of the Devas (known as) Karma-Devas, that is one bliss of Devas, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

The Devas here referred to are the thirty-three.\(^{320}\) Devas who partake of the oblations offered in the sacrificial rites.

These reside on the Northern or Higher Path, the Devayana, the Path of the Gods; they are those

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\(^{320}\) Namely, the eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras, the twelve Adityas, Indra, and Prajāpati
who have practised both sacrificial rituals and contemplation of Brahman.

**The bliss of Indra.**

10. What is a hundred times the bliss of Devas, that is one bliss of Indra, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

Indra is the Lord of the Devas described just above.

**The bliss of Brihaspati.**

11. What is a hundred times the bliss of Indra, that is one bliss of Brihaspati, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

Brihaspati is Indra's teacher.

**The bliss of Prajāpati.**

12. What is a hundred times the bliss of Brihaspati, that is one bliss of the Prajāpati, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

Prajāpati, the Lord of creatures, is the Virāj, who has the three worlds for his body.

**The bliss of the Hiranyagarbha.**

13. What is a hundred times the bliss of Prajāpati, that is one bliss of Brahma, as also of the man versed in the Vedas, not smitten by passion.

Brahma, the Hiranyagarbha, who is manifested as the Universal Being as well as the individual beings, who pervades all the universe of samsāra, in whom all the different degrees of bliss described above unite into one, who possesses the Dharma which causes that bliss, the knowledge concerning that (Dharma and its results), as also the utmost freedom from desire.

He is the Sūtrāman, the first of the embodied beings, as the śruti says, "The Hiranyagarbha was in the beginning." (Tait. Samhitā. 4:1:8) The smṛti also says "He, verily is the first embodied being, He is called Puruṣa, the soul; He, the original creator of all beings, this Brahma came into being in the beginning." Therefore the ever-increasing bliss in this universe of samsāra culminates in Him,

**Freedom from desire is the pre-eminent condition of Bliss.**

His bliss in its entirety is experienced directly by him who is versed in the Vedas, who is free from all sin and unassailed by desire. Therefore we learn that these three attributes form the means (to the Supreme Bliss). Knowledge of the Vedic teaching and freedom from sin are necessary (at all stages), while freedom from desire rises higher and higher at different stages; therefore, we understand that this last — freedom from desire — is the pre-eminent condition (of the Supreme Bliss).

By teaching, as shown above, that all degrees of bliss lie within the scope of the man versed in the Vedas, the śruti has explained how it is that "whoso knoweth the One hid in the cave in the highest heaven attains all desires together."

**The Supreme Bliss and its manifestations.**

Even this bliss of the Hiranyagarbha, which comes within the scope of the man learned in the Veda on developing the utmost freedom from desire, is only a part of the Supreme Bliss, as the śruti says, " Of this Bliss, verily, other beings enjoy apart." (Bri. Up. 4:3:32) This Bliss, from which its parts are separated321 as drops of water from ocean, and wherein those parts attain unity322 — this

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321 Through their upadhis.
322 on the extinction of the upadhis
Supreme Bliss is inherent in Brahman because it is non-dual.

In that Supreme Bliss beyond the Hiranyagarbha all our separated blisses attain unity; there all desire for higher and higher degrees of bliss and all knowledge of duality are absent, in virtue of true Knowledge; and there freedom from desire in all its ascending degrees reaches its culminating point. Having thus arrived at a knowledge of the Supreme Bliss, we should then understand through the scriptures that "I am this Supreme Bliss."— (S).

Here there is no such distinction as bliss and the enjoyer of bliss.

For, the śrutis itself has taught that not the smallest distinction should be made in Brahman. No accessories are necessary for the attainment of one's own Self, because it is naturally attained. The removal of ignorance is alone necessary. Just as a man who is sunk down under a heavy burden attains greater and greater ease by the gradual removal of the burden, so also by the gradual removal of avidyā, one attains gradually greater and greater peace in one's own Self.— (S).

Thus the highest bliss in the world of samsāra which forms the door leading to the Supreme Bliss, has been made known through both Revelation and the direct experience of the man versed in the Vedas. Now, the śrutis proceed to speak of the Supreme Brahman-Bliss.

**The Supreme Bliss is one and non-dual.**

The result of the foregoing enquiry is concluded as follows:

14. *And this one who is in the man, and that one who is in the sun, He is one.*

He who is hid in the cave in the highest heaven, who, having emanated ākāśa and the rest in the universe down to the physical body (anna-maya), has entered into that very universe, is here spoken of as "this one who." — Who is here referred to? The one in this body (puruṣa). "That one who is in the sun" refers to that Supreme Bliss which is said to be within the scope of the man learned in the Vedas and whereof apart alone contributes to the bliss of all beings, from Brahma downwards, who are entitled to happiness. He is one, as the ākāśa in different jars occupying different places is one.

(Objection):— In referring to His existence in man, it is not right to refer to it in such terms merely as "this one who is in the man," without any specification; it would, on the other hand, be right to refer to it in the words "this one who is in the right eye;" for so does the śrutis refer to it elsewhere.323

(Answer):— No: for, this section treats of the Supreme Brahman,324 It is the Supreme Ātman that the śrutis treat of in this section, as witness the passages:

The one

"When in truth this soul gains fearless support in Him who is invisible, selfless, undefined, non-abode, then has he the Fearless reached."

"From fear of Him does Wind blow."

"This is the enquiry concerning Bliss."

It is not of course right to introduce a foreign subject all on a sudden, while the śrutis intends to impart here a knowledge of the Paramātman. It is, therefore, the Supreme Brahman that is here referred to in the words "He is one." Is it not indeed an enquiry into Bliss with which the śrutis is here concerned? The result of that enquiry has to be stated here, in the conclusion, namely, that the

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323 Bri. Up. 2:3:5.
324 Whereas the passage quoted above occurs in a section treating of the conditioned Brahman. — (V)
Bliss of Brahman is inherent and non-dual, the Paramātman Himself, that it is not produced by the contact of the subject and the object. Consonant with this, indeed, is the indication of Brahman in the words "This one who is in the man, and that one who is in the sun, He is one," by doing away with the special features existing in the different beings.

The direct result of the foregoing enquiry into Bliss, as stated here, is that Brahman is the non-dual bliss, quite independent of external means; i.e., that the Brahman whose nature as Supreme Bliss has been shown to us through inference the limited bliss of the beings in the universe pointing to the existence of the infinite Bliss is identical with the inner Self. Brahman, who is devoid of all samsāra and described as "Real, Consciousness and Infinite," has been raised above the unreal and the unconscious and shown to be one with the Self abiding in the mind of man. By the extrication from the not-self the egoism, etc., that lies in the lap of avidyā, of the Witness thereof, we are made to perceive directly that the Witness is the same as Brahman; for, the Witness being self-luminous and immediately known, He is here referred to as "this one." The Inner Self of the man free from avidyā as described in the words, "the man learned in the Vedas, not smitten by passion," occurring in the last instance, is, owing to proximity, referred to in "this one in the man " and so the śruti here teaches; that this Inner Self of man, the Pratyagātman, is one with Brahman. — (S)

When there is no avidyā, Brahman comes, of Himself, within the range of experience. Where an unknown object is to be known, there it is that an external source of knowledge is needed, the ego continuing to be the perceiver; but as to Brahman who is Himself Consciousness, no such external source of knowledge is necessary. Here knowledge of the Self is identical with the Self and involves no consciousness of a foreign object; and therefore no external knowledge is needed. This consciousness of the Self has, unlike others, neither a rising nor a setting. — (S).

The location denoted by the words 'in the man' in the, passage "this one who is in the man" is secondary and should therefore be ignored as unintended, the śruti referring mainly to the Self as it does elsewhere in such passages as "This intelligent one who is in the prānās." (Bri. Up. 4:4:22.) So, in the words "this one who is in the man," the śruti teaches that jīva is identical with that one who is the constant Witness of the mind, and who can be reached by the mind which is not smitten by passion. "That one who is in the Sun" refers to the Paramātman who shines brightest in the sun and is devoid of all separation from us. That the Paramātman is present in the sun is taught in the śruti:

"The Sun is the Ātman of the moving and the unmoving." (Tait. Sam. 2:4:14.)

Because by avidyā the One Reality puts on different forms as Kṣetrajña and Īśvara, therefore, by discarding this distinction, we should regard them as one in reality, just as the ākāśa of a jar and ākāśa outside the jar are one. —(S).

(Objection):— Even then, the reference to the particular entity of the sun is of no use.

(Answer):— The reference is not useless. It serves to show that the inferiority of man and the superiority of the sun should be ignored. Of course, the highest excellence in this world of duality, made up of form and formless matter, is reached in the sun. When we ignore the special features of man, we will find that the Supreme Bliss exists the same (in man and in the sun); and therefore neither superiority nor inferiority exists for one who has reached this state (of unity). It therefore stands to reason to assert "This soul gains fearless support in Him," etc.

The sun is the highest object in the universe made up of the matter having form and of the formless matter. Identity of the Consciousness in us with the Consciousness in the sun, as taught in the śruti, is possible only when the elements which make the man and the sun the lower and the higher beings are eliminated. In the words "this one who is in the man" the śruti refers to jīva, the lower entity, manifested in the mind of man and predicates his unity with Īśvara, the higher entity, as when we say the "serpent is rope." In virtue of this predication of unity with Īśvara, jīva's inferiority which is correlated to Īśvara's superiority should be lost sight of, being incompatible with his unity with
Išvara; and then Išvara's superiority should also be lost sight of, inasmuch as it can exist only in relation to the inferiority of jīva. So, the result of this predication is that the superiority in the sun and the inferiority in the jīva are both lost sight of. Thus discarding both, we get at that which is not what the words of the sentence directly denote, that which is taught only in the words "not thus, not thus," namely, the truth that Brahman is the Self and that the Self is Brahman. Neither superiority nor inferiority exists in the Âtman. It is they, whose vision is over-powered by ignorance, that see superiority and inferiority.

Ignorance alone leads to the perception of superiority, etc.; they do not exist in reality: therefore when ignorance is defeated by knowledge, all distinctions vanish. Moreover, since the Bliss of the Supreme Brahman excels all blisses ranging from man up to that of the Hiranyagarbha, we should hold to the unity of the Self in man and of Brahman in the sun; and then, ignorance which is the source of all differentiation will disappear. By describing Brahman as "Real, Consciousness," the śruti denies the unreal and ignorance in the very nature of Brahman. Ignorance which is the cause of all distinction, being thus removed, the unity of jīva in man with Brahman in the sun is not incompatible with reason.—(S).

'Man' here means the aspirant of wisdom. In him there exists some bliss, as both reason and experience show. The śruti elsewhere has started at length the argument for its existence. Having started with the words "for the Self's pleasure, indeed, does everything become dear," (Bri. Up. 2:4:5) the śruti shows that all objects of pleasure such as sons, wealth, etc., are dear as subservient to the Self, and thereby proves that the Self, as the object of supreme love, is the Bliss itself. Every one feels, "May I ever live! May I never die!" It is thus a fact of every one's experience that the Self is Bliss. Man here stands for all sentient beings of the same class; and in speaking of bliss in man the śruti has in view the bliss in all the external beings that we see around us. The bliss in the sun is typical of the bliss which is beyond our perception and stands for the bliss of all the Devatas or Cosmic Intelligences of the same class as the sun. In whatever being there is bliss, whether it be in man, or in the other sentient creatures around him, or in the Devatas or Cosmic beings, in whatever upādhis or vehicles it is contained, all bliss is one and the same in its essential form. All the distinctions that we make in bliss, such as human bliss, the bliss of gods, and so on, have reference only to the upādhi.

This One Partless Bliss of Brahman, with all the distinctions thereof due to the upādhis from the Hiranyagarbha down to the unmoving objects, has been referred to by the śruti elsewhere in the words:

"This is His highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of this bliss."
(Bri.Up. 4:3:32)

Thus the foregoing enquiry points to this conclusion: that the seekers of knowledge should understand that Brahman's Bliss is one and one alone, that it is one and indivisible, that it is as it were the ocean of bliss whereof the blisses of the Hiranyagarbha and others are so many drops.
CHAPTER 11.

BRAHMAN THE SELF.

The purpose of the sequel.

The question as to whether Brahma exists or doesn’t exist has been answered. The creation, the enjoyment of bliss, the vital functions, the fearless state, and existence of fear, all these point to the existence of Brahma (their Cause), the Source of ākāśa &c. Thus one question has been answered. The two other questions relate to the wise and the ignorant, as to whether they do or do not attain Brahma. The last of the three questions is, Does the wise man attain or not attain Brahma? It is this question which the śruti proceeds to answer in the sequel. The middle one of the three questions being answered when the last question is answered, no (separate) attempt will be made to answer that question.

The foregoing is the Bhāsyakara's (Sankaracharya's) view. As against this, the Vārtikakara (Suresvarachārya) says as follows:

I, whose dense ignorance has been consumed in the fire of His Holiness's (Sankaracharya's) speech, think that these questions relating to the wise and the ignorant have been answered in the words, "When in truth this soul gains fearless support in Him who is in visible..." (Vide ante p. 590 et seq).

By construing the passage just referred to as meant to answer the two questions, not only is the question as to the existence or non-existence of Brahma answered, but also direct answers to both the other questions are obtained. — (S).

To know Brahma is to attain Him.

The śruti now proceeds to describe the result of knowing the Bliss as explained above:

15. He who thus knows, departing from this world, attains this Anna-maya self, this Prāṇa-maya self does he attain, this Mano-maya self he attains, this Viṣṇu-maya self he attains, he attains this Ānanda-maya self.

Whoever knows thus, i.e., 'thus' referring to what has been just said whoever knows "I am Brahma," Brahma described above, whoever casts aside all inferiority and superiority, and realizes his identity with the non-dual Brahma, the Real, Consciousness, the Infinite, he departs from this world, he withdraws from this world, i.e., he becomes indifferent to this world, to this congeries of visible and invisible objects of desire, and attains the Anna-maya self described before at length. He does not see the aggregate of the external objects as distinct from his physical body; that is to say, he regards the whole universe of gross-matter as his own physical body (anna-maya-ātman). Then he identifies himself with the whole Prāṇa-maya being described above, which dwells within the whole Anna-maya; then with the Mano-maya, then with the Viṣṇu-maya, then with the Ānanda-maya, described above. And then, he attains his fearless stand in the Invisible, the Selfless, the Undefined, the Abodeless.

Whenever a person in this world, as it rarely happens, has perfected himself in the course of many past births, and intuitively perceives his identity with Brahma described above, then he loses attachment for this personal self which is full of evil as also for all external beings, and attains to

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325 i.e., the Virāj.— (V).

326 i.e., he sees that he is identical with Brahma in, the form of the physical matter comprising both the individual (vyaṣṭi) physical body as well as the universal (samaṣṭi) physical body. (V).
that Being in whom this physical universe takes its rise, has its being, and attains dissolution at the end. 'He who thus knows' means the person who, thus, in virtue of his knowledge of the truth, has given up all attachment for the separate body or bodies with which he identified himself through attachment; and it is such a person who is the Sūtrātman. (V).

He attains the Anna-maya self, and so on. In the course of his investigation into the nature of things, he sees his identity with the Anna-maya-ātmān, the Virāj; and seeing all the individual beings such as sons, grandsons &c., in the physical world as none other than the Virāj from whom they have been evolved, he rises above them all. Similarly, he sees the Anna-maya self as none other than the Prāṇa-maya self and rises above the former by identifying himself with the latter. Then again, by identifying himself with the Mano-maya which lies within the Prāṇa-maya, he, as a matter of course, gives up his identity with the external, the Prāṇa-maya, just as the serpent for which a rope is mistaken loses its identity as such when seen units true form as rope. Thus, by passing into the higher and higher self, he gives up the lower ones until he attains finally the Fearless, the Brahman beyond the visible and the invisible. — (S).

When a man knows the Inherent Bliss of the Self in the way described above, he attains that bliss in the same order. Brahman denoted above as "Real, Consciousness," and so on, has evolved, by the power of His maya, the whole universe from ākāśa down to our bodies, and is present in the cave of the five sheaths as though He has entered into it; that is to say, He can be directly perceived in us in His unconditioned form. And this Brahman is one partless Essence, the one Supreme Bliss. Now the śruti proceeds to teach by what steps one who has realised Brahman in this form attains the Bliss.

The universe created by Brahman is twofold, made up of the perceiver and the object of perception, the bhoktri and the bhogyā. The former includes the egos ranging from the Inner Conscious Self (Pratyak-chaitanya) down to the self of the physical body. That part of the universe which lies outside our body presenting itself to our consciousness as 'this,' and comprising the son, the wife, etc., comes under the category of bhogyā, the objects of perception. No doubt the son, the wife, &c., are found identified with the self, as witness people who feel happy or miserable when the sons, &c., are happy or miserable; still, their separateness from oneself being clearly recognized by all, they are selves only in a secondary sense, but not in the literal sense of the word; and accordingly the śruti, with a view to prevent their identification with the Self, first treated of the Anna-maya self. The aspirant for knowledge, too, understanding this truth, departs from this world, i.e., gives up his attachment for the son and the like perceived as external to the self, and identifies himself with the Anna-maya self as taught in the śruti. That is to say, no longer identifying himself with the pleasures and pains of the sons, &c., he rests in the mere Anna-maya self. In the same manner he passes from the Anna-maya into the Prāṇa-maya and other selves. On passing into the Ānanda-maya, he gradually gives up the four aspects of the Ānanda-maya sheath and finally rests in Brahman, the One Partless Bliss, spoken of as "Brahman, the tail."

**What is truth, Duality or Non Duality?**

Now we have to discuss this point: Who is he that thus knows? and how does he attain (Brahman)?— Is he who attains (Brahman) distinct and quite separate from the Supreme Ātmān? or is he identical with the Supreme Ātmān?

Or, is he both distinct from and identical with the Supreme Ātmān? —(S).

(Question):— What would follow from this?

That is to say, where is the necessity for this discussion?

A discussion must be calculated to remove a doubt and to serve a definite purpose.— (A).

(Answer):— If he be distinct from the Supreme Ātmān, it would go against the śruti which says:
"This having sent forth, into that very thing He then entered."

"Now if a man worships another Deity, thinking of the Deity is one, I am another,' he does not know." (Bri. Up. 1:4:10.)

"Existence .......... one alone, without a second." (Cha 6:2:1)

"That, Thou art." (Ibid 6:8:7.)

If he be identical with the Supreme Ātman, then he would be both the agent and the object of the action spoken of in the words "he attains the Ānanda-maya self;" which is opposed to reason. Moreover, then, either the Supreme would be subject to the misery of samsāra, or there would be no Supreme Being at all. 327

The third case is evidently open to objection. The three sides of the question being all alike apparently open to objection, it is necessary to discuss the matter thoroughly, with a view to determine which of them is quite free from objection; and everybody knows that it is a determinate and certain knowledge which can be of any benefit.— (A).

(The opponent):— If it be not possible to refute the objections to which both the sides are severally open, then there is no use discussing the point. If, on the contrary, it is settled that one of the two sides is not open to objection, or if there be a third side which is quite unobjectionable, then that must be the meaning of the śruti, and a discussion of the point would be quite uncalled for.

(Answer):— No; because that settlement is the very object in view. Certainly, if the objections urged against the two sides could not be answered, or if there be a third side which is recognized as unobjectionable, then the discussion would be useless. But that point has not been settled as yet; so that this discussion, intended as it is for a settlement of the point, does serve a purpose.

(The opponent):— Yes, the discussion has a purpose to serve, inasmuch as it is intended to determine the meaning of the śāstra or scriptures. So, you are welcome to discuss the matter, but you cannot establish the point.

(The Vedāntin):— What! is there a Vedic commandment that the point shall not be established?

(The opponent):— No.

(The Vedāntin):— Why then ( do you say that I cannot establish the point)?

(The opponent):— Because many are arrayed against you. Relying as you do solely on the teaching of the Vedas, you maintain oneness. But many, indeed, are those who are arrayed against you, arguing for duality and not caring for the Vedas. I have therefore a doubt as to whether you can establish your point.

(The Vedāntin):— A benediction, indeed, to me is this very thing, your saying that I, a monist, have many dualists arrayed against me. I will conquer them all; and I shall now commence the discussion.

**Non-duality is truth, because duality is a creature of ignorance.**

I maintain that 'he who thus knows' 328 is the Supreme Ātman Himself; for, it is here intended to teach that he is identical with the Supreme. Here, 329 in the words "the knower of Brahman reaches

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327 If īva find the Supreme be identical, either īva should be merged in the Supreme, or the Supreme should be merged in īva. In the former case, the existing samsāra should pertain to the Supreme; in the latter case there would be no place for the Supreme, the Ruler of īvas. — (V).

328 i.e. the īva

329 At the commencement of this Valli.
the Supreme," the śruti has indeed proposed to teach that jīva attains identity with the Supreme through knowledge of that Supreme One. Certainly, it is not possible that one can ever attain identity with another altogether distinct.

Whether destroyed or not, one cannot become another; a pot, whether destroyed or not, does not become a cloth. — (A).

(The opponent):— Neither is it possible that one can ever attain identity with oneself.

If jīva be identical with Brahman, he is already Brahman. What then is the meaning of the śruti which says, "He who knows Brahman reaches the Supreme;" "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman Himself." (Mund Up. 3:2:9) — (S)

(Answer):— It is true that jīva is already Brahman, for, he who is not Brahman cannot become Brahman. As to the śruti teaching that the knower of Brahman attains Brahman, it only means to say that what is unattained by avidyā becomes attained byvidyā or knowledge, just as the tenth man who, by ignorance, did not know that he was the tenth, became the tenth by knowledge.— (S).

We answer the opponent thus: The object of the śruti is to remove the idea of separateness caused by avidyā. The attainment of one's own Self through Brahma-vidyā, as taught (by the śruti in the words quoted above), consists in the giving up of the non-self, of the personal self connected with the physical body, etc., which are erroneously regarded each in turn as the self.

(Question):— How are we to understand that such is the purpose of the teaching?

(Answer):— Because the śruti teaches knowledge and no more. And we all see that the result of knowledge is the removal of ignorance. And mere knowledge is here taught as the means of attaining the Self.

Apart from the removal of avidyā, no reaching of Brahman like the reaching of a village is meant here.— (S).

(The opponent):— It is like imparting knowledge of the road. The teaching of mere knowledge (of Brahman) as the means does not point to identity with Him. Why? For, we see that knowledge of the road is imparted for reaching a strange village; and certainly the man who has to go to the village is not identical with the village.

Just as the knowledge of the road to the village is the means of reaching the village through walking, so also, knowledge of Brahman is the means of reaching Brahman through a repeated practice of contemplation of that knowledge. — (S).

(Answer):— No, because that is a different case. Certainly, no knowledge of the village itself is there imparted; it is only knowledge of the road leading to the village that is imparted. On the contrary, here (in the Upanishad) no knowledge of means other than knowledge of Brahman is imparted.

One literally reaches the village by travelling on the road; whereas here the reaching is figurative and consists in the giving up of avidyā by knowledge. — (S).

(The opponent):— It means that knowledge of Brahman aided by the ritual and other acts treated of in the śruti constitutes the means to the attainment of the Supreme.

(Answer):— No; for, we have already answered this objection by saying that mokṣa is eternal, and so on.

So far as liberation is concerned, there is not the least thing to be effected by ritual. The Real is in
His inherent nature ever wise and therefore ever pure. Brahman is therefore ever free. What 330 is there for works to do here? — (S).

And the śruti, in the words "this having sent forth, into that very thing He entered," teaches that the one embodied in the created objects is identical with Brahman.

**Fearlessness in mokṣa is compatible only with non-duality.**

It is only on this theory that we can explain how the knower of Brahman attains fearless stay in Brahman. Of course, it is only when the knower sees none other than himself that he may be said to have attained the fearless state by knowledge, there being then none other than himself that might cause fear. And all beings other than the Self must be creatures of avidyā; for then alone can mere knowledge lead us to regard the external being as unreal.

It is only when duality is a creature of avidyā and the real existence is one alone that the following passages will have a meaning: (S).

"He who thinks 'Deity is one, I am another, he does not know.'" (Bri. Up. 1:4:10.)

"He is to be known as one alone." (Bri. Up. 4:4:20) — (S).

**Duality is not perceived by Ātman in His natural state.**

The existence of a second moon, indeed, is one which is not perceived by him who has eyes unaffected by the disease of timira.

The knowledge that the moon is one will be true only if a second moon is not seen by those other than the timira-diseased man.

(The opponent):— It cannot be granted that no external being is perceived.

(Answer):— You should not say so; for it is not perceived in the states of suṣupti and samādhi. Speaking of suṣupti, the śruti says, "Then there is no duality." So that, though perceived at times, duality is not perceived at other times and is therefore unreal.— (S).

(The opponent):— Non-perception (of duality) in suṣupti is like the non-perception of a thing by one who is quite preoccupied with another thing.

(Answer):— No; for there is then (in suṣupti) no perception of anything at all.

(The opponent):— Since there is a perception of external objects in the jāgrat and svapna states, the external objects must really exist

(Answer):— No, because the jāgrat and svapna are creatures of avidyā.331 The perception of external objects in the jāgrat and svapna states is caused by avidyā, because it does not exist in the absence of avidyā.

(The opponent):— Then even the non-perception in suṣupti is due to avidyā.

(Answer):— No, because this non-perception is the natural state (of Ātman). (To explain):— It is the immutable state of Ātman that constitutes His real nature, because it is not dependent on other things. No changing state can ever constitute His real nature, because it is dependent on other things. Certainly the real nature of Ātman has no need of an external operative cause. It is only a specific aspect of Ātman that stands in need of an external cause to bring it about. This specific aspect is a change, and perception (of external objects) in the jāgrat and svapna states is a specific aspect (of the Ātman). Indeed, that state of a thing which does not depend on an external cause is

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330 such as Īṣvara
331 Avidyā is the erroneous identification of the Self with the body, etc. (A).
the real nature of that thing; what is dependent on an external cause does not constitute the inherent nature of the thing, inasmuch as it disappears on the disappearance of the external cause.

Therefore, suṣupti being the inherent state of the Ātman, the specific aspect (of perception) is then unmanifested, whereas it is manifested in the jāgrat and svapna states.

**Fearlessness is incompatible with duality.**

In the case, however, of those who hold that there exists an Īśvara and a universe distinct from the Self, there can be no cessation of fear; for, fear arises from an external being; and an external being, if existent, can never undergo annihilation; and what is nonexistent cannot make its existence felt.

(The opponent):— The external being becomes the source of fear only when conjoined with another cause.\(^3\)\(^3\)

(Answer):— No, for it is the same with this other cause. Even supposing that the external being becomes the source of fear only when there exists another auxiliary co-operative cause, permanent or transitory, such as good and bad acts (dharma and adharma), we cannot suppose that such a cause will ever cease to exist, and therefore there would be no cessation of fear. If, on the contrary, we should suppose that such a cause would cease to exist, then existence and non-existence would be mutually interchangeable, and no faith could be placed in anything whatsoever.

Supposing fear can arise without a cause and is therefore not caused by Īśvara, even then there would be no cessation of fear. If fear be inherent in Ātman, then it would cease only with the cessation of Ātman. But no follower of the Vedas would ever admit that Ātman will ever cease to exist. (S).

On the other hand, this objection does not apply to the theory of oneness, inasmuch as (the fear of) samsāra as well as its cause are creations of ignorance. Certainly, the second moon seen by the Timira-diseased eye neither comes into being nor undergoes annihilation.

Fear being caused by ignorance, it disappears on the disappearance of ignorance. If it be caused by an external object, then there will be fear always. If it be caused by the Self, then the Self having no control over it, it would not cease unless the Self ceases to exist, which nobody is prepared to grant. And if the Self should cease to exist, there would be none to reap the fruit of the cessation of fear. If we hold that fear is caused by mere avidyā, all this can be easily explained. When avidyā will be absent, fear will be absent too; for, fear arises only when there is avidyā.

Fear arises when Brahman is not realised. Whence can fear arise when Brahman is realised? Where is the serpent when the rope is seen? Therefore avidyā alone must be the cause of fear.— (S).

**Ignorance and knowledge are not the attributes of the Self.**

(The opponent):— Then knowledge and ignorance, vidyā and avidyā, are the attributes of Ātman.

(Answer):— No, because they are cognized in immediate perception (pratyakṣa). Discrimination and non-discrimination, knowledge and ignorance, are, like colour, perceived by immediate perception, as pertaining to the mind (antarākaraṇa). Certainly, as an object of immediate perception, colour can never be an attribute of the percipient. And avidyā or ignorance is cognized by one's own experience, "I am ignorant, and my understanding cannot discriminate." So also, knowledge or discrimination is cognized in one's own experience; and the wise impart their knowledge to others, and accordingly those others understand also.

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\(^3\)\(^3\) This is said against a possible supposition of the opponent, that fear is non-existent and is therefore absent in moksha.

\(^3\)\(^3\) This other cause being jīva's dharma and adharma.
Therefore knowledge and ignorance, vidyā and avidyā, should be brought under the category of name and form. Name and form are certainly not the attributes of the Ātman, since the śruti says:—

"He who is called Ākāśa is the revealer of name and form. That which is distinct from them is Brahman." (Cha.Up. 8:14:1)

These again, name and form, are mere fictions, just as, with reference to the sun, day and night are mere fictions; they do not exist in reality.

**Attainment is knowledge.**

(The opponent):— In the theory of non-duality, an identical being would be both the agent and the object of the action spoken of in the śruti "this Ānanda-maya Self he attains."

(Answer):— No, for this attainment consists in mere knowledge. No reaching, as in the case of a leech (jaluka), is meant here. What then? spoken of in the śruti means mere knowledge.

i.e., the knowledge "I am Brahman," which removes avidyā as well as its effects erroneously ascribed to Brahman, the True Self. So that, on the attainment of knowledge, there would be no occasion for this objection. (A).

It may be urged that the Ātman never sees himself as subject to pleasure and pain; i.e. it may be objected that, since Brahman who is ever free is never subject to samsāra, He cannot regard the cessation of samsāra, resulting from knowledge, as of any benefit. In reply, we ask, then tell me who the seeker of mokṣa is. There being no samsarin other than Brahman, there would be no seeker of mokṣa if Brahman be not subject to samsāra, and the scriptures treating of mokṣa would all go in vain. Moreover, in the states of jāgrat, svapna and suṣupti, the Self experiences Himself as subject to samsāra, by His inherent Consciousness, as "I am black, I am happy, I do not know." Being devoid of causes and effects, of the senses and the body, the Supreme Ātman is not subject to such division as the agent and the object, and soon. Because of the absence of these, the Ātman is nothing but pure Consciousness. Knowledge removes from the Ātman all connection with action, which arises from avidyā. In Himself the Ātman is unrelated to Action. No works are necessary for one to attain one's own inherent nature; for works are necessary only to bring about a change or what is not inherent in the nature of a thing. The rituals enjoined in the Veda are useful only in cleansing the mind and preparing the way for the removal of ignorance. — (S).

**The reaching**

(The opponent):— Attainment should be understood in its literal sense, it being declared in the śruti that the knower attains Ātman.

(Answer):— No; for actual union is not seen in the case of the Anna-maya self. When the knower is said to pass from the external world into the Anna-maya self, we find that no actual reaching takes place as in the case of a leech or in any other fashion.

(The opponent):— The Mano-maya, or the Viṣṇu-maya, having gone out towards external objects, turns back again and attains itself, i.e., abides in itself.

Like the manas or buddhi, which, after going out towards external objects through its vrittis or functions, turns back and reaches itself, so also the Ātman goes out towards the physical body, etc., through manas, and then turning back, comes to Himself.—(S).

(Answer):— Seeing that one cannot act upon oneself, you have asserted that some one outside the Anna-maya self passes into the latter; but you here speak of the Mano-maya or the Viṣṇu-maya returning to itself: this is a self-contradiction.
Even a leech, however active, cannot reach itself by itself. Even supposing that a leech, being made of several parts, reaches one of its parts by another, the Ātman cannot do so, inasmuch as He has no parts.—(S).

So, too, it is impossible to explain the actual attainment of the Self by the Ānanda-maya.

Therefore the attainment is not reaching. Neither is it one of the Anna-maya, &c., that attains Brahman. As the only remaining alternative unobjectionable view, the union (spoken of here) must be mere knowledge, attained by one who is outside the sheaths ranging from the Anna-maya to the Ānanda-maya.

It is only from ignorance that the Supreme Self, the Innermost Self in all, who lies beyond all sheaths and who is immutable, is said to attain or know the Self, just as it is on account of ignorance that ākāśa is said to be a space-giving substance.— (S).

When union is thus viewed as mere knowledge, (we can understand how), on the rise of the knowledge of one's true Self, vanishes away the Ātman's illusory knowledge, that identification of the Self with the not-self — such as the Anna-maya — which arises from the Ātman's connection with the heart-cave, that Ātman who is within all, who abides in the not-self including the Ānanda-maya, and who, having created the universe from the ākāśa down to the physical body, then entered into that very universe. The word "attain" is used in this figurative sense, namely, the cessation of illusion of avidyā or ignorance; the attaining of the all-pervading Ātman cannot indeed be explained in any other way. Moreover, there is no being other than Ātman; and one cannot attain oneself. Certainly a leech does not attain itself. Therefore, it is only with a view to impart the knowledge of the oneness of the Self with Brahman defined above in the words "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," that Brahman who is the object of all experience is represented as multiplying Himself, as creating the universe, as entering it; as the Flavour attained by the wise, as the Fearless, as the Goal attained, and so on; whereas, in point of fact, no such conditions can exist in the unconditioned Brahman.

That is to say, all this representation is intended to lead to the knowledge "I am Brahman" who is the Real, the Infinite, the never-failing Consciousness. On the rise of the sun of knowledge, the Self who lies beyond the five sheaths devours one by one all the five sheaths, and, like a lamp, becomes extinguished in Himself.— (S).

**A summary of the foregoing discussion.**

Sayana gives a clear summary of the results of the foregoing discussion as follows:—

(Proposal):— Who is meant by the words "he who thus knows?" Is it Paramātman or some one else? It cannot be Paramātman, for, He is the one to be known and cannot therefore be the knower. It cannot be someone else either, for, it would be opposed to the teaching such as "That, Thou art."

(Response):— This objection does not apply to our theory for, the Paramātman can be both the knower and the known. When conditioned by the physical body, the senses, and other upādhis, He is the knower; as the one partless Bliss, He is the one to be known.

(Objection):— The śrutis say that 'he who thus knows' attains Brahman. Attainment (sawkramaṇa) means firm conjunction, as we find in the case of a leech firmly holding on to a blade of grass; and certainly, the knower, the Paramātman, conditioned by the upādhis such as the body and the senses, cannot be said to attain the Anna-maya self in the manner of a leech.

(Response):— Not so, for, attainment here means the disappearance of illusion as a result of knowledge. And accordingly the Bhāṣyakara (Sankaracharya) has said, "the word 'attain' is used in a figurative sense, the cessation of illusion, of avidyā." Mere knowledge cannot indeed be the means of attaining, in the literal sense; we do not, for example, find that the mere knowledge "this
is composed of collyrium" ever attaches collyrium to the eye.

(Objection):— Already, in the words "departing from this world" occurring in the first instance, the śruti has spoken of the disappearance of illusory knowledge concerning external objects such as children.

(Answer):— If so, then, by the attainment of the Anna-maya self the śruti may mean that the illusion regarding children and the like will spring up no more. We have accordingly explained the attainment of the Anna-maya to mean resting in the Anna-maya self. On the same principle, by the attainment of the Prāṇa-maya we mean that, as a result of the realisation of the Prāṇa-maya self, the illusion of the identification of the Self with the Anna-maya, which has once disappeared, does not spring up again. And so in the subsequent cases. Though the Anna-maya, etc., are not the True Self, still, they are spoken of as the Self, because from illusion they are commonly regarded as the Self, as the thing corresponding to the notion of 'I'. Seeing that Brahman, the Real Bliss, is beyond speech and thought, the śruti does not speak of the attainment of Brahman, the real Bliss, by the four-aspected bliss of the Ānanda-maya-kośa, though as a matter of fact there exists such attainment.

CHAPTER 12.

THE UNCONDITIONED BRAHMAN.

Brahman is beyond speech and thought.

16. On that, too, there is this verse.

Here is a verse which also teaches that on realizing by knowledge, in the manner described above that One, the Unconditioned Self, one is not afraid of anything whatever, i.e., attains a fearless permanent stay. This verse serves also as a brief summary of the whole teaching of the present section, the Ananda-Valli.

This verse is quoted for the purpose of explaining the view that Brahman is beyond the scope of speech and thought.

[Anuvāka 9]

1. He who knows the bliss of Brahman, whence (all) words recede, as well as mind, without reaching, he is not afraid of any one whatsoever.

From the Unconditioned Non-dual Bliss-Self denoted above, all words all designations which can denote only conditioned things such as substances (dravya), but which are employed by authors to denote the Unconditioned Non-dual Brahman alike, because of the fact that He is also an existent thing — recede without reaching Him; i.e., failing to denote Brahman, they show themselves powerless. Mind (manas) means thought, cognition. And whatever thing speech is employed to denote, — and it is employed to denote even the supersensuous, — thought also proceeds to comprehend that thing. And wherever cognition acts, there speech also acts. Thus everywhere speech and thought, word and cognition, act together.

334 Be it known that Brahman lies beyond the reach of speech. Because of the absence in the Paramātman of the features — such as such as relation with another thing, attributes, action, genus, popular usage, etc., which may occasion the application of words, the śruti studedly asserts, in the

334 The comments running from this paragraph onwards up to where Sankaracharya's Commentary is resumed are taken from Suresvaracharya's Vārtika and Anandajīna's gloss thereon. (Tr).
words "without reaching," that Brahman cannot be denoted by words. We have therefore said before (Vide p.237 et seq.) that the words " Real, " etc., merely define the nature of Brahman by denying the applicability to Him of substantives and attributives which are applicable only to the five sheaths. We hold that the Self is Brahman devoid of the ideas of 'I, Ego' and 'mine'. Therefore, words which are applicable to substantives &c. recede from Brahman because of the absence of the necessary features mentioned above. As veil as mind: All cognitions which are transformations of mind (buddhi) are incapable of reaching Him who is the Witness of the mind and its functions. Therefore, as cognitions fail to reach Him, words which generate cognitions 'recede, as well as mind,' i.e., as well as the cognitions produced by the words.

(Question):— Then how is it that Brahman is said to be known through the śāstras or scriptures?

(Answer):— All the words which are used to impart a true knowledge of Brahman only give us to understand Him indirectly, by implication; they fail to denote Him directly.

The mental cognition which is generated by a word has a form, and so fails to reach the self-conscious Brahman; thus cognitions recede from Him along with the words.

The Word removes our ignorance of Brahman without denoting Him.

(Question):— If Brahman be beyond speech, and beyond the thought generated by speech, how can speech (Revelation) remove the ignorance concerning Him?

(Answer):— Speech, such as "That, Thou art," has that peculiar power in it in virtue of which it removes the ignorance concerning Ātman without directly designating Him, just as, in the case of a man who is asleep, his sleep is removed by such words as "O Devadatta, arise" which are used to awake him, but which do not designate him who awakes. And ignorance disappears because it has a weak basis as compared with knowledge. Knowledge is the very essential form of the Self, and therefore ignorance can hardly exist in the Self. Moreover, speech has an inconceivable power, as seen in the case of spell-chants used for curing bites of poisonous animals; and accordingly we know Brahman through words, which, without directly denoting Him, can produce a knowledge of Him and thereby dispel our ignorance. When men who are asleep are awakened by means of words, they give up sleep and awake without having grasped the relation between the words and what is denoted by them; for, in sleep no one grasps words as he grasps them in the waking state. Thus in the case of a man who is asleep the knowledge caused by speech is effective though there is no grasp of the relation between the words and their respective meanings. So when ignorance is dispelled by speech, there can arise the knowledge 'I am Brahman.' Though the words 'that' and 'thou' in the sentence "That, Thou art," can in themselves denote only the conditioned consciousness, the sentence as a whole generates by implication the idea of the One Invisible Essence, of Brahman as identical with the Inner Self, though this last is not directly denoted by the words; and this knowledge of the oneness destroying the ignorance of it, we realize in experience our identity with Brahman.

The two occurrences, namely, the rise of knowledge and the disappearance of ignorance, are not identical and simultaneous; they are related as cause and effect, the one preceding the other. There is therefore no room for any such question as "which of them precedes the other?" The word which dispels ignorance (avidyā) gives rise to the knowledge 'I am Brahman'; and this knowledge disappears along with ignorance after destroying it, just as the medicinal drug itself disappears after removing the disease. Then there remains that One who is ever self-conscious, pure, and free.

The doctrine of the injunction of Brahma jñāna refuted.

Thus Brahman being eternal and ever free, no necessity exists either for operation (bhāvanā) of any kind or for evidence (mana) of any other sort.

Brahman being Himself Consciousness, He is above the ordinary run of knowable things; and it is
only in the case of the knowable things of our ordinary experience which are known through external means — that is to say, in the case of things which are not self-known like Brahman — that a necessity for external evidence exists. Unlike the fact that "there are fruits on the bank of the river" asserted by a trustworthy person, the fact of Brahman's non-duality is not amenable to such evidence as sensuous perception (pratyakṣa); how, then, can one say that the śrutī speaking of Brahman's non-duality stands in need of further evidence? What evidence does one need to become conscious of That One, by whose presence alone one becomes conscious of the knower, of the instrument of knowledge, of the object known, and of the resulting knowledge. Unlike the consciousness of a pot, which suffers interruption for want of appropriate conditions an appropriate time, an appropriate place, an appropriate state of mind, the consciousness of Brahman never suffers interruption in any State whatever, in jāgrat or svapna or suṣūpti; for, He is the witness of the presence or absence of the interrupting causes. The mind which apprehends 'this should be done thus,' and 'this should not be done thus,' does not exist by itself; it has its being in this One, the Self; what operation or external evidence, therefore does His existence need? What evidence does the One Consciousness need, that One who is wide awake even prior to the operation of the agent, etc., that is to say, in suṣūpti, etc., unassociated with conditions (upādhis) and unconcerned with the not-self?

Though commanded by a Vedic injunction, how can one see that Thing which is not denoted by words and which thought, too, cannot reach? Being eternally existent, Ātman does not stand in need of human effort to bring Him into being; and being beyond the reach of speech and thought, neither can the knowledge of Him form a subject of injunction. If the statements of fact such as "That, Thou art," should be construed as subsidiary to the injunction of knowledge, "the Ātman should be seen," then, the identity of the Self and Brahman asserted in such subsidiary propositions will have to be set aside, as lying outside our ordinary experience; for nothing that is said in a subsidiary proposition can be accepted as meant by the Veda to be true if it should run counter to the evidence furnished by sensuous perception and the like. It is true that the Veda sometimes enjoins things which do not exist as facts of our ordinary experience, as, for instance, when it enjoins us to regard the heavens as fire; but it does so only when the several things spoken of, such as the heavens and fire, are, when taken by themselves, facts of our experience. On the contrary, Brahman who is said to be eternally pure and free is never a fact of our ordinary experience and cannot therefore form a subject of an injunction. A Vedic commandment, though lying outside our ordinary experience, can be made out, as formed of a peculiar correlation of several known things brought together; but Brahman is one and indivisible and is not a composite thing which can be spoken of in a sentence as made up of several detached parts correlated together: Brahman cannot therefore form a subject of injunction.

It cannot be urged that such a thing as the Brahman described above cannot possibly exist; for, how can one say that such a Brahman cannot possibly exist, seeing that evidence as well as non-evidence, as also spurious evidence, all do bear testimony to His existence all of them existing to us only as witnessed by Him who is the Eternal Consciousness?

(Objection):— If the Vedānta does not enjoin knowledge, how can its teaching be authoritative?

(Answer):— Why should not the assertive335 sentences, such as "That Thou art," be regarded as authoritative? They do impart knowledge, which removes the ignorance of the Immutable Consciousness as also the pain that results from that ignorance. Even the injunction (niyoga) of knowledge can have no meaning unless this knowledge of the Immutable Consciousness be held as true; and the injunction itself, which is insentient, cannot make itself known in the absence of this Consciousness.

335 as opposed to sentences implying command or injunction.
If the Vedānta enjoins the knowledge of Brahman, in the words "He shall see Ātman," we ask, whence is the existence of the Unconditioned Brahman known? Is it from the sentence of command or from any other sentence? It cannot be from the sentence of command; for the whole meaning of the sentence consists in enjoining on man the duty of acquiring knowledge of Brahman. A sentence of command enjoins a duty on man without reference to the reality or unreality of the things referred to in it, and cannot therefore be an authority as to the real nature of the things it speaks of.

In point of fact, knowledge cannot form a subject of injunction, insomuch as it cannot be done or undone or otherwise done by a person at will; he cannot therefore undertake the act though he may be enjoined by hundreds of sentences. He can engage only in an act which it is possible for him to do. It cannot be said that the nature of Brahman can be known from such assertive sentences as "That Thou art" for, these sentences being held as subsidiary to the sentence of command, cannot describe Brahman unconditioned by the subject-matter of the main proposition; and therefore Brahman described in such subsidiary assertive sentences must be one who is concerned with action. Those who are given never to transgress Vedic commands may even eat their own flesh and give up their dear lives, these acts being in their power to do. But one does not undertake the boiling of gold pieces though enjoined. He who, believing that he is enjoined by śruti to know Brahman, blindly undertakes the act without any regard to its possibility, would fail to achieve his purpose and so put himself to unnecessary pain, like the thief among boiler-makers.336

Neither can it be said that contemplation (upāsana) of the Conditioned Brahman, which can form the subject of an injunction, gives rise to the Brahma-jñāna or knowledge of the Unconditioned; for, it is a principle laid down in the śruti and the smṛti that the result of contemplation is the attainment of the Conditioned Brahman in accordance with the contemplation, but not of the knowledge of the Unconditioned.

If the contemplation enjoined does not comprehend the real nature of Brahman, then such a contemplation cannot give rise to Brahma-jñāna; the idea of silver, repeated ever so often, cannot give rise to the idea of the mother-of-pearl mistaken for silver.

If the Ātman could be known, then injunction of the knowledge (jñāna) or contemplation (upāsana) of the Ātman would be possible. As the śruti says that the Ātman cannot be known, there can be no injunction of the knowledge or contemplation of Ātman who is beyond the reach of knowledge.

The Niyoga-vādins hold that the Upanishads give us to know the Reality only in connection with an injunction, believing that a mere assertive sentence of the Veda unconnected with an injunction has no value as evidence of truth.

This cannot be; for, it is works that are enjoined in the Vedic injunctions, and a person may be directed by these injunctions to do acts, which he can accomplish with effort. How can he ever be made to undertake what has not to be accomplished by effort and action, namely, the real nature of the Self?

Neither is it the knowledge of the Self that is enjoined here in the Upanishad by the sentences of command; for such an injunction is included in the general injunction "Every one shall study his own section of the scriptures." Just as the knowledge of the injunction of a sacrificial act does not itself require an injunction other than this general injunction, so also the knowledge of Ātman does not require a separate injunction.

336 A thief, with a view to prevent the discovery of his theft, Look shelter in the house of a boiler-maker close by. The master of the house ordered him to make a boiler. He could not help undertaking it; but, not having been trained to it, he was doing the task very awkwardly. Meanwhile, the city police, who were in search of the thief, soon appeared there, and, seeing how awkwardly he was doing the work, they thought he was the thief and arrested him.
Suppose the Niyoga-vādin says as follows: It may be so, if, even in the absence of an injunction, we find people regarding Self-knowledge as a means to the end of man. On the contrary, we do not find that such is the case. It being only from a Vedic injunction of Self-knowledge that we come to know that Self-knowledge leads to the good of man, neither mere assertive statements nor other sources of knowledge can impart the knowledge of that fact.

(We Answer):— It is not so; for we cannot conceive of any result of knowledge other than a comprehension of the object to be known. Since the knowledge of the Self can arise even in the absence of an injunction other than the general one "Every one shall study his own section of the scriptures," what purpose is there to be served by an injunction of Self-knowledge?

Suppose the Niyoga-vādin rejoins thus:— It is not the sabda-jñāna, or such knowledge of the Self as can be imparted by the words of the śruti, that is enjoined in the Upanishad. On the other hand, the Upanishad enjoins quite a different knowledge of the Self. It enjoins the achievement of that transcendental intuitive knowledge of the Supreme Self through the cultivation of perfect self-control, perfect tranquility, perfect endurance, perfect balance of mind. Indeed it is not possible to comprehend Brahman, like a jar, by such knowledge as can be imparted by words, inasmuch as Brahman is not a thing which can be denoted by a sentence.

The import of a sentence, as held by experts in the subject, consists in the correlation of things denoted by the several words in the sentence. We do hold that Vakya or speech is the right source of knowledge regarding Brahman; but, as lying beyond the scope of speech, Brahman's real nature cannot form the import of a sentence; so that we are forced to admit that Brahman has to be comprehended by some other kind of knowledge than that produced by words.

Against this it may be urged as follows: If you do not grant that Brahman can be comprehended by such knowledge as can be imparted by a sentence, then Brahman cannot be taught by the Vedas.

The Niyoga-vādin answers:— You cannot say so; for, Brahman does form the subject of Vedic teaching, inasmuch as He is comprehended by that intuitive knowledge (sakṣatkarā) which is achieved by a constant contemplation of such knowledge of Brahman as is produced by the Vedic texts. We cannot admit, on the mere authority of your dictum, that Brahman constitutes the subject of Vedic teaching, and forms the import of a sentence; for, then, knowledge of Brahman would not depend on the effort of man. Unlike Dharma, the Ātman's nature cannot form the import of a sentence, as He cannot be connoted by any word. Even supposing that He is connoted by a word, He cannot form the import of a sentence; for, single detached words can only connote universals (sāmanya) or generic attributes, whereas a sentence as a whole points to a particular object. Though Brahman may be conceived as a universal (sāmanya), He cannot be regarded as a particular. In point of fact, however, the Vedāntin holds that Brahman does not admit of such distinctions as a universal and a particular; so, how can He be comprehended by speech? Being not denoted by a word, Brahman cannot form the import of a sentence; so that no knowledge of Brahman can be imparted by speech. Therefore the intuitive knowledge that "I am Brahman" is beyond the reach of a sentence; and as this intuitive knowledge is generated by a constant contemplation of that knowledge of Brahman which can be imparted by the Vedas, Brahman may be regarded as forming, in a way, the subject of the Vedic teaching.

The One Self is self-luminous, unconditioned, immutable, non-dual.

(Siddhanta):— A refutation of the theory that the nature of Brahman is taught in the Upanishads in association with an injunction is contained in the verse quoted by the Upanishad here and explained by us 'This is the object known,' 'this is knowledge,' 'I am the knower,' being thus always clearly perceived as distinguished from one another, it is not these three categories of things, of which the Ātman is ignorant. Neither can the Ātman, who is the Witness of all cognitions, be of a nature other than that of pure consciousness; that is to say, the Pratyagātmā, being the basis of all illusory
manifestations, cannot himself be an illusory manifestation. Though of the nature of pure consciousness, the Ātman is not perceived as such owing to ajñāna, illusion, ignorance. He has nothing in Him to cast off and has nothing to acquire. Being the Witness of all that is cast away, and of all that is acquired, He must in Himself be immutable, subject to no change; and He becomes the Witness of the perceiver, etc., only in virtue of His association with ajñāna which is the cause of the perceiver, etc. It is the ego — the buddhi, the understanding — that takes these forms, "I know," "I do' not know;" and this ego is only an aspect or function of the mind (antah-karana-vṛtti) and is the seat of pratyabhijñā, the faculty of the cognition of identity, i.e., the faculty which holds together in association the different cognitions in their sequence. It is the perceiver — i.e., the mind, the antah-karana with a semblance of consciousness — that lacks or comes by knowledge. As the Ātman beyond all the sheaths is indivisible, He cannot put on the different forms referred to, as the mind can. It is the knower i.e., the ego, the agent, who puts on different forms, and who has a semblance-consciousness, who is said to recognize, in the form "this is the thing I saw" or "I am the same person that was": i.e., at the present moment, when the mind is impressed with an object presented to the senses, he recalls his former experience as the perceiver of an object, having all along carried with himself the impression of the object caused by the experience thereof in a former state of mind. Like this recognition of identity, even ignorance (ajñāna), etc., pertain only to the mind, not to the Immutable Consciousness; and it is by illusion that one thinks that ignorance, etc., pertain to the Self. This is a fault of the mind (buddhi):— it is buddhi, the ego, the mind with reflected consciousness, that puts on the forms of external objects, the form of the self or knower, and the appearance of consciousness. Such variety and change of forms cannot pertain to the Self who is Immutable.

Knowledge of the one Self imparted by Revelation.

By the process of manana, i.e., by following what is called the method of 'conjoint presence and absence' (anvayavyatireka) as indicated by the śruti, the aspirant of mokṣa sets aside as foreign to the True Self, all that is the not-self, which is perceived by the mind, and whose form is reproduced in the mind at the time of perception, seeing that the not-self is not always present in the jāgrat, svapna, and suṣupti states; and, seeing that pure consciousness is always present in all states, he holds on in the mind to that pure Consciousness, the Self, the 'Thou', the mind being then thrown into the form of the pure consciousness, which is not a thing that can be described in a sentence; that is to say, which does not admit of that correlation of things which is necessarily comprehended in the import of a sentence. Then the sentence "That, Thou art" or the like, showing the unreality of what is inconstant produces the knowledge "I am Brahma," a state of the mind (buddhi-vṛtti) which, at the very next moment after its rise, burns away the ignorance of the Self and all its effects and gives the student to know that the Self is Brahman and that Brahman is the Self, to know the Unconditioned One. Just as in virtue of the agreement in case (sāmānādhitkaranya) of the two terms in the sentence "The ākāśa in the jar is the mighty expanse of ākāśa," we set aside the limitations of the two ākāśa as incompatible with their unity and comprehend the one ākāśa underlying the two limited ones spoken of as identical, so also, in virtue of the agreement in case of the two words 'That' and 'Thou; in "That Thou art," which shows the things directly denoted by the two words are related as substantive and attributive, we set aside all the limitations denoted by the two words as incompatible with the unity here implied and intuitively comprehend the One, not forming the direct import of the sentence; and inasmuch as the words of the sentence have thus served to indicate the One Reality, the knowledge of the One may be considered to have been directly imparted by the sentence, the sentence being by itself capable of imparting the knowledge of the One who does not form the import of a sentence.

No external evidence is necessary to prove the Self.

The assertion that another kind of knowledge has yet to be achieved is like threshing the husk of the
grain. Non-conception, misconception and doubt are found to arise only with reference to a jar and the like, but not with reference to the cogniser's cognition and the Witness-consciousness. As to cognition there can be no non-cognition, misconception or doubt; for, being immediately present before consciousness it does not need an external evidence.

(To explain):— A cognition, whether it is in the form of certainty or of doubt, presents itself to the cogniser without any medium; wherefore it does not need an external proof. Nor does even the cogniser admit of non-cognition, misconception or doubt, insomuch as he is immediately present before the Witness-consciousness. Such being the case, it needs no saying that the Unconditioned Self whose never-failing consciousness bears a constant testimony to the existence of the cogniser, cognition, etc., require no external evidence at all.

Therefore no knowledge other than that imparted by the words of the Upanishad has to be achieved for further enlightenment. Moreover, this Unconditioned non-dual Self, admitting of no such relations as are implied in the direct import of any sentence, is experienced in suśupti; and this experience cannot be an illusion, as it is supported by the authority of the śrutis which says "As to the view that there (in the suśupti) he does not see, (we say), though seeing, he does not see." (Bri. Up. 4:3:23) The very inherent consciousness of the Brahman-Self manifesting itself in that state of mind which results from a proper understanding of the final teaching of the Upanishads, constitutes the knowledge which can remove the nescience, that knowledge being as constant as the Self whereas the not-self is but a temporary manifestation. This Self cannot be regarded as the known or the unknown, as knowledge or ignorance, as one who knows or one who knows not; for such things exist to us as witnessed by the Self; and even His witnessship is not absolutely real. Wherefore no further knowledge is called for with a view to an elimination of these elements from the Self.

**Knowledge of Brahman cannot be enjoined.**

An injunction (niyoga), moreover, can command a person to do what lies in his power; but knowledge of things as they are, depends, not on the will of a person, but upon things themselves. If the knowledge ‘it is to be done thus’ and ‘it is to be done not thus’ can be derived from the ritualistic section of the Veda, without that knowledge being separately enjoined, why can a person not derive a knowledge of truth from an assertive sentence such as "That, Thou art" without a separate injunction. An injunction can command an action to be done; the agent, &c., do not form the subject of an injunction, because they already exist; and it is further held that an identical sentence cannot point to two things, i.e., (in the present instance) cannot both command an act and impart a knowledge of the true nature of things referred to in the sentence.

It cannot be maintained that all speech implies injunction; for, there is a difference perceived by the ear in the very wording of the two kinds of sentences, those which express an injunction and those which assert. If it be held that sensuous perception cannot always be relied upon, then the definition of sensuous perception that it is the knowledge arising in the ego from contact of the senses with what then exists as given by the omniscient sage, Jaimini, would go in vain.

An agent can exercise his independent will with regard to an act. His will has no sway over the nature of things as they are. Muktı, in our view, is the state of Ātman as He is; if it could be secured by action, then it would be impermanent.

We hold that knowledge alone as true which comprehends a thing as it is. The knowledge which has its origin solely in man's effort can be no true knowledge any more than that of silver (arising when the mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver). As right knowledge comprehends things as they are, it is impossible for the Vedānta to teach the real nature of the Thing as it is in connection with an injunction.

What is the reason for saying that the Upanishad teaches Brahman as related to an injunction? Does every sentence or every pramāna (source of knowledge) convey knowledge of things as subsidiary
to an injunction? Unless some such invariable association is adduced as a reason, we cannot admit that the Vedantic texts impart knowledge of Brahman only as related to an injunction. We hold quite a different view: we hold that the texts of the Upanishad which are not connected with any injunction constitute the authority as to the true nature of the Inner Self as He is, though we admit that such texts of the Upanishad as are connected with injunctions enjoin acts such as śravaṇa, the study of the scriptures, and so on. Moreover, all effort on the part of man enjoined by the śruti in connection with the knowledge of Brahman, be it the knowledge imparted by the very texts or the knowledge which is alleged to result from a repeated practice thereof, presupposes that Brahman forms the subject of treatment in the Upanishads. If this be not admitted, then the injunction of the knowledge of Brahman would be impossible. The theory that the Reality is taught only as associated with an injunction runs counter to the fact that such passages as "Brahman is not gross," (Bri. Up. 3:8:8.)

"Brahman is beyond words" (Kaṭha-Up. 3:15.), &c., treat of Brahman as He is. These passages should not be rendered unauthoritative concerning the nature of Brahman by being made subsidiary to an injunction. It cannot be urged that, if unassociated with an injunction, these passages, like the speech of an untrustworthy person, would have no authority. For, if such passages be not authoritative as treating of Brahman, then the injunction would have no scope at all. Even though enjoined to know Brahman, who is in fact unknowable, one cannot do it; none has power to make a thing what it is not. If it be said that the Vedic injunction would impel him to the act, then he would do it like the thief among the boiler-makers.

Moreover, the injunction of knowledge runs counter to the texts which, in a commanding tone, assert that Brahman is other than what is known and other than what is unknown. The śruti denies Brahman's knowability, in sentences of command such as "whereby shall one know the knower?" (Bri. Up. 2:4:14.) "Thou shalt not see the seer of sight." (3:4:2) Brahman being the Eternal self-luminous Consciousness illumining all luminaries, to know Him is impossible.

(Objection):— It is Ātman that sees the visible universe. So, how can it be said that Ātman is not the object directly perceived?

(Answer):— If so, in the act of knowing the Ātman, the agent and the object of the action would be identical. namely, the Ātman. In fact, being unseen, He cannot be the object; and being immutable (kūṭasṭha) he cannot be the agent in the act of seeing. Thus alone, can we explain the denial with reference to Ātman of the six changes of state such as birth.

It is such distinguishable forms as the cogniser, cognition and the cognized, that are said to be the objects of perception, being themselves not luminous. If, as the Witness-Consciousness, the cogniser be also the object cognized, then the cognition and the instrument of cognition would also be nothing more than the Witness-Consciousness, and the terms 'the cogniser,' 'the cognized' &c., would not denote what are ordinarily meant by such terms. So the Witness-Consciousness cannot be the object of cognition.

**The authority of the 'anuvāda.'**

If the anuvāda repetition of a single notion or of a proposition, in a word or a sentence, in connection with an injunction convey no evidence as to what it signifies in itself, it would not be possible to connect the substance of milk with the act of offering. It is no reply to say that milk may be connected with svarga; for the substance of milk by itself cannot be connected with svarga except through an act. Moreover, when the śruti enjoins (in connection with Darsa and Purnamasa)

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337 The reference here is to the injunction "He shall offer milk," where the act denoted by the word "offer" is a repetition of what was already enjoined in a separate sentence.
"He shall obtain cattle by milk-pail"\textsuperscript{338} instead of by a pan (chamasa), it is held that partly the śruti intends a repetition of what is already taught, namely that water should be poured into a vessel, and that the pouring of water into a vessel is a means to the svarga and that it teaches a new truth in so far as it enjoins that instead of a pan (chamasa) a milk-pail should be used by him who seeks to secure cattle. Thus even here it is through its relation with the pouring of water during the performance of the sacrificial rites of Darsa and Purnamasa which are said to be the means to svarga that the substance of the milk-pail can bring about the intended fruit, namely, cattle. This would be impossible if the repetitions (anuvādas) should convey no authority as to what they signify. Perhaps it may be urged that, on account of the use of the milk-pail, which is different from pan (chamasa), the two acts of pouring are altogether different and that therefore there is no repetition of what is already taught. If this be true, then, it would also follow that the two acts are different as being enjoined in connection with different fruits, namely, svarga and cattle respectively; in which case all injunctions prescribing the use of particular substances for particular fruits in connection with acts already prescribed would have no scope at all.

**The authority of assertive sentences.**

(Objection):— The assertive sentences which do not teach either that something should be given up or that something should be acquired can convey no authority as to what they signify; so that, the sentence imparting the knowledge "I am Brahman" conveys no authority with it.

(Answer):— As Brahman is our very Self, we need not put forth a fresh effort to secure Brahman. Being none other than one's Self, Brahman cannot be given up either. Since the assertive passage such as "That, Thou art" imparts the knowledge of Brahman which leads to the highest bliss, what more is left here for an injunction to do? Without an injunction, the passage is a self-sufficient authority. Similarly, it cannot but be admitted by the crows (of mimamsakas) that anuvādas are authorities as regards what they signify. It is when we seek to know the purpose of anuvādas that we have to connect them with an injunction. Thus in no case can it be shown that a sentence can convey authority as to what it signifies only when viewed in relation to an injunction. Whence then the necessity that from an injunction alone is authoritative knowledge derived?

If the original teaching and its repetition (vāda and anuvāda) convey different meanings, then the repetition should convey authority with it, as imparting the knowledge of what has been not known. And it is a fact of our experience that the two do convey two different meanings; the former is looked upon as teaching what is not already known and the latter as repeating what is already known.

If it be held that the repetitions convey ideas of things which are as illusory as the mirage-water, then injunction can have no scope anywhere. Every single term in a sentence (which is of the nature of an anuvāda) can give us to know what it designates, without presupposing anything else: If it should lack power to give us to know even that much independently, then its utterance would be altogether futile.

We ask, whence have you come to know that a term is an anuvāda or repeats what has been otherwise known, and that it is sakankṣa or presupposes its connection with something else? It cannot be from the term itself having those attributes; for, terms are looked upon as conveying no authority with them. And as to the injunction itself its signification has been exhausted by giving us to know the thing enjoined. When a term presupposes anything, what is presupposed must be something else which is not designated by the term itself; if it should convey no authority with it as to what it signifies, how can the meaning of a sentence be construed?

\textsuperscript{338} In this injunction the śruti seems at first sight to connect the substance of the milk-pail with the result directly, without the intervention of an act.
We may further ask, whence do you know that a term has no authority? Certainly pratyakṣa (immediate perception) and other pramāṇas (instruments of knowledge) give us to know what exists, but not what does not exist, a mere abhāva or non-existence.

And the śruti will, in the sequel (Bhrigu-Valli), give us to know the real nature of the Self by showing that the Self is not of the nature of the physical body, or of the vital air, or of the mind; and it is therefore hard to show that an injunction teaches it.

The śruti does not teach that the Self is distinct (bhīmna) from the physical body, etc., as though these latter really exist. Such a thing as distinction cannot be apprehended by any of the pramāṇas; for, distinction between one thing and another should mean absence (abhāva) of the one in the other, and this absence being a mere negation cannot come in contact with the senses. As other pramāṇas are based upon sensuous perception (pratyakṣa), they, too, cannot apprehend distinction. The opponents may urge that distinction is an abhāva and can be apprehended through the absence of the other pramāṇas, which is also an abhāva. Then, an abhāva of pramāna is considered to be a pramāna, which is absurd. In the absence of consciousness manifested in the mind as the result of the operation of a pramāna, nothing can manifest itself to us. Even the opponents, however, hold that the absence of pramāṇas is not altogether an abhāva; which is quite inconsistent with the contention that an abhāva of pramāṇas gives us to know distinction which is an abhāva. Wherefore the śruti does not teach that the Self is distinct from the physical body, etc., The assertive sentences in the śruti give us to know the nature of the Self as He is, by denying the nature of the physical body, etc., falsely ascribed to Him.

It cannot be urged that the knowledge generated by an assertive sentence derives its authority from an injunction. How can a knowledge which has no authority in itself derive authority from an injunction? Ākāśa, for instance, cannot be converted into trays, however skillfully a potter may operate upon it.

If knowledge of the Ātman be already made out, why should it need an injunction, any more than one injunction needs another injunction?

If it be not already made out, how can it be enjoined?

If it be urged that from an injunction alone can one learn that knowledge leads to liberation, then one would have to look out for another injunction teaching that a Vedic injunction subserves human good; so that we understand that the knowledge imparted by the texts such as "That, Thou art" yields its fruit by itself, just as eating produces satisfaction by itself.

Just as we understand the meaning of the injunction, "Every one shall study his own portion of the scriptures," without another injunction, so also we understand the meaning of the assertive sentence without any injunction.

If, in the absence of an injunction, the knowledge imparted by the assertive sentence is false, then the meaning of the injunction "Every one shall study his own portion of the scriptures" must also be false.

Either the injunction should be held subservient to the assertion, or the assertion should be held subservient to the injunction. The result would be this:— If the assertion be . subservient to the injunction, then, the knowledge imparted would be like the knowledge that "the heavens is fire," calculated to produce some invisible results in future; it would not impart right knowledge, knowledge of the Thing as it is. If, on the other hand, the injunction be held subservient to the assertion, then, no injunction of knowledge can be made out.

**The scope of injunction in the Vedānta.**

Prior, however, to the attainment of the knowledge of the truth as a whole, taught in the assertive
sentences such as "That, Thou art," injunction is possible, enjoining that it is incumbent on a student to discriminate the nature of the things spoken of in the main assertive texts, by the application of the method of anvaya-vyatireka, of "conjoint presence and absence." This investigation is necessary, because ignorance of the true nature of the things spoken of in the passages referred to is an obstacle in the way of the understanding of the truth as a whole taught in those propositions.

If what is taught by a Vedic text is a thing which has yet to be done and stands in need of operative factors, that, then, is a thing which can be enjoined. When one of quite a different nature, the Eternal One who is not concerned with action, is known from a Vedic text, He cannot be made the subject of an injunction. Since the knowledge "That, Thou art," on its very rise can bring about the removal of ignorance without any extraneous aid, the knowledge is not meant for *nididhyāśana* or deep contemplation. If the knowledge that has been attained cannot bring about its own result, namely, the removal of ignorance, it cannot do so when it is made subservient to the injunction of nididhyāsana.

**Wisdom eradicates fear.**

He who knows the inherent, eternal, partless, supreme Bliss of Brahman, that incomprehensible, unutterable, invisible Bliss of Brahmin, which words, employed to denote Brahman by authors in ever so many ways, as well as the understanding that is capable of comprehending all, fail to reveal; which is very Self of the man of spiritual enlightenment who is free from sin and unassailed by desires of all kinds; which is above all contact of the subject and the object;— he who has realised the Brahman-Bliss as described above, has no fear from any quarter, as there is no cause of fear.

Certainly, there exists nothing apart from the wise one, nothing distinct from him, of which he has to fear. For, it has been said that, when one makes even the smallest difference, there is fear for him. And since, in the case of the wise man, all cause of fear which is the creature of avidyā has disappeared like the second moon seen by the timira-diseased eye, it is but proper to say he has no fear from any quarter.

He who knows Brahman's Bliss— the Immutable Consciousness, wherein there is no duality of any kind, has no fear from anything whatsoever. — (S).

The duality signified by the expression "Brahman's Bliss," as also by the expression "the bliss of the brahmana (srotiya)" of him who has known Brahman and thereby become Brahman, is figurative, like "the duality signified by "Rahu's head"; there being actually no such duality, inasmuch as Brahman is unconditioned (nirguṇa). This grandeur of the Brahmin, of him who has known Brahman, admits of no increase or decrease, as it is his inherent nature. On knowing this, he has no fear from any quarter. In the words "He who knows Brahman-Bliss is not afraid of any one whatsoever," the śruti teaches that the fruit of the knowledge is coeval with the knowledge, as the satisfaction resulting from eating food is coeval with the eating: it is unlike svarga, which has to be attained at some future time. Since there is no other obstacle in the way of mokṣa except avidyā, the śruti says that mokṣa is coeval with knowledge, it is duality which is the source of fear; and duality has its origin in avidyā; so that when avidyā has been consumed by the fire of vidyā, fear can arise from no quarter whatsoever. That is to say, when avidyā has been removed by the knowledge that our pure Inner Self is the very Paramātman, the Supreme Self, there is no fear from anything whatsoever.— (S).

In the words "Whence all words recede," the śruti gives us to understand that Brahman cannot be signified by a word or a sentence; and the śruti which teaches absolute truth uses the words "as wry ell as manas" with a view to deny in the Supreme At man all the differentiations that can be imagined by mind. Accordingly the śruti denies all extraneous knowledge of the Self and speaks of

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339 Here we resume Sankaracharya's Comment once more
Brahman as unconscious of anything other than Himself:

"This Self is not obtainable by explanation, nor yet by mental grasp, nor hearing many times; by him whom so He chooses, by him is He obtained. For him the Self His proper form reveals." (Kaṭha Up. 2:23) — (S).

This verse (mantra) was quoted in the section treating of the Mano-maya-kośa, inasmuch as manas is the organ of Brahma-jñāna. There the Mano-maya is by courtesy regarded as Brahman: and with a view to mere fear was denied in the words "fears not at any time." But here, in the verse treating of the non-dual Brahman, the very cause of fear is denied in the words "is not afraid of any one whatsoever."

Because all duality terminates in Brahman, the Inner Self — because the five sheaths do not exist apart from the Self as the serpent terminates finally in the rope, this verse was quoted by the śrutī in the section treating of the Mano-maya-kośa.

The wise man is himself the Supreme Brahman. He sees in Himself the non-dual Self. One alone, without a second, he has no fear, as there exists no cause of fear.

**Sayana's explanation of the verse.**

The explanation of this verse in the chapter on the Mano-maya kośa should be here referred to.

We explain the verse further as follows: — Words can denote only conditioned things; they are nevertheless used by authors to denote even the Unconditioned Brahman simply because He is an existent being; but then they recede without denoting Him: their power of denoting fails altogether. And the mind grasps all super-sensuous truths only in the wake of the words, but not independently by themselves; so that when words recede, the mind also recedes along with words. Accordingly, Brahman's Bliss being superior to that of the Hiranyagarbha, it is impossible to speak or think of its extent. Whoever understands the Bliss which constitutes the very inherent nature of Brahman, which the words can merely hint at by suggestion (lakṣaṇa-vṛtti), and which the mind can grasp at in the same way, that person is not afraid of anything whatsoever.

As quoted in the chapter on the Mano-maya-kośa, the verse reads "fears not at any time." Considering the context of the verse as quoted there, we explain it as follows: He who contemplates Brahman as conditioned by the Mano-maya is not afraid at any time either in this birth or in a future birth, since he can ward off any fear that may ever arise. But here in the case of the one who knows, through proper instruments of knowledge, the non-dual bliss of Brahman, the very cause of fear does not exist: hence the words "is not afraid of any one whatsoever." As the śrutī says "from a second thing, verily, does fear arise,"340 the cause of fear is the thing which lies outside the Self; and such a thing has no place in the non-dual Brahman.

**Positive and negative definitions of Brahman.**

The author of the Vakyavṛtti has said, "Having thus determined the meaning of 'Thou,' the student should reflect upon the meaning of 'That' as denned by the śrutī in both the negative and positive aspects." The śrutī has denned Brahman in His positive aspect as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman." It has been said above that, in thinking of this positive aspect of Brahman, one should assemble in one array all such definitions as 'Brahman is Bliss,' 'Brahman is self-luminous,' and so on. In the words "whence all words recede," Brahman is defined in his negative aspect.

In reflecting upon this aspect, the student should bear in mind all such negative definitions as "not gross, not small, not short," as has been determined in the Vedānta-sūtras.

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. iii. 33).

(Question):— In the Gargi-Brahmana, Brahman is defined by certain negations such as "not gross, not small, not short." So also in the Kaṭha-Upanishad: "without sound, without touch, without colour, without perishing." Similar definitions are found in other Upanishads. The question is: Is it necessary or not that the student of one Upanishad should note all negative definitions given in other Upanishads?

(Prima facie view):— It is not necessary: for, unlike the attributes such as reality and bliss, these negations do not constitute the inherent nature of Ātman, and therefore no purpose is served by noting all the negative definitions.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Just as the negations contained in one Upanishad serve to indicate the nature of Ātman though they do not constitute the very nature of Ātman, so also, those negations collected from other Upanishads serve the same purpose. It should not be urged that, since those negations alone which are contained in one's own Upanishad serve to indicate the nature of Ātman, it is useless to note the negations contained in other Upanishads; for, these latter serve to strengthen the knowledge. Otherwise, even in the case of one's own Upanishad, it would be useless to note all the negations contained therein when two or three alone might serve the purpose. Therefore all negations should be collected together.

**Brahman is not denied.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 22—30).

As regards the negations thus collected together, there remains a particular point to be discussed.

(Question):— In the section of the Brhadaranyaka-Upanishad treating of the two kinds of matter, the matter having form and the formless matter, the śruti, after describing at great length the matter with form comprising earth, water and fire, as well as the formless matter comprising air and ether, proceeds to describe Brahman in the words "Now then is the instruction 'not thus, not thus.' The question is, Does Brahman also come or not come within the sweep of this negation?

(Prima facie view):— After treating of the two kinds of matter, which are manifestations of Brahman, it is necessary to treat of Brahman who manifests Himself in those forms; and with this view the śruti says, 'not thus, not thus.' The universe being denied by one of the two negations, the other would be meaningless if Brahman be not denied by the second negation. So that, Brahman also comes within the sweep of the negation.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The second negation is not useless, since it serves to strengthen the same idea by repetition. By this repetition, the śruti teaches that nothing which can be perceived, i.e., nothing which can be indicated by the word 'thus,' can be Brahman. Suppose we do not understand such a repetition here; then, since by one negation alone are denied the two kinds of matter; matter having form and matter having no form which are the subject of treatment here and which can be indicated by 'thus,' we would have to regard as Brahman what remains undenied, namely, the abhāva or absence of the two kinds of matter as well as the primary avidyā.

(Objection):— Though we understand repetition here, the difficulty will still remain unexplained: for, repetition has unrestricted scope and may include Brahman within its sweep.

(Answer):— No; for, Brahman is not an object of perception and cannot therefore be indicated by the word 'thus,' which represents the things to be denied. Moreover, if the śruti which Has proposed to teach Brahman with much effort, in the words "Now then follows the instruction," were to deny

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341 Bri. Up. 3:8:8
the selfsame Brahman, it would be a mere self-contradiction. The sequel, too, goes against the denial of Brahman. In the sequel the śruti speaks of Brahmans "the Real of the real," meaning thereby that Brahman is preeminently and absolutely real as compared with what are commonly regarded as real, namely, mountains, rivers, oceans, etc. All this would go in vain if all is denied including Brahman. Wherefore Brahman does not come within the sweep of the negation.

CHAPTER 13.
BEYOND WORKS.

The enlightened one is not afflicted by anxiety about good and evil.

(The opponent):— There do exist causes of fear, namely omission of righteous acts, and commission of sinful ones.

It is wrong to say that he who knows Brahman has no fear from anything whatsoever; for, there exists a cause of fear in the form of anxiety relating to dharma and adharma.

(Answer):— Not so.

Why?
The śruti says:—

2. Him, verily, burns not the thought, "Why have I not done the right? Why have I done sin?"

He who knows (Brahman) as described above does not feel afflicted at heart. Now, it may be asked, in what way do the omission of righteousness and commission of sin not afflict him? — We answer: At the approach of death a man feels an after-compunction at "heart, thinking why have I not done the right act? Similarly, he may feel afflicted, fearing that he may fall into the hell and the like, and thinking 'Why have I done the forbidden act?' These two, the omission of the right and the commission of sin, do not afflict him (who knows Brahman) as they afflict him who knows not Brahman.

Him who knows the Self as the non-agent, omission of the right act and the commission of sin do not afflict, inasmuch as all fruit of action goes to the agent. "An accursed being I am who while alive have never done a good act; I have always done sin so that fear has overtaken me!" It is such thoughts as these that cause fear, at the approach of death, in those whose mind is invested with avidyā, when fatal hiccoughs have overpowered them. It is in the very nature of the fruit of an action that it accrues to the doer of the act. Good and evil, which have their origin in him who knows not, do not therefore afflict him who knows himself as the non-agent.— (S).

At the approach of death all sentient beings feel anxious iii mind on the rush of such reflections as the following: Formerly in youth, when the body and the senses were strong, when there was plenty of wealth and other resources, why did I not do sacrificial acts, acts of gift, and such other meritorious acts which are the means of attaining svarga and other regions of the kind; and why did I do acts of sin, such as the robbing of other men's wealth, which will take Me to the hell? Such thoughts, though causing anxiety to all others, do not assail that man who has known Brahman.

The enlightened one derives strength from good and evil.

(Question):— For what reason do they not afflict the wise man?

(Answer):— Being one with the immutable and non-dual Self, he consumes dharma and
adharma, good and evil, as well as avidyā, by the fire of knowledge, and dwells in his own Self. — (S).

The śruti says:

3. **Whoso knows thus, these two as the Self does he cherish.**

He who knows Brahman as described above cherishes these, good and evil, as the Self; he regards them both as the Supreme Self.

Good and evil *exist and manifest* themselves to consciousness. These two factors in their being, existence and manifestation, are derived from the Self; and whatever else is associated with them as causes of good and evil, — their specific names and forms, — are not real, as they are dissociated from existence and manifestation. The Self was originally regarded as virtue and sin owing to avidyā; but now, the wise man thinks that the things which were regarded as sources of good and evil are identical with the Self, and by this knowledge he cherishes the Self the more, and rejoices at the sight of what to the worldly people appears as good and evil, without ever cherishing the least fear. — (A).

He who knows Brahman as his own Inner Self at once burns away good and evil generated by avidyā in the fire of the knowledge that he is the non-agent. Having thus annihilated good and evil without any remnant, he strengthens the Self the more. Though strong in Himself, the Ātman is weakened by the disease of avidyā. When the terrible disease of avidyā is reduced by Vidyā, the latter is said to make the Ātman strong. When a man is wakened from sleep, the objects seen in his dream-perception are found to have no existence outside the wakened soul. So here good and evil remain only as the One Self and no more. — (S).

The śruti gives the reason why the knower of Brahman feels no anxiety. The person who has learnt from the scriptures and reason that good and evil acts are the source of anxiety cherishes the Self with a view to avoid the anxiety caused by the acts. He feels happy in the conviction that this Self is merely the Witness, but not the doer of good and evil acts. As the conviction that "I am Brahman" has altogether destroyed even the avidyā which is the cause of the whole samsāra comprising dharma and adharma and their fruits, he grows very strong; that is to say, he is never overtaken by dharma and adharma.

(Objection):— Though it has been known that the Self is Brahman and non-agent, good and evil acts are necessarily brought about by the activities of the sense-organs and the body which still continue to be active: and there remain also some good and evil acts done in former births.

(Answer):— The śruti explains as follows:

4. **Both these, verily, as the Self does he cherish who thus knows.**

The wise man regards virtue and sin as identical with the Self, divesting them of their specific forms, and thus cherishes the Self. Who is it that cherishes the Self thus? He who knows thus, i.e., who knows the non-dual Bliss-Brahman. Virtue and sin, looked upon by him as the Self, become weak and harmless, and do not lead him to any more births.

Because the wise man who has become the Real Invisible Brahman makes out, by his right knowledge, that good and evil are both one with Brahman, therefore he only cherishes the Self the more through good and evil; so that these can no longer disturb his peace. It is to the subtle body that weakness pertains, and this is due to karma. Karma again has its origin in the agent, etc., and these are set up by the ignorance of the Self. And when the ignorance which is the cause of weakness is destroyed by the knowledge that "I, the True Inner Self, am Brahman," he remains as one alone and grows all the stronger. Such, it is said, is the fruit accruing to him who knows his own Inner Self as described above, as inherently wise, as inherently pure and inherently free. — (S).
He who has known that good and evil acts cause anxiety and that knowledge of the Self removes the anxiety, looks upon good and evil acts as the very Self. That is to say, following the teaching of the scriptures, he regards good and evil acts in their aspects as the Supreme Self. He never regards them in their aspects as good and evil which are mere creatures of Maya. It is a fact known to all sages who see the reality. To the knower of Brahman, good and evil acts whether it be those which were done in the past births or those which are done in the present birth do not exist as such, as distinct from his own Self. When such is the case, it needs no saying that he suffers no pain arising from anxiety about them.

5. Such is the Sacred Wisdom.

Thus has been revealed, in this valli, this Brahma-vidyā, this sacred wisdom, this supremely secret science among all sciences, the science wherein lies imbedded the Highest Good.

This valli is spoken of as the Upanishad because it directly leads to the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman. But 'Upanishad' means wisdom itself; and wisdom is so called because it is by wisdom that a person approaches (upa + etya) the non-dual Brahman and attains (ni+sad) his fearless Self; whereas this sacred Valli, as meant to impart that wisdom, is called Upanishad, only for courtesy's sake, by those who know Brahman and have abandoned all desires.— (S).

The enlightened one is above sin.

(Vedānta-sūtras IV. i. 13).

(Question):— Is the enlightened man affected or not by the taint of sin?

(Prima facie view):— "No karma is exhausted even in hundreds of crores of eons (kalpas) without its fruit being: reaped by the doer "in these terms the scriptures declare that no sin is exhausted without its fruit being reaped; so that even he who has acquired knowledge of Brahman is affected by the taint of sin.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: In the case of him who has realised the Unconditioned (nirguṇa) Brahman, one cannot so much as suspect that he will be affected by sin; for he is firmly convinced that he is Brahman, the non-agent, in all the three periods of time, past, present and future; he feels "I never acted, I do not act, I shall never act." Certainly, not even the dull-witted would ever think that he who is not the doer of an act is affected by the results of the act. Neither is the knower of the Conditioned Brahman affected by sin, inasmuch as the śruti teaches that he is not tainted by sins and that all his sins perish. That he is not, after attaining an intuitive realisation (sakṣatkarā) of Brahman, affected by the sins which may be supposed to arise from his continued outward activities through the body and the senses, the śruti teaches in the following words:

"And as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it." (Cha. Up. 4:14:3.)

And the śruti speaks also of the destruction of all the sins which accumulated, prior to the realisation of (Conditioned) Brahman, both here in this birth and in the past births:—

"As the soft fibers of the ishika reed, when thrown into the fire, are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt." (Cha. Up. 5:24:3.)

As to the assertion that no karma perishes without yielding its fruit, it applies only to those persons who possess neither the knowledge of the Unconditioned Brahman nor that of the Conditioned
Brahman. Wherefore we conclude that he who possesses a knowledge of Brahman is untainted by sin.

**The enlightened one is above good deeds.**

*(Vedānta-sūtras. IV. i. 14)*

(Question):— Is the enlightened one affected or not by good deeds (punya)?

(Prima facie view):— Though unaffected by sins, he may be affected by good deeds. As the good deeds are enjoined by the Vedas, they cannot be opposed to the Brahmajñāna which is derived from the same source.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The Self is not an agent, and, as such, He cannot be tainted by good deeds any more than by evil deeds. As to him who knows only the Conditioned Brahman, the śruti says in the Dharma-Vidyā that "all sins recede from him." *(Chan.Up. 8:4:1)*

The śruti here regards as sins all the good deeds other than the Contemplation of Brahman, inasmuch as the good deeds belonging to the category of interested acts give rise, like evil deeds, to inferior births and bodies; and it teaches that all good and evil deeds as well as their results (referred to in the passage preceding the one here quoted) are all evil and recede from the devotee of Brahman. "Both these, verily, does he cross beyond": in these words the śruti declares that the enlightened one crosses beyond good and evil deeds alike. Wherefore, we conclude that he is untainted by good deeds in the same way as he is untainted by evil ones.

**The indestructibility of the prārabdha -karma.**

*(Vedānta-sūtras,IV.i. 15)*

(Question):— Of the acts done prior to enlightenment, some have not begun to yield their fruits while others have given rise to the present birth. The question is, Is this latter portion of the acts liable to destruction on the rise of knowledge?

(Prima facie view):— With reference to both the classes of acts alike, the Self is not the agent, and therefore they prove false, both alike. From this it would follow that, like the good and evil acts which have not begun to yield their fruits, those which have begun to yield their fruits are liable to destruction on the very dawn of knowledge.

(Conclusion):— The śruti, experience (anubhava), and analogy, (yukti), all point to the indestructibility of the good and evil acts which have already begun to yield their fruits. The śruti says: "For him, there is only delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be perfect." This passage may be explained as follows: The Liberation of him who has known the Real, though delayed, is not delayed very long. It is delayed only so long as the vitalities (prānas) do not depart from the body; and this is because the span of life which has been fixed at the time of impregnation (garbhadhana) cannot be shortened. And when the body and the vitality part with each other, then he becomes one with Brahman. Thus the śruti teaches in this passage that the enlightened one is subject to samsāra till the close of the present body. The experience of the enlightened ones clearly confirms the truth of this teaching.

Now, as to analogy from ordinary experience: Though an archer is free to discharge or withhold an arrow so long as it remains in the quiver, still, once the arrow is discharged, he becomes helpless; and the discharged arrow drops down of itself on the exhaustion of the force imparted to it. We may also adduce the analogy of the revolving motion of the potter's wheel. So, in the present case, too, the Brahma-jītāna may have power to destroy anarābdha-karma, i.e., the acts which have not yet begun to yield their fruits; —but it has no power to destroy the ārabdha-karma, the acts which have already begun to yield their fruits.
If the śruti, etc., do not admit the indestructibility of the ārabdha-karma, then, for want of a teacher, the wisdom-tradition (vidyā-sampradaya) would cease altogether. Certainly, it cannot be held that the unenlightened one would teach wisdom; and if the enlightened one were liberated at the very moment that he came by knowledge, who would be the teacher then? Hence the indestructibility of the good and evil deeds which have already begun their effects.

**The indestructibility and use of obligatory acts.**

(Prima facie view):— Are the Agni-hotra (fire-worship) and the like acts, which are enjoined as obligatory duties (nitya-karma), liable to destruction on the dawn of knowledge?

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: An obligatory act is made up of two factors, the primary factor conducing to the purification of chitta, the organ of thought, and the other, a secondary factor, yielding svarga and other fruits of the kind. We grant that the latter is liable to destruction. But since the other factor which conduces to the purification of chitta has served its purpose by helping the rise of knowledge, it is not possible to conceive it as having been destroyed. Indeed, no one looks upon rice and the like as lost when consumed as food. As to the obligatory acts done after the rise of knowledge, they, like the acts done with a view to reward, do not taint him who possesses knowledge.

**All obligatory acts are aids to Wisdom.**

(Prima facie view):— Those acts which combine contemplation in them are superior, and therefore they alone conduces to the rise of knowledge, not those which are devoid of contemplation.

(Conclusion):— "Whatever one does with Vidyā (knowledge, contemplation), that alone is more powerful." (Cha. Up. 1:1:10.) The śruti which, in these words, teaches that an act associated with contemplation has an increased power, implies that even an act which is unassociated with contemplation has power; otherwise, there would be no occasion for the use of the adjective in the comparative degree. Wherefore the acts which do not combine contemplation in them conduce to knowledge, as well as those which do combine it, but only to a smaller extent than the latter.

**Liberation necessarily accrues from right knowledge.**

(Prima facie view):— Those who have attained knowledge of Brahman do not necessarily attain mokṣa. It is said in the Purāṇas that, under the command of Vishnu, a Vedic teacher, Apantaratas by name, incarnated himself as Krishna-Dvapayana at the end of the Dvapara-yuga. Similarly, Sanatkumara was born of Parvati and Parameśvara as Skanda. In the same way, several others, too, such as Vasishtha, who were all possessed of true knowledge, were born here and there in other
bodies, under the influence of a curse, or in fulfillment of a promise, or of their own accord.

(Conclusion):— All these persons to whom you have referred are rulers of the world; and having in a former cycle (kalpa) worshipped the Supreme Lord by mighty austerities, they have attained to positions of administrative power which they should hold through several births; and on the exhaustion of the karma whereof the fruits are being thus reaped, they will be liberated. And there being nothing which can prevent the true wisdom from consuming the acts which have not yet begun their effects, liberation accrues as a matter of necessity to him who has attained true wisdom.

Persistence of wisdom through subsequent incarnations.

(Vedānta-sūtras, IV, i. 19).

(Question):— Does or does not liberation accrue to those enlightened souls who will have to pass through several births in virtue of their prārabdha-karma?

(Prima facie view):— There is no liberation to the persons who hold positions of administrative power; for, when many incarnations have to be undertaken with a view to work out the effects of the prārabdha-karma, the true wisdom which was formerly acquired disappears; and, as a result of the acts done subsequently, a series of incarnations becomes inevitable.

(Conclusion):— The karma which has commenced its effect can only yield its own fruits in the form of happiness or misery, inasmuch as it operates only to that end. Indeed, none of the acts which were formerly done conduce to the loss of the true wisdom once acquired; so that it cannot be supposed that wisdom would be lost as a result of the past karma. Neither can it be supposed that loss of wisdom occurs during the interval caused by death; for, we see that wisdom is not lost during the interval caused by sleep. So that, wisdom persists through several births; and as the acts done in ever so many births after the attainment of wisdom do not taint the person, liberation does accrue to the rulers of the world.

Though this point was determined in the third adhyāya of the Vedānta-sūtras, it is again discussed in the fourth adhyāya by way of answering an objection.

THE PEACE-CHANT.

May Brahman protect us both!
May He give us both to enjoy!
Efficiency may we both attain!
Effective may our study prove!
Hate may we not (each other) at all! Om!

Peace! Peace! Peace! *
CHAPTER I.
HOW TO INVESTIGATE BRAHMAN.

The purpose of the sequel.

Having created the universe from Ākāśa down to the physical bodies (anna-maya) and then entered into that very universe, Brahman, "the Real, Consciousness, and the Infinite," manifests Himself in the form of so many individual beings as it were; so that one should know "I am that very Brahman, that Bliss, who is quite distinct from all created objects, who is invisible" and so on; and it is with a view to produce this (knowledge) that He is spoken of as having entered into the very objects which He created. When a person knows thus, good and evil deeds do not lead him to any more births. This is the main drift of the teaching of the Ananda-valli.

The Ananda-valli has treated of that knowledge which is identical with the inherent Consciousness of Brahman, the Real, Consciousness, the Infinite, the True Inner Self that inherent knowledge of Brahman which alone, penetrating the mind that has been prepared to receive it by the teaching of the śruti, can eradicate the root of ignorance.—(S).

And there ends the Brahma-vidyā. Now, than with a view to teach what the means to Brahma-vidyā is, the śruti proceeds in the sequel to treat of devotion (tapas), as also of the upāsanas of the Anna-maya and the like.

It is true that in the Samhiti-upanishad (siksha-valli) works and contemplation were spoken of as means to Brahma-vidyā; but they are comparatively remote and indirect means (bahirāṅga-sadhana) to Brahma-vidyā. As the vicāra or investigation of Brahman, which is the proximate means to Brahma-vidyā, was not treated of in the Siksha-valli, the present section proceeds to treat of the subject. The process of investigation of Brahman being treated of, the subsidiary processes of manana (reflection), etc, will also have been treated of.

The bearing of legends in the Upanishads.

With a view to extol Brahma-vidyā, the śruti starts with a story as follows:

1. Bhrigu, that son of Varuṇa, approached Varuṇa, his father, saying "Sir, teach me Brahman"

That' shows that Bhrigu was a celebrated personage.

There was a Maharshi (great sage), Bhrigu by name, the founder of a family (Gotra-pravartaka). He was a celebrated personage often referred to in the mantra and the brahmana portions of the Veda.

"The descendants of Bhrigu and Angiras shall consecrate Fire addressing Him 'I consecrate Thee, O Lord of sacrifices, for the sacrifices of the Bhrigus and the Angiras.' (Tai. Brah. 1:1:4)

Seeking to know Brahman, He approached Varuṇa, uttering the mantra "adhihi bhagavo brahma" which means, "Sir, teach me Brahman."

He who seeks for the knowledge of the Supreme Brahman should approach the Master, the Guru, with faith and devotion, pure in mind, and uttering the appropriate mantra. With a feeling of revulsion from all pleasures ranging below the bliss of mokṣa, Bhrigu asked Varuna, "Teach me the Supreme Brahman." ——(S).

The story speaking of the master and his pupil points to the truth that Brahma-vidyā can be acquired only through a master (guru). The śruti says elsewhere ,"That knowledge alone which is learnt from a teacher leads to real good." (Cha. Up. 4:9:3) — (S). That one should go to a teacher for Brahma-vidyā is taught in the śruti as follows:—
"For a knowledge of That One, he should go to a Guru alone."

The mantra means: Ponder well over Brahman, i.e., Ponder over Brahman in mind and teach me.

The story given here serves to extol Brahma-vidyā, saying that it was imparted by the father to his dear son.

That such stories are intended to extol Vidyā has been established by discussion in the Vedānta-sutras:

(Vedānta-sutras, III. iv. 23 — 24.)

(Question):— During the Asvamedha or horse-sacrifice, the Adhvaryu, the chief priest, should assemble at nights the king (the sacrificer) and his family and tell them some Vedic legends and other chaste stories. This narration is called the pārīplava. Now a question arises as to whether the legend of Yajñavalkya and his two wives, the legend of Janaka and his assembly of sages, and other such legends occurring in the Upanishads, are meant for the pārīplava enjoined in the śruti.

(Prima facie view):— They must have been meant for the pārīplava. If meant for that purpose, the legends in the Upanishads would subserve the purposes of ritual; and this is to serve a better purpose than the mere extolling of Vidyā or knowledge.

(Conclusion):— The legend? of the Upanishads cannot have been meant for the pārīplava, inasmuch as the legends to be so narrated are specified: the legend to be recited on the first day shall be about Manu, the king, son of Vivasvat; on the second day, about Yama, the king, son of Vivasvat; and so on. If the legends in the Upanishads are explained as meant to extol the Vidyās with which they are connected, then there will be a unity of purpose running through the legends and the Vidyās, which are treated of together in the same sections, Therefore we conclude that the Upanishad legends serve the purpose of extolling the Vidyās.

**Gateways to the knowledge of Brahman.**

The Śruti proceeds to show how Varuṇa taught his son the way to the knowledge of Brahman.

2. **To him he said this: Food, life, sight, hearing, mind, speech.**

When the son approached the father in due fashion, the father taught the son in the following words:

food, life, sight, hearing, mind, speech. That is to say, he referred to the food or the body, to the life within the body, i.e., the eater, as also to the organs of perception such as sight, hearing, mind and speech,— he referred to these as the gates to the perception of Brahman.

**Food:** the upadāna or material cause of the physical body.

**Life:** Praṇa, the vital air functioning in five different ways.

**Sight,** etc., are the organs of perception.— (S).

Food, life, etc., are mentioned here with a view to point out an easy way to knowledge, namely, the method of anvaya-vyatireka, i.e., of " conjoint presence and absence." It leads us to this conclusion: the body, etc., are inconstant and cannot therefore be the Self, whereas the Self is constant and must therefore be Brahman. — (S).

Or, it may be that the words "food, life, sight," etc., serve to define Brahman, the Infinite, the Unutterable, as one with our Inner Self, the Pratyagātman. This explanation is also consonant with the śruti which describes Brahman as " the Life of life." The accusative case, too, in which the words 'food (anna)', etc., are used, here, can be better explained when they are regarded as definitions of Brahman. — (S).

To Bhrigu who approached him uttering the mantra, his father taught the gateway to the knowledge
of Brahman. Food, life and mind are the material cause of the Anna-maya, the Prāṇa-maya, and the Mano-maya sheaths. Sight, hearing and speech, too, are, like the mind, gateways to the knowledge. The śruti means to include among these the organs not mentioned here, such as touch and other organs of sensation, as also the hand and other organs of action. When we say "the moon is at the tip of the branch" the tip of the branch pointing to the moon forms an index to the moon, and so serves as a means to the perception of the moon. Similarly, food, life, etc., are means to the perception of Brahman hid in the cave, by way of hinting at Him. That they are means to the knowledge of Brahman is clearly taught in the Brihadaranyaka as follows:—

"They who know the life of life, the sight of the sight, the hearing of hearing, the mind of the mind, they have comprehended the ancient, primeval Brahman." (Bri. Up. 4:4:18)

It is easy to know Brahman through food, vital air, etc., — to know Him as the Food, the Life, etc., — because Brahman is the basic Reality underlying all illusory manifestations such as food, life, etc. That is to say, Brahman should be sought through food, the vital air, etc., which are identified with the Ego.

**Brahman defined indirectly.**

3. To him, verily, he said: Whence indeed these beings are born; whereby, when born, they live; wherein, when departing, they enter; That seek thou to know; That is Brahman.

Having taught that these— food, etc., — are the gateways, Varuṇa taught Bhrigu the definition of Brahman. What is that definition? The definition of Brahman is this: Brahman is that wherefrom these beings, from Brahma down to plants, are born; whereby, when born, they live i.e., they maintain vital functions, and grow; and wherein, when departing, they enter i.e., wherewith they attain unity at dissolution. That is to say, Brahman is that wherewith no object in the creation can ever cease to remain in unity, (i.e., wherewith they remain one always), at birth, during their stay and also at dissolution.

Be it known that Brahman is that, wherefrom none of the beings, from Brahma down to unmoving objects, can ever exist apart, at birth, during stay or at dissolution.— (S).

Now the śruti proceeds to give the definition of Brahman and to show that investigation is the means to the knowledge of Brahman. Seeing that Bhrigu, on hearing of the gateways to the knowledge of Brahman, was very anxious to know Brahman, Varuṇa, the most friendly and credible teacher as he was, taught Bhrigu further, without any question on his part.

Brahman is that wherefrom are born all these creatures, comprising the live primary elements of matter such as ākāśa, as also all sentient beings possessed of material bodies from the Hiranyagarbha down to plants, the word 'indeed' pointing to the well-known teaching of the śruti which elsewhere says "He these worlds did create;" — that One whereby the creatures, when born, are sustained; that One wherein all these beings enter when under-going destruction; just as foam, waves, bubbles, etc., have their birth, being, and dissolution in the one ocean.

**Investigation of Brahman is necessary.**

Do thou seek to know particularly that One, viz., Brahman. That is to say, do thou reach Brahman thus defined, through the gateways of food, etc. The śruti elsewhere says that these form the gateways to the knowledge of Brahman:—

"They who know the life of life, the sight of sight, the hearing of hearing, the mind of the mind, they have comprehended the ancient, primeval Brahman." (Bri. Up. 4:4:18)

Do thou seek to know Brahman thus denned, that One who is not born or destroyed when the
universe is born or destroyed. — (S).

Do thou investigate that Thing which is the cause of the world's birth, being and destruction; and this Thing is Brahman, of which thou hast asked.

The necessity for an investigation of Brahman has been discussed as follows in the Vedânta-sutras:

(Prima facie view):— There exists no necessity for such a science; for, there is nothing to be discussed, and no purpose to be gained. Discussion is necessary where there is room for doubt; but no doubt arises as to the nature of Brahman. If a doubt arises at all, is it, we ask, about His aspect as Brahman or about His aspect as the Self? It cannot be about His aspect as Brahman, for the śruti has determined it as "Real, Consciousness, Infinite." 342 Neither can it be about the aspect as the Self, for, this too is determined in the consciousness of "I." Do you say that this consciousness of 'I' is an illusion, inasmuch as it refers to the illusory self?

It cannot be so, for, the illusoriness of this self cannot be made out. It is not possible to explain how illusion can cause, as in the case of the mother-of-pearl and silver, the notion of mutual identity of the Self and the body, seeing that they are so entirely opposed to each other like light and darkness, the one being sentient and the other insentient. Thus, since no doubt can arise as to what has been determined by the śruti and our self-consciousness, there is no occasion for any discussion. Neither do we see that any purpose is served by the discussion; for, no liberation is seen to follow even when the nature of Brahman, the Self, is determined as revealed in the śruti and in our Consciousness. Wherefore, Brahman being not worth investigation, there exists no necessity for the science.

(Conclusion):— There does exist a necessity for the science, because there is a subject worth discussion and a purpose served by it. Brahman, the Self, is a thing which admits of doubt, owing to the mutual contradiction between the śruti and the consciousness of 'I' In the words "This one, the Self, is Brahman," 343 the śruti teaches that Brahman who is without any attachment whatever is identical with the Self, whereas the consciousness of ego in such forms as "I am a man," comprehends the Self as one with the body.

And the inexplicability of the illusion only proves the existence of the illusion. Therefore there is a subject of doubt here, and it forms the subject of discussion. That liberation results from a determinate knowledge of the subject can be clearly made out both from the śruti and from the experience of the wise. Therefore, inasmuch as we have to investigate Brahman by way of investigating the meaning of Vedantic texts, there exists a necessity for the science.

**Brahman can be defined.**

The investigation of a thing has for its end the ascertainment of the real nature of the thing through definition and proper evidence. The definition of Brahman is thus discussed:

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342 Tait. Up. 2-1.
343 Mandukya-Up
(Vedânta-sutras. I. i. 2).

(Question):— The definition of Brahman is given by the śruti here in the following passages:

"Whence indeed these beings are born; whereby, when born, they live; whither, when departing, they enter: That, seek thou to know; That is Brahman."

"Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman."

Here a doubt arises as to whether this definition of Brahman holds good.

(Prima facie view):—It does not hold good. We ask, what are the defining marks of Brahman? Is it the birth &c., or the reality, etc., that constitute the definition? Birth, &c., cannot be the defining marks of Brahman, for, they inhere in the universe and do not pertain to Brahman. Neither can reality, &c., be the defining marks of Brahman; for, such reality and consciousness, etc., as our experience knows of have distinct meanings and relate to distinct things, and so cannot lead to a knowledge of the one indivisible Brahman. And it does not stand to reason to say that such reality and consciousness as our experience does not know of are the defining marks of Brahman. It is not therefore possible to define Brahman either directly or indirectly.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Though birth, &c., inhere elsewhere, Brahman may be defined indirectly as the cause of the birth, etc., this causality being falsely ascribed to Brahman. We say, for instance, "(what appeared to be) the serpent is this garland." So it is possible to define Brahman through what is ascribed to Him, thus:

Brahman is that which is the cause of the universe. Just as it is not incompatible that one single person, Devadatta, should be spoken of as father, son, brother, son-in-law, etc., though these words have quite distinct meanings, so also the words "Real, Consciousness," etc., which, as understood in their ordinary sense, convey distinct meanings and refer to distinct things, may point to the indivisible non-dual Brahman and thus constitute the direct definition (svārūpa-lakṣaṇa as opposed to tatastha-lakṣaṇa) of Brahman.

**Brahman is the source of the Veda.**

By way of justifying this definition, it has been determined in the Vedânta-sutras that Brahman is the author of the Vedas:

(Vedânta-sutras, I. i. 3).

(Question):— The Upanishad says:—

"From this Great Being has been breathed forth what we have as Rig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda," etc. (Bri. Up. 2:4:10)

That is to say, all this Veda has come forth from the ever-existent Brahman, without any effort, like breath. Here a doubt arises as to whether Brahman is the author of the Veda or not.

(Prima facie view):— Brahman is not the author of the Veda, for, the Veda is eternal. In one of the Vedic verses, a sage prays to his God for inspiration to praise Him with the Eternal Speech; and the Eternal Speech is none other than the Veda. The smṛti says:

"In the beginning was projected by the Self-born (Brahma) the Veda, the Eternal Divine Word, whence all this evolution proceeds."

Therefore Brahman is not the author of the Veda.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: It is meet that Brahman is the author of the Veda; for, we are given to understand that the Veda came forth without any effort, like breath. "From that Adorable One (Yajña), who is worshipped by all, the Rik and Sāman were born" (Puruṣa-Sukta) thus the śruti clearly teaches that the Veda was born of Brahman, here called Yajña
or the Adorable One, who is worshipped in all sacrifices.

Having come forth from Brahman without any effort on His part, it is distinguished from the productions of such authors as Kalidasa who first conceived of the things to be treated of in their works and then composed those works; and so far, it is unlike any work produced by a person. Being reproduced at each creation exactly as it was in the preceding creation, it is eternal, as running in one continuous stream. When it is made out that Brahman is the author of the Veda which treats of the whole scheme of the universe, it is also made out that He is Omniscient.

**The Veda is the sole authority regarding Brahman.**

Having thus justified the definition, the discussion in the same section of the Vedánta-sutras proceeds to determine that Revelation (Agama) is the sole authority regarding Brahman.

(Question):— "Of that Apanishadic Being, verily, I ask: " these words addressed by Yajñavalkya to Sakalya give us to understand that the Supreme Brahman is a being knowable through the Upanishads. Now a doubt arises as to whether Brahman can be known through sensuous perception, &c.

(Prima facie view):— As an objective reality, Brahman must, like all objects such as a pot, come within the ken of sensuous perception, etc.

(Conclusion):— Being devoid of colour, taste, etc., Brahman does not come within the scope of sensuous perception; and being devoid of invariably associated attributes, He cannot be known through inference (anumāṇa); being not similar to any thing known, He cannot be known through comparison (upamāṇa). He can be known only through the Vedas; for 'Apanishada' means 'knowable only through the Upanishads'; and the sruti expressly denies other sources of knowledge in the words '; He who knows not the Veda, knows not Him, the Great One.'

(Objection):— According to the Bhāsyakara (Sankaracharya), who, in his commentary on the Vedánta-sutras, I. i. 2., says "Sruti, etc., and also experience, etc., are authorities here, each in its way," Brahman is also known through other sources of knowledge.

(Answer):— It is true: Brahman is primarily ascertained solely through the Vedas, and then experience and inference are let in as corroborative evidence, in explaining the teaching of the śruti. Wherefore Brahman is known solely through the Veda.

**The Upanishad is the authority regarding Brahman.**

(Vedánta-sūtras. I. i. 4.)

(Question):— Do the Vedantic texts (Upanishads) treat mainly of Brahman, or do they treat only of the agent, the Devata, &c., connected with the ritual?

(Prima facie view):— The texts that treat of jīva mainly refer to the nature of the agent concerned with the rituals; those that treat of Brahman mainly refer to the Devata to be worshipped through the rituals; and those that treat of creation mainly refer to the things employed in the rituals. Thus, the Vedantic texts will subserve the performance of the ritual. If they treat of Brahman in the main, then they would not subserve the ritual and would therefore be of no use. Wherefore the main aim of the Vedantic texts is to throw light on the nature of the agent, the Devata, and other accessories connected with the ritual.

(Conclusion):— The Vedantic texts treat mainly of Brahman; for, as occurring in an entirely different section, it cannot be held that they are subsidiary to the ritual by way of describing the agent and other factors connected with the ritual, while the six marks which go to determine what the main theme of a section is show that the Vedantic texts treat mainly of Brahman.

The six marks (liṅgas) by which the main theme of a section can be determined, are enumerated by
teachers of old as follows:

Upakrama — commencement.
Upasamhāra — conclusion.
Abhyāsa — reiteration.
Apūrvata — unprecedentedness.
Phala — fruit.
Arthavāda — explanatory statement.
Upapatti — illustration.

1. The śruti begins, "In the beginning there was Existence alone, one only without a second"; and concludes as follows: "All this has its being in It; It is the True; It is the Self; and That Thou art." The agreement between the commencement and conclusion of a section, both of which alike refer to Brahman, constitutes one mark.

2. Reiteration, is the frequent repetition of "That, Thou art."

3. Unprecedentedness consists in Brahman being inaccessible to any other pramāṇa or instrument of knowledge.

4. The specific fruit is the knowledge of all, resulting from the knowledge of the One.

5. The explanatory statements are those which speak of Brahman as creating, sustaining, destroying, entering into, and governing the universe.

6. Illustration consists in adducing such analogical instances as clay.

By these marks we have to conclude that Brahman is the main theme of the Upanishads. It cannot be contended that this knowledge is of no use, as not subserving the ritual; for, it is possible that cessation of evil may follow knowledge, as in the case of the knowledge "this is not a serpent, it is only a rope."

**Injunction is not the main theme of the Upanishads.**

(Vedānta-sutras I. i. 4).

(Question):— Do the Upanishads mainly enjoin knowledge? or do they treat mainly of Brahman?

(Prima facie view):— Some Vedantins maintain as follows: Though the Vedantic texts treat of Brahman, they do not end there alone. On the other hand, they first treat of the true nature of Brahman without producing immediate consciousness of Brahman, and then enjoin the achievement of immediate cognition of Brahman. Thus alone, as ordaining action, the Vedantic texts may well be spoken of as Śastra, commandment. Moreover, after enjoining śravaṇa or knowledge acquired by a study of the texts, the Upanishads clearly enjoin the realisation of Brahman in one's own experience by means of reflection and meditation. Wherefore the main purpose of the Vedānta is to enjoin' knowledge.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Knowledge cannot form the subject of an injunction; for, knowledge cannot be done or undone or otherwise done, and does not therefore depend on man's will. And the Śastra is so called not necessarily because it commands (śas = to command) duties; but it may be so called also because it expounds (śaṃs= to relate) the nature of what exists in nature. It cannot, moreover, be maintained that, an indirect knowledge of Brahman having been first acquired through the Vedantic texts, the Vedānta then enjoins the realisation of Brahman in experience by means of rejection and meditation. Like the words "Thou
art the tenth man," the texts can, by themselves, give rise to an immediate knowledge; and it is only prior to the acquiring of the immediate knowledge of Brahman through the Vedantic texts that reflection and meditation, which are forms of activity dependent on man's will, are enjoined, with a view to check the rise of false notions and to remove the idea that absolute unity is an impossibility. Wherefore the Vedantic texts, such as "That, Thou art," end by treating of Brahman.

The threefold process of investigation.

This investigation into the meaning of the Vedantic texts with a view to determine the real nature of Brahman is enjoined here in this Upanishad in the words "That, seek thou to know." The same injunction occurs in another Upanishad which reads, "The Self should be heard, reflected and meditated upon." (Bri. Up. 2:4:5) The meaning of this passage is given in a passage of the smṛti:

"He should be heard through the words of the Śruti, and reflected upon by reasoning; and when reflected upon, He should be meditated constantly. These are the means to the perception of the Self."

The Purana also says:

"Now, O eminent sages, Śravaṇa is the mere determination of the main drift of all the Vedantic texts as shown by such marks as upakrama, * &c., under the guidance of a beloved teacher. Manana means the act of reflecting upon that teaching by applying to it such course of reasoning as will go to support the teaching. Nididhyāṣaṇa means one-pointedness of mind in Śravaṇa and Manana. Śravaṇa, O sages, is the direct cause of the rise of knowledge, whereas reflection and meditation, which are calculated to eliminate foreign elements, are indirect causes, while the control of the mind and the senses, and the like, constitute the necessary conditions of investigation.

These processes of study, reflection and meditation are enjoined under the designations of learning (pāṇḍitya), childhood (bālya) and saintliness (mauna), in the Kahola Brahmana which reads:

"Let a Brahmin, after having fully attained learning, seek to abide in childhood; and having fully attained learning and childhood, he then becomes a saint; and after having fully understood saintliness and unsaintliness, he becomes a Brahmin." (Bri. Up. 3:5:1)

That is to say, on completing the three processes, his true nature as one with Brahman manifests itself in him, and he becomes a Brahmin in the literal and primary sense of the word. Here the word 'childhood,' as implying purity of mind which is one of the essential conditions of the process of reflection, stands for manana.

Necessity of mental purity.

(Vedānta-sutras, III. iv. 50).

(Question):— The Upanishad says 'Let a Brahmin seek to abide in childhood.' Does 'childhood' here mean the period of life so-called, or an unregulated course of life, or purity of mind?

(Prima facie view):— The word ordinarily means a particular period of life; but then it cannot form the subject of an injunction. Then let us understand it in the sense of unregulated course of action and speech. But, 'childhood' can never mean purity of mind.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows:— 'Learning' and 'saintliness' stand for śravaṇa or study of the scriptures and nididhyāṣaṇa or deep meditation on the Vedantic teaching. As occurring between these two, 'childhood' must stand for manana or reflection. And purity of mind is an essential condition of this process, since, when influenced by feelings of attachment and hatred or by sense of honor and disgrace, or by such other passions, a person is unable to reflect and
check the outward course of the mind. If 'childhood' is understood in the sense of 'behaviour of a child,' it may as well mean purity of mind as unrestricted course of action and speech, both alike being associated with a child. But the child-age and unrestricted life are of no use in the process of reflection; on the other hand, they are quite inimical to it, inasmuch as the mind which is quite uncultured or engrossed in external activities makes reflection altogether impossible. Wherefore 'childhood' is here used in the sense of purity of mind, not in the other two senses.

**Necessity of Meditation.**

(Vedānta-Sutras, III. iv. 47 49).

In the Kahola-Brahmana it is said:

"Let a Brahmīn, after having fully attained learning, seek to abide in childhood; and having fully attained learning and childhood, he then becomes a saint; and after having fully understood saintliness and unsaintliness, he becomes a Brahmaṃ." (Bri. Up. 3-5-1)

The meaning of this passage may be explained as follows: Since the highest end of man is to be Brahman, a person seeks to attain to that state. To this end, he should first attain full learning by way of determining the main drift of the teaching of the Upanishads; and then, remaining like a child, without such feelings as attachment and hatred, he should strive to remain constantly brooding over the arguments with a view to dispel all idea of impossibility as to the teaching of the Upanishads. Then having completed learning and reflection he becomes a saint (muni). Now, the question arises as to whether saintliness (mauna) is enjoined here as an essential step.

(Prima facie view):— It is not an essential step, inasmuch as the words of the śrutis do not convey an injunction. Neither can we make out that the śrutis means an injunction here; for, being comprehended in pāṇḍitya, maṇana is not a thing to be freshly enjoined. The word pāṇḍitya means knowledge as also 'mauna' (from mana=to know). So mauna is not enjoined in this connection.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: As a repetition through the word 'mauna,' of learning or knowledge (pāṇḍitya.) already mentioned serves no purpose, the word means here constant devotion to knowledge, which has not been already taught; and by understanding in this connection the words "seek to abide" occurring in the previous clause, we can make out an injunction; and constant devotion to knowledge serves a definite purpose, as it conduces to the removal of strong dualistic tendencies (vāsanās) which are ingrained in the mind. Wherefore saintliness (mauna) which means the same as deep meditation (nididhyāsana) is enjoined in this connection.

**Investigation to be continued till intuition is attained.**

(Vedānta-sutras, IV. i. 1-2)

(Question):— Are the several steps such as śravaṇa in the process of investigation to be carried on once only, or are they to be repeated as often as necessary?

(Prima facie view):— "Once observed the command of the scriptures has been obeyed. "This is the principle laid down in regard to the sacrificial rites, such as Prayāja, enjoined in the Vedas. On the same principle, it will be enough if the several steps in the process of investigation have been once gone through.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing contention we argue as follows. The principle enunciated above applies to those acts whose ultimate fruits lie beyond our ken; whereas here we can make out the result of the investigation to be the attainment of the sākṣhātkāra or an intuitive knowledge of Brahman, which is a visible result. On the principle that it is unreasonable to imagine an invisible result, when a visible result can be made out, we hold that Śravaṇa, etc., should be repeated till the result is attained, just as it is held that rice should be threshed till the husk is removed.
Brahman as the cause of the universe.

Frequent repetition of the process of investigation comprising the study of texts, etc., leads to an intuitive knowledge of Brahman defined above in the words "Whence all these beings are born," etc. The word "whence" here refers to the cause of the birth, etc., of all beings, namely Brahman, and shows that Brahman is both the material (upadāna) and the efficient (nimitta) cause. Brahman is here defined as the cause, not only of the birth of the universe, but also of the sustenance and dissolution of the universe. He is described as the cause of the sustenance of beings with a view to show that He is not a mere efficient cause like the weaver of a cloth. To show that He is not a mere accidental cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) like the union of threads, He is described as the cause of dissolution. To describe that He is the cause of the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the universe, is tantamount to saying that He is the efficient, the accidental, as well as the material cause of the universe, all in one.

(Objection):— It is nowhere taught that the bhutas or root-elements of matter have a birth; and as all material beings are born of the elements of matter, Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe.

(Answer):— Not so; for, the śruti teaches that the root elements of matter have had birth. We are conscious that earth exists, that water exists, and so on, and thus we see that the idea of existence runs through all elements of matter as we perceive them; so that, existence is the material cause of the elements of matter. And this existence is Brahman. The elements of matter are only the forms through which Brahman constitutes the cause of material objects, just as, in the form of a clod, clay becomes the cause of a pot. But it is existence which is the material cause of the universe as clay is of the pot, inasmuch as we find existence running through all material things as experienced by us. The unenlightened, for instance, regard that the material cause of a cloth consists of several threads," even though it is one long thread of which the cloth is woven.

As against the theory that ākāśa, time, etc., are eternal, we hold that, like pots and trays, they must have had a birth since they are conceived as distinct from other objects of our experience (and belong as such to the world of duality and phenomena).

Brahman as omniscient and omnipotent.

The universe that has been created is of utmost variety, and we cannot explain this except by supposing that Brahman, its Creator, is omniscient and omnipotent. Certainly no person other than one who possesses requisite knowledge and power can build mansions of wonderful designs. Though Brahman, who is without sense-organs, does not possess such instruments of knowledge as sensuous perception through which all things are cognized, still, having regard to the śruti and reasoning, we should admit that Brahman is all-knowing. The śruti speaks of Brahman as one "who is all-knowing and all-wise.: The same thing may be made out by reasoning as follows: The consciousness (chaitanya) which is reflected in all transformations of māyā as objects of cognition constitutes what we call the experience of those objects. As Brahman's consciousness is the basic reality underlying all those phenomenal manifestations which are called objects of cognition, it may be readily seen that Brahman possesses knowledge of all the things of the present moment. Though the objects of the past as well as the modifications of māyā corresponding to them disappeared, impressions of these latter are retained, as in our own case, as memories of the objects of past experience, which are also transformations of Maya; and through His consciousness being reflected in them, He possesses knowledge of all the things in the past. Similarly, as a potter has a clear conception of the pot even prior to making it, so Brahman possesses a knowledge of all that is to happen in future, as the transformations of His maya. Wherefore from the stand-point of reasoning, we can make out that Brahman is omniscient.

That He possesses all powers is taught both in the śruti and in the smṛti. The śruti says: "His
"There are in all things potentialities which are unthinkable, but of whose existence but of whose existence there is ample proof. So, there are potentialities such as those of creation inherent in Brahman, as heat is in fire." (Vishnu-purana 1:3:2)

To define Brahman as the cause is to define Him indirectly.

This omnipotent Brahman is defined as the cause of the birth, etc., of the universe. Though birth, etc., pertain to the universe, the causality connected therewith pertains to Brahman, and therefore the definition given above holds good. It should not be urged that if causality, which means association with an act, should, as the defining mark, constitute an inherent attribute of Brahman like the luminosity of the moon, it would detract from the immutability of Brahman. Causality we say pertains to Brahman through His upādhi, and, as such, constitutes an indirect definition of Brahman. When, for instance, Devadatta's house, is defined as the one on which a crow is perched, this feature of being perched upon by a crow does not constitute an inherent attribute of the house, inasmuch as, on the departure of the crow, there is no idea that the house is wanting in any of its parts; so that the feature of being perched upon by the crow is a purely accidental attribute of the house and constitutes but an indirect definition of Devadatta's house. So also here; causality is a feature of Brahman due to His accidental connection with the birth, etc., of the universe, and constitutes but an indirect definition of Brahman.

This definition is not incompatible with Brahman's non-duality.

This feature of Brahman is illusory and does not detract from Brahman's non-duality. In such cases as 'the serpent is a rope', 'the silver is the mother-of-pearl' the illusory features, such as serpent and silver, are used as the defining marks of the rope and the mother-of-pearl, because of an illusory association between the two; so can causality be a defining mark of Brahman.

Māyā as Brahman's coefficient.

Brahman is regarded as the cause, only in so far as He is the basis of illusion, while it is māyā which is directly concerned with the change (vikāra); and this sort of Brahman's causality does not detract from His unconcernedness. As Existence and Consciousness, Brahman is present throughout the whole universe; and as the basic changing principle, māyā is also present throughout the universe; so that both together constitute the material cause of the universe. It we are to determine which of the two is the prominent factor in the causality, it would depend upon the standpoint of view from which the matter is considered. We may view them as two cords entwined together into one string, or as a being and his potentiality, or as illusion and the basic reality underlying it. In a rope made up of two strings, the two strings are the material cause of the rope, and are equally prominent; on this analogy some regard Brahman and māyā as of equal prominence as the material cause of the universe. There are Others who, on the analogy of fire and its burning power, regard Brahman as the more prominent factor. When we say that fire burns, it is the burning power of the fire that achieves the act of burning; still, inasmuch as the power depends for its being on its possessor, prominence is given to fire; so also, Maya, as a mere potentiality, is regarded as secondary in reference to Brahman who, as the possessor of Maya, is regarded as the primary cause. Some others, again, assign prominence to māyā on the analogy of a rope mistaken for a serpent. Though the serpent has no form apart from that of the rope, still, at the time of illusion, the rope is altogether ignored and the serpent is prominently present in consciousness. On all hands, the declaration of the śruti that Brahman is the cause of the universe applies to Brahman conditioned by Maya.
Devotion is the essential condition of Brahma-vidyā.

4. He resorted to devotion.

Having learned from his father the gateways to the perception of Brahman as well as the definition of Brahman, Bhrigu betook himself to devotion, tapas, as the means to the perception of Brahman.

(Question):— Whence, then, this belief of Bhrigu, that devotion is the means to the perception of Brahman?

(Answer):— Because of the incomplete teaching. Varuṇa taught the gateways to the perception of Brahman, such as food, as also the definition of Brahman, "whence these beings...". This teaching indeed is incomplete; for, Brahman has not been described as He is in Himself. Differently indeed should Varuṇa have taught Brahman to his son who was so anxious to know: he should have taught what Brahman was in Himself, 'Brahman is this, He is so and so.' But he did not describe Brahman in that way; on the contrary the teaching was incomplete. So, Bhrigu understood that his father had certainly in view yet another means to the knowledge of Brahman. And he hit upon devotion as the particular one in view because it is the most effective means of all. It is indeed a well-known truth that of all specific means to the respective specific ends, devotion (tapas) is the most effective means.

Even after teaching what Brahman was in Himself that food, life &c., is Brahman, the father gave an indirect definition of Brahman in the words "whence all these beings are born," etc.

If the father had regarded that his teaching of Brahman was complete when he had taught that Brahman was one with one's own Inner Self, he would not have given subsequently the indirect definition of Brahman. Accordingly, seeing that Brahman was not completely taught, and believing therefore that his father had certainly in view some appropriate means to the end, Bhrigu betook himself to devotion, though not taught by the father to do so. And, of all means, he resorted to tapas, inasmuch as it is the most effective means, as the smṛti says,

"Whatever is hard to be traversed, whatever is hard to be attained, whatever is hard to be reached, whatever is hard to be performed, all this may be achieved by devotion (tapas); for devotion possesses a power which it is difficult to surpass."

(Manu 11:239) — (S).

Therefore Bhrigu hit upon tapas as the means to the knowledge of Brahman, though not taught by his father.

And the particular mode of tapas here meant is the composure or concentration (samādhiṇa) of the external and internal organs of knowledge, inasmuch as that forms the doorway to the realisation of Brahman.

"And one-pointedness of the mind and the sense-organs is indeed the highest devotion. It is superior to all dharmas and it is the Supreme Dharma, they say."

This is the subjective or internal (adhyātmika) tapas, one which is appropriate to the end here in view. But even such kinds of tapas as are generally known to people, comprising acts of self-mortification in body and mind, are helpful though as a remote means to the end in view.— (S).

Or, the tapas here meant is the meditating upon the subject by the method of anvaya-vyatireka, of agreement and difference, since this can lead to the knowledge "I am Brahman." Vyasa has said:

"Who am I? Whose or whence? What will one become and how? Thus should the aspirant of liberation ever enquire, seeking to achieve the purpose of life."

Accordingly, for a seeker of mokṣa, this is the appropriate tapas, as it is conducive to salvation. Even the definition of Brahman given here in the words "whence verily, these beings are born" etc.,
shows that this kind of tapas is the one meant here; for, in these words, the śruti directs attention to the application of the method of anvaya-vyatireka thus: the creatures have birth, &c., and are therefore not the Ātman, whereas Brahmā is devoid of birth, &c., and is therefore the Ātman. — (S).

Devotion (tapas) means the duty of the fourfold asrama or religious life, which is the means to Brahma-jñāna. It has no doubt been shown in the Vedānta-sutras III. iv. 36 38 that even those acts such as japa or mere recitation of sacred formulas, fasting (upavāsa), divine worship, and such other acts of piety to which any man may resort which lie outside the duties of the four recognized asramas, lead to Brahma-jñāna; but in III. iv. 39, it has been settled that devotion in one of the four recognized orders of religious life is superior to devotion outside the four recognized orders. The word tapas (devotion) is applied, in the śruti and the smṛti, to the observance of the duties prescribed for the four recognized orders. Of the duty of a brahmacharin it is said, "study of one's scriptures is tapas indeed"; of the duty of a grihastha or householder, "It is, verily, tapas, they say, that one gives away one's property" of the duty of a Vanaprastha or forest-dweller, "there is no higher tapas than fasting " and the duty of a sannyasin is thus spoken of:

" And one-pointedness of mind and the senses is indeed the highest tapas."

The study of scriptures supplies the authoritative source of the knowledge of Brahmā; by acts of charity and gift, one attains vividīśa or a desire for knowledge, as the śruti says, "they attain a desire for knowledge, by sacrifice and gift;" fasting, as is well known, acts as a check upon the imperiousness of the senses, and the śruti declares that concentration is the direct means to knowledge: " But He is seen through sharp intelligence." Accordingly Bhrigu betook himself to devotion in the fourth order of life, as a sannyasin, having renounced all concern with ritual, and engaged in the concentration of the mind and the senses.

The śruti recognises the order of celibates.

In the Vedānta-sutras III. iv. 1-17, it is settled that Self-knowledge is the independent means to mokṣa. And this Self-knowledge is easy of acquisition in the case of him who belongs to the order of celibates. The next section of the Vedānta-sutras establishes that celibates form a recognized asrama or order of religious life.

(Vedānta-sutras, III. iv. 18—20).

(Question):— Is there a recognized order of celibates or no?

(Prima facie view):— There is no recognized order of religious life; for, no such order is enjoined in the śruti. The Chandogya-upanishad says, "There are three branches of Law: sacrifice, study and charity are the first, austerity the second, and to dwell as a religious student in the house of a tutor is the third." Here the Upanishad merely mentions three orders of life, namely, the order of householders (by referring to their duties such as sacrifice), the order of forest-hermits (by referring to their duty of austerity), and the order of life-long religious students; no injunction is expressly conveyed by the words of the śruti. Neither can we argue that, as being otherwise unknown, these three orders of life are here enjoined; for, the śruti censures the abandonment of the householder's duty of fire-worship, in the words "The murderer of a son indeed is he who allows the sacred fire to become extinct." (Tait. Sm. 2-2-5.) When the smṛti speaks of four stages of religious life, it has in view the blind and the lame who are not qualified for the householder's duty. Certainly, a blind man is not qualified for a rite which involves the act of seeing the clarified butter and other such acts; nor is a lame man qualified for a rite involving jumping and other such motions. Therefore it will

346 Katha. Up. 3:12.
not do for one whose sight and other organs are sound, to resort to a life of celibacy, as a means to Self-knowledge.

(Conclusion):— The life of celibacy is a recognized order of religious life. Though it is not expressly enjoined, it is possible to make out that it is enjoined, inasmuch as it is mentioned there as a thing not already known. It cannot be urged that it involves the sin of a child-murder; for, it is only a householder who incurs the sin when he abandons the sacred fire. Further, it is wrong to say that the life of celibacy is intended for the lame and the blind; for, those who are not meant to lead the householder's life are mentioned separately elsewhere, and the life of celibacy is enjoined on them: "Then, again, whether a man is engaged in vows or is not engaged in vows, whether a man has abandoned sacred fire or has kept no fires at all, on whatever day he becomes disgusted with the world, that selfsame day should he wander out". (Jabala Up. 4) Neither is it by mere implication that we learn that the life of celibacy also is meant for those whose organs of sight, etc., are sound; for the Jabala śruti expressly says: "Having completed the student-life, he should become a householder; from the household, he should become a forest-dweller, and then wander out." Wherefore the order of celibates is a recognized one.

**No descent from a higher to a lower stage is permitted.**

(Vedānta-sutras, III. iv. 40).

(Prima facie view):— Is descent from a higher to a lower stage of religious life allowed?

(Question):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: In the first place, attachment should not be allowed any sway, since it has its root in illusion. Neither should one be led by faith in the duties of a former stage of life; for such duties are not enjoined with reference to a man belonging to a higher order, and do not therefore constitute 'duties' at all with reference to him. Certainly a man's duty is not determined merely by his capacity and faith; on the other hand, his duty consists in what is enjoined on him. Moreover, in the words "thence he should not return" the śruti insists on ascent to a higher stage by way of forbidding descent to a lower one. And the custom of the wise does not sanction descent, as it sanctions ascent. Wherefore no descent is allowable.

**Penance for deviation from the path of celibacy.**

(Vedānta-sutras, III. iv. 41-42).

(Question):— Is there a penance for the purification of one who deviates from the path of celibacy?

(Prima facie view):— No penance can purify a man, who, having taken a vow of life-long studentship and celibacy deviates from the path of celibacy by intercourse with a woman; for the scriptures say:

"As to the man who, having ascended to the path of life-long chastity, again strays from it, I do not see by what penance he can be purified."

It cannot be urged that the śruti prescribes a penance in the words, "when a student of Veda has had intercourse with a woman let him sacrifice an ass;" for, this penance is prescribed in the case of an upakurvāna-brahmachārin, one who takes a temporary vow of chastity as a condition of the Vedic study. Wherefore in the case of the Naishṭhika-brahmacharin, i.e., in the case of him who strays from the vow of perpetual celibacy, there can be no penance.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing, we hold as follows:— Just as, in the case of one who
takes a temporary vow of chastity, the tasting of flesh and intoxicating liquor constitutes a minor sin (upa-pātaka), so also in the case of one who treads the path of life-long celibacy, intercourse with a woman other than his tutor's wife constitutes only a minor sin, not a major sin (mahā-pātaka); so that, through penance and reformatory sacraments, purification is attainable. If penance be allowed for deviation from celibacy, on the ground that it is a minor sin, as not enumerated among the major ones, it may be asked, how are we to explain the text quoted above, which says "I do not see by what penance he can be purified"? We answer that it merely inculcates the necessity of great care in the observance of the vow; hence the words "I do not see," but not that there exists no penance. And the penance for the sin is none other than the sacrifice of an ass, it being the violation of chastity which has to be atoned for, in this case as in the other. Similarly, a penance is prescribed when a forest-dweller (vana-prastha) or a wanderer (parivrajaka) deviates from his path:

"The forest-dweller, when he has violated his vow, shall undergo the Kṛchhra penance of twelve days, and grow a large grove of plants; the mendicant shall proceed like the forest dweller, except that he shall not grow the soma plant."

**Penance ensures purity only in future life.**

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. iv. 43).

(Prima facie view):— Is the one so purified by penance to be admitted into the society of the orthodox? Or is he to be excommunicated?

(Conclusion):— It may be that he is purified for the future life; but, as the scriptures say "I do not see by what penance he can be purified" he is not purified," for the present life: and consequently the orthodox shall avoid all intercourse with him.

**Devotion to Bhrahman is incompatible with works.**

Since devotion to works in the several stages of religious life leads the devotee to superior worlds and does not constitute the means to knowledge, it follows that devotion through concentration and the like, accompanied by cessation of all works, is alone the means to knowledge, as established in the Vedānta-sūtras.

(Vedānta-sūtras, III. iv. 18-20).

(Prima facie view):— The śruti, having spoken of "three branches of the Law," says that all those who duly observe the duties of the several stages of life attain to purer and happier worlds, and then teaches that devotion to Bhrahman is the means to mokṣa, in the words "whoso dwells firmly in Bhrahman attain immortality." (Cha. Up. 2:23:2.) Now the question arises as to whether this Brahma-nisṭha or devotion to Bhrahman is possible for him who treads the path of works leading to happier worlds.

(Conclusion):— As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Brahma-nisṭha or devotion to Bhrahman consists in steadily devoting oneself to Bhrahman, abandoning all external activities and directing the whole thought to Bhrahman, to the exclusion of all else. This is not possible for him who is ardently devoted to works. Abandonment of works and performance of works are opposed to each other. Thus devotion to Bhrahman is possible for him alone who has abandoned works.
CHAPTER 2.
REALISATION OF BRAHMAN.

Food realised as Brahman.

Bhrigu was given to understand that investigation was the means of attaining knowledge of Brahman defined above indirectly as the cause of the universe; and the śrutī now proceeds to show what conclusion he came to at the first stage of investigation.

5. He, having practised devotion,

[Anuvāka II.]

1. That food was Brahman he concluded. From food indeed are these beings verily born; by food, when born, do they live; into food, do they, when departing, enter.

He concluded that food\(^{(348)}\) was Brahman. Food, indeed, possesses the attributes of Brahman mentioned above.— How?— From food indeed are these beings verily born; by food, when born, do they live; into food do they, when departing, enter. Therefore, that is to say, it is proper to hold that food is Brahman.

Food (anna), here referred to is the material cause of the Anna-maya sheath spoken of in the Anandavalli.

So also with regard to prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, and ānanda. For, the definition of Brahman can in no way apply to the forms, such as the Anna-maya, evolved out of the upadāna or material cause, such as food. Certainly, the Anna-maya, etc., are evolved out of anna, food, etc.; and since every effect is said to dissolve into and be one with the cause, the investigator is gradually led on to the final cause, Ananda, by first seeing the Anna-maya, etc., as one with anna etc., and then by seeing anna, food, as one with life, life as one with mind, mind as one with intelligence, and finally intelligence as one with Bliss.—(S).

Having zealously practised devotion of the kind described in the last chapter, Bhrigu concluded that food was Brahman, seeing that food possessed the marks of Brahman, i.e., seeing that all beings had their birth, etc., in food. —(S).

Bhrigu investigated the subject with devotion in full concentration of mind, and concluded that food was Brahman, seeing that food possessed the marks of Brahman i.e. seeing that food was the cause of the birth, stay, and dissolution of the universe. The word 'beings' means the gross bodies. These, as everybody knows, have their birth in food; for, it is the sperm of man and the blood or ovum of woman that constitute the source of the gross body, which is made up of the essence of food lying in the womb. The śrutī, too, has declared, "From food man (is born)". It is true that ākāśa, etc., as such, are not born of food; still, their birth in the form of the gross bodies must be traced to food; and it is in this sense that food is spoken of as the cause of the universe.

The first finding is not satisfactory.

2. That having known, again, verily, did he approach Varuṇa the father, saying "Sir, teach me Brahman."

Having thus thought over the subject in full concentration and concluded that food was Brahman, as according both with the definition of Brahman and with reason, Bhrigu felt a doubt and again approached his father, Varuṇa, saying "Sir, teach me Brahman."

\(^{(348)}\) The Virāj, the material cause of the physical body consisting of the five gross elements of physical matter perceived by all. The Virāj is the source of all physical objects.— (A).
Not pleased with the result, he felt a doubt and wished to know more. He did again approach the Guru; he did not give way to sloth.

What, then, was the cause of his doubt? We answer: Because he saw that food (the Virāj) had birth.

Seeing that food was an effect, he again went to' the Guru and asked, with a view to cut asunder his doubt. —(S).

Similarly, finding that prāṇa, manas, and vijñāna, when regarded as Brahman, were open to the same objection, he again and again asked about the Supreme Brahman till there was no occasion for any more enquiry. —(S).

The aspirant to knowledge does not give up enquiry till the Supreme Brahman is known by direct experience like a bilva fruit held in the hand. — (S).

The reason why Bhrigu was not satisfied with his finding may be explained thus:— The Vajasaneyins read as follows:

"Sonic say that food is Brahman; but this is not so, for, in the absence of life, food decays."
(Bri.Up. 5:12:1)

The malodour of food is clearly perceived in the physical body, which is made up of food. The Vishnu-purana, too, teaches the same thing as follows:—

"To the person who does not get disgusted with the foul smell of his own body, what else can be taught to him to cause disgust in him?"

Therefore, though the physical body has its birth, being, and death in food, still food cannot be Brahman.

**Devotion is necessary at all stages.**

3. To him said (Varuṇa):— By devotion, Brahman seek thou to know. Devotion is Brahman.

This reiteration of devotion is intended to impress that it is the best means. Varuṇa means to say: so long as thou dost not find the thing to which the definition of Brahman is fully applicable, and so long as thy desire for further light does not cease, so long do thou betake thyself to devotion through concentration which is thy sole means to the end. That is to say, seek thou to know Brahman by devotion alone.

By repeatedly saying " by devotion seek thou to know Brahman," we are given to understand that through devotion alone is perception of the Self possible.— (S).

To Bhrigu who thus approached his father, the latter taught that only devotion by concentration (described above) was the means to the knowledge of Brahman. With a view to impress the truth that devotion was the proximate means to attain an intimate knowledge of Brahman, Varuṇa spoke of it, by courtesy, as identical with Brahman, in the words " Devotion is Brahman." If Brahman were taught in the words " Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," which define Brahman as He is, then one would think that Brahman, as knowable through scriptures, cannot be immediately perceived, any more than Dharma and Adharma. Accordingly, Varuṇa, seeing that Brahman was perceptible through one-pointed understanding, did not teach Bhrigu what Brahman was in Himself, but taught him only Devotion,

4. He resorted to devotion.
Life-principle as Brahman.

5. He, having practiced devotion,

[Anuvāka III.]

1. That life was Brahman, he concluded. From life indeed are these beings verily born; by life, when born, do they live; into life do they, when departing, enter. The śruti now proceeds to show to what conclusion Bhrigu came by pondering over the matter a second time. Bhrigu again thought over the definition given above, with mind in full concentration, and concluded that life was Brahman. The Aitareyins declare negatively that life is the cause of the birth of the physical body:

"Without life, indeed, semen is not emitted; if it be emitted at all, without life it would decay, it would not be born." (Ait. Ar. 3-1-2-2.)

When a jīva embodied in the subtle body (liṅga-deha), returning from heaven (svarga) or hell (naraka) through rain, enters into man through food, and through his sperm into the woman's womb, then that sperm, heated by the vital air, which penetrates into it, passes through the stages of embryo, etc., and gives birth to the body. But in the absence of vitality, the sperm cannot give rise to the physical body.

As life is the cause of the birth of the physical body, so, it is the cause of its sustenance, as the Kaushitakins declare: "So long as in this body the vitality remains, so long does the body live." It is a well known fact that on the departure of vitality takes place the death of the body: therefore, since vitality, though not the upadāna or material cause of the physical body, is the nimitta or efficient cause of its birth, sustenance and death, Bhrigu concluded that life was Brahman.

2. That having known, again, verily, did he approach Varuṇa, the father, saying
"Sir, teach me Brahman."

3. To him said (Varuṇa):—By devotion, Brahman seek thou to know. Devotion is Brahman.

4. He resorted to devotion.

Manas as Brahman.

5. Having practiced devotion,

[Anuvāka IV].

1. That manas was Brahman, he concluded. From manas, indeed, are these beings verily born; by manas, when born, do they live; into manas do they, when departing, enter.

The śruti proceeds to show at what conclusion Bhrigu arrived after pondering over the matter a third time.

The vital principle is unintelligent and cannot therefore be Brahman. In the words "Consciousness is Brahman," "Intelligence and Bliss is Brahman," the śruti gives us to understand that Brahman is intelligent. And manas is intelligent, because it is the principle of knowledge (jñāna-śakti). The definition, too, as the cause of the birth, &c., of the universe applies to the manas. It has been declared above that the entering of the vital air into the womb leads to the birth of the physical body; and similarly the entrance of vitality is itself dependent on manas, as declared by the

349  the cause of the Virāj, namely what is called Prāṇa, the Hiranyagarbha, in his aspect of activity or kriya-śakti.— (A).
350  The Hiranyagarbha in his aspect of will, sankalpa — ichha-śakti. — (A).
Gārgya asked: "How comes he into this body?" Pippalada answered: "By an act of manas does he come into this body." (Prasna. Up. 3-3.)

The act of manas here referred to is the sānkālpa or formative thought which at the time of death arises in the manas impelled by the karma of the closing life, the thought of the ego that he will be born in such and such a body. By this thought produced at the close of the former incarnations the vital principle which had formed part of the former body comes into the body of the present incarnation. This truth is clearly taught in the same Upanishad:

"His senses still inhering in his mind, whatever his thought, with that he goes into the prāṇa; prāṇa joined with the fire, united with the Ātman, leads him into his world as he has built it up." (Prasna Up. 3-9.)

The ego (jīva) carrying along with him speech and other senses whose functions at the time of death become absorbed as it were in those of manas thinks of the body which he will have to put on next; and with these thoughts concerning the next body the ego enters into prāṇa or vital principle, which becomes at this stage the leading principle of his constitution. And this prāṇa, impregnated with the fire of this intense thought concerning the future body, leads the whole subtle body (liṅga-deha) along with the ego (jīvātman) to the region which he has built up in thought. The Brihadaranyaka gives the following illustration:

"And as a leech, after having reached the end of a blade of grass, and having approached another blade, draws itself together towards it, thus does this Self, after having thrown off his body and leaving it unconscious, and after having approached another body, draws himself together towards it." (Bri. Up. 4:4:3)

To explain: A leech moving among blades of grass, after having reached the end of one blade, first catches hold of another with the fore part of its body, and then draws its hind part to it; so also the jīvātman, abandoning at the time of death the present body by way of ceasing to identify himself with it, leaves it insentient, and then, after first fashioning the future body by thought, then carries his whole body i.e., carries himself embodied in the liṅga-deha to that other body. Therefore all embodied beings are born of manas. As one has to exercise thought in securing means of livelihood such as agriculture and trade, manas is the cause of the sustenance. Since, as shown above, death occurs when one abandons by thought all attachment to the body, manas is also the cause of the dissolution. Thus, as manas possesses the characteristic marks of Brahman, Bhrigū concluded that manas was Brahman.

2. That having known, again, verily, did he approach Varuṇa, the father, saying "Sir, teach me Brahman".

3. To him said (Varuṇa):— By devotion, Brahman seek thou to know. Devotion is Brahman.

4. He resorted to devotion.

   Intelligence as Brahman.

5. He having practiced devotion,
[ Anuvāka V.]

1. That intelligence\(^{351}\) was Brahman he concluded. From intelligence, indeed, are these beings verily born; by intelligence, when born, do they live; into intelligence do they, when departing, enter.

The šruti proceeds to show at what conclusion Bhrigu arrived after pondering over the matter for a fourth time.

Manas being but an organ or instrument like sight, etc., it is dependent on the agent and cannot therefore be Brahman. That intelligence is the agent has been clearly taught by the šruti in the words "Intelligence accomplishes sacrifice."\(^{352}\) The definition of Brahman can be easily applied to the agent; for the agent is the cause of the birth of the body through his acts (karma). The šruti says "Whatever act he does, such does he become. Pure, indeed, becomes he by a pure act, and he becomes impure by an impure act."\(^{353}\) As the agent of such worldly acts as agriculture, intelligence is the cause of the sustenance of the body; and by engaging in battle and other such acts which bring about death, intelligence causes dissolution. Therefore, intelligence, which answers to the definition of Brahman, must be Brahman.

2. That having known, again, verily, did he approach Varuṇa, the father, saying "Sir, teach me Brahman."

3. To him said (Varuṇa):— By devotion, Brahman seek thou to know. Devotion is Brahman.

4. He resorted to devotion.

Bliss as Brahman.

5. He, having practised devotion, —

(Anuvāka VI.)

1. That Bliss\(^{354}\) was Brahman, he concluded. From Bliss, indeed, are these beings verily born; by Bliss, when born, do they live; into Bliss do they, when departing, enter.

Now the šruti proceeds to show at what conclusion Bhrigu arrived after pondering over the matter for a fifth time.

As agency is associated with pain, intelligence cannot be Brahman. Moreover, these four principles, food, life, mind and intelligence, cannot be the cause of the birth of all being; it being impossible that ākāśa and other primary elements of matter should be born of food, etc., which are formed of those elements of matter. On the contrary, Bliss is devoid of pain; being in itself agreeable to all, it constitutes the highest end of man; and it is also the cause of all being including the primary elements of matter such as ākāśa; and for these reasons Bliss may be regarded as genuine Brahman. The nature of Bliss is described by the Chhandogas as follows: "What indeed is the Great, that is bliss; in the small, bliss exists not; the Great One alone is bliss."\(^{355}\) Objects are of two kinds, great and small. The Great One, the all-inclusive one, is alone bliss; but in what lies beyond the Great

\(^{351}\) The Hiranyagarbha in his aspect of intelligence, jñāna-śakti.— (A).

\(^{352}\) Tait. Up. 2-5

\(^{353}\) Bri. Up. 4:4:5.

\(^{354}\) Brahman associated with Maya. Since the Conditioned cannot be the basic Reality of the Conditioned, Bhrigu concluded it was the Unconditioned One that Varuṇa hinted at by speaking of Brahman as the cause of the universe.— (A).

One, i. e., in the small one, there is no bliss. The Great One must be bliss. What constitutes the difference between the Great one and the small is taught in the same Upanishad as follows: "Where one sees not anything else, that is the Great; and where one sees another, that is the small." The non-dual, admitting of no triads, each of these involving three different elements such as perceiver, perception and the object perceived, is the Great One; and the universe of duality involving triads is the small. The same Upanishad speaks of the Great One and the small as the permanent and the impermanent:

"What indeed is the Great One, That is immortal; and what is small, that is mortal."
(Ibid 7:24:1)

In the waking and dream states involving duality, we experience only suffering, for the most part. If there be pleasure at all now and then, even that is a mere pain, as involving many imperfections, namely, the trouble of procuring it, its inferiority as compared with higher pleasures, and its perishability. Accordingly, the author of the Sreyomārga says: "Alas! because the small pleasures of the embodied beings are hard to procure and subject to decay, and conduce only to misery, therefore, there are only miseries upon miseries here in this world." With this view, it has been said that there is no bliss in the small. But, in suṣūpti and samādhi, the two states of non-duality, bliss reigns, supreme and self-luminous. It should not be supposed that it is mere absence of pain; for, mere abhāva or absence cannot be self-luminous. Bliss is self-luminous because it manifests itself without a pramāṇa or medium of knowledge.

Certainly in that state non-duality is not perceived through a pramāṇa; if it were so perceived, then there would be duality and suṣūpti would come to an end. We must, however, conclude that it manifests itself then, because there is no disagreement on the point. If people understand the jāgrat and svapna states without any disagreement, they do understand also the states of suṣūpti and Samādhi without any disagreement. Thus, as manifesting itself without an external medium of knowledge, the non-dual is self-luminous and is therefore not mere absence of pain. The non-dual is bliss because suṣūpti and samādhi are objects of pleasure, like the attainment of sense-objects of pleasure. All men, when they have to do nothing else, lie down to rest, seeking the bliss of suṣūpti. And those who possess right knowledge resort to the nirvikalpa-samādhi, only to enjoy the bliss of it. Both these classes of people subsequently call back the bliss of these states to their mind thus 'I slept happily': 'I felt quite happy in the state of perfect self-composure.' From these instances of suṣūpti and samādhi we may understand that even the non-dual, which existed prior to the emanation of the dual, was Bliss. It is from this non-dual Bliss, that all dual existence including ākāśa and other elements of matter, as also all beings from the Hiranyagarbha downwards, is born.

(Question):— Duality and non-duality, creation and dissolution, alternate with each other, again and again, like day and night. Now, since one thing cannot have two such mutually opposite forms, we must hold that one of these forms must be inherent, while the other is extraneous. Which, then, of these is the inherent form and which the extraneous form of the One?

(Answer):— We answer thus: It is agreed that the non-dual Bliss of suṣūpti is independent of all extraneous means; whereas the dual waking state is based on many external means such as sense-objects, etc. Therefore the non-dual self-existent Bliss is the upadāna or material cause of the temporary universe of duality; the many things such as foam, waves, bubbles have their birth, being and dissolution in the one ocean.

**Devotion is the sole means to Brahma-vidyā.**

Thus when Bhrigu, with his mind purified by devotion, found that life, mind and intelligence did not fully answer to the definition of Brahman, he slowly, step by step, divined within till he came to know, by means of devotion alone, that Bliss, the innermost One, was Brahman. Thus the main drift of the teaching of this section is this: the aspirant to the knowledge of Brahman should resort to
that supreme kind of devotion, namely, to the perfect composure of the external and internal senses, as the means to that knowledge.

By devotion alone, by applying the process of elimination through anvaya-vyatireka, Bhrigu was, step by step, led to find Brahman in the Pratyagātman, the Inner Self. Accordingly those who strive to escape from saṃsāra should always resort to the faultless devotion with a view to finding Brahman in the Inner Self.— (S)

By devotion of concentration, Bhrigu realised that the non-dual Bliss was Brahman defined as the cause of the universe. Therefore devotion alone is the primary means.

And in the sciences of Yoga Patañjali and others have treated at length of several means of attaining this one pointedness of the mind which is the highest form of devotion.

In the legend narrated above concerning the investigation of Brahman as the cause of the universe, it has been shown that devotion in one-pointedness of mind is the proximate means to the intuitive realisation of Brahman as bliss. And, now, with a view to remove a doubt as to whether there exists another principle superior even to Bliss, as Bliss is superior to the four principles, food, life, mind and intelligence, the śruti concludes the subject thus:

**Bliss is the Self.**

2. **This wisdom of Bhrigu and Varuṇa is established in the Supreme Heaven.**

Now, the śruti, departing from the legend, formulates in its own words the propositions established through the legend. This wisdom learned by Bhrigu and taught by Varuṇa, and which first started with the Anna-maya Self, culminates in the Highest heaven, i.e., in the Supreme non-dual Bliss hid in the cave of ākāśa of the heart.

This Brahma-vidyā is well-known, because it is spoken of in other Upanishads, and is realised by one's own experience acquired through one-pointedness of mind. This culminates in the Highest Ākāśa, i.e., in the principle of Brahman. There are three Ākāsas:—

1. That spoken of as born of the Self, the lowest ākāśa;

2. That spoken of as the Avyaktra, the Undifferentiated Root wherein all universe is woven as warp and woof; the middle ākāśa.

3. The Highest Ākāśa, the Principle of Brahman, the Indestructible, the basic Reality underlying all phenomenal universe including the Vedas, the One which in the main is treated of in the Rig-Veda and other scriptures. Than this there is nothing higher to be known. Hence it is that wisdom reaches its culminating point in this principle.

The Supreme Heaven is the Self wherein all distinction of 'I' and 'thou', of the ego and the non-ego, disappears; and wisdom reaches its culminating point there, where one sees Brahman as the Self and the Self as Brahman. Thus, from a sentence one acquires the knowledge "I am Brahman," which cannot be the import of a sentence.— (S).

3. **Who so thus knows is firmly established.**

And whoever else in this fashion dives within, step by step, by the same means of devotion and realizes Bliss as Brahman, He also, in virtue of this culmination of wisdom, becomes established in Bliss, in the Supreme Brahman, that is to say, he becomes the very Brahman.

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356 Mund. Up. 1.1-1; Kaivalya-Up
358 Bri. Up. 3:8:11.
He casts away the five sheaths and attains the supreme support. The wise man attains a firm abode in that support, spoken of in the Ananda-valli as "Brahman, the tail, the support " which is beyond cause and effect.— (S).

The śruti states the immediate visible result of wisdom:

4. Possessor of food and eater of food he becomes. Great he becomes by progeny, by cattle, by spiritual luster, great by fame.

He becomes possessed of plenty of food; we say plenty because, if the mere existence of food were meant, all people possess food, and then nothing peculiar would have been mentioned as the result of wisdom. Similarly, he becomes the eater of food; that is to say, digestive fire is set aflame. He becomes great as possessed of sons, etc., of cows, horses, etc., and of spiritual luster accruing from the tranquility of the mind and senses, from wisdom and the like. He becomes great by fame, as a man of righteous conduct.

It is not quite unreasonable to say that this visible result accrues to him who has known Brahman; for, though a jivan-mukta, he perceives duality owing to a slight tinge of avidyā still lurking in him. By the grace of the Īśvara, even the unenlightened ones come to possess plenty of food; much more so then should they enjoy plenty of food who have realised their identity with Īśvara.— (A).

Never condemn food.

[Anuvāka VII.]

1. He shall not condemn food; that shall be his vow.

Moreover because Brahman has been known through food, let the aspirant regard it as Guru, and so let him never condemn it. This vow is enjoined on him who has thus known Brahman. This injunction of the vow is meant to praise food; and food deserves praise because it is the means of perceiving Brahman.

Or, it may be that here, in these last three passages, the Upanishad speaks of the fruit accruing to those who contemplate conditioned Brahman, i.e., who contemplate food as Brahman. It does not certainly stand to reason to say that such results accrue to those who have attained all desires and have nothing else to attain.— (S).

CHAPTER 3.

SOME MINOR CONTEMPLATIONS.

Contemplation of food as Brahman.

Brahma-vidyā is easy of acquisition for the aspirant of the highest grade, i.e., for him who is endued with one-pointed mind. But, with reference to him whose mind wavers, cherishing a desire for worldly ends, the śruti, by way of prescribing the means of obtaining those ends, enjoins certain contemplations which conduce to the acquisition of one-pointedness of mind.

Food being the first gateway to the knowledge of Brahman, the śruti enjoins the contemplation of Brahman through the symbol of food.

359 A sannyāsin knowing Brahman should partake of that food only which comes by chance. When the food so obtained happens to be poor or unclean, let him not condemn it.

360 Here Suresvaracharya differs from Sankarachārya; and Sayana follows the former. Sayana's interpretation, as according with the subject-matter of the next chapter, will be given at the beginning of the next chapter.— (Tr.)
He who contemplates food as Brahman becomes steady without the wavering of the mind. He will, moreover, possess plenty of food and will be able to eat it, free from all sickness. He will be blest with off-spring, sons, grandsons, etc.; he will acquire cattle, horses etc.; he will acquire spiritual lustre through constant study of the Vedas and other scriptures; he will be famous in all these respects. Because one attains to Brahma-vidyā through the gateway of food by making it an object of constant contemplation, therefore the devotee should never condemn food as though it were his Guru. This refraining from condemning food should be made a vow by this devotee; it should be accomplished as a matter of necessity. If this vow be transgressed, the contemplation will be so far defective.

Contemplation of life and body.

With a view to enjoin another contemplation, the śruti proceeds to show the object which should be contemplated:

2. Life, verily, is food, the body the eater of food. In life the body is set; life is set in
the body. Thus food is set in food.

Having taught that the direct means to the knowledge of the One is the constant meditation of the Reality underlying the entities denoted by "That" and "thou," and having also treated of the result of the knowledge in the concluding words of the section, the śruti now proceeds to prescribe the contemplation of Prāṇa etc., as an indirect means to Brahmajāhana, for the benefit of those who, not being fully developed, are unable to carry on the process of investigation described above.— (A).

Life (prāṇa) is food because it exists within the body; and whatever is set within another forms the food of that other. And life, too, is also set within the body. Therefore life is food, and the body the food-enter. And, rice versa, the body is food, and life the food-eater. Why? Because the body is set in life; the existence of the body being dependent on life. Wherefore, both these, the body and life, are food- as well as the food-eater. Because each is set in the other, therefore each of them is food; and because each of them is the support of the other, therefore each of them is the food-eater.

Just as the food that has been eaten lies within the body, so prāṇa dwells within the body and is therefore regarded as food. By reason of containing the life-food which lies within it, the body is regarded as the eater. Just as a pillar within the house supports the house, so life, dwelling within the body, supports the body, and therefore the body is said to be set in prāṇa. That life is the support of the body is declared in the dialogue of the vital principles:

“It is I who by this very quintuple division of myself together keep and hold this bundle up.” (Pras. Up. 2-3)

And it is quite evident that the body is the supporter of life. The devotee should constantly contemplate that life and the body are each other's support.

Moreover, it has been said before that, as dwelling within the body, prāṇa is food. And the body is food because it is evolved from food; so that, both of them being food, and both of them being the support of each other, it should also be contemplated that food itself is set in food.

Having thus treated of the thing to be contemplated, the śruti proceeds to enjoin the contemplation thereof.

3. Whoso knows that thus food is set in food, he is settled; possessor of food and food-eater he becomes. Great he becomes by progeny, by cattle, by spiritual lustre; great by fame.

[Anuvāka 8.]

1. He shall not abandon food; that his vow.

This vow is enjoined on him who contemplates life and the body as taught above.— (S & A).
That his vow: This, as before, is intended to extol food: when thus one does not abandon food, without making any such distinction as good food and bad food, food becomes exalted. The same interpretation should be put on the succeeding passages also, beginning with " Water verily is food."

**Contemplation of water and fire.**

Now the śruti proceeds to treat of yet another thing to be contemplated:

2. Water verily is food, fire the food-eater. In water is fire set; water is set in fire. Thus food is set in food,

As the water that is drunk is digested by the digestive fire in the stomach, water is regarded as food, and fire as the food-eater. As the lightning is present in the rain- water and as perspiration occurs when the body is heated, water and fire are regarded as each other's support. For the same reason they are each other's food:

The śruti proceeds to enjoin contemplation.

3. Whoso knows that thus food is set in food, he is settled; possessor of food and food-eater he becomes. Great he becomes by progeny, by cattle, by spiritual luster; great by fame.

[Anuvāka 9.]

1. He shall make food plentiful; that his vow.

He who contemplates water and fire as food and food-eater shall make it his vow to earn plenty of food.

It has been formerly enjoined that the food which comes to hand at the dinner-time should not be abandoned on the ground that it is not good, while here the śruti enjoins that one should earn plenty of food to give it to travelers.

**Contemplation of Earth and Ether.**

The śruti proceeds to treat of yet another thing to be contemplated:

2. Earth verily is food, ether the food-eater. In earth is ether set; earth is set in ether. Thus food is set in food.

As the earth abides in the ether which lies both above and below it, the earth is food and the ether is the food-eater. Since, in the view of the uneducated, the ether lies upon the earth, they are related as container and contained. But from the stand-point of the educated, the ether is the basis or container. The devotee should thus contemplate them as each other's food.

The śruti proceeds to enjoin contemplation:

3. Whoso knows that thus food is set in food, he is settled; possessor of food and food-eater he becomes. Great he becomes by progeny, by cattle, by spiritual luster; great by fame.

[Anuvāka 10.]

1. None, as to lodging, he shall turn away: that his vow.

He who contemplates earth and ether shall not turn away any one who comes to him for lodging.

2. Therefore, by whatever means, he should earn much food.

When lodging is given, food should necessarily be given; therefore he shall earn plenty of food, by every means.

When lodging is given to a traveler, food also must be given to him; otherwise sin will accrue, as
is taught in the śruti. The śruti says that an inhospitable person is debarred from all good both here and hereafter:

"Hopes, expectations, communion with saints, pleasant words, sacrifice and public charity, sons, cattle, all are taken from the fool in whose abode a brahman fasting rests." (Katha Up. 1-8.)

Therefore, with a view to give food, he should earn plenty by any of the following means: officiating as a priest at another's sacrifice, teaching scriptures to others, receiving gifts.

The śruti quotes the custom of the wise:

3. Food is prepared for him, they say.

When a man comes seeking for food, the wise, possessing plenty of food, say that food is prepared for him: they do not turn him away telling him that there is no food. For this reason also he shall earn plenty of food.

The śruti, moreover, speaks of the meritoriousness of the act of giving food.

4. This food, verily, being prepared at the highest, at the highest is food ready for him. This food, verily, being prepared at the middle, at the middle is food ready for him. This food, verily, being prepared at the lowest, at the lowest is food ready for him, (for him) who thus knows.

In whatever manner and at whatever period of time a person gives food, in the self-same manner and at the self-same period of time does it accrue back to him. The śruti shows how this is the case. If food is prepared and given to the needy guest at the prime of life, or in the best fashion, i.e., with greatest respect, the giver will reap this fruit: at the prime of life, and in the best fashion, does the food accrue to him, just as he has given food. Similarly, if he gives food at the middle age and with moderate respect, or if he gives food late in life and in the lowest fashion, i.e., with least respect, nay with disrespect, at the self-same age and in the self-same way does food accrue to him. Whoever knows the merit of food as described above, and knows also the fruit accruing from the gift of food, to him accrues fruit from gift of food as described above.

To show that the earning of much food leads to great results, the śruti teaches that superior gifts produce superior results. The food that has been earned is best given when given at the best of places (i.e. at a sacred piece of land or body of water), at the best of times (i.e., at the time of solar solstices, on new-moon days, etc.), to the best person (i.e., a chance guest who is engaged in the study of the Vedas and other scriptures and in the observance of their precepts), in the best fashion (i.e., with due devotion, homage and respect), and by the best giver (i.e., by him in whom sattva or the principle of goodness predominates). This sattvic gift has been thus described by the Lord;—

"That gift which is given — knowing it to be a duty to give— to one who does no service, in place and in time, and to a worthy person, that gift is held Sattvic."
(Bhag. Gita 18:20.)

If a person knows what sattvic gift is and acts accordingly, to him in a future birth food accrues in the best way. The two succeeding sentences should be interpreted as referring to the rajasic and tamasic gifts. These have also been described by the Lord as follows:—

"And that gift which is given with a view to a return of the good, or looking for the fruit, or reluctantly, that gift is held to be Rajasic."

"The gift that is given at a wrong place or time, to unworthy persons, without respect or with insult, that is declared to be Tamasic." (Ibid. 18: 21-22)

The passages speaking of the fruits of the three kinds of gift should also be interpreted accordingly.
As incidentally connected with the vow which forms part of the contemplation taught above, the truth that the fruit of a gift will be in accordance with the nature of the gift has been here taught.

**Contemplation of Brahman in man.**

Now the śruti proceeds to teach how Brahman should be contemplated:—

5. **As safety in speech, as gain and safety in prāṇa and apāṇa, as action in the hands, as motion in the feet, as discharge in the anus: such are contemplations in man.**

*Safety* means preservation of what has been acquired. The devotee should contemplate that Brahman dwells in speech as safety. As speech is conducive to safety, safety lies in speech.— (S).

*Gain* means acquisition of what has been not already acquired. Though gain and safety occur when prāṇa and apāṇa are strong, still they are not altogether due to them. On the other hand, they are due to Brahman. Therefore it should be contemplated that Brahman dwells in prāṇa and apāṇa as gain and safety. So, too, in the other cases that follow, Brahman Him-self should be contemplated in such and such a form.

*Action* being brought about by Brahman, it should be contemplated that Brahman dwells in the hands in the form of action. Similarly, Brahman should be contemplated as motion in the feet, as discharge in the anus. Such are the contemplations of Brahman in reference to human personality.

Because these are the contemplations of Vishnu man, therefore the wise always call them samājñās or perfect knowledge, highest contemplations relating to man. — (S).

Speech, prāṇa, &c., are symbols through which Brahman should be contemplated. Action: activities such as sacrificial rituals, fighting, &c. Brahman should be contemplated as sacrificial ritual in the Brahmin’s hands, as fighting in the warrior's hands. These are the contemplations that can be practised through parts of human body. These upāsanas are termed samājñās, because these activities are constantly carried on and all around. The plural "contemplations" shows that these contemplations are independent of each other.

**Contemplation of Brahman in the Cosmic Being.**

6. **Next as to those referring to Devas: as satisfaction in the rain, as strength in the lightning, as fame in cattle, as light in the stars, as procreation, the immortal, and joy in the generative organ, as all in the ākāśa.**

Next, follow contemplations (of Brahman) in Devas. As rain conduces to satisfaction through food, etc., it should be contemplated that Brahman Himself dwells in the rain in the form of satisfaction. Similarly in other cases, too, Brahman should be contemplated in such and such a form. He should be contemplated as strength in the lightning, as fame in cattle, as procreation, the immortal, and joy in the generative organ. As the generative organ conduces to all these — to the attainment of immortality by way of leading to a discharge from debts through a son, Brahman should be regarded as dwelling in it in those forms. All things are set in the ākāśa: and therefore, all things that exist in ākāśa should be contemplated as Brahman.

He who contemplates Brahman as the all in ākāśa, becomes one with all. — (S).

Having treated of contemplations of Brahman in parts of human body, the śruti proceeds to treat of those relating to parts of the body of the Deva or Cosmic Being. Rain, lightning, etc., here refer to the Devatas or Intelligences who identify themselves with them. Procreation, sexual enjoyment, and

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361 This member should rather go along with the contemplations of Brahman in man in the preceding article.— (A).
sexual intercourse are effected through the organ of generation as the Kaushitakins have taught ......
In the whole universe comprising matter and material objects, Brahman abides as the Devata or
Intelligence who identifies himself with ākāśa.

Contemplation of Brahman in some special aspects.

"We should understand that the fruits of the contemplations here taught, commencing with the
contemplation of speech, are in accordance with the upāsana. The īśāṇa teaches that in whatever
form a man worships Him, he becomes that very thing. With this view the śruti proceeds to treat of
some contemplations along with their fruits:

7. Let him contemplate That as support, he becomes well-supported. Let him
contemplate That as great, he becomes great. Let him contemplate That as thought,
he becomes thoughtful. Let him contemplate That as homage, to him desires pay
homage. Let him contemplate That as the Supreme, possessed of supremacy he
becomes. Let him contemplate That as Brahman's destructive agent, around him die
his hateful rivals, and those rivals whom he does not like.

The ākāśa too is Brahman. — Let a man contemplate Brahman as the support of all; and by
contemplating Brahman as the support of all, the devotee will have full support. Similarly, in the
preceding contemplations, whatever fruit is dependent on a thing, that fruit is Brahman;
and by the contemplation of Brahman as such, the devotee attains that fruit. The śruti too says
elsewhere: — "In whatever form one worships Him, he becomes that very thing." If a man
contemplates Brahman with the attribute of greatness, he becomes great. If a man contemplates
Brahman as manas or thought, he becomes capable of thinking. If one should contemplate Brahman
with the attribute of homage, all objects of desire bend low before the devotee. Brahman's
destructive power is that in which the five Devatas Rain, Lightning, Moon, Sun and Fire meet their
end. Brahman's destructive agent is Vāyu, as the śruti has elsewhere taught. Vāyu is one with
ākāśa, and ākāśa is therefore Brahman's destructive agent. If a man should contemplate ākāśa in its
embodiment of Vāyu, as Brahman's destructive agent, such of his rivals as hate him the rivals are
thus qualified because among rivals some hate, while others do not die all around him, as also those
rivals whom he hates though they do not hate him.

He becomes well supported: He will possess all means of living, such as food and clothing. Great:
by wealth. Homage: on subduing others.

CHAPTER 4.

FINAL ATTAINMENT.

The Ātman is ever beyond Saṃsāra.

Having thus, from the stand-point of illusory knowledge, taught the several contemplations, such as
those which fall within the scope of the average aspirants, the commentator (Sankaracharya) now
proceeds to expound the underlying truth, apart from all illusion.—(A).
In the section beginning with the words "Life, verily, is food, the body the food-eater," the śruti has taught us that it is the evolved universe, including the ākāśa, which appears as food and food-eater.

(Question):— True, it has been taught. What of that?

(Answer):— From this it follows that the saṃsāra which is due (to the things in the universe) being mutually related as enjoyers and objects of enjoyment, pertains to the evolved universe, but not to the Ātman. It is only ascribed to Ātman through illusion.

This relation of food and food-eater belongs to the world of effects and therefore pertains to the aggregate of the principles comprising human upādhi. The śruti has taught this at length, with a view to show that that relation pertains only to the world of effects and that it should not be extended to Brahman who is beyond thought and words. —(S).

(The opponent):— The Ātman, too, is a thing evolved from the Paramātman, and it is therefore but right to say that saṃsāra pertains to the Self.

(Answer): No; for, the śruti speaks of the entrance of that one who is not a saṃsārīn. "This having emanated, into that very thing He entered": in these words the śruti declares the entrance in the universe, of the Paramātman Himself who has created ākāśa and other things and who is not a saṃsārīn. Therefore the living self, the jīvātman, who has entered the universe, is none other than the Supreme, who is not a saṃsārīn. And the identity of the agent in the acts of creating and entering leads to the same view. When the creation and the entrance are looked upon as the acts of one and the same agent, then alone does the participle, "having created," become explicable.

(The opponent):— On entering, the Supreme undergoes change of nature.

(Answer):— No; for, we have refuted this interpretation by showing that entrance has quite a different meaning.

(The opponent):— As the śruti says specifically that the One has entered the universe "in this form of the jīva," (Chha. Up. 6-3-2.) the Supreme must have entered the universe with a different nature (as saṃsārīn).

(Answer):— No, because the śruti again speaks of the jīva as identical with the One, in the words "That, Thou art."

(The opponent):— There the śruti merely presents an exalted picture for contemplation, whereby the jīva who has come to be a distinct being (as saṃsārīn) may rid himself of that distinct feature (saṃsāra).

(Answer):— No, because of the identity taught by the śruti in the words "That is real, That the Self, and That Thou art."

That is to say, the opponent's view is incompatible with the identity which the śruti, when literally interpreted, conveys, and which we find no reason to set aside.—(A).

(The opponent):— Why, our experience does show that the jīva is a saṃsārīn.

(Answer):— It cannot be; for the perceiver cannot be an object of perception.

(The opponent):— Why, the Self with his attribute of saṃsāra is perceived.

(Answer):— No; for, since an attribute is not distinct from its substratum, the Self would then be an object of perception as well as the perceiver; i.e., the Self would be both the agent and the object of the act of perceiving; which is impossible, just as it is impossible for heat to become heated and for light to become illumined.

(The opponent):— As the Self is found to be subject to fear, &c., we infer that the Self is subject to pain, &c.
(Answer):— For the very reason that fear and pain are perceived, they are not the attributes of the perceiver.

(The opponent): — This is opposed to the reasoning adopted by the followers of Kapila and Kanada:

(Answer):—That does not vitiate our theory; for, as their systems lack proper foundation and contradict the Veda, we must look upon them as based on illusion.

Thus Âtman's freedom from saṃsāra has been established both through śrutī and reasoning.

Therefore the common view that the Self is the enjoyer of external objects should be relegated to the region of avidyā; such a relation cannot apply to the Âtman who is one with the Real Infinite Brahman. That the duality comprising the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment arises from avidyā is taught by the śrutī in the words "when there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other, one hears the other........" (Bri. Up., 2-4.14.) And again in the words "But when the Self only is all this, how could he smell another, how could he see another........." the śrutī teaches that the Self who is free from avidyā and all such things is always free from duality ascribed to him by avidyā.— (S).

**Unity of the Self and Brahman.**

And (the jīva is not a saṃsāra) because he is one (with Īśvara).

How is the jīva one (with Īśvara)?

The śrutī says:

**8. And this one who is in the man, and that one who is in the Sun, He is one.**

This passage has been explained already (vide ante pp.622 628).

**The enlightened one attains unity with the All.**

He who thus knows, departing from this world and attaining this Anna-maya self, then attaining this Prāṇa-maya self, then attaining this Mano-maya self, then attaining this Viṣṇu-maya self, then attaining this Ananda-maya self, traversing these worlds, having the food he likes, taking the form he likes, this song singing he sits.

The meaning of the verse beginning with the words "Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman," has been explained at length by the whole Anandavalli which forms a sort of commentary on the verse. But that part of it which speaks of the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman in the words" attains all desires together, as Brahman, as the wise/ has not been explained at length. In the sequel, the śrutī proceeds to show what all those desires are, what objects they refer to, and how he attains them all together as Brahman. Now, in the legend of the father and his son, which forms a supplement to the Vidyā taught in the previous section, it has been taught that Devotion (tapas) is the means to Brahma-vidyā. The śrutī then treated of the mutual relation, as food and food-eater, of all created things from prāṇa up to ākāśa, and treated of the modes of contemplating Brahman. The śrutī has then treated of desires relating to the different objects in the creation (such as ākāśa) and of the appropriate means by which they can be realised. But, if Âtman be one alone, there cannot be objects of desire as well as one who desires them, inasmuch as the whole variety is resolved into the One Self. Such being the case, how, it may be asked, can we understand that the knower of Brahman attains all desires together as Brahman?

We answer: because the knower of Brahman be- comes the all.

The knower of Brahman enjoys all objects of pleasure at once because he has become one with Brahman; and none but Brahman can enjoy all objects of desire at once. Nothing in the universe exists by itself and all things exist in the Supreme Brahman who is the Real, Consciousness, the Infinite, and Bliss. — (S).
Or the Upanishad comprised in this chapter is intended to teach that Brahma-Vidyā devours all things in the universe which are mutually related as food and food-eater, and that therefore truth points to non-duality—(S).

How has he (the knower of Brahman) become the all?

The śruti answers thus: By knowledge of the unity of the Ātman in man and in the sun, he eliminates all inferiority and superiority from the Ātman, and gradually passing beyond the selves generated by avidyā, such as those ranging from the Anna-maya to the Ananda-maya, he becomes one with the Real, Conscious, Infinite Brahman, the Invisible, the inherent Bliss, the Unborn, the Immortal, the Fearless, the Non-dual, the Goal. Having the food he likes and assuming the forms he likes, he traverses these worlds, the earth and other worlds: i.e., as one with the all, he sees all these worlds as the Self, and sits singing Sāman. Sāman is Brahman who is 'sama' or one with all.

To sing Sāman is to proclaim, for the benefit of the people, the unity of the Self as well as the perfection in life resulting from the knowledge. The knower of Brahman realizes, by his knowledge, the unreality of the whole not-self set up by avidyā, and sees himself to be the Self, the Brahmā who is the Real, the In-visible, etc. Having thus become one with Brahman, and devoid of inferior and superior forms, he traverses through these worlds, i.e., he continues to perceive the upādhis created by acts, though he knows them to be unreal. No traversing through them in its literal sense is possible in the case of Brahman who is immutable; the śruti says "He thinks as it were, he moves as it were." (Bri. Up. 4:3:7) The wise one, being himself the all, sees all these worlds as the Self; and feeling that he has achieved all, he sings the song that follows:—(S).

The enlightened one becomes a Jīvan-mukta.

Here (in the passages 8 and 9) the śruti teaches what the aspirant on attaining one-pointedness of mind either in this birth or in the next as the result of the contemplations described in the last chapter will know and what he will attain as the result of that knowledge. Though this has been taught in the Anandavalli, still it is repeated here with a view to show that devotion (tapas) concentration or one-pointedness of mind which can be attained through various kinds of upāsana (contemplation) finally leads to the Supreme end of man. Since the aspirant has realized that the one partless Bliss, described in connection with the Ananda-maya-kośa as "Brahman the tail, the support," is his own Self, and since he has rid himself of the illusion that identifies with the Self delight and other members of Ananda-maya-kośa as well as the sheaths lying outside the Ananda-maya sheath through which the Self becomes bound, he is liberated in fact. But, people speak of him as living inasmuch as they still see his body and sense-organs as before. Thus in the view of the world he still lives, while in his own view he is liberated, and he is therefore called a Jīvan-mukta, liberated while still alive. Having realised identity with Ātman as shown above, he lives like other people here till death.—How does he live? — Eating what food he likes, putting on what form he likes, he traverses these worlds. As he has risen above the laws which enjoin certain kinds of food and forbid certain kinds of food, he eats in any man's house he likes. So the śruti says:—"Begging food, from all castes, the stomach his dish." (Jabala-Up. 6) And the sages also say, "As to those who tread the path beyond the three guṇas, what can be enjoined or what can be forbidden?" (Ibid) He also puts on any dress he likes; the śruti speaks of them as those whose dress is undetermined, whose conduct is undetermined." Eating as he likes and dressing him-self as he likes, he wanders through Kasi, Dvaravati, and other places, one after another, never settling in a house in one place; the śruti speaks of such a man as "not dwelling in a house, and making no effort." (Ibid) Or we may explain thus: Convinced that he is one with all, that "all sentient beings, from Brahman down to unmoving objects, are my body," he finds satisfaction in the thought that, whatever persons move about and in whatever worlds, all such movements are his own. What more does he do? He

367 Upadesa-sahasri.
sits singing the sāman that follows here, a mantra in the form of a song. It is a mantra which teaches oneness (samatva). The śruti says: "One with all, hence Sāman" (Chha Up. 2-9-1) and also "Same always; hence sāman." (ibid)

Singing the mantra in the manner prescribed in the Samaveda, he thereby proclaims to his disciples that he has become one with all.

The Jīvanmukta's song of unity with all.

10. O! O! O! I am food, I am food, I am food, I food-eater, I food-eater, I food-eater! I am the combining agent, I the combining agent, I the combining agent. I am the First-born of the existence! Prior to gods, the centre of the immortal. Whoso giveth me, he surely doth thus save. I, the food, eat him who eats food. I the whole being destroy. Light, like the sun!

Oh!: This expresses extreme wonder.—Where is the occasion for this wonder?—Though I am the non-dual taintless Ātman, I am myself food and food-eater. The threefold repetition is intended to denote the wonderfulness of the thing.

All this is divided twofold, food and food-eater. The enlightened one says "I who am the Ātman, the Real and the Infinite, am myself this twofold world."—(S).

The wonder is this, that by the mere knowledge obtained through the grace of the Guru and the scriptures, I who was one with the body have become Brahmā who is the all. In the words "I am food" etc., the enlightened one proclaims his experience of oneness. Whatever food is prepared,—rice, wheat, barley,— all that is myself; for while the name and form of the food are false appearances, the basic Reality underlying them which is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, is none other than myself. So too in the case of "food-eater" and "combiner."

Food-eater: Brahmins, kṣatriyas, cattle, horses, etc.

I am myself also the combining agent, the Intelligence that brings about the combination of food and the food-eater. Or, (to interpret it better), I am the Intelligence who brings about the combination of various objects, which, having no purpose of their own, are intended solely for the purpose of another being, so that it might serve as the food of that other being, the food-eater.

I myself, the Ātman, of the nature described above, am the connection between food and food-eater, the connection as perceiver and objects of perception. There exists nothing else except myself.—(S).

The enlightened one sees in himself the Self who is devoid of action and of the several factors concerned in action.—(S).

The threefold repetition of "I am food" etc., implies extreme regard for the knowledge, which is thus expressed with a view to create confidence in the minds of those people who betray want of faith.—(S).

I am myself the one who brings various elements together, as for instance, a king who collects an army, and the like. Or (to interpret it in another way), I am the maker of verses, i.e., the poet. The threefold repetition in these cases shows that all food, all enjoyers, and all poets are here referred to. To be all these, one must necessarily be one with all. The threefold repetition is also meant to inspire confidence, as in the case of swearing. Such threefold repetition is often resorted to both in the Veda and in common parlance. People say "I swear thrice before you." The Veda says: "Thrice real are Devas." (Taitt. Sam. 6:3:10.) I am the First-born of the existence, i.e., of this universe comprising the corporeal and the incorporeal objects. Prior to all gods, I am the centre of immortality; that is to say, the immortality of all sentient beings is rooted in me.

I existed even prior to the whole universe made up of forms and formless objects, of food and the
food-eater; that is to say, I am devoid of this universe; I am of quite a distinct nature. The śruti says, "That eats nothing whatever." (Bri. Up. 3:8:8.)

Even prior to Devas I was; i.e., I existed ever before the manifestation of jīvas or separated intelligences; I was pure, without separation of any sort. I am the centre of the immortality of the Devas, because I, the Self, the Pratyagātman, am the cause, the basis, of their immortality; or because the liberation of the individual intelligences consists in their realisation of identity with me, with Brahman.— (S).

I am Brahman's First-born, the Hiranyagarbha, the first evolved entity, because, Ātman is the Reality underlying the phenomenon called the Hiranyagarbha. I existed even prior to Indra and other gods, these latter having been created by Ātman, as the śruti says:

"It created still further the most excellent kshatra (power), namely those kshatras among Devas Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛtyu, Iśāna." (Bri. Up. 1:4:11.)

I am the prop of mokṣa, like the knave of a wheel, which is the support of the wheel and its spokes, inasmuch as in the words "the knower of the Self crosses beyond sorrow". (Cha, Up. 7:1:3) The śruti teaches that knowledge of the Self leads to mokṣa.

Whoso giveth &c.: Whoever gives food to the seekers of food, i.e., whoever teaches that I myself am in the form of food, he preserves it as it is, without losing; but if one does not give food in proper time to those who seek it and eats it himself, such a person who so eats,— him I myself, who am food, will eat up at once as one eats food.

The teacher who teaches me, the Paramātman, to his disciples, he alone saves his disciples by imparting to them the knowledge of the Paramātman. Or, if a person generously gives me to Brahmins, etc., for feeding, such a person alone saves the Brahmins. The Yajñīkī-Upanishad, after speaking of the evolution of things, such as food, in order, says: "Therefore he who gives food gives all these." That is to say, the Paramātman who is to be taught, and the food which one gives to another, are both myself. I, in the form of the Devata presiding over food, eat up the greedy miser who eats all food by himself with- out giving it to others; that is to say, I ruin him by hurling him into hells such as the Mahāaurava. The śruti says: "A perfect sinner is he who eats alone." (Tai. Bra. 2:8:8.) The smṛti also says " Sin do those sinners eat who cook food for their own sakes." (Bhag. Gita. 3-13)

(The opponent):— If so, then I am afraid of mokṣa, of this oneness with all. Let me have sāṃsāra only, since, even when I am liberated from sāṃsāra, I, becoming food, shall be eaten up by food.

(Answer):— Do not be so afraid; for, the enjoyment of all desires has been spoken of from the stand-point of ordinary experience. The enlightened one, having become one with Brahman by knowledge, rises beyond the world of our ordinary experience comprising things related as food and food-eater set up by avidyā. To him there exists besides himself nothing else, of which he may be afraid. Therefore one need not be afraid of mokṣa.

(The opponent):— If so, why does the śruti say, "I am food," "I am food-eater," etc.? (Answer):—The food and the food-eater we commonly speak of are mere phenomena and exist only in name; they do not exist in reality. Though they are such, still, with a view to teach that the phenomenal world emanates from Brahman and has no existence outside Brahman, and with a view to extol the unity of the Self with Brahman attained as the result of Brahma-vidyā, it is said "I am food, I am food-eater," etc. To him who has become Brahman by the destruction of avidyā, there is no trace of fear and other evils which are all caused by avidyā.

I the whole being destroy: As the Paramesvara, I destroy the whole being, this whole universe which is the resort of all creatures from Brahma downwards, and in which all creatures take their
On becoming Brahman, the Real Infinite Consciousness, I dispel the whole being set up by avidyā, as the Sun dispels the night's darkness, and remain all alone.— (S).

It was I who, as Īśvara, destroyed the whole universe at the time of Pralaya or Dissolution.

*Light like the sun:* like the sun my light is ever luminous.

Just as the sun is self-luminous and shines without the aid of other lights, so I am the self-luminous consciousness, shining without the aid of the eye or any other medium.

**Knowledge ensures Bliss.**

11. *Whoso thus knows, Such is Upanishad.*

To him who, controlling the senses and the mind, abstaining from all outward concerns, endued with perfect endurance and with perfect balance of mind who, by mighty devotion, like Bhrigu, attains the knowledge of the Paramātman as imparted in these two vallis, to him accrues all the fruit described above. Amen!

The fruit mentioned above accrues to that person who realizes, through Anna-maya and other selves, the Ātman, the One Partless Bliss, spoken of as "Brahman, the tail."

Though it has been already said that the enlightened one attains this fruit, still it is repeated here with a view to show that the enlightened one alone attains the fruit and that the enlightened one does necessarily attain the fruit.

**THUS ENDS THIS UPANISHAD,**